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Abstract
Sustainable Competitive Advantage in PFI
A systematic and holistic approach to identify the CSF in Risk Management
in PFI, taking into account the whole life cycle
Taking into account the envisaged future expansion of PFI this study main goal
was to assess and propose a model for the Sustainable Competitive Advantage of
PFI. The model integrates an Adequate Social Political Economic Framework,
with the management of risk uncertainty over the whole life cycle and the Critical
Success Factors of a PFI, which are Clear Strategy, Effective Leadership and
Knowledge Management.
The political and economic context was determinant for PFI emergence and
development. It was a response to government needs for ftinding, and was
favoured by the political and macro economic environment. Nevertheless the
framework for risk allocation between the private and public sector is not as
through as could be desired. RM techniques are used extensively, but often fail
to account for the holistic, systemic, long-term nature of the projects.
PFI delivers 'VFM, as the focus on measures to control costs is always present. It
delivers a better service although customer responsiveness is derived mainly by
the necessity to comply with the contracted service provision.
PFI is a competitive procurement tool versus the traditional forms of
governmental procurement as it induces improvements in: Efficiency, Quality,
Innovation and Customer Responsiveness. Increased efficiency is brought by the
need a strict cost control to deliver VFM. 'Freedom to innovate' is key as it gives
the private sector the opportunity to propose less costly solutions over the whole
life cycle.
The research permitted to conclude that the sustainability of PFI's competitive
advantage is going to depend upon the continuing focus throughout the whole life
cycle on efficiency gains (cost control), innovation, quality and provision of a
better service.
A case study methodology was used to test and validate the proposed models.
xvi
Introduction
CHAPTER 1
Introducfion
1.1 Introduction
Since the mid 20th century in the USA and, more recently, since the 1970s in Europe,
Asia and other Developing Countries, national governments have increasingly used
private capital to implement infrastructure projects and to provide services previously in
the scope of the public sector. Following this trend, in 1992, the United Kingdom (UK)
Government announced the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), a guidance and a legal
framework for concessions in the UK. Its main objective was to encourage private
capital investment into public projects. The underlying logic being to profit from the
private sector's efficiency and allocate the project risks to the part best able to manage
them. The impact of PFI has been felt in both the public and private sectors, in particular
in the construction industry. There is now the widespread practice of management tools
like: whole life cycle costing, risk management and benchmarking. Although it has
permitted the launch of several major projects, its development was beyond expectations
during the first years. It was only after 1997 that combined government enforcement,
clarification of the regulatory environment and the accumulated experience by both the
public and private sector, that PFI gained momentum. According to the forecasted
government spending plans until 2002, the investment in PFI projects by the private
sector is set to continue at an increased pace over the next years.
Taking into account the envisaged ftiture expansion of PFI and making use of the
experience already gathered, it is very important and timely to propose a conceptual
framework for the PFI's Sustainable Competitive Advantage. With this framework
government and private companies will have a sound empiric basis for ftiture strategic
decisions on whether or not to pursue the PFI route.
The goal of this research is therefore to create and justify a conceptual framework for the
PFI's Sustainable Competitive Advantage.
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The generic aims of this thesis that flow from the goal are as follows:
I Has PFI proved to deliver better service and Value For Money (VFM) than the
traditional forms of undertaking public projects?
2 Has PFI proved to provide an adequate framework for risk allocation between
the private and public sectors?
3 Has PFI proved to be a competitive procurement tool?
4 Has PFI the adequate conditions in the macro economic and political
environment to develop?
In order to examine these aims the following objectives have been developed:
I Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management model
2 Critical Success Factors model
3 Sustainable Competitive Advantage model
The remainder of this chapter describes the UK political environment and the main
events related with the development of PFI. It's roots lie in the fundamental beliefs of
the Monetarist Theories that were first put in practice by the Conservative Governments.
The PFI concept is innovative in the sense that what the Government pays for is solely a
service. This has permitted the PFI to extend its sector coverage to areas where
concessions were traditionally not being used. Since then several developments have
taken place, mainly setting up standard procedures.
Chapter 2 presents the research methodology, including the strategic framework for the
research, the development of the research questions and a discussion on the use of the
case study methodology to test and validate the models proposed.
Chapter 3 presents the underlying rationale as to why the UK Government introduced
PFI. Although a national policy it must be analysed and integrated within the historic
and economic background and in an international context as each state is a participant in
the global economy.
Chapter 4 proposes a definition and conceptual framework for PFI applying the existing
management models: Life cycle, value chain etc. In addition, based on the empiric data
2
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from the research and recurring to business information sources and academic studies on
PFI (still very limited), the chapter addresses important issues that emerged from the
introduction of PFI.
Chapter 5 proposes a dynamic model of Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management
for PFI projects. It is a clear picture of how uncertainty progresses throughout the
whole life cycle, and is comprehensive so as to avoid the wishful thinking attitude that
might prevent the adoption of correct risk-management measures.
Chapter 6 proposes a conceptual model for the Critical Success Factors for a PFI. It is
systemic and holistic and is based on the hierarchy and inter-relationships of the issues
identified in PFI projects
Chapter 7 proposes and discusses the dynamic and iterative model for Sustainable
Competitive Advantage in a PFI. This model aggregates the models on Risk Uncertainty
Management (Chapter 5) Critical Success Factors (Chapter 6) and integrates them with
the political and economic environment (Chapter 4).
Chapter 8 summarises the conclusions on the proposed models, the assessment of the
research aims as well as the reasons for variability in projects within the international
context and sector-wise. Included are also findings as to a viable role for the Small and
Medium Enterprises, a set of recommendations for the public and private sectors and
topics for future research work.
Chapter 9 presents the bibliographic references.
3
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1.2 The Introduction of PFI
1.2.1 The Background of PFI
Next follows the chronology of the landmarks of PFI development. It starts with a brief
description of the UK' political and economic framework that led to the emergence of
PFI and proceeds indicating the main events in the UK and internationally.
1977: Redefinition of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) - "the amount
of money the government needs to borrow to meet its spending plans". In other
words, it is the amount by which spending exceeds tax revenue. In recent times, it
is also referred to as Public Sector Net Cash Requirement (PSNCR). Before 1997,
all expenditure on nationalised industries and public services was charged against
the PSBR. Post 1977, the focus was switched to the External Financing Limit
(EFL) - a cash limit set aside for each department, which some argued, constrained
the growth of nationalised industries and contributed to the recession.
1979: Election of the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher in May. Its
economic policy was based on Monetarism, part of which philosophy is that, to
reduce inflation the growth in money supply needs to be controlled. A strict policy
of reducing public expenditure was put in place.
1981: In view of the widespread criticism of the EFL, a committee chaired by Sir
William Ryrie examined the conditions under which nationalised industries should
make use of the private capital markets. The Ryrie Rules set the principles for
private funding of governmental projects:
"Decisions to provide funds for investment should be taken under
conditions of fair competition with private sector borrowers.., such
projects should yield benefits in terms of improved efficiency... The use of
private fInance is justfled f
... 
it provides the most cost-effective
solution... The risk of losses - unprotected by public guarantees - is a the
heart of market disciplines" (1-Evi Treasury 1988 in Haque 1996).
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The Rules stated that there was a need to compare private and publicly funded
alternatives. They also made it clear that the private sector option would only
proceed if it was more cost effective than the public sector option. Moreover,
private funding should provide best VFM when compared to conventional public
funding.
1989: The Ryrie Rules proved to be very difficult to implement, and 'were regularly
criticised for being too restrictive and giving public bodies no incentive to seek
privately funded solutions' (Private Finance Panel 1995 in Broadbent 1999). The
question then became, in the words of the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury,
John Major 'How can we involve the private sector in building the infrastructure
where the Government is the major provider... '. The Ryrie Rules were partially
withdrawn in 1989 and abandoned in 1992 with the launch of PFI.
Despite all criticisms the Ryrie Rules permitted the launch (Department of the
Environment Transport and the Regions - DETR 1999) of major infrastructure projects
like the Dartford Thurrock Crossing in April 1987 (150 million), the Second Severn
Crossing in April 1990 (fl30 million) and the Birmingham Northern Relief Road in
February 1992 (E300 million).
1.2.2 The Launch of PFI
1992: The Conservative Government of John Major was re-elected in May. The UK had
joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a system of fixed interest rates, in
1990, an attempt to depoliticise economic policy-making and achieve automatic
correction to inflation. However, the anti-inflationary discipline (Kerr 1998) of the
ERM deepened the recession. Between 1990 and 1992 (although with a reduction
in inflation) high interest rates, persistently slow economic growth, pressure on
public spending, and loss of revenue intensified the fiscal crisis of the state and
resulted in a large balance of payments deficit. The PSBR moved from -14% in
1988/89 to 36.5% in 1992/93. The second quarter of 1992 saw Britain's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) fall 3.6% from its 1990 level while other European
Union (EU) nations experienced a rise of 2.8% on average. The balance of
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payments continued to slide, recording a current account deficit ofE13,680 million
in 1992. From a financial deficit in 1990 of2 billion, the Government ended 1992
with a deficit of37.5 billion. The pound became a target in financial markets and
Britain was out of the ERM in 1992. This forced the newly elected Government to
focus on 'domestic' conditions to contain inflation. As such, new ways of reducing
public expenditure and subordinating state activities to the logic of the market were
sought.
The PFI was formally launched in the UK Autumn Statement (Broadbent 1999) of
the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont. Against a background of
recession the Chancellor set out to reorganise the framework of monetary policy
(on the exit of the pound from the ERM), to control fiscal policy and limit public
sector spending and to increase the growth rate of the economy. The later was
seen to be best achieved by "Pressing ahead with our policies on privatisation,
deregulation, cutting out waste and keeping the tax burden of companies and
individuals as low as we can" (Norman Lamont, House of Commons Hansard
(HCH), 12/11/92, column ©994 in Broadbent 1999).
"The FEZ, like the earlier policies ofprivatisation and contracting-out, is
based on a political rationality' that private sector enterprise and
discipline can bring gains in efficiency and reduction in costs and is
stimulated by the 'fundarnental duty' of the Government - keeping
inflation down and getting public finances back on the right track" (I-IN'I
Treasury 1998)
In this context, there was recognition of the continuing need for capital
expenditure. Whilst the Chancellor sought to give some protection to the
provision of capital from public resources a major theme was the development of
the "private financing of capital projects" (Norman Lamont, HCH, 12/11/92, ©
998 in Broadbent 1999).
Three developments were announced: Free-Standing Projects, Joint Ventures and
DBFUs:
Free-Standing Projects: Any privately financed project in the public
sector that could be profitable should be allowed to proceed. The private
sector is required to recover all costs through charges on the final (usually)
private users of the service. The public sector plays a facilitating role but no
public money is involved - for example, toll bridges.
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• Joint-Ventures that allow a sensible transfer of risk to the private sector
should be encouraged. The public sector contributes a subsidy to a project
but the revenue comes principally from third parties. These projects have a
positive cost benefit analysis, but would not be financially viable if funded
by private finance alone - for example, urban regeneration schemes or
congestion relief roads.
• Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): Leasing that permits good
value for money and for risk to remain with the private sector, should also
to be allowed. The private parties Designs, Builds, Finances and Operates
the facilities and the public partner purchases the services
The fundamental requirements for PFI projects are:
•	 The public sector must secure VFM;
•	 There must be an appropriate transfer of risk to the private sector.
The transfer of risk to the private sector does not waive responsibility of the
Government for service provision. As the National Audit Office (NAO 1999)
clearly states in it's report "Examining the value for money of deals under the
PFI":
'The auditor should be aware that departments cannot transfer to the
private sector the risk of political embarrassment or the risk to the
delivery of their core business should the contractor fail to deliver their
contracted services"
The aim of the PFI is therefore to increase the flow of capital to projects against a
background of restraint on public expenditure by utilising the private sector money
and management skills. It is not expected that the public sector will be the sole
beneficiary, the PFI is supposed to offer 'real benefits to the private sector in the
form ojincreased business profit' (DETR 1999).
Very importantly, key decisions for the PFI project are always with the public
sector. This is different from turnkey projects were the owner retains the risk of
viability of the project plus the risk of the operating and maintenance costs. Like
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contracting-out and privatisation policies (Kerr 1998), the PFI represents a
fundamental change in the focus of the public sector, away from being a direct
provider to the public and towards becoming a procurer of services and a
regulator. What makes PFI different (Table 1.1) is that, unlike privatisation, the
public sector retains a substantial role in PFI projects and, unlike contracting-out,
the private sector provides the capital assets as well the services.
Table 1.1. Central Differences in Governmental Policies
Ownership of	 Service Provision Private Sector ultimate
assets by	 by Private Sector	 responsibility for
Private Sector	 service provision
Privatisation	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes
Contracting-out	 No	 Yes	 No
Concession	 In fixed term	 Yes	 No
A major difference between PFI and a traditional concession is that the government
is no longer acquiring assets and providing for the services, but instead is only
buying services. This simple concept has extended the sector coverage of the PFI,
from being limited to infrastructure projects (like concessions) and allowed it to
include other sectors like schools, accommodation, custodial services, hospitals, IT
projects, etc.
PFI was also part of a much wider agenda of attempts to increase the efficiency of
the public sector through the introduction of managerial change, and expertise
drawn from the private sector. At one extreme, this has involved privatising key
activities and organisations previously owned and managed by the public sector. In
others, as with PFI, it has involved increasing levels of partnership with the private
sector, although the government always has the ultimate responsibility for the
delivery of a service.
In conclusion, PFI was a product of a set of pre-conditions and based on these a
regulatory framework was established. It was useful for both the government and
industry. The government didn't have funds to spend on infrastructure and PFI's
capital expenditure is off-balance sheet so it reduces the PSBR. From the
industry's side it ensured a steady flow of work and the need for efficiency was not
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a new requisite. Design and Build procurement was already widespread (the
cheapest was the winning bid) and outsourcing (more efficient) was already
increasingly being used throughout the private sector.
1.2.3 Evolution of PFI
1993: The private sector continued to show little interest in investing capital into public
projects. The new Chancellor, Kenneth Clark gave the PFI greater impetus by
announcing, in the Autumn Statement that a new Private Finance Panel would be
created. Its role would be
to encourage greater participation in the initiative by both the private
and public sectors, to stimulate new ideas, to identj5 new areas ofpublic
sector activity where the private sector could get involved, and to seek
solutions which might impede progress." (Private Finance Panel 1995 in
Broadbent 1999).
1994: In November in its Autumn Statement the Chancellor, Kenneth Clark ensured
engagement with the private sector by making plain that the Treasury would not
approve any capital project unless options to secure private finance had been
explored. So it became mandatory that all capital projects in the public sector that
require Treasury approval should explore private finance options.
1996: The Public Private Partnerships Program (4Ps) was launched on 11 April, 1996,
by the Local Authority Associations of England and Wales. It aims to bring about
increased investment in local services through PFI and other Private/Public sector
Partnerships (PPPs). It will last until March 2001 (HM Treasury 1997c).
The PFI 'industry' (Clarke 1996), by then comprised construction and engineering
companies, hotel groups, and utility and facilities management companies, as well
as finance houses, law firms, and accountants.
May 1997: Labour Government of Tony Blair is elected and continues the ongoing
development of policies promising to reinvigorate PFI.
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June 1997: First Bates Review on PFI resulted in the launch of the PFI Treasury
Taskforce to replace the Private Finance Panel and to help build up PFI expertise
in Government. It was established within the Treasury and consisted of a Policy
Team, composed predominantly of civil servants, responsible for developing policy
guidance on PFI, and a Projects Team of around a dozen highly skilled people
from the private sector, who are available to help public sector bodies execute PFI
deals. It had a limited life of 2 years. The intention was that at the end of this
period, the level of expertise of the PFI ftinctions within the Government would be
sufficient to set up partnerships with the private sector without any continuing
need for a central co-ordinating capability.
The Taskforce main aim was 'to be a driving force, in conjunction with spending
departments, in bringing about PFJ and other Public/Private Partizershios'. The
newly appointed Chief Executive, Adrian Montague, reported directly to the then
Paymaster General (HIVI Treasury 1997a). The need for such a Taskforce was
clearly stated by the Paymaster General Geoffrey Robinson in his speech
welcoming the appointment of its members.
"Previously the lack of concentrated expertise, a prolferaIion of
unprioritised projects and constant reinvention of the wheel used to stand
in the way of success. The Taskforce is going to provide the assistance
and impetus required to improve projects and deliver a sound basis for
fluture business. "(HIM Treasury 1997b).
One of the most important changes was the abolition by Geoffrey Robinson, of the
rule that all projects had to be universally tested for private finance, which had
created an enormous bottleneck with inappropriate projects.
November 1997: Partnerships for Prosperity was launched as an introductory guide to
the reinvigorated PFI.
"It sets out clearly in one document, the Government support for PFI,
the role of the new Treasuiy Private Finance Taskforce, fundamental
policy principles, the procurement process, a list of key contacts and
further reference areas. " ( HIM Treasury 1997c).
PPPs were introduced to the local authority sector without first ensuring that the
necessary legal framework was in place. Consequently, the governing body or
board members of the public sector entity could be at risk of acting outside their
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powers, that is, Ultra Vires. Local Authorities Regulations 1997 were published to
correct the problems related with Capital Finance (Brown 1999). Also, the Local
Government Act 1997 established a certification process for qualifying PPPs
contracts that in effect overrides public and private law challenges to the contract
ensuring agreed termination payments. Legislation was also published concerning
the National Health Services Trusts empowering them to establish PFI contracts.
1998: For several years there has been significant disagreement (Brown 1999) between
the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the UK Treasury over the accounting
treatment of PPPs. So far the views of the ASB have prevailed. This has resulted
in some projects remaining on the public sector's balance sheet and therefore the
UK Government is considering alternatives to private sector finance, such as public
sector equity funds and infrastructure bonds. Under the current accounting
practices set by the Financial Reporting Standard 5 (FRS5), contracts for services
are not capitalised. As a PFI is a contract for services, it falls into this category.
However where a substantial property underpinned the services provided under a
PFI contract, it was necessary to determine who had the asset. The clarification of
this issue led to the publication of an amendment to FRS5 'Reporting the
Substance of Transactions: Private Finance Initiative and Similar Contracts" by
the UK's ASB in September 1998.
The efforts to promote PFI deals started to produce results. In October, the then
Paymaster General Geoffrey Robinson announced a second tranche of a further 30
significant PFI projects. Speaking about the second list he said:
"The Taskforce has been up and running for one year now and in time
52 signficant projects have been signed worth nearly £4 billion... The
Taskforce has made real progress in standardising PFI deals and it is
now starting to bring dividends. Shorter completion times and lower
transaction cost mean better value for money for the public sector." (HIM
Treasury Taskforce 1998).
Between May 1, 1997 and January 7, 1999 there has been over £3,800 million
worth of PFI projects signed. Table 1.2 summarises the main features of PFI deals
signed until 1998 by sector (HIM Treasury Taskforce 1999).
11
20
30
30
25-27
25 - 27
15 —25
30
25-40
Accommodation	 RefurbishlRelocate Government
Offices
Railways	 New light rail and high speed rail
networks
Roads	 Individual or linked new build and
road widening schemes
Prisons	 New Prisons
Schools	 New build and refurbishment of
schools
Defence	 Equipment supply, maintenance
and property new build and
refurbishment
Healthcare	 New hospitals
Water	 New-upgrade water treatment
70— 1,500
90 - 3,000
50 - 300
35 - 120
15 - 150
15 - 1,500
70-300
10 - 80
Introduction
Table 1.2. PFI Contracts Signed Prior to 1998
Sector	 Type of Project	 Contract Tenn Typical Transaction
(years)	 Size (k million)
March 1999: Second Bates Review examined the progress made by the Government in
the delivery of PFI and PPPs and recommended changes to existing arrangements
intended to improve further the Government's approach to PPPs. It concluded
that although the creation of the Taskforce has been successful in improving the
public sector's performance, there still remains a shortage in essential skills
required to set up effective partnerships with the private sector. In particular it
refers to a lack in deal-making skills in departmental private finance units and
concluded that a longer-term requirement for central expertise remained. In
particular, Bates pointed to the following areas of weakness: strategic planning;
project management; negotiation skills; financial disciplines and management of
long-term contracts. It recommended that, following the expiry of the Taskforce a
new public private partnership should be set up (I-IIM Treasury Taskforce 1999).
Gershon Report - This report was published in conjunction with the Bates review
and dealt with the issues of Civil Procurement within the UK Government. Among
its conclusions, and relevant to PFI procurement is that more emphasis should be
given on whole life cycle costs and integrated supply chains for all procurement
processes.
June 1999: The Treasury Taskforce published the guidance How to Account for PFI
Transactions. The then Chief Secretary of the Treasury Alan Milburn said:
"The Government new guidelines will make PFI work more effectively
and more fairly. This will help deliver higher levels of investment to
12
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modernise Britain's key public services such as the National Health
Service (NHS).... Already this Government has signed 140 deals worth
£4.7 billion since May 1997 including the largest programme of new
hospital building in the history of the NHS......By providing aplatform of
certainty, the new guidance will help the PFI continue to grow." (HM
Treasury Taskforce 1999a).
July 1999: Announcement of Partnerships UK (PUK), a PPP, as a successor of the
Taskforce, in line with the recommendations of the Second Bates review. It will
act as a project manager for PFI deals, providing expert advisory and
implementation skills. It will address the key weakness in the current PFI/PPP
process. It will take the form of a partnership, with the private sector taking a
majority stake in a joint venture with central Government and with a Board
Chairman drawn from the private sector. A steering group will be formed to
oversee the development of its business case, to consider governance issues, and to
prepare for the raising of private sector capital, which is not expected to take place
before March 2000 (1-IM Treasury Taskforce 1 999c).
July 1999: PFI Standard Contract launched. These contract guidelines ensure that ftiture
PFI contracts across different public services will be able to follow a consistent
approach by incorporating standard conditions (I-TIM Treasury Taskforce 1999b).
All parties involved in PFI welcomed standardised documentation. They saw it as
a measure to increase the efficiency of the stages prior to the signing of the
contract, lowering negotiation times and leading to lower bidding costs.
August 1999: The NAO published the report by the Comptroller and Auditor General
Examining the value for money of deals under the Private Finance Initiative. The
report describes the analytical framework developed by NAO to analyse PFI deals.
It seeks to cover comprehensively the key value for money issues. The principles
its audits are based on are:
• Setting clear objectives;
• Applying the proper procurement process;
• Selecting the best available deal;
• Ensuring that the deal makes sense.
June 2000: The first tranche of PFI and PPPs projects under Partnerships UK is
announced. According to Andrew Smith, Chief Secretary to the Treasury
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"Partnerships UK has got together a first rate team who are capable of
delivering the Government 's vision on public private partnerships over
the next decade. The private sector skills they offer will help in the drive
to deliver improved public services..." (Partnerships UK 2000).
February 2001: Partnerships UK announced that it seeks private investors for a 51%
stake in its expected capital base of £45 million. The remaining 49% will be
retained by the public sector (Partnerships UK 2001a).
April 2001: Partnerships UK has successfully raised private funding for the 51% stake.
The sale was 30% oversubscribed which is a clear indication of the market interest.
Within the main investors are banks, financial institutions and corporate companies
(Partnerships UK 2001b).
December 2001: Partnerships UK has announced the publication of 'A Guidance note
for Public Sector Bodies forming Joint Venture Companies with the Private
Sector'. James Stewart, Chief Executive Officer of PUK said:
"The new guidance will equip the public sector with the knowledge to
make a success of joint ventures, and thereby increase the number of
wider market transactions. It complements the support that Partnerships
UK can bring to bear on a project" (Partnerships UK 200 Ic).
1.2.4 Future Prospects
PFI has spread to a great number of sectors within the UK and this trend of increasing
use of PFI for government projects is set to continue given prevailing economic
conditions in the UK. Up to September 30, 2001, about 450 PFI projects were signed,
with a capital value of more than £20 billion (Financial Times 2002).
According to the UK Government's 2001 Budget, public finances in the UK in the fiscal
year of 1999-2000 showed a budget with over 2% of GDP surplus. This compares with
an average deficit of over 4% of GDP between 199 1-92 and 1996-97. Net
 borrowing,
which peaked at almost 8% of GDP in 1994, has also moved into surplus. Net
 debt,
which doubled over the first half of the 1 990s, has been falling as a percentage of GDP
since mid-1997. Net
 borrowing remains low, despite higher public investment and the
debt burden continues to fall. Both the budget deficit and debt burden were well within
the Maastricht reference levels in calendar year 1998. It is expected to continue to meet
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the Maastricht criteria. In the face of these good results the ongoing economic and fiscal
policies are expected to be pursued.
In 1999 and over the next three years (Wilson 1999), a high proportion of public
expenditure investment in the UK will be financed privately. According to HM Treasury,
from 1999-00 to 2001-02 around £11 billion, and from 2000-01 to 2003-04 some £13
billion of new investment is expected as a result of PFI. Also Table 1.3 shows that
investment by the private sector under the PFI is expected to be equivalent to 16% of the
total public sector investment (public sector gross investment) over the three year (1999-
2002) period covered by the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR): New Spending
Plans 1999-2002 (HIM Treasury 1998). The CSR sets out the plans to allocate
expenditure between spending programmes that will help to secure the Government's
key objectives.
Table 1.3. Forecasted Investment in Public Projects by the Public and Private
Sector for 1999-2002
Public Sector	 Public Sector
( billion)	 Gross	 Net Investment
Investment	 (PSNI)
1998/99	 18.0	 3.4
1999/2000	 20.3
	
5.5
2000/200 1	 22.7
	
7.5
2001/2002	 25.4	 9.6
Source. HMTreasury 1999.
The ftiture of PFI in the UK seems certain. In the words of Chief Secretary of the
Treasury, Alan Milburn, announcing the launch of Partnerships UK:
"The Government is modernising how we do business to provide a better
deal for taxpayers and public services alike. Partnerships UK will
provide the expertise of the private sector. We have turned the FF1
around. Ending universal testing, providing certainty through new
accounting treatment, offering staff a fairer deal and standardising
contracts have reformed the FF1... The challenge now is to use the new
FF1 to help drive fonvard the Government 's modernisation programme
of our public services. We want to expand the PFI especially in sectors
where it has not worked before. Partnerships UK will help deliver that.
It will help get more FEZ deals done more quickly... It will have world
class project management skills to help deliver world class public
services. " (HM Treasury Taskforce 1999c).
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1.2.5 International Expansion
The UK's PFI experience has been exported to several regions. Geoffrey Robinson, in a
speech in April 1998, announced that the Treasury had received delegations for
consultation about PFI from several countries such as Australia, Brazil, China, Japan,
South Africa, and from regions such as East Europe and the Middle East and European
countries like France, the Netherlands and Spain. Indeed, in Europe (Warner 1998,
1999) PPPs are increasingly common induced by the:
Development of the single European Market that gave rise to the realisation
of the need for substantially increased investment in infrastructure to achieve
its objectives;
• The Economic and Monetary Union (EIVIIU) that has brought a series of
disciplines and reforms of public funding policies to meet economic and
monetary convergence.
The European PPPs in general follow the UK's model, with a risk sharing approach to
the project although often without taking the ownership of the asset. Several examples
of PPPs outside the UK are:
• Netherlands: Dutch high-speed rail link between Amsterdam and the
DutchfBelgian border. From the border, it will link to Brussels. The
Netherlands has a treaty with Belgium that commits each country to
completing its respective part by 2005. On completion, the private sector is
to take over the civil side and have responsibility for operating and
maintaining the entire railway. Under the contract, a performance fee based
on a target level of availability of the railway service is to be paid;
• Portugal: This is the country where PPP deals are more similar to the UK's
model. For example, the Vasco da Gama Bridge that was inaugurated in June
1998, and the Tapada IIPP power station. As of 2001 bidding process was
well advanced for the SCUTs (shadow toll roads), which resemble the UK's
DBFOs. This consists of seven toll road projects with a total value of
approximately $5.5 billion;
• Greece has probably the biggest programme concession projects after the
UK. It has undertaken the Spata Airway, the Essi Motorway and the Rion
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Antirion Bridge. Under a structural funding agreement with the EU in 1998,
Greece will benefit from an investment programme of $49.5 billion for 2000-
2006 to be co-financed by the EU and the Greek Government. Most of the
investment is to be directed to infrastructure projects. With the Olympic
Games to be hosted in Athens in 2004, a priority is to establish privately
financed concessions for projects such as the Olympic Village and the
Olympic Stadium;
• Italy: Under their national law implementing the EU work directive, it
includes the principles of project finance. A PFI panel is being set in place.
There are already a number of PFI projects under preparation, but there is as
yet no authority to proceed with them;
• Finland has a shadow toll road and is considering extending the experience to
schools;
Ireland is considering the use of PFI in several areas;
• Outside Europe, Japan has been studying the PFI concept. The Osaka Stock
Exchange has established the first PFI market in September 1999 and in
March 2002 Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister, has considered PFI an
important part of the structural reform for revitalising the economy (Financial
Times 2002). In South Africa, prison PPP projects are underway and road
projects are also to be considered.
• In Australia great effort has been done on developing both a clear guidance
and promoting the real understanding on how public private partnerships
function. They realised that the introduction of PFIIPPP schemes is a
fundamental cultural change.
Chapter 1 introduced PFI and its economic and political context. The next chapter
presents the research methodology followed to address the research aims.
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CHAPTER 2
Research Methodology
2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology developed for this research. It starts by defining
the methodological approach, the strategic framework. Pursues discussing the research
purpose development of the theoretically derived models. Lastly it discusses the research
design explaining the reasons for its choice and pursues examining data collection,
analysis and validation.
2.1.1 Methodological Approach
A PhD thesis aims to advance science and knowledge 'To get the answers to the why
questions, to find the explanations, relationships, generalisations and theories that can
provide answers that develop the understanding, always involving decision making and
policy formulation' (Phillips 1993).
In a research methodology three types of questions are always involved: the Why
questions, the What questions that are the information gathering process and the How
questions stating exactly which procedures were adopted during the various stages of the
thesis, in brief:
What I am going to do, or the Research Purpose and its Validation - To define
the research questions that state the basic directions for the study. The answers
to the questions are based on an intelligence-gathering process: a literature
review and exploratory research are usually undertaken to develop the research
questions.
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1990) and the basic direction for ftiture actions. It allows isolated tasks and activities to
fit together; it moves separate efforts toward a common integrated purpose and provides
a clear guidance for the research, and assures that the objectives are met. The strategic
framework of the current research is inevitably interlinked with the macroeconomic
environment of the countries where PFI was (and is) used as a procurement tool. The
research feeds on this framework to find its strategic objectives, or questions to be
answered.
In 1992, the UK Government introduced the PFI to capture private ftinds for public
projects. Simultaneously, in the EU, after signing the Maastrich Treaty, Governments
had to control debt and consequently public funds to undertake governmental projects
were limited. PPP/PFI was one solution to overcome these constraints and currently
these types of projects are increasingly common in Europe and other regions.
In recent years PFI already accounts for a very significant part of the UK Government
investment. According to the CSR, over the three-year period 1999-2002, it is expected
that PFI projects will reach 16 percent of the total public sector gross investment. PFI
has spread to a great number of sectors within the UK: Roads and Bridges, Prisons,
Hospitals, Government Office Accommodation, Defence, Tolled Motorways, Trams and
Metro, Street Lighting, Court Buildings, Schools, Universities, IT Projects, Water and
Sewerage Systems, and also Social Housing and Regeneration, City Centre Traffic
Management Schemes and Multi-sector projects.
In the UK, PFI's impact has been felt in both the public and private sectors. Among the
most relevant consequences are:
changing the role of the Public Sector in the procurement process, from service
provider to service specifier;
a change in the way the construction industry is managed. There is now the
widespread practice of management tools like: whole life cycle costing, risk
management and benchmarking;
• the development of innovations in the capital markets sectors, like the
development of new forms of bond issuance;
• the emergence of the notion of Corporate PFI. This derives from the concept
underlying in PFI of service provision and is an extension of its applicability to
the private sector's own projects.
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In a PFI project the private service provider has to manage and make the project
profitable during the whole life cycle. This means it is very important to pursue Whole
Life Cycle Cost savings to increase the profitability of the private funds invested in the
project. These savings are in turn, a source of VFM for the public sector, guaranteeing a
better allocation of the taxpayer's money. Not the least important, the general public
gets, in theory, a better service than the one that the public sector could have provided.
Taking into account the envisaged future expansion of PFI and making use of the
experience already gathered, it is very important and timely to assess the sustainability of
the competitiveness of PFI. Both government and private companies will have a sound
basis for future strategic decisions on whether or not to pursue the PFI route.
Having established this dissertation strategic framework and methodological approach,
the next section describes the research purpose.
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2.1.3 Research Purpose
The research was conducted in two main stages: The exploratory research that started
by defining the research questions, and the theoretical frameworks developments, or
models that answered these questions, and second the confirmatory research stage to test
and validate the models using a case study approach.
The next sections describe how the study was conducted to develop the research aims
and objectives.
2.1.3.1 Exploratory Research
The research aims and objectives development was based on the data collected in an
extensive literature review and exploratory fieldwork research. The information sought
after was first related to the PFI development in the UK. How were the PFI projects
performing? What were the main reasons for success and failure in the bidding and
operational stages? The same issues were also covered in Portugal where the PFI model
has been adopted for some large governmental projects. The issues that arose were
related with project finance and risk management issues. Project finance is a financing
technique that has been in use for a long time in concessions and PFI financing structure
is similar.
The most important feature that emerged was the lack of a holistic long-term approach
to PFI. These projects develop long term and a systematic and continuous approach to
risk management is missing. Due to the importance that PFI has, and its future
prospects, within the UK Government procurement it is critical to assess its current and
long-term competitiveness.
The research was systematised at three levels: the project in itself as a unit, its
comparison with other procurement models and its sustainability, to get a holistic long-
term view of PEE. The three research levels are:
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The FEZ project in itself— Focusing on the issues encountered over the whole life
cycle in the PFI market;
FEZ Competitiveness - The comparison with other procurement models and its
relation with other forms of procurement, aiming at evaluating whether the PFI
procurement model is more competitive than other traditional procurement
models, i.e., does PFI bring any advantages?;
FF1 Long-Term Sustainability - The dynamic evaluation over the long-term for
PFT was analysed aimed at identifying the necessary pre-conditions for its long-
term competitiveness sustainability. More precisely, if PFI is currently a
competitive procurement model what are the factors that assure that it will
continue to be competitive in the future.
During the first stage of the research, it was found necessary to define what risk and
uncertainty meant. The two concepts are very often interchanged, yet they refer to
different, although very closely related concepts. In the following chapters proposed risk
and uncertainty definitions will be presented and thereafter both terms will be used
accurately. For the current description of research methodology, it was found more
adequate (and simpler) to use only the term risk, as significant correctness will not be
lost.
During the exploratory research, several constraints to the development of the study
were encountered. The main ones were:
. Limited academic bibliography - As it is a new model there are very few
research and academic studies on this area. The bibliography for this theme ends
up with a great weight in specialised economic journals (not academic) like
Financial Times, etc.;
. The bit/k of the bibliography that exists is mainly focused in construction and
financial risk, or project finance issues, lacking information on bidding, and
Operation/Management risks;
PFI has a typical life cycle of 20-30 years and the great majority ofprojects have
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been operational only for afew years so there is very little (or no) experience of
the operation/maintenance stage;
Limited regional coverage - The interviews were done in Portugal and UK. It
would have been usefi.il to assess how PFI is performing in other regions and/or
organisational cultures;
Portugal has very few projects of this nature and although using the generic PFI
model, the political commitment to it is not the same as in the UK.
Also, during the exploratory research and interviews it was not possible to take up
several issues:
. The PFI market currently comprises a great number of different sectors with very
different characteristics. Nonetheless, it would have been useftul to examine the
possibility of dividing the market using segmentation variables, other than the
sector itself, like technology, social visibility, etc. A possible fUrther line of
research could be to examine the newfound segments and assess if the project's
risk level is correlated with the market segments, that is, if the risk level is
correlated with any of the segmentation variables. This was not possible because
not enough sectors were studied in detail, but this research line can be a post-
doctoral development;
• Interviews with governmental authorities are few relative to those done with
persons of the private sector. It was not possible to obtain several interviews
although solicited. The public sector view is largely based on the available
bibliography, and other documentation.
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2.1.3.2 Development of Research Aims and Objectives -
Based on the preliminary research, the research aims needed to achieve the goal for the
PhD thesis 'Sustainable Competitive Advantage in FF1 - A systematic and holistic
approach to identify the CSF in Risk Management in FF1, taking into account the whole
life cycle' have been defined as:
Research Aims
1. Has FF1 proved to deliver a better service and VFM than the
traditional forms of undertaking public projects?
2. Has FF1 proved to provide an adequate framework for risk
allocation between the private and public sectors?
3. Has FF1 proved to be a competitive procurement tool?
4. Has FF1 the adequate conditions in the macro economic and
political environment to develop?
The research objectives needed to answer the aims have been defined as:
Research Objectives
1. What is the mode/for sustainable competitive advantage in
FF1?
2. What is the mode/for whole life cycle risk management in
FF1?
3. What are the Critical Success Factors in a FF1?
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2.2 Development of the theoretical frameworks, or Models
The models are the theoretical developments that PhD research level aims at. The
models based in the intelligence gathered provide an answer to the research questions,
thus being the theories, generalisations or the scientific advances that are the main
contribution of a PhD. The models (Phillips 1993) are the answers to the why questions
and always involve explanations, relationships, comparisons, predictions, generalisations
and theories. As mentioned before, in a PhD three questions are always present: The
why, the what and the how questions. The advance of science is pursued with the
answers to the why questions in order to have theoretical advances; the what questions
derive from the intelligence gathering process and its output are the research questions;
the answers to the how questions summon up the procedures adopted.
A summary description of the models developed to answer the three research objectives
described in 2.1.3.2 follows. For each model, the corresponding why question(s) whose
answer is the justification that clarifies the underlying relationships and generalisations
considered when the models were conceptualised, is also presented.
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2.2.1 Sustainable Competitive Advantage Model
Research Objective
What is the model for sustainable competitive advantage in PFI?
Developed Model
Competitiveness Sustainability Model
Justification
What are the CSFs in a PFJ? And why?
What is the Risk Uncertainly Management model?
To evaluate the competitive advantage the '4Blocks' Model (Hill & Jones 1995) was
utilised. It consists of four Dimensions or Generic Factors: Efficiency, Innovation,
Quality and Attention to the Client. These are the main blocks to build a company's
competitive advantage vis-à-vis its competitors. In turn, these factors are derived from
the company's competences, resources and capabilities. This model was adapted to
assess the competitiveness not of a company but of PFI. The rationale was that PFI is
equivalent to a company with a pre-defined life span. This assumption is indeed very
close to reality, as every PFI requires the setting-up of a regular company - a Special
Purpose Vehicle (SP\T) that executes the project.
The assumption was that if PFI brings in improvements in efficiency, innovation, quality
and attention to the client's needs, then it is more competitive than other methods of
government procurement.
The evaluation of the Factors was done recurring to secondary data, mainly documentary
and primary data from interviews. The interviews were with a panel of experts of
selected functional areas, and within the case studies developed. All the Factors can be
applied to a wide number of issues. The evaluation tried to be as comprehensive as
possible but due to the study's constraints in scope and time, it is possible that some
issues were missed. Nevertheless, the research undertaken can provide sound
conclusions on the models competitiveness based on identified improvements in
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efficiency, quality, innovation and attention to the client, although with limitations that
must be acknowledged.
If PFI proves to be a better model (more competitive) than the traditional methods of
government procurement, the next step is the evaluation of its sustainability, i.e., what
are the factors that render the PFI model susceptible to be used in the long term. The
key issue is: How to avoid failure? Research suggests that long-term failure can be
mitigated by continuous attention to what originated the competitive advantage: Was it
increases in Efficiency? Improving quality? Does innovation still play an important part?
What are the client's needs?
The research identified three areas that must be addressed to secure the sustainability of
the competitive advantage:
Political, social and economic environment that favours the use of private
capital and innovation;
Risk Uncertainty Management to improve mainly efficiency and efficacy;
.	 Critical Success Factors (CSFs) to ensure success acting on all four factors of
competitive advantage.
These areas are closely interrelated and overlap in many issues. After consideration of
the entire context of the study, and to accomplish the main research a model for the
Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA) of PFI was conceptualised and proposed. It
is our thesis that if PFI develops within an adequate environment (seen as a pre-condition
to success) and applies the models of risk uncertainty management and critical success it
will meet all the conditions to develop a sustainable competitive advantage.
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The SCA model (Figure 2.1) must be dynamic and iterative and integrate:
o An adequate political, social and economic environment;
o The Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management model (WLCRUM)
proposed in the current research;
o The CSFs model proposed in the current research.
iteratiVe Dyna,0
Figure 2.1. Proposed Conceptual Framework for the Sustainable Competitive
Advantage of PEt.
The next sections present and describe the two sub-models on Risk Uncertainty and CSF
that will be developed on Chapter 5 and 6. The Political social and economic framework
will be addressed in Chapter 4
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2.2.1.1 PFI Risk Uncertainty Management Model for the Whole Life Cycle
> Research Objective:
What is the model for the whole life cycle risk uncertainty management in PFI?
Developed Model
FF1 Risk Uncertainty Management Model for the Whole Life Cycle
Justification
Why the proposed model for PFI' risk management truthfully describes and
quantfles uncertainty over the whole lfe cycle?
A PFI project is complex involving several types of risk throughout all stages of its life
cycle. A model for the WLCRIJM was developed including all the global risks, like
financial, construction, operation and management (O/M), environment, and social, etc.
The model's main innovative feature is that it describes how uncertainty of each risk type
progresses and evolves throughout the whole life cycle.
The quantification of the WLCRUM model is next step. For each project it is then
possible to have its risk level characterised by a numeric factor thus enabling the risk
ranking of projects. MatLab© 532 was the software tool used to analyse the
WLCRUM. For each type of risk it computes the linear function that describes the
existing data points, and calculates the area beneath the line. If instead of singular points
it is a smooth line that describes the uncertainty, the application calculates the best-fit
line by interpolation and subsequently the area beneath the line. The value of the area is
the quantum or value or uncertainty for each risk. The project's total uncertainty is
obtained adding the various risk uncertainties (that is, adding the various areas). The
data is normalised to enable the comparison between risks and between projects. There
are still limitations with the calculations. The software available doesn't calculate areas
for smooth lines when applying fuzzy logic, which is more appropriate to the type of data
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obtained that is based on people's perceptions. Ayyub and Gupta (1994) present a good
review on uncertainty modelling including the application of fuzzy logic. Other methods
rely on the Monte Carlo simulation (Vose 2000) with its corresponding probabilities and
regressions, requiring precise number and therefore not so well adapted to the type of
empiric data of the current research.
This methodology is also more adapted to project risk ranking as other methods
developed (Baccarini 2001) were based on scores assigned to risk factors and didn't take
into account the whole life cycle developments.
The WLCRU]VI risk scale can also be used as a basis for strategic decisions: For
example, it would be for: Senior Management a Decision Support System to assess the
risk in long-term projects, Project Managers a tool to quantify and control the risk (to
rethink the 'real life' factors that influence risk and make the necessary modifications, or
adjustments to reduce the risk level of a project), and to Researchers a basis to develop
Fuzzy models for Long Term Risk Assessment in PFI or other projects that develop
throughout time.
2 MATLAB is a high-performance language for technical computing. It integrates computation, visualization, and
programming.
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2.2.1.2 PFI Critical Success Factors
> Research Objective:
What are the critical Success Factors in FF1?
Developed Model
Critical Success Factors in PFI
Justification
Why the proposed modelfor CSF truthfully describes the factors for
success in a PFI?
The CSFs were determined using the Cognitive Map (Eden 1988 , Eden & Ackerman
1998, Ackerman, Eden & Cropper 1992) technique. The principle is that you work with
the ideas, see how they relate and influence one another. Also the logic of arguments or
lines of reasoning are clearly represented in the map as each one is linked to other by
arrows (Eden 1998) that indicate 'may lead to', 'has implications for', or 'supports' -
moving up the arrow, or 'is supported by' when moving down the arrow.
A cognitive map represents the individual thinking and perception of an issue. When
several individual maps are merged into one it ceases to be the representation of
individual thinking and it provides the aggregated view of a representative group. A
selected group of PFI stakeholders were interviewed and the resulting map illustrates the
shared understanding of the development of a PFI project. The PFI map becomes a
holistic and systemic view of all the content and context (links around) of all the
concepts (or ideas) involved in a PFI, i.e., the issues, their relationships and how they fit
together in a hierarchical manner. The data from the aggregated interviews was analysed
using Decision Explorer qualitative data analysis software that helps to identify
relationships (Banxia 2001) between different ideas and perspectives that might be
expressed about any subject.
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Similar techniques are Mind Map (Buzan 1993) and Concept Map (Novak 1993) but
there are important differences that justify the choice made. Mind Mapping starts with
one central concept (idea) and all the links depart from this central idea; which is not
adequate as it was important to capture all possible issues avoiding all preconceived
ideas about the centrality of the issues. Concept maps permits the free development of
ideas departing from several focuses but lacks the ability to establish causal relationships
between the concepts which is essential to create an hierarchy of concepts permitting the
assessment of goal(s) and of the issues that 'may lead' to achieving those goals. In
concept maps the links between concepts are merely characterized with descriptions,
identifying the association between concepts. It is only descriptive, no cause-effect
(causal) relationship can be recognized.
Existing alternative methodologies are based on surveys and ranking of factors by expert
panels. A good review can be found in Chua (1999). These methodologies miss the
relationships and influences between the factors. Making it more likely that some factors
are missing since their reasoning is not checked, or that others overlap, being different
terminologies for the same concept. The usage of Cognitive Map for the CSF
determination is an innovative proposal of the current research.
Decision Explorer ©1997-20013 was the software tool used to analyse the PFI
Aoareaate Cognitive Map
The next section is the answer to the How question. It describes the procedures adopted
from the first stages of exploratory research to the validation of results by case study
analysis. Included is a brief discussion on the theoretical framework for the use of case
studies, qualitative data, as well as its validity and reliability.
Banxia® Software Ltd.
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2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Empirical Study
The approach to the research design was iterative and took into account the
macroeconomic strategic framework in which PFI developed. In the exploratory
research, focused interviews (Robson 1999) were conducted with a panel of selected
experts, both in the UK and in Portugal. The interviews were focused, giving plenty of
freedom to the interviewee but conducting his/her reasoning to specific themes, like
CSFs, Risk Management, the relations between the parties in the Bidding stage (their
main area of expertise) and focusing on the long-term issues like the
operation/maintenance stages in PFI.
The interviewee's expertise was horizontal, i.e., being part of a functional area, project
management, financial, etc but all had a wide cross-experience over several projects
and/or sectors. This was judged appropriate for this stage of the research that required a
systemic view of PFI.
The experts were chosen because of their involvement in several PFI projects in different
sectors, and on successful and unsuccessful bids. In this way, it was possible to profit
from their overall experience and have more insight than with the in-depth study of only
one or two PFI projects. Comparisons could be made and conclusions taken based on a
much larger number of projects making use of different points of view.
There were different sets of data collected:
•	 Focused interviews in the preliminary research;
•	 Semi-structured interviews within the cases studies;
.	 Documentary data from the companies and specialised press;
Bibliographic research on related themes and contexts like concessions,
project finance and risk management.
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From all interviews there was a summarised and written report, already including
comments and interpretations
The literature review covered all the bibliographic databases that were available at the
universities - Salford and 1ST, plus books, theses and journals on risk management,
project finance and construction management. The two most important databases from
those used were Proquest and Bids in the UK. Throughout the study there was
extensive recourse to web based research using various search engines. This has proved
to be an invaluable source of references both academic and non-academic. Amongst the
search engines used Lycos, Google, Yahoo and Sapo proved to be the most useftil.
The exploratory research was conducted by focused and relatively unstructured
interviews (Robson 1999) with a panel of experts. In these interviews, the order of
questions is not fixed and the interviewer provides the guidance for specific topics. It
allows people's views to emerge providing insight of the important aspects, their
meaning and the effects on those involved. The experts were from the various areas
involved in PFI - construction companies, facilities management companies, financiers,
and insurers.
For the case studies, a Case Study Protocol was developed (Annex I) trying to cover all
the relevant issues and maintain the same analytical and descriptive structure throughout
all case studies. One of the most important sections is the last - Key Learning Points, or
if preferred, the Key Lessons that the case provided. The development of the Key
Lessons required the researcher's insight, feeling, personal interpretation and judgement.
An Interview Guide (attached) was developed, and included in the protocol, to provide
structure to the data collected; questions were open ended so that interviewees could
develop their own reasoning, insight and evolve to issues that the researcher had no prior
knowledge. The more structured approach in this second set of interviews facilitated the
analysis and permitted more accurate comparisons between cases.
The protocol laying out a set of procedures for the study, together with the case study's
records (field observations, interviews, archival material, etc.) provides the necessary
means for reanalysis (or external inspections) thus ensuring the stud's repeatability or
reliability.
As expected, the most important, and interesting, data source were the interviews with
project participants. The information was completed recurring to all other available
information source, like project documentation. The Protocol intends to cover all the
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relevant issues in a PFI project, but for some case studies it was not possible to collect all
the information to make the case fully complete. Nevertheless, the missing information
was not considered to be relevant for the key learning points of those particular case
studies, and it would be too time consuming if not impossible to obtain it due, in many
instances, to data confidentiality.
The possibility of respondent bias was controlled by using a multi-interview approach,
obtaining several perspectives for the same issues interviewing persons of various areas
within a PFI: private and public sectors, financial, operational, etc.
The Cognitive Map for the CSF was presented to successive interviewees always
incorporating the issues of previous interviews. The interview technique was based on
the one described by Rosenhead (2001). The interviewees usually had no previous
knowledge of the technique, but after a brief introduction and initial guidance on how the
issues were related, the interviewee would be confident to provide his comments and
insights, adding new issues (concepts) and relations or making eventual corrections to
the map. During the interview the model was explained interactively so that possible
misunderstandings were checked. This procedure also ensures that questions are derived
from the interview data not from a tight set of pre-prepared questions.
The data from the interviews was complemented, and checked by documentary data from
the companies and other public sources.
2.3.1.1 The Role of Interviews
According to Bullen & Rockart (1981) all good managers have implicit (or heuristics4)
knowledge of the CSFs, most often subconsciously. In addition, these factors are very
subjective. The task of the researcher is to make those factors explicit and consistent in
a logic and hierarchical way. Considerable preparation and skills are required to perform
this task; a key skill is good interviewing technique. Interviews are quick, interactive,
4 Heuristks - mies of thumb that usually lead to the coect solution but that are not guaranteed to work all of the
Ume.
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gaining insight in the empiric knowledge of the interviewee. It captures not the way he
thinks, but how. It permits to watch for relations and question them.
The process of building the map with the interviewee itself is a good method to construct
an effective interview. It helps to put forward the right questions and clarifj the issues.
The interviewer (Eden 1998) can miss many of subtle but important parts of an interview
like the non-verbal clues, which very often are critical. Not building the map during the
interview can also result in maps with missing links as this lack was not identified during
the interview and questioned. In this case, the map was first built from the preliminary
research and it was presented in all interviews being successively refined.
Interviews started with gathering general overviews, and it was after this that the
interviewer would follow with predefined questions (interview guide) and with others
that derived from this first general overview where issues that come up sometimes were
not from the interviewer's knowledge. Interviews typically lasted between 1h30 to 2h.
They were not taped as very often it constrains the interviewee.
An interview is very often a unique opportunity that has to be fully capitalized making
full use of the interviewee time and knowledge.
Pre-interview preparation was done based on the preliminary research and available
documentary data on the projects/sectors in analysis. When several interviews for the
individual case studies were done the information gathered was always incorporated in
this preliminary phase of subsequent interview preparation.
2.3.1.2 Problems with Interviews
Possible interviewer and interviewee bias - Especially with non-structured or semi-
structured interviews it is very possible for the existence of interviewer bias. It is
necessary to carefully analyse the results of the interview to eliminate or minimise this
problem. Considerable experience and critical analysis is required.
As one goes down from top management to the operational level, it is clear that the
interviewees tend to focus only, or primarily on the issues that affect their own functional
area. In this case the first interviews were done mainly with people in the financial area
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and the map was naturally focused in this area, it was only when the range of
competences was enlarged that the resulting map started to show the systemic nature of
PFI. People tend not to attribute any importance to issues outside their area of activity.
Only top management, or project managers, can fully grasp the wholeness of the PFI
project. It was found, that several interviewees, after reviewing the fill map, were
surprised by the number, characteristics and inter-relationships of the issues that come
up.
The next sections describe the methodology used to develop and validate the
theoretically derived models of the Risk Uncertainty Management and Sustainable
Competitive Advantage of PFI models. The main concern was to choose a methodology
based on the nature of the problems addressed. The methodological approach and the
reasons for the choices made is also included.
2.3.2 Development of the Theoretical Framework (theoretically derived models)
The conceptualisation of the models, based upon the critical analysis of the exploratory
research and the literature review, permitted the development of Sustainable Competitive
Advantage and Risk Uncertainty Management (and Uncertainty throughout the whole
life cycle) models in PFI projects. Ancillary analytical techniques were also used:
Cognitive Mapping for the CSFs assessment, and MatLab for the semi-quantification of
the Risk Management Model
2.3.3 Validation and Reliability
The methodology used for the validation of the developed models is largely based in
qualitative data and case study analysis. The next sections begin by discussing the
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adequacy of using qualitative analysis and continue describing the methodology used to
test and validate the models.
2.3.3.1 Qualitative Analysis
Qualitative analysis (Miles 1994) 'is a powerful tool for assessing causality and is able
to idenlfy mechanisms, going beyond sheer association. It is local, and deals well with
the complex network of events and process in a situation. It can sort out the temporal
dimension, showing clearly what precedes what, either through direct observation or
retrospection and show the underlying variables, and that these variables might have
connections over lime'. Or in the words of Croswell (1998) 'Qualitative research is an
inquiry process of understanding ... The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture,
analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a
natural setting'.
A qualitative inquiry strategy (Patton 1990) 'emphasises and builds on several
interconnected themes'. The most important are:
. Relevance of qualitative data - The analyses focus on naturally occurring
ordinary events in natural settings, so that it is possible to have a strong handle of
what "real life" is like. Another feature of qualitative data is their richness and
holism, with strong potential for revealing complexity;
Naturalistic inquiry - Studying real-world situations as they unfold naturally;
non-manipulative; unobtrusive, and non-controlling; openness to whatever
emerges - lack of predetermined constraints on outcomes;
. Inductive analysis - Immersion in the details and specifics of the data to discover
important categories, dimensions and interrelationships; begin by exploring
genuinely open questions rather than testing theoretically derived (deductive)
hypotheses;
• Holistic - The whole phenomenon under study is understood as a complex
system that is more than the sum of its parts; focus on complex interdependencies
not meaningfully educed to a few discrete variables and linear, cause-effect
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relationships.	 The researcher's role is to gain a "holistic" (systemic,
encompassing, integrated) overview of the context under study: its logic, its
arrangements, and its explicit and implicit rules.
The validity, meaningftilness (Patton 1990) and insights generated from qualitative
inquiry have more to do with the information richness of the cases selected and the
observationallanalytical capabilities of the researcher than with the sample size. For
example, Piaget contributed a major breakthrough to our understanding of how children
think by observing his own two children at length and in great depth. Freud established
psychoanalysis based on fewer than ten clients.
A qualitative method permits the study of selected issues in depth and detail.
Approaching fieldwork without being constrained by predetermined categories of
analysis contributes to the depth, openness and detail of qualitative inquiry.
Quantitative measures (Patton 1990) are 'succinct, parsimonious, and easily aggregated
for analysis, quantitative data are 'systematic, standardised, and easily presented in a
short space. By contrast, the qualitative findings are longer, more detailed, and
variable in content, analysis is difficult because responses are neither systematic nor
standardised'.
Yet, the open-ended responses allow the understanding of the world as seen by the
respondents. The purpose of gathering responses to open-ended questions is to enable
the researcher to understand and capture the points of view. The advantage of the
quantitative approach is that it is possible to measure the reactions of many subjects to a
limited set of questions, thus facilitating comparison and statistical aggregation of the
data. By contrast, qualitative methods typically produce a large quantity of detailed data
about a much smaller number of people and cases.
2.3.3.2 Validity and Reliability of a Qualitative study
To be valid and reliable a qualitative study should address a number of questions. How
credible are the findings and the rigor employed by the researcher? Although the exact
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conditions of the study cannot be replicated would a similar investigation yield findings
roughly congruent with the original study? How replicable are the study's interpretations
given the same set of data? Can we be sure that the study's findings are valid
representations and not simply a set of conclusions by a biased researcher?
The threats (Padgett 1998) to the credibility and trustworthiness to qualitative studies fall
into three categories:
• Reactivity - It refers to the potentially altering effects of the researcher's
presence in the field. How are we interfering with the setting affecting the
behaviours, attitudes and feelings?
• Researcher's bias - It is the temptation to filter one's observations and
interpretations through your own preconceptions and opinions.
Researchers may deliberately choose informants that fit them, or may ask
leading questions during interviews to get the answers they want, or may
ignore data that do not support their conclusions.
• Respondent's bias - At one extreme it can be the withholding of
information and even lies to protect respondent's privacy or to avoid
revealing some unpleasant truths. At the other extreme, the respondents
may try to be "helpfhl" and offer answers that they believe we want to hear.
There are two basic tactics for enhancing rigor and trustworthiness adapted to each
threat (Table 2. 1) Triangulation and Member checking.
Table 2.1. How to Overcome the Threats to the Trustworthiness of Qualitative
Studies
Reactivity	 Researcher Bias	 Respondent Bias
Triangulation	 +	 +	 +
Member checking	 +	 +	 +
Triangulation is the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomena
(Patton 1990). This can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including both
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qualitative and quantitative approaches. There are four basic types of triangulation
(Denzin 1978 in Padgett 1998):
. Data triangulation - The use of a variety of data sources (interviews,
archival materials, observational data, etc.);
• Researcher triangulation - the use of several different researchers to
achieve agreement;
• Theory triangulation - the use of multiple theories perspectives to interpret
a single set of data;
• Methodological triangulation - the use of multiple methods to study a
single problem, for example, combining quantitative and qualitative methods
in a single study;
• Interdisciplinary triangulation - the use of more than one discipline in a
single study. A social work researcher, for example might collaborate with a
psychologist, sociologist, anthropologist or historian.
According to Scandura & Williams (2000) that made an extensive assessment of the
research methodologies in management triangulation can improve external5 and
internal validity6 as the conthination of separate research strategies in one study helps
to counter the trade - off inherent in others.
This research combined data triangulation (Qualitative data from the interviews is used
to complement and supplement data from bibliographical and archival documentation),
theory triangulation (the analysis of PFI used risk management and decision analysis) and
finally methodological triangulation - qualitative data for the CSFs and Qualitative and
Quantitative models for risk management.
External validity concerns the generalisation to dilierent samples, of previously established relationships.
Internal validity concerns a cause-eftect relationship. T ypically laboratory experiments have high precision al1d
control of variables.
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2.3.4 Case Study Analysis
Case studies are 'studies of events within their real-4fe contexts' (Miles & Huberman
1994) and become 'particularly useful where one can identify cases rich in information
- rich in the sense that a great deal can be learned from a few examples of the
phenomenon in question' (Patton 1990). A case can be a person, an event, an
organisation, a time period, a critical incident or a community. Regardless of the unit of
analysis (the level at which information is required for decision making) a case study
seeks to describe the unit in depth and detail, in context arid holistically.
Qualitative fieldwork begins by gathering data and allowing patterns to emerge . Next,
this exploratory process gives way to confirmatory fieldwork. This involves testing
ideas, confirming the importance and meaning of possible patterns, and checking out the
viability of the findings with new data and additional cases. This stage of fieldwork
requires considerable rigor and integrity on the part of the researcher in looking for and
analysing 'confirming and disconjirming' cases. Confirmatory cases are additional
examples that fit already emergent patterns; confirm and elaborate the findings, adding
richness, depth and credibility. Disconfirming cases are no less important. These are the
examples that don't fit. They are a source of other possible interpretations as well as
questions raised about the findings. They may be "the exceptions that prove the rule" or
exceptions that disconfirm and modify what appeared to be emergent patterns.
Case studies (Yin 1994) can be done as:
• Single case study, in the case of Critical, Extreme/Unique or Revelatory
phenomena, that is the instance (Miles & Huberman 1994) "proves" or
exemplifies the main findings. Searching deliberately for confirming and
disconfirming cases, extreme or deviant cases, arid typical cases serve to increase
confidence in conclusions;
• Multiple case studies. The number of cases used depends (a) if one is trying to
assess or predict similar results (a literal replication) or (b) produces different
results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication).
To assess literal and theoretical replications usually three to four case studies are used in
each case (Yin 1994). If the cases are somewhat contradictory, the initial proposition
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must be revised and retested with another set of cases. The logic underlying the use of
multiple-case studies is to consider them as one would consider multiple laboratory
experiments. Both follow a "replication" logic, similar to the ability to conduct a limited
number of experiments in related topics and deal with contradictory experimental
findings.
Case study analysis and scientific experiments have analogies: both are used to validate
(or not) the theoretical developments. Both are holistic - they describe the entire
phenomena in the study and are done in relatively small numbers. In both, the analysis
and validation of the findings can be very complex involving a multitude of triangulation
techniques. In experimental science, for example chemistry and physics, similar to case
studies the aim of the analysis is to provide supporting evidence for a proposed
theoretical framework. The fundamental difference is that in a laboratory the
experiments are in a closely controlled environment, while in case studies the
environment has a multitude of variables open to multiple interactions that often are
unknown or overlooked. Nevertheless case studies are much richer in information and as
they are open can provide insight on unforeseen issues. Multiple case analysis is not
analogous to the analysis of multiple respondents in a survey (or to the multiple subjects
within an experiment), it doesn't follow a "sampling logic". It doesn't follow a statistical
generalisation to a larger population. It is deterministic (Lee 1999) in that 'a theoretical
proposition, concept, or ideas fits, partially fits, or does not fit with the facts of the case
study under study
Surveys look for prevalence (or incidence) of a phenomenon in a population. Whereas
the main objective of case study analysis is the development of a theoretical framework.
Case study analysis contrast with surveys where the analysis is a priori structured and
easier to undertake. In a survey, the selection of a representative sample is one of the
key issues, and depending upon the size of the whole population a very large sample
(large number of units of analysis) can be required in order to have valid conclusions. In
contrast, case study analysis usually involves a relatively small number of cases (unit of
analysis) to achieve the required theoretical generalisations, relying on triangulation and
member checking to validate its conclusions.
Case study research has also some limitations. Yin (1994) has identified three sources.
First, is the potential lack of rigour, because the researcher is solely in control of the
application of the research methods. Thus the research quality is dependent on the
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quality of the researcher. Secondly, is their poor use of generalisation. Carroll and
Johnson (1990) state that 'the primary goal is to understand the case itself only later
might there be efforts to generalise from the case to broader principles'. This implies
that the emphasis and strength of case study research is on understanding, not
generalisation. Thirdly, case studies involve vast amounts of data that very often are
difficult to organize and to understand its relevance.
Lee (1999) on his assessment of qualitative methods in organizational research, considers
that Yin case study methodology offers meaningful reliability and validity (internal and
external). The current research seeks to focus on the strengths of the case study research
as it is used to increase the understanding of the underlying reasons for the answers to
the proposed research aims. The other criticisms - lack of rigour and vast amount of
data - are acknowledged and taken into account throughout the research development.
2.3.4.1 PFI Case Studies
A PFI project is an appropriate unit of analysis for the study of CSF and Risk
Management Models. The main characteristics of case study analysis-making use of
qualitative data are adequate to the objectives of the current study:
• Development of theoretical frameworks;
• Naturalistic inductive analysis;
• And holistic nature.
It's real life, there are issues that can only be understood from a holistic perspective, and
the objective of the current research is the development of theoretical frameworks.
In PFI, the key decisions are always made at the top level, taking into account the project
as a whole, consequently it makes sense to consider a PFI project as the appropriate unit
for a case study. Case study analysis being holistic and integrative in nature is
particularly adequate to the current research.
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To validate the theoretical developments, i.e., to assess theoretical replication, which is
different results but for predictable reasons it will be necessary to use a multiple case
approach. Based on the exploratory research it is expected that the main factor that
distinguishes PFI is the sector were the project is developed - Transports, Health,
Accommodation, etc. - so case studies in different sectors were done to assess
theoretical replication. To validate each case study a Data Triangulation approach is
adopted using a variety of data sources: literature review, archival materials, interviews,
etc.
The assessment of literal replication, or similar results expected, undertaking for
example, three case studies on the same sectors, has not been done because it was
outside the scope of the current research which was to test the applicability of the models
to different sectors, but should be used in fUture research developments.
Both the CSF and Risk Management Models in PFI projects are expected to vary
according to the sectors where they are implemented. Therefore, both literal and
theoretical replication can be sought within a multiple-case design.
The amount of data that needs to be obtained for each case study is considerable. This
places some constraints on the sample size. Taking into account the resources available
and the need to increase the potential for generalisation it was decided to undertake four
in depth case studies within different sectors both in the UK and Portugal, and to collect
data from other PFI projects and experts on the PFI market also both in the UK and
Portugal.
A limitation of the research is the reduced number of sectors covered by the case studies
developed to test and validate the model. This is counter balanced by the several
interviews with finance and project management people that had interacted with various
sectors and provided the holistic perspective of PFI. Also the extensive literature review
provided valuable insight to minimise this limitation
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2.3.5 Empirical Data
Primary and secondary data was collected during the fieldwork at three levels:
1 - For the development of in-depth PFI case studies:
•	 Lusoponte (Transport) the PFI to build and operate two bridges in Lisbon,
Portugal (Annex II). The Concession Agreement, awards the design,
construction and financing of the Vasco da Gama Crossing, plus the operation
and maintenance of both the new and the existing 25th April Crossings. To
settle all pending disputes and claims a Global Settlement Agreement (GSA)
was signed on the 3 July 2000, that extends and establishes the concession
expiry as 24th March 2030, irrespective of the number of crossings, and
includes the additional obligation for Lusoponte to undertake pre-feasibility
studies for a 31C1 crossing over the Tagus
• The Victoria Dock Primary School (Education) in Hull, UK a PFI to build and
operate a primary school (Annex III). It was the first school in the UK to be
built under a PFI scheme. It was such a successful project that an extension of
facilities soon had to be contemplated. The new building was completed in
January 2001, and opened by Lord Puttnam in September 2001. The land
where the school was built has been leased to the Sewell group for 40 years,
although the PFI contract is for only 25 years. After this period and for 15
years the buildings and land can have alternative usages such as: continue as a
school, disco, nursery, homecare, according to the local residents' needs in 25
years.
•	 The Joint Services Command Staff College - JSCSC (Education, but focused
in the construction stage) in Watchfield, UK (Annex IV). The PFI Contract
awards to Defence Management the design, construction, financing and the
operation and maintenance of the JSCSC for 30 years. This College merges
the educational activities of three services: Army, Navy and Royal Air Force.
The construction of the building was done on time, but the costs escalated from
£88 million to £120 million at the expenses of the construction sub-contractor,
•	 Indá qua Feira (Water and Wastewater Systems Construction and Operation)
in Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal (Annex V). Indáqua Feira was awarded the
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concession for water distribution and wastewater in Sta Maria da Feira. The
Municipality committed itself to build part of the necessary infrastructure, for
which it needed the contribution of the Cohesion Funds. However, in the
meantime the political guidelines changed and the Municipalities were not
allowed direct access to the finds. This has left the St' Maria da Feira unable
to frilfil its contractual obligations, and has led to a standstill in the construction
of the sewerage networks.
2 - Information drawn from PFI projects: the Manchester Fire Station in the UK
Hospitals and Prisons in the UK, and the SCUTs (shadow toll roads) in Portugal.
3 - Generic information on PFI was also obtained from interviews (other than those done
for the PFI Case studies) with experts in PFI:
• E.C. Harris Capital Project and Facilities Consultant - David Wood, Leslie
Gerelli, Thimothy Neal, Geoffrey Hawkings and Weng Lee;
• Povall Flood & Wilson - Brian Grew;
. Kvaerner Construction - Paul Gandy;
McBains & Cooper - Construction and Property - James Baines and Andrew
Rogerson;
• Price WaterhouseCoopers - Jackie dos Santos;
• KPMG - Melanie Speller and Catherine Broadbent;
• AON Risk Services - Mike Durejko, Johann Meeke, Peter Adlington and Gary
Winson;
• Finpro - Dr. Antonio Paula Santos;
• Banco EspIrito Santo Investimento - Dr. Rui Baptista;
• Banco Efisa - Dr.Nuno Cardoso;
• ABN Amro - Dra Mariana Abrantes de Sousa;
• Banco Portugués de Investimento - Dr.Tiago Simöes de Almeida;
• Instituto de Estradas de Portugal - Dr. Rui Soares;
48
Research Methodology
. 
4Ps - Public Partnership Programme - Martin Lipson;
. Universidade Nova de Lisboa - Department of Environmental Studies - Prof.
Gomes Ferreira.
For the case studies a Case Study Protocol and an Interview Guide were developed (see
Annex I).
2.4 Conclusions - How derived
All the conclusions drawn in the research were based upon the data collected and upon
consideration of all the constraints reservations and limitations. It combined all the
findings and the models were conceptualised, tested and validated according the
developed research methodology.
This chapter presented the research methodology. Chapter 3 explains how an adequate
socio political and economic framework is needed for the development of PFI.
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CHAPTER 3
The PFI' Political Social and Economic Environment
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the international historical context that led to the development of
PFI. Although a national policy (Kerr 1998), the underlying rationale of PFI must be
analysed and integrated as each state is a participant in the global economy. Since the
mid 20th century in the USA and, more recently, since the 1970s in Europe, Asia and
other Developing Countries, national governments have increasingly used private capital
to implement infrastructure projects and to provide services previously in the scope of
the public sector. They do it using several types of concessions. Following this trend, in
1992, the UK Government announced the PFI, a guidance and a legal framework for
concessions in the UK This chapter concludes presenting the main political socio and
economical issues that affect the development of PFI.
3.2 Concessions: Early Years - l7 to i9 centuries
Concessions use private capital in projects that are of the initiative of a government, but
they are a different mechanism from the privatisations and contracting-out, as it was
discussed in Chapter 1 when PFI (a special form of concession) was introduced. In
privatisations, the ownership of the assets changes and the responsibility for provision of
services lies with the private sector. The public sector might retain a regulatory role in
some sectors. In concessions, unlike privatisations the ultimate responsibility of service
provision lies with the public sector. In contracting-out, the private sector only provides
services, not capital assets, unlike concessions, where capital assets might be provided by
the private sector. The differences can be summarized as presented in Table 1. 1.
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The International Finance Corporation (IIFC), an affiliate of the World Bank defines
concessions as 'An agreement usually with a government authority, to operate one
project or provide the specfiedservicesfor a certain period' (IFC 1999).
The theme that this chapter will try to develop is therefore: What are the Political and
Macro-Economic factors that have influenced the development of concessions?
Government policies are dictated not only by domestic conditions but also by the
developments in the political ideologies, international economic conditions, and financial
markets. This is especially relevant in the case of open economies, such as the UK and
Portugal (the two countries where the fieldwork for the research was undertaken).
Concessions are always from the initiative of national governments, so to understand
their development, they must be integrated in the rationale of policies that reflect the
ideological, political and economic conditions in each country.
The history of concessions goes back a long way, as they are (Hollihan 1994) not a new
mechanism for infrastructure development. Concessions were an often-used mechanism
from the l7ti to the middle of the 19th century in the form of BUT (Build-Operate-
Transfer) or BOO (Build-Own-Transfer) concessions. With a BUT, the private sector is
required to finance, design, build, operate/manage the facility, and transfer the asset free
of charge to the host government, after a pre-specified concession period. BOO is
similar except that the asset is not transferred back.
Examples of early concessions are (Urbanik 1999) the private toll roads in the 17th
century, in England. The English Parliament began granting franchises to private
companies for the maintenance of public roads, allowing the companies to charge tolls
for the use of roads. These toll roads were called "turnpikes", named for the turning of a
pole, or pike, to permit entry of a vehicle after the driver paid the toll. Over 1,000
turnpike companies maintained 32,000 km of roads in England in the 1830s. After this
period, increased competition from railways began to hamper the profitability of the
turnpike systems.
In the United States of America (USA), turnpikes were introduced in the late 1 700s as
profit-making ventures. Routes among towns in the Northeast became mud roads during
spring and winter. Inter-town commerce was virtually impossible when it rained because
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Stockton and Darlington is
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section of the Baltimore &
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St.	 with	 steam-hauled
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of difficulties passing over the mud roads, so private concessionaires paved the roads
with wooden logs (later with flat wooden planks) across the mud on the road and had
concessions through which they could charge a toll. Early United States (US) turnpikes
were local government projects, but later turnpikes were privately operated. However
many turnpikes failed to make a profit, and most returned to county control by 1850.
Another example is (Huang 1995) the 99 years water concession Lyonnaise des Eaux
(France) signed in 1853. By 1900, privately owned concessionaires provided a majority
of public services in France.
Table 3. 1 summarises the main macro-economic, political and ideological developments
that took place in the 19th century and that influenced the development of concessions.
A summary of the most relevant privately financed projects is also included.
Table 3.1. Context of Privately Financed Projects in the 1800s
Milestones	 Privately Financed
Projects
Macro-Economic Environment
1800s
Industrial Revolution fuelled by the ideas of
both the l7thcentury French Physiocrats in
France advocating laissez-faire', i.e., non-
intervention by the government in individual or
monetary affairs, and, Adam Smith with An
inquiry into the Nature and of the Wealth of
Nations (1776). Both contributed to the belief
that the basic production facilities - land and
capital- should be privately owned, and that
distribution of wealth is most efficiently
accomplished through free trade without
government interference.
The application of mechanical power to
production brought with it an increase in
efficiency, which made goods abundant and
cheap. Consequently, the real standard of
living rose throughout much of the world
during the 19th century. However, it had
serious human costs. Abusive child labour,
long working hours and dangerous and
unhealthy workplaces were common.
In the USA, the modem corporation begins to
emerge, with an immense financial power, and
forms monopolies that could control an entire
industry.
Source: IFC, 1999; Peterson, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Weisser, 1999, Encarta, 1999.
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The macroeconomic environment favoured the development of major infrastructure
projects financed by private capital through concessions in several areas such as railways,
tramways, highways, and canals, in the USA, Europe and Africa. The Victorian
Railways and the London Underground (Grubb 1998) were built primarily with private
money, designed by private engineers, and licensed by the public sector. The world's
first public railway was the Stockton and Darlington, which opened in 1825. The
Metropolitan Railway opened the world's first underground in 1863. The railways
remained in private hands until 1948 when the UK government completed the
nationalisation of the railways, docks, canals, airlines and road freight.
An example of private funding in infrastructure development involved US western rail
(Overton 1999). The need for transcontinental lines was felt so urgently that
construction of the Union Pacific Railroad began during the American Civil War (186 1-
1865). The US Federal Government offered concessions to private sector companies to
build the rail track out to the West Coast. To give incentive to the private sector
companies to build that railroad, each company was granted one-half mile of public land
bordering the railway in each direction. The companies then had the right to develop
these lands, whose value was increased by construction of the railway giving the private
sector an opportunity to further increase their income. In return, the railways gave the
government a substantial reduction in rates for the usage of their services.
Another well-known example of private funding is the Suez Canal Concession (The
Napoleon Foundation 1998). Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French engineer and diplomat in
Egypt got the exclusive rights to set up the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime
Canal, to use the canal and to construct a port at each end. The concession was for 99
years, beginning the day the work started. At the end of this period, the canal would
become the property of the Egyptian government. The company capital was set at 200
million gold francs divided into 400,000 shares at 500 francs per share. The share
subscription was an unprecedented success throughout Europe and the Ottoman Empire.
On April 25, 1859, construction began, and the French Empress Eugenic inaugurated the
canal on 17 November, 1869. On July 26, 1956, Egypt nationalised the Canal and in
1962, all original shareholders were paid off.
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Concessions substantially fell out of favour during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The main reasons were:
• Private sector abuses of monopoly pricing power: By the 1 870s, US railways were
under public pressure. They were accused of anti-competitive collaboration with
some petroleum-refining companies such as The Standard Oil Company, a corporate
monopoly, or trust, run by the industrialist John D. Rockfeller. In 1911, the US
Supreme Court ruled the first big anti-trust case, stating that the company was an
unlawful monopoly that hindered free competition. The railways also came under
attack by the "Grcznger Movement", the powerful fraternal agrarian association that
grew out of a number of grievances that farmers had against the railways, mainly
concerning overpricing of freight charges on agricultural commodities;
• Financial failures: Over time, many of these projects foundered and financiers lost
significant amounts of money. An example was the Panama Canal. In the late 1 870s
a private French company directed by Ferdinand de Lesseps, which had already
overseen the construction of the Suez Canal, won a concession from Colombia
(Panama was then a province of Colombia) to build a sea-level canal to link the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Financing was raised and construction began in 1882.
The company quickly ran into problems caused by the difficult terrain, climate,
tropical diseases, labour shortages, and a flawed design. In 1888, it ceased work and
went into bankruptcy;
• Increased government role. General trends at this time included growth of the
government sector and popular belief that the Government would not abuse its own
monopoly power. Many thought that the government could engage in more
integrated planning than the private sector because it controlled the development of
urban plans, and consequently infrastructure projects like roads, bridges, hospitals
and schools. This shift in public attitude toward the government policies was caused
mainly by changes in the ideological, intellectual and social environment. At the turn
of the century, capitalism was the dominant economic and social system;
nevertheless, industrial capitalism that had led to the Industrial Revolution had also
resulted in serious human costs with appalling conditions for a large number of
workers. This led to the emergence of socialist and communist policies initiated with
the work of Karl Marx and Friederich Engels that favoured state intervention with
land and capital owned collectively, that is, by the society.
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3.3 Re-birth of Concessions: First-half 20th Century
The first half of the 20th century saw several cycles in the macro-economic environment,
as summarised in Table 3.2. Before World War I, it was the end of the Industrial
Revolution and the emergence of socialist theories that advocated state control of the
economy. As such, in the early 2Othcentury (Plessa 1998) most infrastructure projects
were Government financed. Between the Great Wars in 1936, John Maynard Keynes
published The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, which laid the basis
for modern capitalism that would be applied in the Western World after World War II.
For 25 years (Kerr 1998) after the war, the mixture of Keynesian theories and traditional
forms of capitalism were very successful. Western capitalist states enjoyed nearly
uninterrupted growth, low rates of inflation, and rising living standards. It was then, by
the mid 20th century, that concessions started to re-emerge in the USA to fund
infrastructure development. The improvements in the socio-economic context and the
development of US financial markets contributed to this. Financing of roads in USA had
switched from private ventures to state control. By the end of World War 11(1939-
1945) many roads were congested and deteriorating. The rapid increase in the number
of cars and the subsequent demand for adequate highways led local governments with
limited financial resources to award concessions to the private sector for bridges, tunnels
and highways. Modern highway construction resumed nation-wide, and many of these
roadways were built as toll roads.
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Table 3.2. Context of Privately Financed Projects in the First-Half of the 20th
Century
Macro-Economic Environment
	 Milestones	 Privately Financed
Projects
1900-l945s
Russian Revolution in 1917 leads to the John Ma ynard Keynes publishes the
first communist state. 	 General Theory
 of Employment,
Interest and i'vIoney (1936) and lays theWorld Wail (1914-1919). basis	 of	 modem	 capitalism.
US Wall Street collapses in 1929, and Governments use their powers to spend
begins the Great Depression. Roosevelt money, vary taxes and control the
launches the New Deal (1933-1938) to money supply in order to control or
counteract its effects. 	 A major eliminate the curse of capitalism -the
restructuring of the financial system is cycles of boom and bust'.
	 In a
undertaken,	 depression,	 government	 should
increase its spending, even at the costWorld War 11(1939-1945). 	
of unbalanced budoets, to offset the
decline in private spending. The
process should be reversed if a boom
threatens to get out of hand, leading to
excessive speculation and inflation.
1945-1960s
The	 two	 opposing	 ideologies, The
	 Keynesian	 theories	 are 1950s: In the USA. modem
communism and capitalism, co-existed incorporated into US law when highway
	 construction
for 25 years.	 Congress passed the Employment Act resumes nationwide.
in 1946, representing the formalBetween 1945 and 1975 the number of
abandonment of laissez-faire asCommunist countries greatly increased, national policy.
partly because the division of the world
after World War II, and because 1948: The UK government tinalises
communist movements gained strength the nationalisation of rail companies.
in various parts of the Third World,
Milton Friedman publishes Studies inChina and Eastern Europe.
the Quantity Theory
 of i'vlonev (1956),
laying the basis of Monetarism. Their
main concern is money and its effects.
To reduce inflation, the growth in
money supply needs to be controlled.
ource: iru, i y9; i-'ererson, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Weisser, 1999: Lncarta, 1999.
In addition, in the USA, the domestic financial markets were by then developing a
sophistication and volume that enabled such projects to be fImded as concessions.
Effective financial regulation and tax incentives generated a large pooi of insurance and
pension find resources with very few investment restrictions. In Europe, lenders and
investors didn't have such incentives. Support for infrastnjcture projects was provided
against government guarantees. The US finance industry (Drucker 1999) was until the
1970s much more entrepreneurial in style than its European counterparts. It was only
after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that the Russian State Bank, afraid of having its
American assets frozen, shifted its foreign reserves to London. However, the Russians
wanted their money in dollars. This, along with the negative balance of payments in the
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USA led to the creation of the Eurodollar. This financial innovation signalled the start of
the rebirth of the City of London. More innovative financial tools were created from
then on.
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, inflation erupted nearly everywhere, and
unemployment rose. At the same time social-welfare spending by governments
continued to grow, posing serious budgetary constraints to governments.
3.4 New Developments in the 1970s and 1980s
During the I 970s, important changes in the political environment were taking place, as
summarized in Table 3.3. Keynesian policies were in crisis, being replaced by
Monetarism with strict control of the money supply to control inflation and low taxes to
encourage investment and minimal government intervention. Privatisation started,
regulations were changed, and state subsidies removed. In the Western world,
Monetarist policies became increasingly common. Governments had inherited large state
monopolies and sectors such as energy and telecommunications, which were heavily
regulated. Greater focus on the private sector necessitated major regulatory reforms
such as large-scale privatisation's that, in turn, have created new markets in areas
previously operated only by the government. For example, in 1978, the US government
passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) and established a new private
market for electric power.
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Foundations for project
financing in the power
sector. Previously
confined to the mineral
resources sector.
In the late 1970s
deregulation starts in the
Western World.
USA: PURPA is passed
and establishes a private
market for electric power
(1978). It provides the
foundation on which non-
recourse lending could
take place in the power
industry.
UK: British Petroleum (BP)
raises finance to develop its
Forties oil field in the North
Sea (1972).
Macroeconomic policy
changes - national states are
forced to introduce policies to
improve their position in the
global price hierarchy, to
depoliticise their domestic
policy and reduce further
state	 expenditure.
Regulatory reform continues.
UK: the Ryrie Rules are
published in 1981 setting the
principles for private funding
of public projects.
USA:	 AT&T lost the
monopoly in the
telecommunications services
(1984).
Turkey: The PFI underlying
concept (Tiong 1992), the
BOT first appeared in recent
times through Turgut Ozal in
1984, then the Prime
Minister of Turkey within
the framework of privatising
Turkey's public projects.
The first BOT project for
infrastructure is developed in
1987.
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Table 3.3. Context of Privately Financed Projects during the 1970s and 1980s
Macro-Economic Environment
1970s
1973: Bretton Woods system of fixed currencies
collapses. Flouting exchange rates are introduced.
The stability of global finance is no longer based
in the convertibility of world money (dollar) into
gold. States and Central Banks took over the
function of gold acting as guarantors of the credit
system. The States necessitated adjusting the
ratio of debt to GDP. This entails a policy of tight
money and sound finance and thus the
replacement of an expansionary policy by a policy
of state austerity and the containment of inflation
by closing the gap between the expansion of the
money supply and productive activity.
Creation of the European Monetary System (EMS)
in 1979. The primary purposes of the EMS were
to stabilise exchange rates in the EU, and to aid
the long-term process of European monetary
integration. The central component of the EMS
as the ERM, a voluntat' system of fixed
exchange rates. This system was based on the
European Currency Unit - ECU (which later
became the Euro in 1999). Under the ERIvI, the
currencies of participating countries were allowed
to fluctuate in relation to each other and to the
ECU, but only to small amounts.
1979: Conservative government of Margaret
Tatcher was elected. Its policy was based on the
monetarism economic theories.
l980s
Milestones	 Privately Financed
Projects
Monetarist orthodoxy was abandoned as a
consequence of the debt crisis in 1982 The
state policy is one of a monetary framework of
tight money and state austerity, and the
encouragement of credit based private
consumption. The outcome is that money
(credit) replaces the state as the agent of
restructuring, while the money form is imposed
in the state (value for money audits) and large-
scale privatisations take place.
Despite the attempts to restructure the state,
many national states were still confronting a
crisis of over-accumulation. The underlying
weakness of the real' economy indicated that
the expansionary policy of easy credit in the
1 980s was not sustained by capital growth but
rather by an inflationary growth in the money
supply.
Financial crash in 1987. Company liquidations
increased, unemployment soared and private
debtors were fuced with consumer default.
Source: IFC, 1999; Peterson, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Weisser, 1999; Encarta, 1999.
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In Latin America and other Developing regions, authoritarian governments were being
replaced by democracies. Their economies also had been heavily regulated and had huge
state monopolies. So, gradually, new regions joined the trend for privatisation and
encouraged private capital for the funding of government projects.
The breakthrough for concessions financing arose through the development of British
Petroleum (BP)'s North Sea Forties oil field in 1972 (BPAmoco 1999). Due to the large
volume of investments needed, traditional corporate finance was not possible, because
the primary source of repayment of debt for investors was the sponsoring companies,
backed by their balance sheets. The company just didn't have enough assets to be used
as collateral for the loan. The oil field development was made possible by an innovative
financial arrangement. BP raised £370 million from a syndicate of 66 banks, then the
largest wholly private bank advance ever arranged. Lenders could not rely on the limited
balance-sheet strength as security for their loans, and had to evaluate the present value of
future cash flows generated by the project and use this as a security for their loans.
Additional security was provided by the asset value of the oil and gas reserves in the
event the project failed to be implemented or under-performed. The result was that the
potential for Project Finance was realised. Subsequently, similar financial structures
were applied to other sectors where the security available for lenders had certain
similarities to oil and gas.
Project Finance is therefore (IFC 1999) a form of financing in which lenders look solely
or primarily to the cash flows of a project to repay debt service and to all of the
underlying project assets (including all physical and contractual assets) as collateral for
the loan. There are two basic types: Limited and Nonrecourse financing. Limited-
recourse project finance: Lenders look mainly at the cash-flows of a project to repay
debt service, but permit creditors and investors some recourse to the sponsors for
repayment. Nonrecourse project finance: Lenders look solely to the cash flows of the
project to repay debt service and the assets of the property for security.
In traditional finance, the primary source (IFC 1999) of repayment for investors and
creditors is the sponsoring company, backed by its entire balance sheet, not the project
alone. Although lenders still seek usually to assure themselves of the economic viability
of the project being financed, they still retain a significant level of comfort that they will
be repaid even if the individual project fails. The lenders do not necessarily suffer as long
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the company owning the project remains financially viable. In project finance, if the
project fails, sponsors, investors, and lenders can expect significant losses.
Another important aspect in project finance is that the risks are borne not only by the
sponsor but also by different types of investors such as equity holders, debt providers,
and quasi-equity investors. Therefore, because the risks are shared, one criterion of a
project's suitability for financing is whether it is able to stand alone as a distinct legal and
economic entity. Project assets, project-related contracts, and project cash flows need to
be separate from those of the sponsor.
3.5 Recent Developments: The 1990s
As summarized in Table 3.4, the main political events in the 1990s that influenced the
development of concessions were the signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the
opening of the former communist economies. The Maastricht Treaty formalised the
beginning of the monetary and economic integration of the EU, and set the Convergence
Criteria (CC). The CC were the five conditions that countries had to meet if they wanted
to take part in full economic and monetary union. They forced governments into
disciplines and budgetary constraints that were dictated by more than just their own
internal economic conditions. They were:
• Inflation - no more than 1.5% above the average inflation rate of the lowest three
inflation countries in the EU;
Interest rates - the long-term rate should be no more than 2% above the average of
the three countries with the lowest inflation rates;
• Budget deficit - no more than 3% of GDP;
• National debt - no more than 60% of GDP;
• Exchange rates - currency within the normal bands of the ERM with no re-
alignments for at least two years.
60
The PFI' Political Social and Economical Environment
Table 3.4. Context of Privately Financed Projects since 1990
Macro-Economic Environment	 Milestones	 Privately Financed Projects
1990 - 1992
In 1989, Poland holds the lirst free election, in the Expansion of sector UK: FF1 launch of a program of
cormnunist eastern block, starting the democratic coverage,
	 public partnership with private
process that led to the opening of the markets. By
	 industry, to bring private investorsAccess	 to	
capital into financing a wide range ofthe end of 1991, the Soviet Communist Regime
markets	 andcollapses, which starts the dissolution of the
	
	 traditionally government activities
securitisation.Union of the Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR).
	 (1992).
These developments signal the opening of the In the 1 990s, most
USA: COSO Geothermal project,Eastern Bloc to modern capitalism.
	 Latin	 American $560 million.	 First project
countries undertook two1992: Maastricht Treaty signed in Februaiy
	 financing arranged in the quasi-
between the then 12 members of the EU. The major policy reforms: public Rule 144A securities
treaty moves significantly towards economic, private participation in market.
	
First project-related
political and social union and set out the detailed pension 	 hind financing to achieve investment-
timetable for EMIJ.	 It also sets out the management	 and grade status.infrastructureConvergence Criteria for economies that wanted to
investment.join in EMIJ.
1993: In the UK withUK: The Conservative government of John Major
the publication of the
'as elected in May 1992. The UK has joined the
Railway
 Act hems theERM in 1990, but the weakness of the pound
forces Britain out of the ERM in 1992.
	
privatisation of the
railways.
1993 - 1995
More former communist countries continued to Expansion of regional USA: Indiatown Cogeneration
open their economies, embracing market driven coverage.
	 Project, $505 million; publicly
policies,	 registered capital markets projectSecuritisation of project financing.
	 First to receiveGlobalisation accelerated with the economies of equity. investment-grade rating duringthe former Eastern Bloc and Western bloc ongoing
construction period.integration. This process is favoured by the
technological developments in information
	 Several projects commenced in
technology. Japan, Philippines, Colombia,
Mexico, Ivory Coast, Poland and
Oman.
1996 - 1997
1997: UK Labour Government of Tony Blair is Larger
	 exposures, UK:
	 AES Barry, UK first
elected and continues the on-going policies longer tenures, less merchant power plant financing to
regarding PFI.
	 government	 close; 230 MW gas-fired power
Multilateral	 plant.Mid 1997:	 Asian financial crisis starts in Development	 Banks UK: Sutton Bridge. Gas-firedThailand and starts spreading to other countries and Export Credit
such as Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. Agency involvement, power plant project market a key
Japan's trade and investment is severely hit by the Greater market access.
	
development as the first Eurobond
economic downturn in Southeast Asia. with a Rule 144A placement,
Continued growth in which was London-listed and on
regional coverage, and which investors bear construction
improved	 fmancing risk. First, investment-grade rating
terms through mid for a plant with some merchant
1997.	 power risk.
Foreign currency crisis China Tangshan Sithe Coal Fired
overtakes	 many Plant, $128 million. First limited-
projects.	 recourse project in China.
Several projects commenced in
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Chile,
Panama and Venezuela
(cont.)
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Table 3.4. Context of Privately Financed Projects since 1990 (contd.)
Macro-Economic Environment	 Milestones	 Privately Financed Projects
1998
August: the Russian government announces that Continued innovation Several projects commenced in
it will devalue the currency and default on part of in selected financial China, Ivory Coast, India, Brazil
its fbreign debt. The Dow Jones Index of the New areas, but slowdown in and Mexico.
York Stock Exchange plunged 1,800 points. The financial flows. Fewer
events were followed by a currency crisis in new projects, many
Brazil.	 cancellations and debt
restructuring.
1999
Financial systems in several emerging markets September: In Japan
start to stabiljse.	 the	 Osaka	 Stock
Exchange established
the first FF1 market.
Source: IFC, 1999; Peterson, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Weisser, 1999; Encarta, 1999.
Project Finance had been a financial tool in use for hundreds of years in the mineral-
resources sector, but its widespread use that started in the 1970's with BP and
accelerated in the 1990's because of governments budget constraints and the consequent
need to use private ftinds for infrastructure development. Simultaneously, the
governments undertook the necessary regulatory framework for the application of the
projects. These regulatory reforms created new markets for the private sector in areas
where, previously, only the public sector operated. Simultaneously, partly at the
government's initiative, but also because of advances in computer and communications
technology, liberalisation, and globalisation of the financial markets took place. Very
important was the development of information technology tools that enabled the
appearance of a new set of financial debt, equity, and derivative products and a wider
range of risk management techniques. Securitisation in the form of project bond
offerings, starting in the early 1990's, and credit ratings for those bonds by major rating
agencies, starting in the mid 1990s, were milestones that greatly influenced the
development of project finance.
Since 1990, the flow of foreign investment to the Developing Countries has greatly
increased. It has taken place chiefly through concessions and the associated project
finance tools that increasingly use private capital to finance infrastructure projects.
According to the World Bank, between 1990 and 1997, long-term flows to private
sector borrowers in developing countries rose from about $44 billion to $322 billion. As
shown in Table 3.5, project finance flows accounted for an estimated $123 million in
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19,000
17,000
15,000
4,000
4,000
3,700
3,400
3,000
2,981
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1997 before the financial crisis in 1997. Asia received the majority of project finance
funds - $58 million in 1997. During the period from 1984 to 1995, 28% of the total
projects for private infrastructure worldwide were in Asia.
Table 3.5. Project Finance Transaction by Region, 1997-98
Region	 Number of Projects	 Amount (millions US$)
1997	 1998	 1997	 1998
Europe	 207	 104
Asia	 191	 63
Latin America	 105	 49
North America	 75	 33
Middle East & North
	
35	 14
Sub-Saharan Africa	 11	 8
Total
	
624	 271
Share of Developing	 380	 140
Countries
Source: International Finance Corporation, World Bank.
	81,7 	 26,173
	
58,405	 27,477
	
41,610
	
33,554
	
28,400	 15,033
	
22,876	 7,169
	
3,429
	
2,114
	
236,423
	
115,520
	
123,169
	
60,069
Also, as shown in Table 3.6, out of the ten largest private investment projects during the
same period, seven were in Asia (Park 1998). China is no exception; since late 1996
concessions have been awarded (Wang 1999) for several BOT projects, mainly power
plants, water plants and roads.
Table 3.6. Top Ten New Private Infrastructure Projects 1984-1995
Location	 Project
France/UK	 Channel Tunnel
Taiwan	 Taipei mass rapid system
Japan	 Kansai International Airport
Argentina	 Buenos Aires Water and Sewer
Thailand	 TelecomAsia communication
China	 Daya Bay nuclear power plant,
Malaysia	 North-South toll expressway
Mexico	 Petacalco coal-fired power plant
Thailand	 Bangkok elevated road and train
Source: World Bank Private Infrastructure Project DataBase.
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Since the onset of 1997 and due to the major financial crisis in Asia, the flow of foreign
capital for the Developing Countries has declined dramatically (I1FC 1999). Projects had
their debt re-structured, while others were cancelled or deferred. The recovery will
inevitably depend on the willingness of domestic banks and international banks to resume
lending and the performance of local financial markets to calm investors' and lenders'
fears about foreign-currency and interest-rate risks. In other developed countries, the
investments have continued at the same pace. Nevertheless the experience of the last
years has pointed out that these projects are complex and their start-up is time
consuming. While there have been some impressive successes, unfortunately many
projects never got off the ground, others have taken more time to develop than planned,
and some have run into financial difficulties after only a few years of commercial
operations. According to the latest data (Financial Times 2002) the project finance
market shrank in 2001, as the number of project finance deals fell to 303, worth $144.6
billions. However, as also stated, some bankers, while acknowledging that in some areas
there has been a decline, said that the lower figures were also a reflection of tighter
definitions regarding what qualifies as a project finance deal.
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3.6 Conclusions
Concessions have developed as a response by the governments to changes (Haque 1996)
in the ideological values from Keynesian economics that predominated in the post-war
era, to Monetarism. With it, the promotion of freedom is a major value. This means that
a free market is seen as a predominant mechanism through which services and goods
must be distributed, price being the signalling mechanism. Keynesian economics is
heavily interventionist whilst monetarists advocate a minimalist state. These ideological
shifts in government policies were dictated by the failure of the Bretton Woods system
and the Keynesian welfare state. Concessions were also favoured because of enabling
developments in project finance techniques, financial markets, and information
technologies.
Summarising the reasons for this worldwide trend in the usage of concessions (Hollihan
1994, IFC 1999) there is a mixture of ideological, political, economical and financial
factors:
. Abandonment of Keynesian theories, and the emergence of the New Capitalism that
favours the regulatory intervention of the state, and the usage of private capital to
fund its policies;
. Governmental budgetary constraints - EU member countries are not supposed to
have total debt more than 60 percent of GDP; and in the Developing Countries the
governments don't have sufficient funds for the necessary investments in
infrastructure;
Infrastructure in the private sector taps new sources of capital:
1. Strategic investors, for example, developers and owners of power
plants in the USA and other developed countries. Their power programs are
mature in their home countries, and yet they want stay in the power business, so
they are reinvesting offshore and building power plants in developing countries;
2. Private sector lenders, typically life insurance companies and
pension funds, a significant part of whose portfolio is required to be in the
private sector. The long-term investment profile of these funds fits the long-
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term debt issues of concessions. Also, the EU is considering to set limit pension
ftinds investments to high risk holdings , which favours the PFI bond issuance
market (Financial Times 2002);
• Globalisation of financial markets has helped to create a broader spectrum of
financial instruments and new classes of investors;
• The recourse to project finance has two important advantages:
1. It reduces the overall risk for major project participants, by
tapping various sources - equity investors, banks and capital markets. Each
demands a different risk/return profile for its investment, so large projects can
raise finance at relatively low cost;
2. The risks of a new project remain separate from its existing
business. If the project, large or small, were to fail, would not affect the
financial integrity of the sponsor's core business;
• Private sector efficiency - this has been one of the main justifications given by
governments to justify the partnerships with the private sector. In effect, empirical
research points out (Wolf 1988) that the private sector, being more dynamically
efficient, is a better allocator of resources and therefore increases the efficiency of the
country over time. One of the reasons advanced is that the public sector lacks
competitive pressure to increase efficiency.
Concessions, although offering a number of advantages both to the public and private
sector, pose stringent requirements to all stakeholders involved. First, a very long-term
(20-30 years) relationship has to be managed. This implies dealing with human,
technical, financial, environmental, and economic issues that can present unforeseen
aspects in later years. Second, from the point of view of the government, by putting the
private sector in charge of the provision of a service, the government doesn't waive the
responsibility for the public service (Vives 1997) it only changes the type of
responsibility, which can even bring an increase in its technical and political complexity.
Delegating the service to the private sector means that the government has to adopt legal
and institutional mechanisms to ensure that the service is provided efficiently and the
responsibilities assumed by the private sector are thifilled. Last, Project Finance is a
demanding tool. Since it relies on the cash flows of the project, it requires the exhaustive
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identification, analysis, allocations and mitigation of all risks. This is a complex process,
subject to a great deal of uncertainty and lengthy negotiations. In order (IFC 1999) to
attract financing, a project needs to be careftilly structured to ensure that all parties'
obligations are negotiated and are contractually binding. Financial and legal consultants
and other experts may have to spend considerable time and effort designing the structure
and conducting a detailed appraisal of the project. These steps add to the bidding costs
of the project, which can only be recovered if the consortium wins the tender
Concessions using project finance techniques are a most valuable way of capturing
private capital for otherwise publicly financed projects. However, their success depends
primarily on the existence of a supportive regulatory framework - rules, regulations and
policies - and of a developed financial market. Working to its advantage is the increasing
globalisation and sophistication of financial markets that have innovated and created a
broader spectrum of financial instruments and new classes of investors.
As mentioned earlier, PFI is part of this world-wide trend in private finding for public
projects, but it has specific and innovative characteristics. Concessions have been in use
for a long time, and conceptually PFI is also a concession. The difference between PFI
and concessions lies in one innovative aspect of PFI. It relates the revenues for the
private partner solely to the provision of a service, which in turn is performance related.
The innovative focus on service provision has opened to the private sector a variety of
sectors that previously were outside of the scope of concessions such as schools, prisons,
accommodation, hospitals, etc., providing managerial and custodial services.
Traditionally concessions were used only for infrastructure projects, but now with PFI a
whole new range of sectors is available for private funding and operation.
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The following chapters are dedicated to describe the proposed framework for PFI
sustainability and constitute the essence of the conceptual framework developed, i.e., the
model for the Sustainable Competitive Advantage of PFI. Chapter 4 introduces the PFI
as a procurement tool. Based on the research it describes its life cycle, value chain and
the main reasons for variability among projects. Finally assesses the competitive
advantage of PFI. Chapter 5 proposes the PFI Risk Uncertainty Management model and
Chapter 6 the PFI Critical Success Factors model.
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CHAPTER 4
The Nature of PFI
This chapter describes PFI according to the traditional management frameworks, like
the value chain, life cycle, etc. PFI is as a novel way to do business, and requires the
establishment of a long-term relationship. PFI is an innovative concession as it relates
the revenues for the private partner solely to the provision of a service, which in turn is
performance related. To assess PFI success or failure is still premature due to the long
life cycle of PFI projects, 20-30 years, and most projects have not yet been in operation
for 10 years. Nevertheless, based on the experience gained by all stakeholders in
dealing with these projects it is possible to point out to the existence of several issues
that have to be addressed.
4.1 The Integrative and Holistic Nature of PFI
The background and development of PFI was described Chapter 1. A proposed
definition for PFI follows based on the UK's Government published regulations, the
background of PFI and its implementation procedures. PFI has been minimalistically
characterised as a government procurement tool. An integrative and holistic definition
must include the "why" and "how" of PFI. As such, the PFI definition adopted in this
research follows:
PFI is an integrative, holistic, social and economic
developing policy of the UK Government. It integrates a
hierarchy of four levels of concepts: Government Ideology,
Principles, Practices and Tools. In its essence is the
provision of a public service funded by private capital.
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A comprehensive definition must begin with the Governments' fundamental beliefs that
form the basis for PFI's conceptual formulation. The beliefs are the underlying
condition for the government' policies, which in turn are put in practice by a framework
of regulations. To implement these regulations a set of tools - management, technical,
financial, etc. - is used. Figure 4. 1 illustrates the PFI holistic and integrative model that
was adopted. At the first conceptual level is the monetarist political and economical
ideology. Monetarist's principles and beliefs are at the second conceptual level. The
ones relevant for PFI are: the establishment of a free competitive market, the control of
public expenses, and that VFM must be obtained by gains in efficiency and
effectiveness (fostering innovation) and transferring the risk to the party best able to
manage them (be it the private or public sector). At the third level are the Practices to
implement the PFI projects: Free-Standing Projects, Joint Ventures and DBFO. Finally,
at the fourth and last level are the main tools used in PFI projects: VFM-performance
Auditing, Public Sector Comparator (PSC) Benchmarking, Project Finance, Risk
Management, Value Management and Total Quality Management (TQM).
Govern,ne,:t
Ideology
Monetarist
/	 Basic Principles
/	 Free competitive market
/	 Control of Public Expenses
/	 Value for Money
Risk Transfer to the party best able to manage it
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Innovation
Practices
Free - Standing Projects
Joint Ventures
DBFO
TooLc
VFM - Performance Auditing
PSC Benchmarking,
Project Finance
Risk Management
Value Management
TQM
Figure 4.1. PFI Holistic and Integrative Conceptual Model
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4.1.1 PFI Relation with Other UK Government Policies
The UK Government has launched in 1996 the PPP, and it is common to find reference
to PPP/PFI. Then what distinguishes PPP from PFI?
PPP is one UK' Government policy to involve the private and public sector in
Government initiatives in generic terms. Its purpose is to "negotiate deals that are
good for both sides" (HM Treasury Taskforce 1997). PPP as in words of Tim Wilson,
(1999) Head of Private Finance Policy Team is
'The PPP programme include: privatisation, improving regulation of
utilities, wider market 'making state assets sweat', making Government
commerce more businesslike (e.g. greater commercial freedom for the
Post Office) and the Private Finance Initiative.....The PFI is a service
funded in a variety of ways'.
The fundamental difference between PPPs and PFI, being that PPP is a generic public
private partnership, while PFI is a sub-sector of PPP, with the specific purpose to
deliver a service of publicly managed assets using private capital.
4.1.2 PFI Relation with Other Forms of Concessions
Concession's ftindamental principles are that the private sector is responsible for the
finance, design, build, and operation of the service. The revenues of the project
guarantee the financing. This basic scheme can present numerous alterations,
depending upon the risk allocation between the private and public sector. The main
categories of risks allocated are Finance (the public sector can subsidise projects that are
not economically viable) Design, Build, Operate, Ownership and Transfer of Assets at
the end of the concession period. The most common types of concessions are the BOT,
BOOT-Build-Operate-Own-Transfer and DBFO.
The predominant model for a PFI is the DBFO, followed at distance by free-standing
projects and joint ventures. In time, as each contract is unique, other forms of PFI will
probably develop. Table 4.1 summarises how the three types of PFI projects compare
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Table 4.1. Private Sector Involvement in Concessions
Payment	 CharacteristicsFinance Design Build Operate Own Transfer Mechanism
The private sector is
Free	 required to recover
all costs throughStanding	 Yes	 charges on the finalOnly Direct
Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 .	 by Users, e.g. (usually) 	 private
users of the service.
	
Fixed	 Toll
term The public sectorplays a facilitating
role but no public
___________ __________ __________ _______ __________ _________ ___________ ____________ money is involved.
The public sector
Joint	 contributes a subsidy
Users	 + to a project but theVenture Subsidies by revenue	 comes
Govt	 for principally	 from
social	 third parties. These
services, like
	
projects	 have	 aPartially	Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 urban	 positive cost benefit
regeneration	 analysis, but would
schemes	 or not he financially
congestion	 viable if thnded by
relief roads	 private	 finance
alone.
The private parties
DBFO	 Designs,	 Builds
	
Yes	 Finances	 and
Design	 In	
Government
Operates	 the
Build	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 pays only tbr facilities and ihe
	
fixed	 services
Finance
	
term	 delivery	
public	 partner
Operate	 purchases	 theservices.
Specific	 for
DCMF	 custodial services, in
Design	 the	 UK.	 the
Const.	 Yes	 Yes	
consortium provides
prisoner	 places.
Manag.	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 In	 Volume risk is taken
Finance	 fixedManage	 by the public sector,
	
term	 that is also in charge
of	 the	 policies
relating	 to	 the
individual prisoners.
Concession	 life
BOT	 significantly shorter
Build	 that the facility's
economic life,. e.g.,
Operate	 Coal - fired power
Transfer	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 plant typically 15-20
years for the
concession vs. a
plant life of 30-40
years.
BOOT
Build	 Yes
Own	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Fixed	 Yes	
synonymous	 of
DBFO in the USA.
Operate	 term
Transfer__________ __________ _______ __________ ________ ___________ ____________ ___________________
BOO	 Consortium has a
Build	 Yes	 concession life as
Own	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Fixed	 long as the expectedeconomic life of theOperate	 term	 facility	 (30-50
years).
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with other concessions. A YES indicates that private sector takes responsibility for that
particular stage. In all forms of concessions, the private sector is required to Finance,
Design, Build and Operate the facilities. The main difference lies with the Payment
Mechanism, the Ownership and the Transfer Mechanism of the Assets at the end of the
concession period. Regarding financing the exception are Joint Ventures where finance
is provided both by the public and private sector, in all others it is the private sector sole
responsibility.
4.2 Key Concepts related with PFI
In the bidding phase the participants have to deal with two of the most important criteria
in a PFI project: VFM and PSC. A description of both concepts follows.
4.2.1 Value for Money
One of the main criteria for winning a PFI proposal is a clear demonstration of VFM. It
is a financial test (Grout 1997) that compares the cost to the public sector of conducting
the project with the cost of buying in the service from the private sector. When the
public provision side is considered, the project is being valued from the cost side. That
is the Treasury is calculating the present value of the cash flows of the cost of the
project. When private provision is considered the project is calculated from the revenue
side. That is the Treasury calculates the present value of the cash flows of the revenues
of the project. Providing the correct price of risk is used for each calculation, then these
two valuations are exactly the correct ones and the route with the lowest present value
should be chosen.
Value for Money is often used by governments and public in current language but not
always with the same meaning. 'VFM is a term used to describe two concepts:
Public Accountability of Governments;
An Accounting Method used in Performance Auditing.
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Clearly both concepts are closely inter-related (Jacobs 1998) since there is a growing
emphasis upon accounting and management of the public sector, and a link between
accounting and public policy. One way that this emphasis has been expressed is in the
practice of VFM auditing. VFM can be defined as "an examination designed to
determine whether the organisation in question is performing economically, efficiently
and effectively in its use of resources, operations, procedures and pursuit of objectives"
(Jacobs 1998). Although different terms are used to describe the process (VFM,
operational, performance and management auditing, economy and efficiency reviews)
they describe the same thing. However, and very important to understanding this
concept, the exact nature of VFM is dependent upon the legal mandate and practices in
a particular context.
VFM was first used as a management tool. The case of New Zealand is particularly
enlightening and it will be described it in some detail to better understand the evolution
of VFM concept. In the 1970s, there was an economic slowdown, and the National
Government went into power with a desire to cut costs within the public sector. There
were also public demands for accountability sparked by a series of ministerial scandals
and well publicised cases of departmental incompetence. Some new Government
Ministers were committed to developing a business-like approach within their
departments. There were also underway a number of financial and administrative
reforms. In addition, during the 1 970s many countries expanded the compliance and
probity roles of the legislative auditor to include matters such as efficiency,
effectiveness and performance of government units. In 1977, New Zealand
Government publishes the Public Finance Act 1977 Section 25(3) that provided a legal
mandate for the Audit Office to conduct performance or VFM auditing. While the
Auditor - General did not have the power to question the merits of executive policy, he
could inquire whether resources were applied effectively and efficiently in a manner
consistent within a given policy.
The concept of VFM as a solution to the need to cut costs and to ensure that there was
'value for money' from public spending was further developed under Tyler as New
Zealand's Auditor-General. Tyler argued that the Auditor-General was responsible not
just to parliament but to the public too:
'There are those that believe the Office of Controller and Auditor -General
should report to the House and leave it at that. But I've always been of the
view that my responsibility was to the people. It was them that I was
reporting to through the agency of Parliament representing people. But in
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the ultimate it's people's money: they are the stockholders, and that's
where my loyalty lies' (Taylor 1992 in Jacobs 1998).
As such, Tyler developed the concept of VFM as a tool for Public Accountability.
In the UK with PFI's introduction, both policy concepts of VFM were reinstated by the
Government (HIVI Treasury Taskforce 1998). In June 1997 the Bates Review
recommended that the Treasury Taskforce should issue guidance on the way in which
PSCs should be calculated, and bids evaluated for VFM. The Paymaster General
accepted Malcom Bates's recommendation and decided that the new guidance should
fully reflect the government's commitment to using PFI as a procurement tool whenever
it enhances VFM when judged alongside other options. This policy decision makes the
assessment of the relative VFM of such options a fundamental part of good project
appraisal. As public procurement involves the expenditure of taxpayer's money, there is
a constant need to ensure that the money has been spent economically, efficiently and
effectively. Where it can be shown that money has been spent in this manner, it is
reasonable to conclude that VFM has been achieved. The Taskforce Guidance
concludes 'The achievement of value for money is a key responsibility of the Accounting
Officer'.
4.2.2 Public Sector Comparator
How and when does the Government apply the VFM test? The answer is stated in the
HM Treasury Taskforce Guidance (1998a) on how to conduct the Preliminary Options
Appraisal of Public Projects. It uses the "Public Sector Comparator" as a benchmark
against which VFM is assessed.
According to the Taskforce Guidance (HM Treasury Taskforce 1999) on 'How to
construct a Public Sector Comparator'the PSC can be defined as:
A hypothetical risk-adjusted costing, done by the public sector as a
supplier, to an output specijI cation produced as part of a PFI procurement
exercise. It:
Is expressed in net present value terms;
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. Is based on the recent actual public sector method of providing
that defined output (including any reasonably foreseeable
efficiencies the public sector could make; and
.	 Takes full account of the risks that would be encountered by that
style ofprocurement.
The purpose of the PSC is therefore to provide a benchmark against which to form a
judgement on the VFM of PFI bids. It is important to understand that Comparators are
used in a variety of circumstances, one of which is the PFI procurement process. Also,
however sophisticated the Comparator it is important to remember that this process
focuses on factors that are not easily quantified and expressed in monetary terms. For
example, a PSC, which is lower than a PFI bid, does not imply automatic rejection of
the PFI. Consideration of the wider benefits (and costs) of accepting the bid may lead
the Accounting Officer to conclude that PFI still represents best \TFM, because of the
transfer of risks which are not quantifiable and hence not reflected in the PSC.
In the context of PFI procurement, it is helpful to distinguish between two roles for
which the PSC can be used (HM Treasury Taskforce 1999):
• As a management tool during the project;
• As a means of demonstrating VFM, when the contract has been signed.
According to the Treasury Taskforce a PSC should include:
An overview of the project;
• An estimation of the basic procurement costs: capital costs, such as purchase,
construction, project management (internal and consultants), and operating
costs;
• A risk matrix - costs, likelihood of occurrence and consequences for the project;
• A discounted cash flow and the corresponding net present value of costs of the
project;
• Sensitivity analysis, showing the consequences of varying key assumptions.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the steps in the decision process as whether to pursue or not the
PFI route.
Preliminary Option
No Comparator needed to
L Identifies PFI as an option
Appraisal:	
Yes	 ate value for money
aybe
Yes
No
Is the project a joint-
venture involving publiL
subsidy'?
No
I Is conventional funding the
Ioutput specification a
The cost of providinrealistic option'?
	
__ice using
convention
The Accounting Officer should consider
whether to use a conventional PSC and/or
a Comparator based on a lower level of
No	 service using an alternative affordable
asset base
Figure 4.2. The Decision Process in a PFI
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4.2.3 PFI Contract Model
A PFI is a free contractual relationship between the parties. As such, although there are
guidelines and usual practices, every contract is unique. Each contract can have
different features as long as all parties agree upon them. Nevertheless, to reduce time
and costs involved in the bidding stage, standard documentation can be used as a basis
for the discussion of contracts. The Taskforce published in September 1999 the PFI
Standardisation Document.
The general mechanism for a PFI contract is shown in Figure 4.3. The main
participants in the contracts are:
Authority - Public sector party buying the service. It can be a department of central
Government, a Local Authority, or a separate legal entity established under statute, such
as National Health Service Trusts or the Passenger Transport Executive.
Contractor - Counterpart of the Authority. A consortium that is an autonomous
legal entity, totally independent of the companies that own it, commonly designated as
SPV, with sub-contractors providing the actual performance on its behalf. It is the only
entity that can establish contracts with the Authority;
• Construction Sub Contractor - The entity performing the constructionldevelopment
obligations;
• Operating Sub-Contractor - The entity performing the operating/maintenance
obligations;
• Senior Lenders - The providers of finance to the Contractor under a financing
agreement, but excluding any shareholder or Affiliate of any shareholder in the
Contractor. They provide the Senior Debt and can be banks, bondholders and/or
monoline (that solely insures credit risks) insurers. When all those with a financial
stake (including shareholders) are referred to, then the expression 'financiers' is used.
The PFI Contract is the main contract and is established between the Authority and the
Contractor. The mechanisms to purchase the specific service are then established. It
defines the service, identifies and allocates the risks and establishes the payment
mechanism, among other clauses.
The complexity of the PFI contracts lies not only in the main contract between the
Authority and the Contractor, but also in the other parallel contracts that have to be
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signed among the private parties. There are basically four other types of legal
agreements, which have to be signed in addition to the PFI main contract;
• Contractor Contract. This contract creates the SPV that acts as the promoter for the
project. They usually are joint ventures of construction and operating companies
including suppliers, vendors, etc. This agreement defines the new autonomous legal
entity usually referred as the Contractor. It establishes their contractual relationships,
the measures to control the breakdown of the consortium and dispute resolution
procedures;
• Sub-Contracts between the Contractor and Sub-Contractors: the Construction
Contract and the O/M Contract. Often there is another contract between the
construction sub-contractor and the operator for building maintenance through the life-
cycle of the project;
• Loan Agreement. The finance of the PFI is a mixture of equity and bonds, although
it can take several forms. It is established between the Senior Lenders and the
Contractor. Lenders are often commercial banks, pension funds or export credit
agencies. This is the usual form of contract, but there are exceptions, e.g., prisons (1-IIM
Treasury Taskforce 996) where the Senior Lenders also establish a Direct Agreement
with the Authority if the consortium runs into difficulties, or fails to comply with its
objectives. When there is outstanding debt it allows the lenders to change the
construction company, operating or maintenance company, or indeed the consortium
itself,
• Direct Agreement is an agreement between the Authority and Senior Lenders that
deals with their relationship following a termination or threatened termination for
Contractor Default (when there is outstanding debt). It gives Senior Lenders an
opportunity to set up remedial actions, that can include the replacement of the
Contractor;
• Shareholders Agreement typically between the Sub-contractors and Investors.
Investors may include suppliers, vendors, financial institutions as well as private
individuals. Investors provide equity to finance the project, the amount often
determined by the debt/equity ratio required by lenders.
The final PFI contract is only established when all the other contracts are in line with it.
The final structure of the contract has to make sense for all parties. To finalise it has to
be remembered that each contract is unique and variations around the presented model
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of contractual arrangements happen in each PFI project. Nevertheless, the alterations
usually involve adding extra contracts keeping the basic contractual structure as the one
presented in Figure 4.3.
Investors
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'-a)
0
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Contractor
Spy
Senior Lenders
PFI Contract
(0
(0\'
Authority
c.
'I
I
ConstructionOperating	
)... - - 
BuddIng Maintenance - -
	
Sub-ContractorSub-Contractor
Figure 4.3. The Contracts in a PFI
Consultants (technical, legal, insurance) have ancillary contracts with all entities from
the private and public sectors.
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4.3.1 PFL Value Chain and Value Delivery Network
4.3.1 PFI Value Chain
The concept of value chain was introduced by Porter (1985). It disaggregates a firm
into its strategically relevant activities in order to better understand the behaviour of
costs and potential sources of differentiation. Every firm is a collection of activities that
are performed to design, produce, market deliver and support the product/service. The
value chain identifies nine strategically relevant activities that create value and cost in a
specific business. The nine value-creating activities consist of five primary activities
and four support activities.
Primary activities - Are the activities involved in the physical creation of the
product/delivering of the service. In a firm primary activities can be divided into five
generic categories. Inbound Logistics, Operations, Outbound Logistics, Marketing and
Sales, and Service.
Support activities - Are the activities that support each other and the other activities by
providing purchased inputs, technology, human resources and various ftinctions: Firm
Infrastructure, Human Resources Management, Technology Development and
Procurement.
Linkages within a firm's value chain - Are relationships between how one value
activity is performed and the cost or performance of another. Linkages can lead to
competitive advantage in two ways: optimisation and co-ordination.
Vertical Linkages - These are external links to the firm and exist between the firm's
value chain and that of suppliers and channels. There are two sorts of vertical linkages:
- Supplier Linkages between a firm's chain and the value chain of suppliers;
- Channel Linkages are similar to supplier linkages, but are referred to the
linkages to value chains through which a firm's product passes.
The firm's value chain plus the one from suppliers, channels (distributors, customers),
and the vertical links between all value chains is the Value-Delivery Network. Value is
created not only within the company but also throughout the entire network.
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Competition is therefore between networks, not firm's. The competitive advantage
derives from the better network, not only from the firm's own value chain.
Activity Types - Within each category of primary and support activities, there are three
activity types that play a different role in competitive advantage: Direct, Indirect and
Quality Assurance.
Value chain analysis is a tool designed to emphasise firm's competitive advantage vis-
à-vis its competitors. It is not suited for industries since it would be too broad and
important sources of competitive advantage, and differentiation that can only be applied
to a company will necessarily be obscured. Differences among competitor's value
chains are a key source of competitive advantage. The firm's task (Kotler 1999) is to
examine its costs and performance in each value-creating activity and to look for ways
to improve it. The firm should estimate its competitor's costs and performances as
benchmarks. To the extent, it can perform certain activities better than its competitors,
it can achieve a competitive advantage.
The classic value chain is a static model designed to analyse one firm vis-à-vis its
competitors, and PFI is a project (not a firm) that develops continuously through time.
Therefore, the underlying assumptions of a value chain don't adjust 100% to the case of
a PFI. Nevertheless, this concept is extremely useful to pinpoint the activities that
create value. In order to use the value chain concept within a PFI, this study proposes to
make two adjustments: first, it has to be assumed that a PFI can, in generic terms, be
compared with a SBU - Strategic Business Unit and consequently with a singular
company as it has its own individual inputs and outputs and one can measure its value
creation; second, time has to be introduced as another dimension. New primary
activities are introduced and others are phased out. Value is created throughout the
development of the project. These two assumptions enable us to draw the PFI Dynamic
Value Chain where the Primary Activities will be different from the classical Value
Chain. The Support Activities will remain the same.
The PFI Dynamic Value Chain (adapted from Porter in Kotler 1999) is represented in
Figure 4.4.
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The nature of FF1
The Support Activities in a Dynamic Value Chain of a PFI are:
- Human resources management
- Firm Infrastructure with the following activities
- Management
- Finance
- Accounting
- Legal
- Insurance
- Technological Development
- Procurement
The Primary Activities in a Dynamic Value Chain of a PFI are:
- Business Need
- Appraise Options
- Business Case
- Expression of Interest
- Bidding Design Short List Selection
- Negotiation Final Evaluation
- Construction Development
- Operation
- Termination
4.3.2 PFI Value-Delivery Network
The Value-Delivery Network encompasses the value chains of all the stakeholders. In
a PFI project, there are numerous stakeholders involved in value creation, so the model
of a PFI value-delivery network gives a better and clearer picture on how value is
created, than just the representation of the PFI value chain. In a PFI value is dependent
not only from the value activities performed within the PFI project, but also by the PFI
related value activities performed outside the project.
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Stakeholders of a PFI
• Authority
• Contractors
• Finance - Senior Lenders
• Insurance
• Construction Sub-contractors
• Operating / Maintenance Sub-Contractors
• Suppliers
• Users that generate return
• Users that don't generate return
• Technical consultants
• Accounting consultants
• Legal consultants
• Financial consultants
• Auditors (NAO)
• Statutory / Regulatory Agencies
• Environmental Issues
• Labour Issues
• Political Issues
Figure 4.5 presents the value-delivery network of a PFI project (adapted from Kotler
1999) with the stakeholder's value chains and their inter-actions. The bold arrows
represent the most important connections that form the essence of the PFI contract. The
dotted arrows are potential influences (that might occur).
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Figure 4.5. PFI Value-Delivery Network
The other arrows represent connections that are always present in a PFI but that are not
part of the PFI contract itself In the centre, we have the main players: the Authority
and the Contractor surrounded by the other stakeholders that can influence one or both
of the main players. For example, in Figure 4.5 several stakeholders influence directly
86
The nature of PFI
only the Contractor like Sub-contractors, Senior Lenders, Insurance, and Suppliers
while Auditing only influences directly the Authority.
Although all the consultants are connected both to the Authority and Contractor, they
are not the same for both. This simplified representation is chosen as to not to
overburden the figure with the duplication of all the consultant's value chains.
Regarding the users of the service two types are represented: Users A the ones that pay
for the services, like toll-bridges, and Users B that don't pay for the service, the
authority pays according to the usage rate of the service 1 , like motorists in highways
where the Government pays the shadow tolling.
The Value Delivery Network that is represented in Figure 4.5 can be considered only to
be a simplified version. To have a full picture of how far the value chains interact one
would have to consider for instance the value chains of the relevant professional bodies,
and the externalities conveyed by PFI.
4.4 Life Cycle of a PFI
The life cycle of a project is the time span over which the project develops from the
very beginning until the end. Based on the usual procedures in the development of a
PFI a model is proposed that characterizes the various stages. It is important to assess
the PFI's life cycle since a basic principle in a successful PFI is that it must be
profitable on a whole life cycle basis. That is why life cycle costing has been one of the
management techniques more developed in these projects. The project in itself is
continuous but it is always possible to divide it into stages according to the actual
developments that are taking place, the criteria being the similarities of functions
undertaken and the stakeholders that intervene in each one.
The life cycle of a PFI develops through eleven stages (Figure 4.6). The establishment
of a PFI project starts with the bidding process, continues with the signing of the
contract, service provision and contract management, and ends when the contract
expires. Clearly there is always the possibility that at the end of the pre-specified time
for the provision of the service it will be again re-tendered and another contractor steps
in.
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The eleven stages are (1-IM Treasury Taskforce 2000):
1. Establishment of Business Need
2. Appraisal of Options
3. Development of Business Case
4. Expression of Interest
5. Bidding / Design I Short List Development
6. Negotiation 2 / Final Evaluation
7. Contract Award and Financial Close
8. Construction / Development
9. Operation (Servicing, Monitoring, Maintenance)
10. Contract Management
11. End of Contract
Now follows a brief description of the several phases. The first steps of bidding and
contract signing are crucial since they state the conditions for the long-term relationship
that is going to be established. I\ 'lost importantly the contract's structure must clearly
define the basis for the future long term operational and managerial relationship
between the Authority and the Contractor:
- Business Need - In this stage the Authority assess the need for the service, the
affordability of the project and the business objectives
2 - Appraisal of Options - All the options to carry on the project are appraised by the
Authority: The scope of the project is clearly identified and assessed for its consistency
with the strategic objectives. If the investment is expected to be affordable and cost-
effective the analysis proceeds to Stage Three
3 - Development of the Business Case - The possibility of a PFI solution is explored.
A clear definition of the service (output) to be delivered is done (not asset description)
and a decision is made whether to consider a PFI funding type of project or not, by the
Authority. A reference project is developed, or a PSC, where the capital investments,
operation, maintenance, analysis of service time overruns and service under-
performance costing is done.
In FF1 literature they are referred as 'Users that generate return' and 'Users that don't generate return'.
2 The negotiation procedure can lead to a change in service requirements that \vere included in the original OJEC.
This can lead to a 7udicial review' when other competitors can claim that if those were the conditions they could
have presented a proposal with better VFM. This happens otlen in the uK. e.g., in the accommodation sector, during
a negotiation a land deal might be proposed hich was not there in the first place.
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Figure 4.6. PFI Life Cycle
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A complete risk analysis of the project is undertaken together with a preliminary
evaluation and costing of the risks that will be transferred to the Private Sector. The
project needs to be costed with sufficient reliability so that the service seems affordable
on a year-by-year basis. It is necessary to undertake a comprehensive estimation of
whole life costs and the identification/evaluation of the risks inherent to the investment.
In special cases a preliminary market study is undertaken to ensure that there are
adequate suppliers - sometimes a prior Information Notice appears in the Official
Journal of the European Community (OJEC) to elicit potential expressions of interest of
potential suppliers that will informally discuss the project.
If the PFI project seems unaffordable, return to stage 2: repeat the options appraisal.
Readdress the need for the service and investigate other solutions until an affordable
Reference Project is identified.
During this stage a project leader is selected and the PSC is checked by the financial
consultants regarding to costs, by the legal consultants regarding to the compliance with
UK and EU legislation's and by accountancy consultants regarding the compliance with
the accounting norms.
Finally, the Government makes a decision whether to proceed with the project.
4 - Expression of Interest - In this stage the PFI Procurement Team is developed - It
has members from the Authority, outside consultants and Internal Audit has also to be
considered. It is very important to ensure that Senior Government Officials are
committed and empowers the team. The roles, responsibilities are established, as well
as timetables for when the flilly costed proposals and the selection of the preferred
bidder are due. Training in PFI projects and negotiation is often undertaken. It ends
with the publication in the OJEC after checking its compliance with the EU's framework
procurement method.
5 - Bidding / Design /Short List Selection - This is the first stage where the Private
Sector is involved with the formation of the Bidding Consortiums. In the bidding
process is also comprised the design, because to bid the design has to be established.
The received bids are assessed by the Authority regarding financial strength as well as
to technical approach and appetite for risk. These criteria form the basis for the short
list selection. The funding commitment by the bidders is re-affirmed and the project is
again checked for accountancy compliance. This stage ends with the refining of the
appraisals. The first stage of the bidding process - short list - is also based on past
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experience. In the early days it used to include some design but that has been
discontinued to minimise costs.
6 - Negotiation (Tendering) / Final Evaluation - An invitation to negotiate is issued
by the Authority after having established the negotiation strategy. The bidders
proposals are evaluated mainly regarding the establishment of an innovative solution,
that there is enough evidence that the proposed risk allocation is accepted by the
proposed funders (senior lenders) and that the levels of financial commitment are
realistic. At the end of the negotiation procedure the Authority might seek a Best And
Final Offer (BAFO). From those the preferred bidder is chosen. The accounting
treatment is reconfirmed. Finally the PFI is re-evaluated regarding its affordability and
VFM.
In this stage and to ensure the success of the PFI, a complete and honest assessment of
the consistency of strategies and strategic objectives of all participants, must be done
before signing the contract. Unresolved conflicting interests are going to come up at
later stages and their resolution will be much more difficult, and in the worst case
scenario impossible.
7 - Contract Award and Financial Close - Detailed schedules must be completed on
the project documentation, construction and operating sub-contracts must be drafted and
financing documentation must be put in place. Contract award and financial close are
likely to be simultaneous.
8 - Construction / Development - It is the contractor's responsibility. The term
development issued since increasingly Information Technology (IT) projects are being
developed through PFI type projects. Construction is applied to PFI projects in the
construction area.
9 - Operation - It is the contractor's responsibility. 	 It starts with the Service
Commencement, and it comprises three operations: Servicing, Monitoring and
Maintenance. Top management must set out a Quality Management Policy so that a
Quality Management System will be in place.
10 - Contract Management - Contract management is an activity performed by the
Authority and ensures that roles and responsibilities in the contract are understood and
fulfilled. It is a distinct activity from the procurement process, and the Public sector
must manage, and have guidance, to ensure delivery of the contract services, on how to
deal with performance variations, and, if it applicable, to authorise payments. The long-
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term relationship between the Authority and the Contractor must be ruled by two
principles: Continuity and Knowledge.
11 - End of contract - The PFI contract specifies the provision of a service and has a
pre-defined life span. When it ends there is the possibility that the asset is transferred to
the private sector, or returned to the Public Sector. In this case the Authority has either
an alternative use for the asset, or re-tenders the service. Prior to the re-tendering of the
service there must be an evaluation of the Business Need.
The next sections present a brief discussion on these issues to help to clarify the context
in which PFI develops, and provide a better understanding on the conceptual
frameworks developed from Chapter 4 through to Chapter 7.
4.5 Key Issues in PFI
The shift from conventional procurement to PFI type of procurement brought about
several issues that have to be tackled and understood by all the stakeholders involved.
The issues range from the ones with a holistic nature like the organisational culture, to
others like the structure of financing and risk allocation. Based on the empiric data
collected and bibliographic sources (academic and non-academic) the issues that
emerged within the current research as key issues in a PFI are:
Change in Organisational Culture brought about by a move into the
Services Sector, coupled with the need to deal with Long-Term Issues;
Financing Structure: the balancing of debt and equity and the
hypothesis of considering bond issues to finance senior debt;
.	 Risk Allocation between the public and private sectors.
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4.5.1 Change in Organisational Culture
The public sector changes roles from the one of service provider and designer to service
specifier and performance monitor. The private sector also changes roles from the one
of an asset provider to a service provider. This focus on a service provision for an
extended period entails a change in both public and private organisational cultures.
They have to adjust to the move to the service sector, and to the commitment to very
long-term relationships.
Figure 4.7 illustrates how a governmental project in a non-PFI environment would be
conducted, and in contrast what happens in a PFI project. The private sector is involved
for 3-5 years, and as it delivers the project its role finishes. The public sector will then
operate and maintain the assets for the remainder of the life cycle of the project. In
contrast, with a PFI project, the private sector will be involved for 20-30 years, finances
and is also the service provider, operating and maintaining the facilities. The public
sector role is to monitor service performance.
Build
	 20-30 years
Public Sector
Monitors
Performance
Public Sector	 Operate
Maintain
End of Concession
Figure 4.7. Public and Private Sectors Change Roles in a PFI
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4.5.1.1 Move into the Service Sector
The main objective of a PFI is a service provision. This study considers it as a "move
into a new business" as it a new way to serve your clients, with all the changes in
company culture that it implies. The services sector is new for most of the private
parties involved. For example, for construction companies that have equity share in the
SPV it means a vertical diversification. They are no longer in the construction business
but in the services sector. For operating sub-contractors PFI projects also imply a
profound change in their approach to the way they operate. The payments are related to
unusual performance measures of service provision, e.g. in custodial services the service
provided is availability of prison space (the public sector retains the policies and actions
related to individual prisoners). This availability is not only the physical space but
includes a series of features like adequate staff levels, healthcare and food services.
Companies have to build and design buildings bearing in mind the adequacy of the asset
to a specific service. For example, if food services are to be supplied they are defined
by a given standard of food, rather than the need to build a specific kitchen.
In the public sector, PFI projects have also changed their usual ways of conducting a
procurement procedure. The focus on requirements for service provision rather than
saying how the service should be met, often through very detailed specifications,
requires an organisational culture with an open-mind and flexibility to accept innovative
solutions that might challenge established practices and procedures.
Design freedom was an important (HM Treasury Taskforce 1996) part of HIM Prison
Service's (1-II1VIIPS) procurement approach. The private sector consortia are formed from
a mix of construction companies, custodial service operators, facilities managers and
other service providers. During presentations of bidders proposals, the influence of the
operator on the design was quite apparent, reflecting not just the arrangements for
looking after prisoners but also the implications for fUture maintenance. The best bids
received were from consortia where the operators most clearly led the design team.
'Design freedom against an output based specification for the
service requirement (i.e. defining what you want in ternis of
the delivered service rather than saying how the service
should be met,) is a fundamental feature of successful PFI
projects, allowing the private sector to come forward i,'ith
innovative solutions' (HM Treasury Taskforce 1996).
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There is still a limited experience on how to define criteria for the services to be
delivered (Output Service Specifications) which are objective, easily measurable and
monitored. Typically, output specifications are broadly divided into two categories:
Services deriving from the underlying assets relating to their availability;
• Other services sometimes known as Secondary or "Soft services", like
caretaking, catering, laundry, grounds maintenance, etc.
For example, in the case of accommodation (or prisons) availability is not only the
physical availability of space but include also a set of services such as heating within
specified temperature range, mail delivery, conditions of access, and lighting. Not only
must the private sector supplier fail to deliver the service but it must also fail to remedy
within a prescribed time before it may suffer remission from the payment it was going
to receive. One of the objectives of establishing the Treasury Taskforce was the
production of Guidelines and Standard Contracts to overcome, or diminished these
problems.
4.5.1.2 Dealing with Long-Term Issues
Long-Term contractual relationships have inherent features related to long-term
strategic decisions. It's also a relationship that has to be managed for 20-30 years and
all aspects ranging from the human, technical, organizational are important. The SPV is
an autonomous legal unit and can be seen as a new company with a pre-established life
span of more than twenty years. This is a long period. Many companies don't last that
long. It is estimated (IAPMEI 1998) that new businesses have a 70% rate of failure
within five years of starting. All contractual relationships have to provide for this
extended life of the contract, and establish measures (Cordova 1994) to prevent
(control) the breakdown of the contract and establish dispute resolution procedures.
These procedures range from litigation, arbitration or Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) to avoid litigation or arbitration that are costly. Private companies must adjust
their organisational cultures to a long-term involvement instead of the past commitment
only to short-term projects. Among the features that PFI stakeholders have to bear in
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mind two are very important: It is vital to minimize whole life-cycle costs and to be
aware that the return on investment for the private sector is long-term.
• Minimize Whole Life-Cycle Costs - A long-term relationship has its specific
problems, and the financial incentives facing managers in many firms (Welles
1999) do not encourage them to evaluate long-term issues, short term benefits
are much more attractive. In PFI the design and build of infrastructures has to
be adequate not only to the immediate needs of the service, but also on a long-
term basis where the long term maintenance and replacement costs have to be
the optimised. By reducing maintenance costs whole life cycle costs may be
minimised. The empirical data indicates that companies are already engaging in
long-term planning of infrastructure design aimed at reducing both day-to-day
and long-term maintenance costs (Annexes II and III address this issue). The
design also favours flexible lay-outs adjustable to other future uses for the
assets. This effort in turn fosters innovation, which isperse an objective of PFI.
• When does the private sector get its return on investment? The ftrnding of a PFI
is a mixture of equity and senior debt that has to be paid back on maturity. In a
typical construction project companies and financing partners will be involved
during 3-5 years as the physical completion coincides with financial completion
of the project. When the construction phase is completed the sponsors receive
their payment and the project ends. The SPY does not receive a singular
payment at the end of the project as when in traditional procurement, but instead
payment is raised by a continuous inflow of capital throughout the life of the PFI
to service the debt and recover capital. The full payment for the investment of
the private sector will only be achieved after years of service provision. It can
happen that the project reaches financial completion before the end of the
contract. For example, the Dartford-Thurrock Crossing concessionaire has until
2008 to recoup costs from tolls (DETR 1999), but as of 1999 they were expected
to achieve their financial objectives by autumn 2001. There will be then an
additional year of tolls to accumulate a maintenance fund. The crossing will
then revert to the Government free of debt. In a Free-Standing PFI the public
sector is responsible for the payment, and it seems reasonable that the payment
risk, i.e., the risk that the private sector takes is relatively low. Governments
usually pay their dues. Nevertheless in projects where it is the users that pay for
the service there is an accrued risk of non-payment. A good example is the
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Indáqua Feira project (Annex V) where the users connected to the water and
wastewater systems pay directly to Indaqua. There is always the risk of
payment default especially when people run into financial difficulties. The
result is very often a costly collecting procedure sometimes involving court
procedures.
4.5.2 Which is the Best Financing Structure?
The financing structure has to deal with two main issues: The balancing of debt and
equity and the resort of bond issues to finance the senior debt
4.5.2.1 Balancing of Debt and Equity
The balancing of debt and equity is often difficult to achieve (Vives 1996) due to the
structure of project financing deals, their risks and the incentives that guide the
sponsors. The importance lies in the relationship of the ratio of equity to debt with the
amount of risk the shareholders are willing to take, principally on a long-term basis.
For example, low equity participation (Beato 1997) and control of concessionaires by
construction companies might have contributed to the problems of the Spanish
concession program between 1960 and 1980. It is argued that it was a mistake to allow
companies to invest as little as 10 percent in equity. In effect, there may exist an
incompatibility in incentives between the role of the construction company as a
shareholder and as an input supplier. While shareholders attempt to minimise the cost
of inputs, suppliers attempt to maximise it. In addition, shareholders recover their
capital through long-term project cash flow, while a company that is both a shareholder
and an input supplier may recover its investments in the initial phases of the project. In
many cases, the leading sponsors, like construction companies or equipment suppliers,
can recover their investments (Wells 1999) through upfront payments, subsequent
profits are "cream", other partners or lenders bear most of the long-term risk.
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In principle, (Vives 1996) equity should be provided up to the point that the debt service
can be consistently supported by the project's cash-flow under a variety of events, while
allowing an adequate return to shareholders. There are schools of thought that advocate
(HIM Treasury Taskforce 1996) that the more equity injected the more commitment the
sponsors have. Nevertheless, the consequent effect on the potential weighted average
cost of capital for the project should be borne in mind. Generally speaking, equity
being unsecured is more expensive than debt. As the prisons have shown, the incentive
for delivery and continuous improvement can be provided for under the contract (and
the bidding-negotiation procedures). Typically, a PFI—SPV (Brown 1999) is capitalised
with a combination of 10%-30% equity (or equity subordinated debt) and the balance as
senior debt. The senior debt can be financed either by bank funded project loans or
bond issues.
4.5.2.2 Bond Issues to Finance Senior Debt
In project finance each project requiring financing resources has its own specific
characteristics, that is, each financing package is unique like the sources of financing,
debt restructuring, or refinancing. The question is when to resort to bond financing.
Anthony Forshaw, director of infrastructure finance at Deutsche Bank, says that with
the continuous innovation in bond issuances, the capital market's role will continue to
grow "Bank debt is still the more dominant form of funding - mainly because bond
deals are more viable only for the larger deals, but capital market funding has a
significant role to play f bond issuers continue to get more creative" (Financial Times
1 999e).
The UK has a privileged position in the international banking services, which is an
advantage to the financing of projects. The City of London (Stanton-Ife 1999) has 500
banking institutions, of which 200 take part in project finance. Overall 2/3 to 3/4 of
senior debt is financed from traditional bank loans, and approximately 1/3 is financed
from bond issues that are increasingly more common due to the good acceptance by the
capital markets. Bond issues are also becoming more innovative, for example the £91.2
million bond issue maturing in 30 years issued by Meridien Hospital for the
redevelopment of the Greenwich hospital in south-east London, was the first hospital
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bond to be issued, and successftuly closed, "unenhanced" or "unwrapped" that is
without credit enhancement (unguaranteed) from a bond insurer. A triple A monoline
credit insurer can wrap-around a bond issue, and guarantee or credit enhance the
payment of the principal and the interest of bonds.
In the UK (Financial Times 1999c) PFI projects are already using domestic bond issues
as an important source of funding, and several funds specialise in financing PFI
projects. For example, the Innisfree Fund (European Venture Capital 1996; Jury 1999)
the first dedicated PFI fund, was launched in 1996 and raised £150 million to fund PFI
projects both in the UK and in Europe. The Innisfree Fund is a mixture of equity and
fixed-income assets and expects to deliver annual returns of between 12 and 15%. This
type of funding will inevitably introduce a much more rigorous evaluation of the project
risk.
Bond issues can be complex and expensive, but they offer access to the wide range of
resources of the capital markets. In principle, to be cost effective, bond issues are better
suited for medium (over £50 million) or large projects (over £100 million). Schroders
and the Rotch Property Group (Project Finance 1999) are studying the launch of a
Eurobond issuance programme of up to $1.6 billon to help finance medium-sized PFI
type projects that have had financing problems. Future European projects (Financial
Times 1999c) could also be funded by euro-denominated bond issues.
The trend for the increasing usage of bond financing is favoured by the trend to bundle
small PFI projects, to promote efficiency and to minimize bidding costs. For example,
local authorities group several schools and offer the package for tendering, as with the
£1 billion contract (Financial Times 1999d) to integrate the provision of information
technology access and the repair, rebuild and maintenance of Glasgow's 29 secondary
schools. Consequently, a question mark is raised as to the future trends of the size for a
typical PFI project. It looks likely that the more probable scenario will be that the PFI
market will consist of medium and large PFI projects, consequently with the senior debt
funded by bonds.
Other issues not directly related to the PFI market can affect PFI bond financing. The
success of PFI bond issues can be fostered, or hampered, by conditions that are external
to the PFI market. Investment funds which currently are very active in the bond market,
could the economic conditions deteriorate would withdraw, with dramatic consequences
for the bond market and consequently with devastating consequences to the debt service
of the PFI. However in the present market conditions there is a different scenario: The
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UK Government has not been issuing debt at the levels it used to (more private
investment through PFI) so there is shortage of long-dated government bonds - 15 or
more years to maturity. As such, the market reacts very favourably to the issue of long-
term bonds by the private sector. For example, the issue of the then largest ever, £137.4
million index-linked guaranteed bonds maturing in 203 1 for the rebuilding of the South
Tees hospital on 11 August 99 (Financial Times 1999a). Early in 1999, an index linked
and insured bond was issued to fund a £67 million hospital at Bishop Auckland, County
Durham. In conclusion, the private and government bond market has to reach
equilibrium so that the shortage/excess of risk-free government debt doesn't affect
negatively the private bond market.
4.5.3 Risk Allocation between the Public and Private Sectors
One of the fundamental beliefs that are the essence of PFI is an optimised transfer of
risk from the public sector to the private sector, that is the party best placed to manage
and control some of the risks. This brings efficiency and effectiveness to the project,
and the public sector benefits from the skills of the private sector. In the end this leads
to better \TFM, and the public sector can be confident that it is using public funds in the
best way.
This scenario is the objective of every PFI. To achieve it is not easy. There are lengthy
and difficult negotiations on risk allocation prior to the signing of the contract.
Essentially what the public and private sectors are doing is setting up the Risk
Management framework for the PFI project. Experience has shown that this process
has improved with time, as all parties are more familiar with the procedures. Also, as
more sectors are brought to the PFI arena, a broader range of issues is covered and the
lessons learned can be used in future projects.
Risk management in PFI projects is extensively discussed in Chapter 5.
100
The nature of PFI
4.6 Delivering Variability in Projects
A PFI project is unique, but it is inevitable that there are features common to certain
groups. The research provided insight on the similarity (and variability) of PFI projects
when classified according to the promoter's size, the sector and the international
context.
A discussion of the research findings on these three topics follows:
4.6.1 Promoters Size
Some concerns have been raised that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 3 are being
left out of the PFI market due to the dominance of large companies. As an example, in
Germany the Ministry of Finance (Christen 2001) of the State of Rheinland-Pfalz
presented the endangering of SMEs as a contra-argument to the utilisation of PFI as a
procurement tool due to the conflict between the application of the VFM concept and
measures for SMEs protection. In view of the importance of SMEs in the national
economies, this is a key issue with a great socio-economic impact. The scope of the
current research excluded the detailed analysis of the influence of company size on PFI
development. Nevertheless the research has provided some insight on this issue (Annex
Viand sec.8.3.2). It is then possible to have an overview of the SMEs positioning in the
PFI market and to draw some recommendations regarding the relationship between
SMIEs and PFI projects.
4.6.2 Differences Sector Wise
The applicability of PFI has steadily been extended to a great number of sectors,
diverging from the traditional concessions like infrastructure projects, thanks to the
According to the European Commission SIvs are all private enterprises with: Less than 250 employees <250:
Turnover =< 40 Million Euros, or Balance Sheet =< 27 Million Euros: and pass the Independence criteria: >25% of
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notion of service provision. The number of sectors where PFI projects are undertaken is
vast: Transport - Roads, Bridges, Rail (Metro & Light Rail), Hospital Services,
Custodial Services, Housing - Provision of new houses and management of existing
ones, Schools - Refurbishment, repair and maintenance, Accommodation Services,
Management of Waterways, and IT projects. The nature and characteristics of the
services they provide are very diverse, and the performance and development of PFI is
very different across the sectors.
4.6.3 Cross Border Variability - The International Context - Portugal
In Portugal there is a great need of infrastructure investment, but the prevalent political
will doesn't favour the systematic use of private funding '. 'It almost seems that it has
to he hidden' [sic] was mentioned during an interview at Bank Efisa. Also there is no
governmental unified policy and it is clear from all the collected empirical evidence that
a strong and unequivocal political will determine to a great extent the success or failure
of a PFI project. The Ministries are autonomous and each one states the terms of the
tenders. For example, Sta Maria da Feira Municipality, the Authority in the Indáqua
project, suffered the consequences of lack of Decision Power and of Empowerment in
the governmental system. On one hand only Local Authorities had the power to award
the concession, but on the other hand they could not minimally control the decision
power that derived from central government directives. An important lesson to draw is
not to sign contracts for which they don't have to rely on future decision, as it was the
case where there was no firm (written) commitment from the Central government to
allow the Municipality access to EU funding.
In Portugal there is a different approach to the PFI methodology from the one that was
established in the UK. In Portugal the \TFIVI criteria is not applied, and the decision
whether to undertake the project, is based on purely political, economical and financial
conditions of PFI as a stand alone project not in comparison with a benchmark such as
the PSC. Similarly to the UK there should exist an evaluation of VFM, ensuring that
the project is less costly than when compared with the government's traditional
equity caimot he owned by any company that cannot be qualified as a SME (except investment or venture capital
companies not exercising control).
There are several concessions that don't include construction, like the Hospital Amadora Sintra.
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procurement. This would help to reduce some perception in the political and media
environment that a PFI is more costly and that the State is pawning future generations
income.
In contrast with the UK the existence in Portugal, but not in the UK, 5 of significant EU
funding was a determinant to the launching of infrastructure projects. The same applies
to the European Investment Bank's special financing conditions. In Portugal there are
two very important legal/regulatory restrictions regarding financing: first, the Code for
the Commercial Societies doesn't allow bond issuance of societies with less than three
years of existence, and only up to an amount of the society's equity; second at a fiscal
level there are some taxes that don't exist in the UK, e.g. 'iniposto de selo'.
There is a negotiation procedure with two bidders (no short list or preferred bidder).
After the selection it takes 2-3 months to establish the SPV and draft all the other
contracts. Similarly to the UK all contracts have to be established at the signing of the
contract (inclusive the risk transfer to the insurance companies).
In contrast with the UK where the Treasury Taskforce has published a series of UK PFI
case studies, in Portugal there is no tradition to learn from past cases. Whenever a past
experience is used, it is only to copy without critical analysis. This can lead to
disastrous results as in Tavira where they copied a contract. After bidding started the
tender had to be suspended, because the contestants started asking for clarifications that
could not be adequately answered. Finally it was cancelled.
A common criticism both in Portugal and in the UK is that sometimes (more often in
small projects) the public partner doesn't provide sufficient information and doesn't
have a clear idea of the objectives, before issuing the tender. Consequently this over-
extends the negotiation period, like Indáqua (Annex V), or creates problems in the
construction schedules like in the Joint Services Command and Staff College - JSCSC
(Annex IV).
Due to importance of the construction sector in the PFI market there follows a brief
characterisation of the sector in Portugal and the UK. 	 This permits a better
understanding of the issues that can be raised when dealing with cross border PFI
projects
5 Some EU funding is available in the UK.
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4.6.3.1 The Construction Sector in Portugal and UK
The construction industry' structure is very different in the UK and Portugal. In the UK
there is the more widespread usage of management techniques like value chain analysis
and risk management, and the governmental regulatory policy has been adjusted to the
PFI specific needs, like for example the accounting standards.
The construction market in the UK is larger (in terms of business volume) such that a
large project such as bridge or a shopping mall doesn't have the same impact as in
Portugal where any of these will represent a large slice of the market. Similarly the
impact of public works is much greater in Portugal than in the UK, which gives
Portuguese companies a strong political power. For example Kvaerner that integrated
the Lusoponte consortium was very active at providing technical expertise and know-
how, while Portuguese companies provided key political connections and access to
local suppliers.
In the UK the construction market is more fragmented (about ten very large players and
fifty large intermediaries) than in Portugal with an oligopoly where a reduced number of
very large companies controls the market. Within the Portuguese construction sector
there are more than 30 000 registered construction companies that account for about 7%
of the GDP and employ 9% of the country's total workforce. There are more large
companies in the UK although their relative weight is smaller than in Portugal due to
the larger dimension of the construction market. The large companies in the UK are
usually vertically disintegrated sub-contracting the design, quantity surveying etc, while
in Portugal the large companies have their own in-house competences recurring to sub-
contracting only in very large projects. The structure of the Portuguese construction
sector (IAPMEI 1998) - distribution of companies by number of employees and
business volume - is very similar to the average structure of the European Union.
The main problems in the Portuguese Construction sector (IAPMEI 1998) can be
grouped in the following areas: Lack of: Adequate Human Resources, Innovation,
Investment and Productivity, Management and Organisation Abilities, and very
importantly the overall fiscal, regulatory and governmental policy is not favourable.
These factors provide a somewhat negative picture for the ifiture of construction
companies. The overall tendencies point to the increased weight of large projects that
require private ftinding, using sophisticated techniques of financial engineering, and the
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opening to the private finance initiative of sectors, like water sanitation, transport, etc,
that require large infrastructure projects. These developments place the construction
groups in a privileged position to diversifly their activities and minimize the effects of
the economic cycles that always affect the construction industry but only the companies
that are prepared for it will profit.
There are cultural differences between the two countries. In the UK it is assumed that a
contract is a definitive document while in Portugal, the prevailing attitude is that re-
negotiation is always an option, leading to great waste in time and money. Companies
and owners of the projects have a tradition to revise construction contracts introducing
extra-works that are carried out without tender. In Portugal there is still a lax attitude
towards the enforcement of regulations, while in the UK companies strictly abide by the
regulations including those from the EU.
The Portuguese companies are very interactive, with an informed network and are much
more flexible than in the UK. This was not happening in the UK with a very
fragmented industry where the different partners were doing what they wanted. As PFI
forces interaction it is noticeable that this has changed and the integration of the
different companies value chains is a great concern of the industry especially because it
is so vertically disintegrated.
Other cultural differences between the UK and Portuguese construction sectors refer to
the social environment. According to 4 Review of Procurement and Contract
Management for the EU' (Eaton 2000), the European national construction industries
can be classified according to their cultural, ethical and legal similarities:
• UK and Ireland integrate the 'Conzinon Law Group';
• Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal integrate the Mediterranean-Romano Group'.
The groups are characterised as:
Common Law Group - The countries have a strong common law history, providing
clearly defined and definitive legal traditions and legalistic process. 	 There is a
predominance of separate and independent professions. The main contractor
significantly dominates total national output, and therefore, a strongly organised and
extensive network of sub-contractors and specialists exists to assist. There is a division
of legal responsibility, derived from the separation of design from construction. The
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basis of competition tends to be based upon price and speed (or a combination) rather
than quality of output;
Mediterranean-Romano Group - In these countries quality is less emphasised, but
might be exceptionally good. The public administration of planning and development is
notoriously slow, and is characterised by 'expensive' regulatory mechanisms and the
entire administration of procurement and management of projects is bureaucratic and
highly politicised. The cultural attitude towards innovation is also different.
Portuguese construction companies are less keen to innovate with very often a high
degree of resistance to change. A contributing factor being that a significant number of
companies is family-owned. In contrast, UK companies tend to envisage innovation as
a central factor for competitiveness.
This Chapter proposed a definition and conceptual framework for PFI, and described
some features of the PFI market. Next follows the proposal for a dynamic model of
Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management for PFI projects (Chapter 5), a
proposal for the model on PFI's Critical Success Factors (Chapter 6) and in Chapter 7 is
discussed and proposed a model for PFI's Sustainable Competitive Advantage.
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CHAPTER 5
PFI Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management Model
5.1 Introduction
"The key objective ofpublic sector procurement is to ensure that taxpayers get
fr7M This requires that public service clients should ensure that economic
appraisal, including a proper appreciation of risk are applied rigorously and
that risk is allocated between the public and private sectors so that the expected
VFM of the services provided to the public is maximisect' (HIM Treasury
Taskforce 1999). "The iden4fication, allocation and management of risks have
grown to become an essential part of the PFlprocesf (PRAM 1997).
This chapter proposes a dynamic model of whole life cycle risk uncertainty for PFI
projects. It was conceptualised and developed based on the empirical data collected.
The model presents a clear picture on how uncertainty progresses throughout the whole
life cycle; it is comprehensive, doesn't underestimate the risks avoiding the wishful
thinking attitude that often prevents the adoption of correct risk-management measures.
The whole life cycle model of risk uncertainty can be quantified and used to classify
projects according to their degree of uncertainty and maturity. It is innovative as it
recognises that uncertainty is dependent simultaneously on the particular risk and on the
period of the project's life cycle. This model is also a powerful tool for structuring
strategic decisions.
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5.2 Definitions
5.2.1 Risk and Uncertainty
Risk underlies everyday events, in that no one can forecast with complete accuracy what
is going to happen in the future. If the outcome of future events could be predicted with
absolute exactitude, there would be no risk. Every outcome, good or bad, would be
certain. In every day life, the term risk means something that is both uncertain and
undesired, as implied by its origin: risk derived via the French risque, from Italian
rischo, from rischiare "to run into danger" (Encarta 2000). Yet, Bernstein (1998)
considers risk from a less negative perspective. In his detailed account on the origins and
history of risk, risk is considered 'a choice rather than a Jate' as he considers that the
term risk derives from the Italian 'risicare' which means 'to dare'. He concludes that all
the mathematical developments that permitted the quantification of risk helped to
transform the perception from chance of loss into opportunity for gain.
It was mainly through the applicability of risk in the insurance (Williams, Smith & Young
1998) and banking (Bessis 1998) sectors that risk became associated with the concept of
probability of occurrence of an event, and hence the notion that the outcome can also be
better than expected, removing the association with something always going wrong.
As such, the notion of risk in itself is highly subjective. What is an acceptable risk for
some people might be completely unacceptable to others. It all depends on their
respective tolerances for risk: some people are risk averse while others are risk prone and
can view risks as opportunities, not threats.
A definition of risk must be simple, straightforward, and account for the possibility that
the outcome can be either better or worse than expected, even though in everyday life
the term risk implies that something is both uncertain and can be undesirable. The
definitions of risk-related concepts adopted in the research are based on the heuristics' of
accepted practices of project risk management, as well as the definitions of Covello
(1993), Smith (1999), Raftery (1994), PRAIVI (1997) and Edwards & Bowen (1998).
I Heuristics - Rules of thumb that usually lead to the correct solution but are not zuaranteed to work all of' the time.
Encarta.
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The risk definition adopted in the current research is:
Risk - A characteristic of a situation or action wherein two or more outcomes
are possible, the particular outcome that will occur is unknown, and at least one
of the possibilities is undesired' (Covello 1993).
This definition of risk has the advantage of being consistent with the way people think
about risk in everyday life, but is more comprehensive because it accounts for the
possibility that the outcome can be better than expected. For PFI, the Treasury
Taskforce (HM Taskforce Guidance 1999) adopts an accounting definition of risk, which
is coincidental with this one, but goes a step ftirther emphasising the cost of risk. It
states:
Risk is uncertainty as to the amount of benefits. It includes potential both gain
and exposure to loss' (1-ilvi Treasury Taskforce 1999).
Risk is a concept with two-dimensions, both presenting the duality between the Known
and the Unknown. The risk dimensions are the characteristics (plus timing and
magnitude) of the event, and the probability of occurrence. Both the event and
probabilities of occurrence are usually based on historic series of statistical data or, in
special cases, on expert opinions.
Risk is often related, referred or used with another concept: "Uncertainty". In risk
management, risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably, but that can lead to
misleading reasoning's or interpretations. Peters (1999) in his work on the
unpredictability of financial markets affirms that it is crucial to distinguish between risk
and uncertainty. Otherwise there will be no progress in the understanding of complex
systems such as the economy. Morgan and Henron (1990) present the opposing view
that for real-world decision making the distinction between risk and uncertainty renders
the probability theory virtually inapplicable. This view is obviously limited to the
methodology the authors use for analysis and prevents the development of new models
more adjusted to reality. Thereafter, in this study risk and uncertainty are considered to
be two different concepts, uncertainty being one feature of risk.
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Uncertainty - can be considered as a feature of risk of an event where the
probability of occurrence is not known, hence it cannot be quantified (Smith
1999).
To clarify these two concepts Table 5.1 relates the characteristics of Events and their
Probability of Occurrence and shows how the same risk can present different levels of
uncertainty.
Table 5.1. Uncertainty attached to Risk
A Known Event with a Known (reasonably) probability of occurrence is a Risk with No
(or Low) Uncertainty attached to it. But in contrast, a Known Event of which we don't
know the likely probability of occurrence will be a Risk with High Uncertainty.
5.2.2 Risk Management
Risk is a pervasive element of everyday life. To deal with it effectively, risk-based
considerations must be integrated into an analytical framework like Risk Management
(RM). As such, the ultimate objective of any RM exercise is to identify, mitigate,
reduce, and, if possible, eliminate risks.
Risk Management - It is a systematic approach for dealing with risk. A risk
management system: establishes an appropriate framework; sets goals and
objectives; idenqfies and analyses risks; influences risk decision-making, and
monitors and reviews risk response; ideiztifies, selects and implements
appropriate actions to control risks, and is supported by the information
gathered in risk analysis (based on Covello 1993 and Smith 1999).
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Good Risk Management is central to PFI success. It aims at identifying all the risks
involved in a PFI project, to calculate the financial consequences, to establish mitigation
procedures and to allocate the risks to be transferred to the party best able to manage
them. RIVI is an interdisciplinary process, where all stakeholders (or their
representatives) are involved, including the ultimate users of the asset/service.
When a risk is identified, there are several options available to decision makers:
• Elimination - To implement measures that can remove a particular risk;
• Avoidance - Different procedures to keep away from particular risks;
• Reduction - To implement measures that can lessen the adverse effects of risks;
• Transfer - Give management responsibility of the risks to other parties;
• Absorption (retention) of risks - To keep management responsibility of the
risk.
The two last options - transfer and absorption - are usually combined in a procedure
named Risk Allocation. For example, in a project involving several parties, before the
actual start of the project, all identified risks are reviewed and the responsibility to
manage each risk is assigned to a specified partner. In principle, the risk should be
allocated to the partner best able to control and manage it. The decision of the allocation
must be done jointly and through a negotiated procedure, so that all parties are willing to
accept their share of responsibility in managing the risks. Then, if elimination of the risks
is impossible, mitigation measures can be identified to minimise the adverse effects. Risk
Allocation can also include the option of Risk Sharing, where two or more partners
decide to jointly manage pre-defined risks.
If risks are dealt with a priori, the project will have some risks eliminated, other risks
reduced, and the remaining risks with mitigation measures already in place. There is
always the possibility of unidentified risks occurring, but then measures have to be
agreed upon on how to proceed, usually involving a renegotiation of risk allocation 2 . It
is important to stress that the first Risk Allocation exercise is a procedure that takes
place before the actual start of the operational stage of a project, and that to simplify
2 Validate - Au parties have to confirm that the risk is to be considered and accepted as such.
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procedures, risks are first classified into global categories, in a top down approach. In
these global categories are included Force Majeure events - events over which the parties
have little control, but that can have serious impact on the project, like wars, nuclear
explosions, earthquakes, etc. A Force Majeure Event usually implies the termination of a
project.
To improve the probability of a successful project, RM must not be considered optional
- it must always be done. It enables the project manager to act after consideration of the
risks, and mitigation procedures can be considered in a non-stressful environment before
the actual operational stage. In addition, it is possible to recognise the potential
consequences of accepting the risk. In principle, decisions that are more effective are
achieved, as the approach to RM is proactive rather than reactive/crisis management.
RN'l in long-term Projects, like PFI projects, is critical to their success. These projects
develop over the course of 20-30 years, and necessarily, the social, political, economic
and financial environment change as well. Consequently, the risks and the assumptions
that were the basis for decision-making also change. If the risk management process is
not adapted to this changing environment, and corrective measures are not put in place,
the chances of something going wrong are high, possibly compromising the viability of
the project. It is likely that when new risks appear (or change), they are left unmanaged,
or not adequately managed. Then the corollary of Murphy's Law applies "If something
can go wrong, it will go wrong, and at the worst possible time ".
The next section proposes the Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management model.
5.3 Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management model - WLCRUM
In PFI, the public sector transfers risk to the private sector that must raise the capital,
manage and operate the project, and maintain predetermined specifications for providing
the service. As a result in PFI, there is a multitude of risks. In this research it is
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considered that the most appropriate classification uses a top-down approach (Smith
1999) analysing first the global risk 3 categories and only then the elemental 4 risks.
The WLCRUM model is therefore limited to global risks - those that can affect the
economy or one sector as a whole. Elemental risks are project-specific and can be
analysed with a similar methodology. The two criteria used in this research to classify
global risks in PFI are: first the type of risk, and second the type of stakeholders involved
- private or public to allow a separation of Regulatory and Legal Risks. As such, the
global risks in PFI are:
• Political and Regulatory Risks originating within the public sector, such as will
of government, change in law, price controls, labour regulations, other actions of
regulatory agencies, and Ultra-Vires;
• Economic and Financial Risks related to the development of the economy such
as Inflation, Interest Rate, Foreign Currency Exchange Rate and Funds
Availability;
• Social Risks originated by protestor actions or collective actions, for example,
environmental groups or local residents associations;
• Legal Risks that are the responsibility of the private sector like Breakdown or
Insolvency of consortium;
Bidding Risks inherent in the negotiation procedures like unsuccessful bids;
• Design Risks that arise when the desired level of performance or quality in
service provision is not reached, even if the project is constructed satisfactorily to
the specifications of the project;
• Construction Risks that prevent physical completion, for example, Cost and
Time Overruns, and related warranty repairs caused by poor building work after
the asset has been completed (latent defects). A subcategory of risks external to
the construction process but included here consists of the risks not directly
derived from construction, like ground condition, archaeological findings, and
site availability. These can delay or even prevent construction completion;
3 Global - It includes all risks that affect all projects lor a particular sector, like the ones derived from changing economic
and regulatoiy conditions.
4 Elemental - It includes all risks specific to the project, for example, some of construction risks.
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• Operational and Maintenance Risks such as penalties for Under Performance,
Non Availability, and the risk that costs will be greater or less than was expected
specifically because of changes in price;
• Commercial Risks that affect the commercial performance of the PFI such as
Demand Risk, the risk that the demand for the service will be greater or less than
the level predicted or expected, and Payment Risk, the risk that the service will
not be paid for;
• Residual Value Risk that at the end of the contract the property will be worth
more or less than expected at the outset;
• People Risks stemming from factors such as culture, experience, motivation,
attitude, interpersonal and teamwork skills;
• Force Majeure events over which the parties to the contract have little or no
control, but which could have serious impact on their ability to fulfil the
contractual terms. These include war, rebellion, nuclear explosion, earthquakes,
and usually weather and geologically related natural disasters like earthquakes,
floods, droughts fall into this category. Force Majeure risks are those that a
priori are not expected to occur, consequently with an unknown probability of
occurrence and a maximum uncertainty.
Due to the long concessions period, temporal aspects of risk are particularly important.
A PFI project typically lasts 20 to 30 years. The question that needs to be answered is:
Do we know what is going to happen in X years? The impact and probability of
occurrence of a particular risk type changes as the project goes through the several
stages, and consequently the uncertainty can either diminish or increase depending upon
which period is considered. As decisions are made throughout the project, the
uncertainty associated with, for example, construction or design risk diminishes, but the
uncertainty of other risks such as economic, financial and political increases. A practical
example is that the impact of the risk of severe flooding diminishes as a building is
structurally complete, but clearly the risk is present for the whole contract period.
Similarly, the probability of a fatal accident may decrease in the later stages of
construction, after scaffolding has been removed, but the probability may remain
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constant through a civil engineering pipeline project. In either case, the impact of
adverse events may remain unchanged.
Figure 5.1 shows the proposed WLCRUM model of PFI projects. The model recognizes
that in the long-term projects the evolution of the uncertainty attached to each risk is the
key factor to manage. If uncertainty is high it means that there are few mitigation
measures in place (probably for some risks there are none possible). If uncertainty can
be reduced, it means that the risks are better managed, hence a project with a higher
probability of success.
The evolution of uncertainty is represented for the above-mentioned global risks. It
shows when uncertainty starts, when it ends, and the trend in between. As this
representation of the model is not quantified the trends are the important issue, the fact
that one trend line is above the other doesn't necessarily mean that the uncertainty is
higher.
The risks presented are inherent of the PFI project irrespective of the partner to which
they are allocated. In the great majority of risks uncertainty increases along the time
horizon. If you are thinking today about the possible outcomes in five years time you
might have a reasonable expectation, but if the time horizon is 20 to 30 years, the
possible outcomes are increasingly difficult to forecast - that is, uncertainty increases.
The next sections describe in more detail how uncertainty evolves for all the global risks
considered.
5.3.1 Political and Regulatory Uncertainty
Figure 5. 1 shows that Political and Regulatory uncertainty starts at the very beginning of
the project and continues to increase throughout the life cycle. It seems reasonable to
consider that uncertainty starts at the beginning of the bidding stage, although formally it
should start at the establishment of business need since there is always the possibility of a
project's rejection.
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The directives of the Government and the Regulatory Framework 20 to 30 years from
now are difficult, if not impossible, to predict, hence the increase in uncertainty.
Political and regulatory risks are often overlooked but are of the utmost importance in
the long term. Political risks in this study are considered to be those defined by the HIM
Treasury Taskforce (1999) as Policy Risks, the risk of changes of policy direction not
involving legislation. Regulatory risks can also be called legislative risks, i.e. the risk that
changes in legislation may increase costs. This can be subdivided into general risks, such
as changes in corporate tax rates, and specific risks that may discriminate against PFI
projects. Ultra- Vires, the risk that a government body will act outside its jurisdiction,
was a common setback in the early years of PFI before legislation was passed to cIarify
the position of NI-IS Trusts and Local Authorities. The legal and regulatory framework
must be thorough, trustworthy, quick and transparent.
The government is responsible for the social, political and economic context and the
regulatory framework. These are interdependent. For example, price controls can be
dictated by the political and social climate. Risk management tends to overlook political
risk, assuming an attitude of wishful thinking, and that the political environment will
remain stable throughout the whole life cycle of the project. However, the assumption of
political stability is fundamentally erroneous. Political instability is a major source of
unforeseen risks.
The history of Political and regulatory risks is not well known. Rarely do managers
know the shaky history of private investments, even when their own firms were involved
in the disputes (Wells 1999). The first major shock to the stability of the international
regime of private foreign investment was the nationalisation of foreign and domestic
investment during the Russian Socialist Revolution in 1917 (Bubnova 1999). Other
nationalisations took place decades later during the revolutions in China, Eastern Europe
and Egypt. Classified as "strategic" all natural resource exploration infrastructures were
expropriated in Mexico (1938), Iran (1951) and Bolivia (1952). In 197!, assets of the
British Petroleum Exploration Company in Libya were expropriated. Even in Europe,
expropriations took place in the late 20th century. In 1975, the Portuguese government,
after the Carnations Revolution nationalised all private companies in the finance and
industrial sectors that were classified as strategic. In 1989, the Tiananmen Square
government crackdown in China changed what had been considered a safe environment
for foreign investment, bringing about US$ 10 billion in uninsured losses. Political risk
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insurance coverage of foreign direct investment is traditionally small. During the I 990s,
the share of foreign direct investment covered by Berne Union investment insurer
dropped 7%, from 14.9% in 1990 to 7.9% in 1998, reflecting relative comfort with
political risks.
In recent years, in the Southeast Asia region (Tam 1999) there has been a growing trend
for governments to undertake infrastructure projects under the BOT model. Very often
it has been a painful experience for the private sponsors. One of the main conclusions
drawn was that it was key that the host government would 'guarantee a proper business
environment, such as no competing projects.'
Conflicts can also arise in the long term from the emergence of a new government. For
example, the election of an opposition government in India led to renegotiation of
contract terms for the Euron Dabhol power facility. Other sources of conflict derive
from conflicting strategies of Governments that have the regulatory power and the
companies that operate in the sector. One of the earliest conflicts occurred in Argentina.
In the 1870s, the British-owned Argentine railways and the government didn't agree
over expansion plans. Therefore, the Government built its own rail lines. Similarly,
conflicts between different investment plans led to the nationalisation of Indosat, an ITT-
owned communications company in Indonesia.
The country debt crisis in the 1980s and economic and financial crisis in Asia, Latin
America and Eastern Europe in the late l990s (West 1999) also have reminded investors
that political/economic events do not merely have the potential to cause losses, but
actually do cause losses. Consequently, investors are now paying much more attention
to political risk assessment and management.
5.3.2 Economic and Financial Uncertainty
Economic and financial uncertainty starts with the bidding process as can be seen in
Figure 5. 1. The representation of financial risks includes the bidding risks that run until
the contract is established and construction starts. Bidding risk usually is the sole
responsibility of the contractors. Bidding costs are viewed as the starting point for the
developer's total investment. Bidding very often involves significant investment;
118
PFI Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty Management Model
especially design costs, consultancy and legal fees. Only after the signing of the contract
do the senior lenders finance the project and share in the exposure. Bidding risks are
highly dependent on the quality of information provided and decrease step by step as the
several stages of the bidding progress. Financial Uncertainty increases with time. It is
difficult if not impossible to accurately predict inflation, interest rates and foreign
exchange rates. The same applies to the payment mechanisms.
Economic risk arising from the changes in the economic and policy environment is especially
impoltmt in an international context (I1FC 1999). Currency, foreign exchange, and interest
rate risks fall in this category. Currency risks arise whenever foreign-currency-denominated
finds, in the form of equity or debt, are used to finance the project. Such risks are associated
in part with foreign exchange convertibility and foreign exchange rate. Macroeconomic
stability, the balance of payments situation, and the foreign-exchange-rate policy in the project
country are important factors to consider in assessing currency risks. Foreign-exchange-
availability risk can be a problem when the project generates revenues only in local currency.
Foreign exchange may not be available when it is needed to import materials, repay project
debt or repatriate the profits and dividends of foreign shareholders. Interest rate risk applies
to international project financing where long-term loans have floating interest rates. The
international interest rate environment can change during the maturity period that is typically
as long as 25 years. PFI is a national policy and some of these risks don't apply, but
increasingly IlK companies are partners in PFI type projects abroad, so they must be aware of
the risks, and implement mitigation actions. For PFI, one of the most important economic
risks is the Inflation risk, the risk that actual inflation will differ from assumed inflation rates.
Several types of finds are used for the financing of a given project. There is always a balance
between short-term and long-term funds. Usually when a project begins its operational
phase, some risks such as construction risks are eliminated and the flow of income starts to
cover the debt, gradually reducing the exposure of lenders. It is not unusual for a project to
refinance, or restructure the debt, looking for better financing conditions. This re-structuring
is necessarily conditioned to the availability of funds in capital markets.
Similarly to political risks, and as the recent financial crisis in Asia demonstrated, economic
and political risks are always prevalent. In 1997, within a period of only three weeks, the
Thai baht slipped by more than 20 percent against the US dollar, and then dropped even
further (IF C 1999). Because of Thailand's previously strong economic position, power
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purchase agreements of international power projects in Thailand typically had not considered
exchange rates in their purchase price calculation. As a consequence, to limit the losses,
those power purchase agreements had to be renegotiated.
Edwards (1998) undertakes a literature review of risk and risk management in construction
and finds surprisingly few references to economic and financial risks in construction. It
suggests the need for bidding models that can reflect the economic climate. Financial risk
literature is also a rarity, which is surprising considering its importance in project feasibility.
Edward's analysis concluded that a prudent pre-construction risk evaluation could reveal a
project's vulnerability to a property slump that endangers its financial viability. In addition,
Edwards noted that the bankruptcy of American companies was most frequently attributable
to economic and financial factors such as inflation, debt interest rates and inadequate capital.
5.3.3 Social Uncertainty
Uncertainty attached to the social risk begins to increase as soon the project is publicly visible
(Figure 5. 1). It reaches its maximum at the beginning of the construction stage when public
awareness of the project is at its highest level, and consequently, the project is more prone to
public scrutiny. As construction progress uncertainty continues to diminish until the end of
the contract period.
The consequences of social risk are usually not as extreme as political risks, like
expropriations, but still can be damaging. Infrastructure projects, by their size and impact on
the economy ('Wells 1999) are particularly sensitive to "social visibility" especially if they deal
directly with the public. Price and other issues like safety can have a major social and political
impact. For example, in the UK the Paddington disaster on October 5, 1999, where 31
people lost their lives and a further 400 people were injured when two trains crashed head-on
near London's Paddington Station, triggered the revival of discussions about the privatisation
and the use of PPP/PFI schemes in the transport sector. It was argued that due to pressures
for profitability, investments in safety devices were cancelled, resulting in increased danger for
the public as it was demonstrated that these devices could have prevented several disasters
involving the loss of lives that had occurred since 1995. Consequently, the responsibility for
safety in public transport was taken back to the government.
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Infrastructure projects are especially susceptible to the increasing environmental
consciousness in society, very often translated in Protestor's Actions. For example, the 'Eco-
Warriors' in the UK build tree houses and dig tunnels closed by brick and steel doors. When
an action takes place, they live on the trees and tunnels until they are forcibly removed. It
took three to four weeks to remove them from the Manchester Airport in August 1999, when
they were protesting against the construction of the second runway, which entailed felling
some trees and reducing the height of others.
Also banks are increasingly aware of the ill effects of non-compliance with environmental
standards, so they insist on the assessment of environmental due-diligence as part of their
funding decisions. For example, the World Bank has its own sets of environmental guidelines
that are internationally accepted as a benchmark. The IFC goes a step further and includes
the assessment of due diligence of social issues like child labour, resettlement of indigenous
peoples, etc.
5.3.4 Legal Uncertainty
The insolvency and breakdown of a project consortium may look remote in the near
future, but it is a possibility that cannot be underestimated with project lives as long as
30 years. As such, Legal Uncertainty (Figure 5.1) starts when operation begins and goes
on increasing.
There are several legal risks such as Breakdown and Insolvency of the project
consortium that originate in the private sector. The contract must include measures to
prevent, or at least control, the breakdown of the consortium. If differences can be
resolved by a series of practical steps leading to a sound and practical conclusion, then
such mechanism should be the preferred solution (Cordova 1994). The usual way to
mitigate these risks is to include ADR measures in an attempt to reach commercial
settlement instead of complex and costly litigation and arbitration procedures.
For example, the Government changes a Law that affects a sector as a whole, not an
individual company, for example legislation for the disabled in the UK was not in place
10 years ago.
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5.3.5 Bidding Uncertainty
Bidding Risks are those inherent to the negotiation procedures like unsuccessftil bid or poor
quality of information. The uncertainty deceases in steps according to the progress across the
several stages of the bidding process. After short-list, preferred bidder, etc. the uncertainty
decreases sharply until it ends at contract signing. There are situations however when bidding
uncertainty is prolonged afterwards due to unresolved (or unclear) issues in the contract.
5.3.6 Construction Uncertainty
Construction risks comprise risks of cost overruns if construction is not completed in
time, to budget and to specification. If costs significantly exceed the initial financing
plan, they will affect the project's financial rate of return, and if the project cannot be
refinanced, it may even be abandoned.
During construction and start-up uncertainty is high and large volumes of finance are
required, typically a mixture of equity, senior debt and guarantees ([FC 1999). As can be
seen in Figure 5.1 as construction progress, all uncertainties attached to cost overrun,
completion, and delays continue to decrease. Finally, with project completion
construction risks ends.
According to Smith (1999) the Risk Drivers for the construction sector are Financial,
Legal, Political, Social, Environmental, Communication, Geographical, Geotechnical,
Construction, Technological and Demand/Product. In the current research, the majority
of these risk drivers are included in categories other than Construction but Geographical,
Geotechnical were considered included within the Construction Risks.
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5.3.7 Design Uncertainty
Design Risk is the risk that the design will not deliver services with the required
performance or quality standards, and consequently the project will not meet its service-
output specifications. It involves detailed technical assessment of the project and
planning of the actions needed to put the project in practice.
Typically uncertainty is higher in the beginning of the bidding process (Figure 5.1). As
negotiation progresses, service specifications are defined and uncertainty decreases
sharply until the contract is signed. Nevertheless, in some projects, the decrease is not as
steep and continues to diminish until well after construction finishes. In all projects after
Service begins, uncertainty increases again, because it is when latent defects may become
apparent. As time goes on, uncertainty diminishes. Due to possible liability from latent
defects, uncertainty extends through the legal period of 12 years after the contract is
signed.
The level and evolution of Design uncertainty is substantially dependent on two factors:
experience and ambiguity prevailing within the sector. Empirical evidence shows that the
effect of a company's learning process in successive PFI projects in the same sector, the
so called 'learning curve' is reflected in a line that declines more sharply with each
project. A company/sector with a line that starts at a lower level and declines sharply by
the time of contract signing can be considered in the mature evolutionary stage. The
influence of the sector is also marked. Sectors like hospitals, with high ambiguity, tend
to have a plateau starting from the bidding stage, declining slowly until the middle of
construction stage, and declining more sharply until the end of the construction stage.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 5.8 (sec. 5.4.7).
5.3.8 Commercial Uncertainty
Commercial risks are the subject of lengthy discussions because of their combined high
level of uncertainty and criticality to the PFI's profitability. As a result, it is common
practice to undertake three independent market studies before a contract is signed: one
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by the Authority, a second by the project sponsor and a third by the senior lenders. It is
a clear indicator on how the participants in the negotiations are trying to cope with
uncertainty. Also, it is clear that, as time progresses, the uncertainty attached to both
technical and service obsolescence continues to increase (see Figure 5.1).
Commercial risks are both critical to project revenues and complex to analyse because in
reality they represent a combination of several other risks (HIM Treasury Taskforce
1999) such as the following:
• Operational Risk - The risk that operating costs vary from budget, that
performance standards slips or that the service will not be provided;
• Maintenance Risk - The risk that the costs of keeping the assets in good
condition will vary from budget;
• Technology Risk - The risk that changes in technology will result in services
being provided using non-optimal technology;
• Volume Risk - The risk that actual usage of the service will vary from the level
forecasted;
• Demand Risk - The risk that demand for the service does not match the levels
planned, projected or assumed. As the demand for a service may be at least
partially controllable by the government, the risk to the public sector may be less
than that perceived by the private sector;
• Third Party Revenues - The risk that revenues generated from third party demand
for the property will be greater or less than predicted or expected. This risk has
two key variables: price and quantity. This risk is evident when a third party to
the contract pays for the service in a free-standing project;
• Penalties for Under Peiformance and Non Availability Risk - The risk that
deductions relating to payment will be greater or less than expected;
• Potential Changes in Relevaizi Costs Risk - The risk that expenditure on relevant
costs will be greater or less than was expected specifically because of changes in
price. Who bears the risk will depend upon whether or not the price variations
can be passed onto the purchaser. If the unitary payment is fixed or varies in
relation to a general inflation index, the risk is borne by the operator. If the
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unitary payment varies with specific indexes to reflect actual costs of the
operator, then the pricing risk is borne by the purchaser;
Payment risk - The risk that the buyers of the service will not pay.
The discussion that follows shows how these risks interrelate, and how they can affect a
PFI project's profitability. The key underlying concept is Margin defined as 'Revenues
less the Costs 6 of the project'. In relation to margin the statement that all participants in
a PFI must be aware is:
The profit of a PFI is determined from the margin that the
contractor can get from the supply of the service.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationship among the variables included in the Margin.
Margin = Revenues - Costs =
Revenue - (Fixed Costs + Variable Costs)
Price *
/
PFI Contract
ume - (Fixed Costs + (Unit Costs * Volume))
OperationlManagement
(under Contractor's control)
Users Demand
Figure 5.2. The Relationships within Commercial Uncertainty
The contractor, in order to maximise its profits, has to:
• Maximise Revenue to have more income;
• Minimise Costs to decrease expenses.
5 Revenues arc calculated multiplying Market Volume (measured in units) by Unit Price.
6 Costs are subdivided in Fixed Costs and Variable Costs (costs incurred by unit produced or serviced).
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Profit (positive margin) for the contractor is dependent on several factors over which it
has little control during the operational phase of the project. The price is dependent on
the previously established PFI contract. An incorrect estimate can have damaging
consequences. The volume (or level of usage) depends on the market and has both a
positive and a negative influence, respectively increasing revenues, increasing variable
costs. Also, if the service is not used up to the levels that were forecasted, the revenues
are less than expected with serious consequences for the profitability of the project.
Again, there is little possibility that either the Government or the Contractor can control
the usage level like in the Royal Armories 7. There are special cases where the service
level is pre-set (prisons and accommodation where the volume is determined by
availability not occupancy), but with a free-standing PFI project in a market-driven
situation such as toll roads, the volume is dependent on the users.
The next section describes in more detail the factors also included in the margin but
related to Operation and Maintenance.
5.3.9 Operation and Maintenance Uncertainty
As can be seen in Figure 5.1 O/M uncertainty starts with Service commencement and
goes on increasing as times progress until the end of the PFI.
Strict O/M cost control is critical to project revenues. Effectively, it is the only factor
included in the margin that the contractor can effectively manage once the service
provision has commenced.
Costs are the only items for which the Contractor is directly responsible, and their
control is a critical factor for the revenue of the project. It is important to note that not
even the contractor has complete control over costs, because other variables such as
inflation and prices of supplies also affect costs. In lato sensu, within costs are also
included financial costs, but this discussion focussed only on operational costs as for
financial costs there are adequate mitigations measures, such as renegotiation of debt and
7 The Royal Armouries (a free-standing PFI project) has in. July 1999. revised the ongoing PFI wntract for the management
of the Armouries. The attendance of public was half of what was expected. and there were simply not enough revenues to
make the project viable, so management went hack to a trust, and the previous concessionaire now only runs catering and
other services.
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other instruments specific to fmancial management that are dealt with in financial
uncertainty.
Included in Operational and Maintenance Risks are Performance and Obsolescence
Risks. Performance risk is related to possible deviations in the level of service from
specifications that were predetermined in the PFI contract. Obsolescence Risk has two
components: the risk that the service will no longer be needed, and the risk that the
technology in place will become outdated.
In projects where the government is not the client, another type of commercial risk that
gains relevancy is Payment Risk. When the buyer is not creditworthy, project sponsors
often seek government guarantees.
5.3.10 People Uncertainty
The influence of human factors in risk management is widely acknowledged. Yeo and
Tiong (2000) consider that the 'human factors' have strong influence in entrepreneurship
and in a consortium where they can be decisive in risk reduction and in the overall risk
management process.
At the beginning of a PFI project, uncertainty is higher due to the poor level of
confidence among parties (Figure 5.1). The establishment of good interpersonal
relations will only be built up during the development of the project thus reducing
uncertainty. There is also a learning process and shared experiences, which gradually
causes uncertainty to diminish. A good example of people's uncertainties is the difficult
negotiations between Unions and the UK National Health Service. John Hutton, the UK
Health Minister has recently announced (Financial Times 2002) that ancifiary staff wifi
remain in NHS in all new PFI hospital deals, which triggered some attacks from private
companies that interpreted this move as "a political fix to buy off trade union
opposition".
In the PFI environment, the most relevant people uncertainties deal with risk perceptions,
risk attitudes, decision choice, and the ways in which interpersonal communication
affects the flow of information and the project management process. Decision-making
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biases and risk-learning process are also important related issues. The behaviourist
aspects related to the uncertainty of project outcome and the sheer amount of financial
risk involved makes people uncertainty a very important area in PFI. A brief comment
on the most relevant issues mentioned above follows. These are: Risk Perceptions, Risk
Attitudes, Decision Choice and Interpersonal Communication.
5.3.10.1 Risk Perceptions
An analysis by Akintoye (1998) of the risk perceptions of government, contractors and
financial institutions involved in PFI projects shows clearly that each group ranks most
highly those risk factors that are closely related to their own business objectives.
Contractors focused on risks that threaten their profit level, the most important is design
risk, closely followed by construction cost overrun risk. Governments look first to risks
that threaten the timing, availability, and performance of the asset, with commissioning
risk ranked highest followed by performance risk. Lenders look to threats to the
recovery of capital and interests, payment risk being the most important, followed by
volume risk. The three parties have adopted different methods and techniques in dealing
with risk assessment of PFI schemes. They also approach risks in different ways, and it
is therefore not surprising that this results in different and conflicting outcomes. There
are similar findings (Edwards 1998) concerning clients, contractors and consultants.
Their risk perceptions were quite different.
The fact that parties have different risk perceptions is not necessarily bad; on the
contrary, it might be welcomed. Different perspectives, if well managed, can lead to
better decisions, less biased and more thoroughly checked processes. For example, in
some IT PFI projects that have had problems, the contractor has provided its own
financing. It has been suggested that one of the reasons for these problems is that the
lack of a financial partner has prevented a more careful and thorough project feasibility
study. The key is to manage the different perspectives efficiently and effectively so that
the conflict is not disruptive, but on the contrary can lead to better decisions.
Risk perceptions are closely related to tolerance for ambiguity (Ghosh 1997). If the
government or the project is ambiguous, they will trigger resistance from employees,
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who perceive their jobs to be threatened. In PFI, the Public sector has several options
regarding staffing (Morgan 1999):
. No Staff transferred, as with all new prisons contracts;
• Some staff is transferred, as in hospitals and schools (clinical/teaching staff
remain in the public sector);
• All staff transferred as with major IT projects.
Special attention has to be given to adequate training and reassurance to people that are
transferred to the private sector regarding issues such as conditions of employment,
transfer of pensions and acquired rights.
5.3.10.2 Risk Attitudes
The people attitudes towards risk (Boothroyd 1996) can be illustrated by the Utility
Theory graph shown in Figure 5.3.
Gain
Figure 5.3. Utility Theory
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Utility theory simply measures the satisfaction a person will receive from particular levels
of gain and what that person is willing to gamble in order to achieve that gain. People's
attitudes towards risk fall into three categories: risk neutral, risk averse, and risk seeking.
Prior experience and knowledge can also influence risks attitudes.
How managers react to a decision environment (Coopers 1988) depends on how they
interpret signals from that environment. Decision situations can be categorised as either
opportunities or threats. Managers consistently tend to see more opportunities in risky
situations than do bureaucrats, and typically express strong confidence in their abilities to
take advantage of opportunities. Therefore, in PFI projects, the public and private sector
can be expected to have different risk attitudes. The public sector being more risk averse
and the private is more prone to take risks. The need for people with different risk
attitudes to work together is one of the critical human-relations aspects of the PFI.
The importance of the role of staff attitudes transferred from the public to the private
sector is emphasized in the Treasury's recommendations.
Success relies on dedication and commitment of staff ....it is necessaiy to
encourage personal investment in the future of their orgcrnisation' (Morgan
1999).
5.3.10.3 Decision Choice
The roles of risk attitude and tolerance for ambiguity for predicting choice were analysed
by Ghosh & Kay (1997) and the results indicate that
• Both risk attitude and ambiguity intolerance determine choice behaviour;
• The role of individual attitudes depends on the levels of the two treatment
variables of risk and ambiguity. In managerial terms, this means that ambiguous
decisions contexts, with the presence of risks and ambiguity, can lead to
dysfunctional behaviour and sub optimal decisions;
• The presence of ambiguity accentuates the perception of risk in individual
subj ects;
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• Decision-makers who have greater tolerance for risk and ambiguity, display
greater confidence in their choice. Krueger and Dickison (1994 in Gosh & Kay
1997) demonstrated that more confident and optimistic decision-makers take
more risks and Gosh & Kay (1997) found that less risk-averse decision-makers
display more confidence in their decision choice. Therefore, when managers are
more confident and take more risks, their organisations will enjoy more
innovations. Also, because risk-averse individuals display less confidence, the
presence of ambiguity in managerial decision context, if interpreted as risk,
reduces confidence and induces decisions that are even more conservative.
5.3.10.4 Interpersonal Communication
Project success (Edwards 1998) is highly correlated with project management approach
in terms of team communication and understanding of project goals. Successulil risk
management was found to correlate with experience; the riskier the project is likely to
be, the more experience is sought in the person appointed to manage it. The IFC (1999)
found that, in its experience, one of main reasons for the failure of projects it finances is
poor project management, others being construction problems and lower-than-expected
projected demand. The right man for project leader seems to be of critical importance, at
least in the bidding stage. Indeed, key-man loss is one of the items included in PFI
insurance packages. Some authors, like Mobsby (1994) suggest that the project leader
should be someone independent of the organisations involved. Only then it would be
possible to have an unbiased and thoroughly considered decision.
According to Rocheleau (1999), one of the reasons of failure in public procurement has
been the inability to share. Although the technical barriers can be overcome, many
organisations may be reluctant to share because they have strong incentives to retain
control over information, and information is power. Again interpersonal relationships
play an important role, as they remain the main vehicles for exchange of information; for
example, it is estimated that in an interview 65% of the information is transmitted via
visual contacts (Padgett 1998).
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Showing a great concern with the interpersonal issues in PFI the UK NAO published a
report that stated
'The key question we have sought to aner is whether authorities manage their
FF1 relationships to secure a successful partnership.... FF1 projects involve
long-term relationships between authorities and contractors who, at first sight,
appear to have dyfferent objectives. A successful outcome for both parties can
only be achieved f they are prepared to approach projects in a spirit of
partnership' (NAO 2001).
5.3.11 Force Majeure
Force Majeure consists of events that cannot be forecasted and therefore its uncertainty
can be considered constant throughout the life of a PFI project (Figure 5.1). It begins
when the decision to undertake the project is made and ends when the project finishes.
5.3.12 Residual-Value Uncertainty
Residual-value uncertainty concerns the value of physical assets at the end of the
contract. At the end of the PFI project, the asset can be returned to the Government if it
is going to be re-tendered. In this case, compensation might be paid to the contractor.
Alternatively, the asset can be handed to the contractor that will use or sell it. Residual-
Value Risk is associated with the ftiture value of assets, and similarly with other risks,
uncertainty increases as the time period is extended. So whenever there is a value
allocated to the future value of an asset, the related uncertainty increases with time
(Figure 5.1).
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5.3.13 Summary: the WLCRLJM applicability
A PFI project is complex involving several types of risk throughout the different stages
of its life cycle. This chapter proposed the WLCRUM model. It has a top down
approach on risk and includes all the global risks grouped in categories, like financial,
construction, operation and management, environmental, and social, etc. The model's
main innovative feature is that it recognizes that each risk's uncertainty is not constant
throughout the whole life cycle, thus recognising that uncertainty is dependent both on
the type of risk and on the period of the project's life cycle. It is more informative than a
risk matrix where the risks and their impact are assessed.
The WLCRUN'I model is an assessment and management tool for risk uncertainty. The
model's fundamental assumption is that in the long-term projects the evolution of the
uncertainty attached to each risk is the key factor to manage. If uncertainty is high it
means that there are few mitigation measures in place (probably for some risks there are
none possible). If uncertainty can be reduced, it means that the risks are better managed,
hence a project with a higher probability of success.
The WLCRUM model can also provide a preliminary evaluation of the degree of
maturity of the PFI by the analysis of evolution of the design uncertainty. It can also be
used to structure the analysis of strategic decisions regarding PFI. It can be used as a
Decision Support System for Senior Management to assess the risk in long-term projects
as it allows a clear view on how uncertainty progresses, avoiding the wishful thinking
attitude that underestimates some types of risk, thereby preventing the adoption of
corrective measures. Project Managers can also use it as a project management tool as it
forces them to rationalise the underlying reasons of uncertainty and provides an
opportunity to implement measures to reduce it. Finally Researchers can use it as a basis
to develop models (Fuzzy Logic seems a natural choice adequate to the type of data
obtained) as for the quantification of the Long Term Risk Assessment in PFI (or other
similar projects).
The remainder of the chapter presents the test examples drawn from the case studies on
PFI to validate the WLCRUM model, and concludes with the application of the model to
quantify uncertainty in two PFI projects: Lusoponte and Indáqua.
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5.4 Testing the WLCRUM model
The following sections present the tests on the risk uncertainty model drawn for the case
studies developed in the current research. For each type of risk were chosen the two
most illustrative examples drawn from the case studies (for some PFI projects the graph
of the uncertainty's evolution is included). The risks are described together with the
consequences and adopted mitigation measures. It is important to note that often the
same issue relates to more than one type of risk. An effort was made to analyse
separately each risk type, but it is inevitable that in some instances more than one type
of risk is apparent, nevertheless it was decided to maintain the description, as it is to
make it possible to understand the issue.
The data was collected during the fieldwork undertaken for the PFI case studies. For
the PFI projects of Lusoponte and Indáqua it was possible to collect semi-quantitative
data for the evolution of uncertainty throughout the whole life cycle. As such, the
chapter ends with an example of the quantification of each risk for the different projects.
MATLAB was the software used to analyse the data and quantify uncertainty; it is a
high-performance language for technical computing that permits data analysis,
exploration, visualization, modelling, simulation, and prototyping.
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5.4.1 Political and Regulatory Uncertainty
Lusoponte and Indáqua projects exemplifj political uncertainty (Table 5.1). In both
instances, political uncertainty is strongly affected by lack of consistency in government
will and by governmental changes that affected the composition of the negotiation and
project management public sector teams. Co-ordination problems within the various
governmental bodies and agencies also adds up to uncertainty.
Maximum Uncertainty
	 lndáqua
Figure 5.4. Political Uncertainty in Indáqua and Lusoponte.
Figure 5.4 illustrates how political uncertainty throughout the whole life cycle is
perceived by Lusoponte and Indáqua' stakeholders. The different trends in the two
projects reflect the particular conditions under which each project developed, especially
during the bidding stage.
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Table 5.1. Political Uncertainty
LusoPoN'rIi
Lack of consistency in governniental will - During the
negotiations and after the contract' signing the
Government's orientation changes. Such changes happened
when a Socialist (PS) Government replaced the Social
Democrats (PSD) Government. And also when a seccnd PS
government replaced the first PS government
The lack of consistency has become more apparent after
Gabinete da Travessia do Tejo em Lisboa (GATTEL - The
government's project management team) influence
diminished because: first, it was scheduled for extinction at
the end of 2000, and, second because of a lack of political
backing from the second PS government. Lusoponte now
has to deal with the Ministry of Public Works and the
Ministry of Finance separately. This creates co-ordination
problems, the tso \'linistries don't have a common
orientation, and although Lusoponte tries to sit both at the
same meetings it is very difficult to find a common
governmental orientation, It is like having to deal with
several partners instead of one.
Third Crossing - Lusoponte as per the settlement
agreements signed in July 2000. is undertaking a pre-
l'easihility study t'or the Third Crossing (road-train) over the
Tagus. So for, the Government is politically determined to
have t crossing that connects the north and south rail
network, and although a road crossing looks necessary to
alles rate the 25th April crossing, it hasn t so tar committed
itself unequisocallv to a road crossing. This Business Case
consisting mainly of trallie studies and other preliminary
technical studies, will he the basis for the Government's
decision regarding this Lrossing.
The e\isting contract doesn't award Lusoponte the design
and Lonstruction of the crossing, and the decision to make
(or not) the crossing lies entirely ssith the Portuguese
Government. .'Jso, if ' the project is to have access to
European hinds it must he competitively tendered and there
is an additional potential risk that Lusoponte will have to
operate a crossing designed and built by another entity,
svhose concern sill lie solely con.struction and not
maintenance.
INDAQUA
Conflicting interests - The disarticulation among Ministries
has lead to delays in the decisions and potentially reduced
the bargaining posser of the public sector in the negotiation.
The negotiation teams are almost alwa ys replaced sshen the
government change, each Ministry has its own policy
guidelines and the Government often imposes politically
driven decisions that affect the financial equilibrium of the
project.
New Political directions after signing tire concession
contract led to non-availability of EU funding - S Maria
da Feira Municipality opted to apply for EU finding to
construct some inl'rastructures because it has a small budget
and is legally prevented t'rom having the sers ice debt weight
over 2000 of its budget. The concession contract was signed
in the belief that the Environment Ministry would make the
necessary hinds available. What happened was that: First,
the Central Government took about a year and a half to send
the application to Brussels for finding through the II QCA
(Community Support Framework),. It arrived there four
months before the end of the program and the hind was
exhausted. Second. by the time the III QCA was available
the Minister had been replaced and the policy f'or EU
funding too, giving in practice sole access of EU hinds to
IEP-AdP (a state owned company).
According to the concession contract, any delays in
construction or no (reduced) EU fi.inding are considered to
be the municipality' exclusive responsibility, as it is
recognised that Indáqua Feira would incur revenue losses
due to the non-availability of infrastructures that are part of
the networks under con.struction and that are critical for the
sshole operation. St Maria da Feira Municipality partially
solved the problem by establishing a second contract to
build their share of water distribution s\stem with SL\IRIA -
Sistema Multi-municipal de Recolha, Trataniento e Rejeicao
de Efluentes da Ria de Aveiro. a local Multi-municipal
s\stem participated by IEP-AdP and adjoining
\lunicipalities.
However, St Maria da Feira has yet to solve the problem of
funding to construct its share of the wastewater sewerage
network the sewage interceptors and treatment. The share
f the netsork that is the private partner' responsibility is
also on hold, as under the agreement established hetsseen
Indaqua Feira and European Ins estment Bank (EIB). the
Loncessionaire will not start any insestments in the
sewerage network until this issue is definitely solved.
State Monopoly - In Portugal. the majority of Local
Authorities are small, and depend on the availability of EU
structural hinds to undertake the much needed infrastructure
investments. But, now the Central Government controls the
III QCA hinds, and only accepts the proposals (against EU
directives) from Multi-municipal s ystems in which IEP-AdP
is a majonty shareholder. Nor can the private compa'lies or
even the Local Authorities appl y. as was the case when the
Indaqua Feira concession contract was negotiated and
signed.
Consequently, the private companies, like Indaqua, that
have entered the water supply and sesserage management
market with an expectation for a large market are now faced
ssith legislation that, in practice. gives the monopoly of all
the systems upstre.im from the clean ssater distribution
networks or downstream from the ssastewater collection
networks to IEP-AdP a state osned compan y. IEP-AdP has
the exclusive rights to apply for the EU funding (non
returnable) and the Local Authorities, that have the
exclusive competence to manage these sers'ices. don't have
the necessary hinds to undertake the construction works.
This leaves f'or the private sector only the market f'or
infrastructure of the clean water distribution and the
ssastes\ater collection iietssorks. because ssith the level of
investment needed it would be impossible to have an
adequate return and simultaneousl maintain a reasonable
level of tarifi's if only private funding would be used.
As an example of the prevailing political will, art 25Im May
2001 the concession of the Municipal Sstem of Wastewater
Treatment of Algarve (southem Portugal) sas awarded
directly ssithout an\' tender to the company Aguas do
Algarve. owned 5l0o by IEP.AdP and several municipalities
ofAlgarve that were forced to join against their will.
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In Lusoponte it is almost consensual that political uncertainty increases steadily as the
projects proceeds, reflecting the common perception that further down the time horizon
what will occur it is not known. However, from the commercial side there is a different
opinion: They consider that in a project of this nature - running a public infrastructure
with low operating risk and a guaranteed market - the political risk diminishes once it is
perceived that the project is operating well. Consequently political uncertainty should
decrease by steps coinciding with the stages of the life cycle. This opinion clearly
reflects the commercial side of the project, but undoubtedly there are factors that
increase uncertainty in time, like the hypothesis of a privatisation. This example
illustrates how two totally different opinions co-exist in the same project, reflecting the
different perceptions of the stakeholders. In a real life situation, different opinions
would make it necessary to re-analyse the issues reuniting the stakeholders in order to
reach a consensus.
With Indáqua political uncertainty has a maximum at the moment of the beginning of
construction mainly due to the lack of clear goals of public sector and changes in central
government directives. Clear objectives were defined after construction begins, hence
the decline. Uncertainty rises again during the operation stage.
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5.4.2 Economic and Financial Uncertainty
Lusoponte and Indaqua projects exemplify the economic and financial uncertainty
(Table 5.2). In both projects the financial uncertainty associated with the heavy
investments for the usual financing and insurance arrangements mitigate the
construction start-up. As to the economic uncertainty the main concern is inflation,
which is always taken into account in the financial models. These are risks always
taken by the private sector up to a certain level, like the price correction mechanisms
associated with inflation. It is the private sector task to look in the financial markets for
financing and mitigation tools that can minimize uncertainty.
T.nd.r	 Strt.gy	 Nogotuation Contract Slgnrng Contrc,ctuon.	 O(M . Begina	 Conatructton	 OIM . Enda
Preparation	 Evaluation	 Begins
Figure 5.5. Economic and Financial Uncertainty
Figure 5.5 illustrates how economic and financial uncertainty throughout the whole life
cycle is perceived by Lusoponte and Indáqua' stakeholders. For Lusoponte the
economic uncertainty begins with contract signing and increases with time. The
uncertainty of the some important variables, is already taken into account in the
financial model. For example the unit price for the service is indexed to inflation and
the impact will be reduced.
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As for other financial uncertainties like Interest and Foreign Currency Exchange Rates
- a risk taken by the private sector - the uncertainty also increases with time. Very
importantly their impact will be much higher at the beginning of the project than in the
end. (see Figure 5.5 for the dotted line that represents the potential impact in the
project). At the beginning leverage (debt) is much higher so the impact is higher.
Nevertheless these risks are usually partially mitigated recurring to some of the existing
financing mitigation tools.
Table 5.2. Economic and Financial Uncertainty
LLJSOPONTE
Interest Rates The contract had fixed interest rates and
when the tender sva.s launched, in 1993, the interest rates
varied between 7-°o. In March 1995 the y had climbed to
I l-12°o. Consequently, the Internal R.ite of Return
decreased from 1 l.43°o to 1Oo. This risk was completely
absorbed by the private sector without mitigation measures
even insurance. The Portuguese financial market was not
developed enough to permit the contracting of a 'cap', i.e.,
to insure the risk of esces.sive increases in the interest rates.
As a result the risk wa.s reflected in the project adding ,in
extra l billion e.scudos to the overall project cost.
Contract not yet shielded reduces financing options - The
20-year EIB financing was needed because at the time of the
contract signing there was no other entity that ould lend
over this penod. as ,ln example public debt was not issuing
bonds at such long-term the maximum was 10 years. The
other option for long-term financing - capital markets - was
considered inadequate fbr this projecL A monoline finances
long-term, hut with thousands of investors in the stock
markets, it ne.ds a very stable project. It is completely
impossible to refinance, and there are ver y strict controls of
the financial ratios variability. The EIB financing was a
strategic decision t.iken by the shareholders. In the last
refinance negotiations EIB and an US monoline were
competing for the financing with very sinsilar conditions.
The shareholders knowing that the project was not
contractuall y shielded, and that it would not reach financial
stability for a prolonged period (the construction of a third
crossing is an open possibility), opted for EIB financing
because it was more flexible than a monoline financing.
As to the additional financing needed fbr the third crossing
in the event that design and construction is awarded to
Lusoponte, one of the two options is possible:
•	 It will be included with the existing financing,
involving a global financial restructuring of the project.
INDAQLSA FEntt
Inflation - Both Indáqua Feira and the Municipality
 carry
financial risks, because both have construction ssorks to
undertake, and need external li.inding. Inflation is a major
risk that the project carries especially because the works are
going to extend for eight years.
Payments by the Municipality - The concession can
involve several types of payments to the concessionaire
from the Municipality. These can he either the predictable
annual subsidies to the concessionaire or unexpected
paments like when the financial equilibrium of the
concession has to be re-established by the Local Authority.
Two issues negatively afléct the realistic possibility of
getting the payments:
• The Local Authorities have small budgets and
the service debt weight on the annual budget is nearly
always very close to the limits, so they cannot recur to
further borrowing. Any financial compensation will be hard
to get;
• The other sva\' to get a financial compensation is
increasing the tariffs, which is both unpopular and
politically damaging to the local politician.
Indáqua - In this project, the construction is phased, the operation of part of the network
starts before the construction stage ends. As such, economic uncertainty increases up to
the start up of service commencement afterwards it decreases as construction gets to be
completed and less finds are needed. After the end of the construction stage
uncertainty increases again, but it is the natural increase associated with the project'
long term nature, and also the hypothetical need for financial compensations to the
concessionaire by the Municipality.
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5.4.3 Social Uncertainty
Apart from the risks associated with enviromnental concerns, there are risks related to
the project' social impact. Typically the social uncertainty reaches a maximum during
the first stages of construction when the project becomes visible and decreases
afterwards after dealing with the issues raised.
Man,um Urertainty
Figure 5.6. Social Uncertainty
The examples of Indáqua and Lusoponte illustrate this view (Figure 5.6). The
uncertainty trends in both projects are very similar, with only the difference that the
level of uncertainty in Lusoponte is much higher. This reflects both the project's social
visibility and all the problems that arose. A good example is the extensive litigation
between Lusoponte and GATTEL and particularly with the indemnity that was awarded
to Lusoponte regarding the claims for the loss of revenues with the 25t1 April Crossing
imposed unilaterally by the government. The image transmitted to the public by the
media (and some political parties) was that the project was costing a lot of taxpayer's
money. This negative image was even extrapolated to project finance, creating the
assumption that this type of financing was expensive and likely to need a lot of
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taxpayers' money and consequently pawning future generations' income
In Table 5.3 are described examples of social uncertainty in three PFI: Lusoponte,
Indáqua and JSCSC. It illustrates how Social Uncertainty never drops completely and it
is not uncommon that social issues can be present for the duration of the project's life
cycle as it happens with the JSCSC with a potential claim from the Human's Rights Act
(HRA).
Table 5.3. Social Uncertainty
LtJsoPo4TE
E'cpropriations - Lusoponte took the risk of expropriating
all the land necessary for temporary and permanent works.
including the risk of land price inilation. This was the first
time that this process, normally undertaken by government
agencies, had been earned out by a pris ate sector company.
The Government's sole role wa.s to declare the desiguated
areas for "public benefit". This administrative process was
ssell conducted. . \i the beginning, there v,ere 350 parcels to
expropriate, out of these 250 settled amicabl y and 100 had a
Court settlement (20 are still pending). Some tried to
speculate by asking for unreasonable values. For example.
an industrialist asked for 1.8 billion escudos, and finally the
court for 280 million escudos settled it.
On the north shore, there were two areas: the EXPO98 site
a disused industrial area and to the northern end, property
was predominantl y commercial and residential where 273
families were re-housed in new apartments constructed by
Lusoponte or received financial compensation. 	 A new
prima school is being built at Portela to replace one
demolished on the boundary of the Praça Jose Queiros
access and ,in old age day care centre in \toscavide has been
relocated. On the south shore land was predominantls
agricultural.
Buzinao (Big hoot) According to contractual terms, the
tolls for each crossing where to he equalised. As a
consequence of this the Portuguese State raised the tolls on
the 25th April Crossing in June 1994. This caused a public
outcry (buzinio) and the government was forced to rescind
this decision. The toll will remain frozen at 150 escudos
(for class I vehicles) until 2002, when it will be raised to
200 escudos (1 Euro). A rise of 1.5 times the Base Toll
instead of 2.6 times. In addition, the Portuguese State
imposed on Lusoponte a Frequent User Discount Schense in
August 1994 for users of the 25 April Bridge only. A 10
percent discount tbr users pre-purchasing books of ts%enty
tickets with no date limit, and a 20 per cent discount for
users pre-purchasing books with a one month limit was
introduced. A further scheme was introduced for the Via
Verde, allowing a 50 per cent discount after the 13th trip
within a month, and with all trips alter the 7201 being free.
As a result the Portuguese Government had to agree on six
compensation packages required to restore Lusopontes
financial position in relation to the GATTEL Base Case.
INDAQVA
Public Perception - This project doesnt involve a great
deal of controversy since the need for the establishment of
the water distribution and sewage networks is ssell
understood and accepted. Nevertheless it is alwas
necessary to mitigate some opposition especially related
with the inconveniences dunng the consti'uction stage. For
example, it is necessary to maintain good relations with the
church (it is a strongly catholic region) and make provisions
to prevent that construction works, like open ditches.
disrupting the passage of processions.
Mi'ing Local Authorities - The solution to integrate St
Maria da Feira network with the networks of adjoining
municipalities carries the risk of opposition based on ancient
rivalries. The projects involving water supply are especially
sensitive to these issues and procedures to deal with them
have to be established.
Rights of Way - During construction it is also necessary to
take care that the rights of way are accounted for. Local
people are very sensitive to these rights.
JScSc
Hwiians Rights Act (HR$-1998) - and its application
commencement in October 2000 gives local citizens a
statutory right of appeal against infringents of personal
rights.freedom. There is a strong body of legal opinion that
Government bodies (and by implication their agents such as
Defence Management - DM) cannot interfere with their
rights by claims to Crown Immunity, as was previously
done. Social risks;for example the temporary shortage of
school places; could lead to action against the MoD and
their agents, DM. etc. There are current1 no legal
directions as to the liability for actions under HRA (1998).
Therefore DNI has an unknown potential liability.
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Environmental uncertainty is considered included in the social uncertainty. It is related
mainly with: The activity of environmental pressure groups (e.g. Lusoponte) and that
derived from Force Majeure events - natural causes (e.g. JSCSC) for which there are
few (or none) mitigation measures (see Table 5.4). The environmental awareness is
growing in our society and when a project is launched (especially if it has a great social
visibility and/or potential social impact) it is inevitable that it will be closely scrutinised
(e.g. Lusoponte). By complying with good environmental practices, always undertaking
environmental impact assessments, the sponsors can in great extent reduce the
uncertainty.
Table 5.4. Environmental Uncertainty
LUSOPONTE
The environmental groups were very active during the
bidding and construLtion. As a result of their pressure there
were several .idserse and non-foreseen consequences for the
winning consorti,i:
• The Europe.in Commission conditioned the availability
of ti.inds subjeLt to the existenLe of an approved
Environmental ImpaLt Assessment (EIA) that wa,s
influenced by the Commis.sioner \Vulf.sIathies.
• Suspension of EU hinds, due to alleged violations of
the EIA until the signing of a protocol between the EU and
the Portuguese State establishing conditions that had to be
satisfied for a further release of funds,
• Increased expropriation of an area of 300 ha, to include
the Samouco Salt Pans special protection area. The viaduct
would typically have required a much smaller area. This
resulted in a claim (now settled) of 1.2 billion escudos for
expropriation and rettirhishment of the saltpans area.
• The building 01 a viaduct instead of an embankment to
cross the saltpans. Initiall y the crossing ot' saltpans was to
be made by embankment, hut to avoid a detrimental eflct
upon the area a 4.5 Km viaduct was built sshich meant an
increase of 25 billion escudos in costs.
• The Lusoponte's staff also includes an Environmental
Engineer, which svas not anticipated at the beginning of the
proj ccl
The environmental impact of the bridge was controlled and
minimized by:
•	 Measures to minimize noise levels and air pollution
including landscaped acoustic harriers;
• The leaching of metals from the bridge is controlled.
On the South Viaduct. where it crosses the saltpans, the
rain%ater runotL contaminated by metals, oils and other
pollutants, is collected in three treatment tanks;
• The construction not all.ting the fish nursery areas in
the estuary;
• The disturbance of river sediment being a one-off
situation, and svas not significant since the estuary
 is very
dynamic - every day 1 3 of the water volume is transferred
to the sea by the tides- consequently, the tidal erosion in the
riverbed is very high, rendering irrelevant the disturbance
caused by the bridge
• The greatest environmental impact of the crossing
being the urban development on the South shore. How this
development will proceed depends on the Local Authonties
permissions for urban developments in an area that was
mainly rural. The monitoring studies that Lusoponte
regularly undertakes, includes an evaluation of the social
and economic conditions surrounding the Vasco da Gama
crossing.
JScSc
Flood Vater - The JSCSC was built to withstand an event
that ssould occur 1:100 years (once every hundred years),
i.e.. exceptional one. Unfortunatel y the rains in the winter
2000 were a 1:200 event, which caused all sorts of problems
namels: tlooding in the ground floor of the main building
and the lagoon's overfiossing in spite of the drainage
installed (it was supposed to overflow to a creek).
Contamination - The 1:200 event caused mains sewerage
from site (and also of-site) to overflow into the containment
lagoon. This lagoon (also a landscape feature) was then
required to be pumped dry, its previous stone lining
removed, the sshole cover decontaminated and then relined
with a new stone lining and then retilled. All at no
additional cost to the SPV client and at the expenses of John
Laing Const.
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5.4.4 Legal Uncertainty
Uncertainty starts at the beginning of bidding until the signing of the contract, increases
sharply during construction with the increase in number of companies involved and the
contracts that bind (thus increasing the possibility for claims). After service
commencement the contracts are tested and the situation thereafter is much more clear.
The examples shown (Table 5.5) illustrate how only after the operation starts all the
legal implications became apparent (Lusoponte), how the uncertainty connected to legal
issues can extend through the whole life cycle as in the JSCSC and the potential
application of the Humans Rights Act and how it is important to check all laws and
regulations before signing the contract (JSCSC).
Table 5.5. Legal Uncertainty
LUSOPONTE
The concessionaire as.suines lull acceptance of the risk
associated with Lhanges in general law or taxation. The
only exception is changes in regulations that attèct directly
and adversely the operational revenues of the crossings.
Legal Due Diligence investigation checks the adequacy of
existing legislation with the contract responsibilities, and
was done before tinal siguing of contract by the banks to
ensure that all contracts accord with the Portuguese and UK
law Of all the contracts concession, warranties,
intercreditor, etc only the security agreement has to accord
with Portuguese law onl y. This is a crucial contract for the
banks because it is the warranty against their financing and
all assets given as a svarranty are in Portugal and any
disputes must be ruled in a Portuguese Court. Given the
intricacies of Portuguese law it is sometimes diflicult to
adapt the contract to UK law. The reverse is not true. All
the other contracts are usuall y drafted according UK law.
and are ea.silv accepted.
In spite of all Due Diligence investigation problems
occurred with Via Verde - One related to alterations in the
existing contract with Brisa and another with a legislation
gap. Alter the signing of the contract but before taking over
the operation of the 25th April crossing it was found that the
conditions of the existing contract with Via Verde were
changed (from the time of contract signature?). This led to
claims against the grantor. Also the transgressions on Via
Verde led to legal problems When a car without
transponder crosses Via Verde it is registered and a
procedure starts to recover the payment and tine. \Vhen the
concession was signed it included obligations against the
transgressors. but irs reality there was a gap in the legislation
and Gestiponte didn't have etThctive posver. It took four
years to update the legislation and give Lusoponte the power
to issue notitications against the otInders.
Now if the offender is not immediately stopped and notified
by the police, a notification for voluntary payment of a fine
and the tariff is mailed. If it is not paid (the majority are)
the process proceeds to courts (which is costl y). Lusoponte
recovers 400 o of the tine and the due taritt
When Gestiponte started operating the 25th April crossing,
violations accounted for up to 5 per cent of all transactions.
The installation of more accurate equipment and a
sen.sitisation campaign for the users enabled the reduction of
the level of violations to 1 percent of total tolled traffic.
Jscsc
The concession contract (and 28 schedules) became an
implied document in the construction contract. Therefore
the requirements of untried/untested PFI concession became
an implicit feature of all contractual negotiations. The fill
implications of the implied terms svhere not recognised in
Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP). Hence the reason for
constructors costs escalating from £88 million to £120
million with no change in GMP.
Planning regulations surprises and Coiistruction
approvals: Traditionall UK Government Departments
have been exempt from Local Authority Planning Approval
Procedures (Although by custom and practice they have
tried to comply). At the time of the contract's signing Laing
Construction (L.C.) assumed that the construction was
approved by the Local Authority Planning Department and
had the construction works ready to start when they were
informed that the building would onl y be approved if was 2
meters deeper than planned. The immediate major adverse
consequence was that the building's foundations reached a
very bad soil instead of rock as planned, and consequently
costs escalated.
Humans Rights Act (HRA-1998) - and its application
commencement in October 2000 gives local citizens a
statutory right of appeal against infringents of personal
rightfreedom. There is a strong body of legal opinion that
Government bodies (and by implication their agents such as
the concessionaire) cannot interfere svith their rights by
claims to Crown Immunity, as svas previously done.
Therefore any "local" complaints about planning and or
Construction Approvals could potentially lead to a claim
under the HRA(l998).
143
Model for Management of Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty in PFI
5.4.5 Bidding Uncertainty
Indáqua and JSCSC projects exemplify bidding uncertainty (Table 5.6). The
uncertainty is related mainly with the need for adequate information to prepare and
negotiate the bid. The uncertainty decreases as time progress and theoretically should
end when the contract is signed. What happens in reality is that very often the contract
is signed and not all issues are clarified. Consequently the bidding uncertainty extends
beyond the point of contract signing carrying the uncertainty of unresolved issues.
Table 5.6. Bidding Uncertainty
JNDAQtJA
Low Quality of Information - The bidding risk is related
to laLk of and erroneous information that can lead to the
inability to take decisions, or alternatively to make the
srong ones. Atler the signing of the contract, it became
clear that clarifications. interpretations. etc., were still
needed. Clearly a sign that the information provided during
the negotiations was not completely adequate
No clear objectives - The Public partner has to have a clear
idea ot the objectives, before issuing the tender. Apparently
clear objectives were not defined. This has over-extended
the negotiation period
.rscsc
Poor Information - An Industry Briefing Day was held by
the Ministry of' Delnce (MoD) to provide the interested
companies with sufficient information to enable them to
make an inlormed decision on whether or not to hid. Topics
typically covered were: haLkground information, how the
service is currently being delivered, the sereice
requiremenLs, the project timetable and other sources of
further information.
The injbrmation brief was con.sidered b y L.C. to have been
not clear enough; the construction requirements ssere loose
and with open-ended solutions leaving too much room for
interpretation to the lead designer that felt free to interpret
the client's wishes as to sshat the building was supposed to
look like. The consequence was that the contract was signed
with inadequate information to correctly budget the
construction works.
At the start of construction only 5° of the drassings were
available. Their quality was poor, impossible to estimate
from effectively, which was problematic since the
construction contract was budgeted according to the
philosophy of Guaranteed Maximum Price. This
methodology to be valid requires the assurance of _.8000 of
the design of what is going to be built. But at the time of
signing the JSCSC construction contract not even 5O°o of
the design was known, making it impossible to budget
correctly. Even the materials choice was done as
construction progressed. for example. it happened that as
image svas a big issue L.C. was forced to use walnut for the
doors instead ot'a cheaper material.
A good example is the Indáqua project where the bidding uncertainty during the
operation stage is derived from the need of clarifications, interpretations regarding the
non-compliance with contractual agreements, and from not clear monitoring procedures
of the Municipality to the constructionlservices. Nevertheless, in this project, contrary
to what happened with the JSCSC, there was the establishment of a Partnership
Approach to the Negotiations. The complexity of the contract has led to extensive
negotiations and special care was given to establish good relations between the authority
and the concessionaire. This approach has helped to solve many of the problems
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encountered.
Another issue related with bidding uncertainty are bidding costs. Experience and
information from other projects play a very important role. Knowing how to deal with
these processes is very important, as cost reductions can be huge. In the Indáqua project
the public and private partners fully assumed their respective bidding costs. These are
usually high and at a total loss to the private partner if they don't win the bid. For the
Municipality this was the first project undertaken using project financing and their costs
went up to 500 million escudos. They estimate that the experience and knowledge
gained with the negotiation of this contract would make it possible that on future
negotiations the costs will be reduced to about 200 million escudos.
5.4.6 Construction Uncertainty
Construction uncertainty is related with all the issues that can potentially conduce to cost or
time. Table 5.7 describes the most important issues raised in the JSCSC and Lusoponte
projects and that caused unforeseen delays. Typically the uncertainty starts at high
levels when construction begins because it is then that the real site conditions are tested.
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Table 5.7. Construction Uncertainty
JSCSC	 LUSOPONTE
Site conditions - One of the main problem that L.C.
encountered related to the site conditions is related to
Ground water. Bad ground and excavations below water
table occurred in excess of all reasonable expectations at
tender stage. The 1:200 floods caused a significant
alteration in ground water levels and ground water content.
The requirement to deeper excavations for foundations by a
further 2 metres increased the volume and technical
complexity of earthwork and sub-structure activity. L.C.
having agreed a Guaranteed Minimum Price with the
concessionaire did not lay-off its risk to their sub-
contractors. The construction sub-contracts were largely
"traditional" and allowed sub-contractors to send and obtain
reimbursement for variations in the works.
Pour drainage - One of the main problems encountered was
poor drainage alter the heavy rains of the first winter alter
delivery of the luilding. This might be related to the
alterations requested by the planning departments to lower
the building 2 metres. It happened that L.C. had already
built the drainage network before knowing of the alteration,
and although they were removed on paper as the pipes were
already in place actually they were not removed, SShiLh
might have caused the flooding of the building.
An example of' trying to compl y ssith planning
requirements: The doLumentiry evidence v.as amended to
suggest compliance whilst the physical ssorks (already
executed) were not .smended. If this should cause local
flooding problems in the future, there is the possibility of an
action under BRA 1998 by "local residents".
NB: These "local residents" could even be the occupiers of
the military famil y homes on site, who historically have
been unable to take any actions against MoD (and agents)
because of claimed Crossn Immunity. Once again DM base
an unknown potential liability.
Co-ordination problenis - There were sequencing and
programming dilliLulties, that for example. led to the
scaffolding sub-contract in the final account amounting to
plus 87°o over tender, that is £560,000 in excess of L.C.
estimate.
Labour shortages - L.C. experienced serious labour
shortages as the Ssvindon area is very buoyant with few
people available that can he employed as carpenters.
electricians, etc.
Latent Defects - Alter delivery there was a 3 months period
of' snagging to correct construction defecLs. A final
inspection will be performed one year after delivery to
assess if all defects were corrected. There is a period of 12
years during which L.C. will be liable for latent defects.
As mentioned, all the problems encountered meant that the
GM? contract of'tt8 million would in realit y cost L.C. £120
million.
Delays in contract signing: The detail design was
developed during the construction stage, and work could
only start alter GATI'EL's approval. Because of the delays
in signing the contract, and to assure that construction could
be completed according to schedule it was necessary to:
Support additional temporary Site installation costs.
All the resources needed for construction were made
available by the French partner even before the final
approval. While waiting for the 'green light', they
undertook minor works. In the end this measure, although
costly, paid off because construction could begin the day of
the final approval, and it was not necessary to wait for the
mobilisation of resources;
•	 During this period the design team was developing
work at Lusoponte's risk;
•	 Novaponte commenced construction at its own liability
in July 1995 before GATTEL's approval.
Structural adjustments: The crossing was designed to last
120 years, so special care svas given to the structure. This
resulted in additional costs and/or delays because:
• The driven piles svere supposed to be 60 metres deep,
but instead it was necessary to go up to 100 metres deep.
greatly increa.sing costs:
• The intertidal zone of the piles has twice the
anticipated thickness of concrete to prevent corrosion of the
steel cables.
• The unavailability of land considered in the proposal
fbr temporary site installations and consequent need to
relocate and split up such installations
Completion: The Vasco da Gama Crossmg has been in
operation for two years but the construction risk has not
been extinguished, because the outstanding works were
expected to be finished by the end of December 2000. Alter
the Final Inspection Report, Lusoponte will issue the Final
Acceptance Certificate to Novaponte. It's shareholders
confirmed their commitment to carrying out all works
necessary to achieving Final Acceptance Certification.
The' are hilly liable for completion.
The Inspection Report acted as a pressure instrument dunng
the period svhen all disputes and claims ssere pending.
The one-year defect warranty period (alter delivery) has
now expired. The question now is the definition of delivery.
Alter two years in operation there are issues that anse and
that are related with the usage of the asset, and it becomes
difficult to distinguish between those and problems related
ssith construction that should be covered by the defect
ss'arranty.
Alter the Final Acceptance Certilicate by Lusoponte. there
is a one-year warranty fbr a 12-month maintenance penod.
dunng svhich any minor defects, imperfections or faults
have to he remedied. For latent defects there is a 10-year
(alter Final Acceptance) performance svarranty. The
consortium Novaponte will be dissolved alter finishing
construction hut the liability is transferred to the
shareholders.
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Typically construction uncertainty decreases throughout the construction stage reaching
zero when construction finishes. This decrease can be linear (more or less) or in stages
coinciding with the completion of the most important construction stages. Figure 5.7
illustrates the situation for roads where the stages are: Ground Works, Drilling, Tunnels
and Special Structures. In a real life situation, the profile would be more complex with
several active work fronts.
Uncertainty
Construction
	 Construction
Begins
	 Ends
Figure 5.7. Uncertainty Decreases during the Construction Stage of Roads
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5.4.7 Design Uncertainty
The design uncertainty is related with the availability and quality of the drawings and
with the adequacy to the specified services requirements. Uncertainty decreases
throughout the construction stage presenting a slight increase after service
commencement due to the possible existence of defects that only become apparent after
service commencement because it is only after the actual start that the structures are
tested and latent defects become apparent and have to be correct within the warranty
agreed terms (3- months to one-year). Afterwards uncertainty still exists as there is a
period of several years when the constructor can be liable for latent defects.
Hospitals	 -	 -	 -	 - - -
-	 - -
T.nd.r	 Strategy	 N.goliation	 Contract	 ConCtrUCtlOfl	 OIM . Begins	 Construction	 O/M . Ends
Prepatallon	 Evaluation	 Signing	 Begins
Figure 5.8. Design Uncertainty
From the data collect it emerged that the design uncertainty trend is strongly dependent
on the maturity of the PFI market sector. Figure 5.8 illustrates three situations: the
most typical where uncertainty slowly decreases as construction progress; the top line
illustrates the situation found in the hospital sector widely acknowledged as a complex
high-risk sector with too many decision centres — uncertainty is very high and only when
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construction is at mid-term it starts to decrease; and finally the bottom line found in
sectors like the prisons sector, or fire-stations, where the majority of uncertainty is dealt
with a priori contract signing.
Underlying the different lines is always the question of how much of the design is
complete at the moment of contract signing. In the hospitals sector the definitions of
detail design are dealt with during construction by a large numbers of interested parties,
like the heads of department. This situation has the potential for disputes and hence
uncertainty remains high. In contrast, in the prisons sector design is well established,
proven from previous projects and there are clear objectives, so typically 90% of the
design is established at the moment of contract signing and declines steeply afterwards.
Insufficient specifications were already discussed previously and are also related with
design uncertainty. The examples in Table 5.8 were drawn from the Lusoponte and
JSCSC case studies.
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Table 5.8. Design Uncertainty
LUSOPONTE
The main difficulty encountered was the need to comply
with the construction schedule (that was already very tight)
co-ordinating the delivery of the designs so that the
constructors wouldn't be stopped by a lack of design details.
During construction, GATTEL imposed several
modifications to the preliminary and construction designs.
These caused significant delays in the relevant approvals
besides the additional costs incurred by changes in the
nature of construction works and the need t'or land
availability. The delays also caused significant onerous
acceleration measures to ensure timely completion. This led
to claims by Lusoponte that amounted to 25 billion escudos.
The most important were:
• The reformulation of the link to Pc. Jose Queiroz on
the Northern Bank. The initial project was for a level
connection, svhiLh was soon discarded. In Oct. 96 the
connection was not et defined. One of the main reasons for
the delays was the need to coordinate all intervening
authonties: GArI'EL. EPAL (Water company because of
the Aiqueva Aqueduct), Municipality of Loures and Lisbon.
Epo9S and the Lisboa and Vale do Tejo Regional
Coordination Committee:
• A similar situation inolved the Southern
connection, also involving the need to coordinate several
entities, among shich the Brisa (concessionaire l'or
motorways) and JAE (Roads Authority)
•	 The refonnulation of Sacavem Interchange, also
involving increased construction works. 	 Extra cost
amounted to 3 2 billion escudos;
•	 Remediation.
jScSc
Poor design procedures Laing devised The Review
Process themselves hut it proved to he very had for the
progress of the con.struction works. It introduced delas
because construction could only start sshen there were no
comments from every partner. The Review Process was an
iterative process with the following stages:
•	 First, the architects produced the drawings;
• The drawings were sent to a review committee
composed ot MoD. Serco. planning and building control.
They had 20 days to comment:
•	 The drawings were redone and resubmitted to the
committee;
•	 This process would repeat itself' until there were no
comments.
But No comment" didn't mean, "I agree", which meant
that later problems could surfhce. Effectively, it happened
that long after construction commenced problems were
raised. For example, there was only one overworked
planning officer in the municipality, who although issuing a
"No comments" would raise issues long after because it was
then that he had time to analyse the drawings. Also the fire
department stated afterwards that construction was not in
accordance with saf'ety regulations. The usual way to
proceed is to present the drawings t'or comments, and after
receiving comments proceed with construction.
Designs were not timely - Often the plans were revised,
with the annotation that there were onl y minor alterations.
which in reality would mean alterations in 50 items.
SLhedule revisions were constant, which was very
disturbing because it was a tight schedule as L.C. had to
deliver the building already equipped on 6 September
2000. Otherwise it would mean a one-year dela y in starting
operation, as the academic year ssould he lost. Design
evolution was accompanied by panic control. The
difJrence between the ideal delivery schedule and as it was
in reality was enormous. The construction sub-contractor
had the majonty of the drasvings in his pos.session only near
the end of the construction penod, whilst its delivery by the
designer should have been smoothl y phased from the
beginning of construction.
Service Specifications - "Fit for purpose" svas introduced
in the construction sub-contract to characterise the service
specifications of some construction items. It proved to be
the origin for several problems. because the purpose can
change depending on the client's point of view. The most
striking example is the 'Fit for purpose' of a tire escape:
outside the bar there is a fire exit with a balcony and stairs to
the ground. It happened that during the commemoration of
Victory in Europe (VE) Day people ssho were at the bar.
went out to see the planes flvpast and the excessive weight
caused the balcony to bend. It was designed for people to
pass through not to stand, but as it didnt prove in that
particular circumstance. L.C. was forced to redesign it and
rebuild it as it was "not fit l'or purpose'. It is important to
note that the concept of 'Fit for Purpose' is uninsurable. no
one insurance company will accept to cover this risk, and it
is the constructor that takes the risk not the designer.
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5.4.8 Commercial Uncertainty
Commercial uncertainty, or uncertainty in the project's revenues, is present when
dealing with a free-standing project where the clients pay for the service (Lusoponte,
Indaqua). With a DBFO the client needs are predefined and it is the public sector that
pays for the service level of usage as in shadow toll roads, or service availability as in
schools according the contracted service specifications (Victoria Dock Primary School
or JSCSC). It is not a real life market driven situation and it occurs in several sectors
like prisons, schools and fire stations.
Ma)arrljm Uncertainty
Figure 5.9. Commercial Uncertainty
As for the long-term perspectives of a free-standing project, it is clear that uncertainty
increases with time (Figure 5.9); the private sector always assumes some risks. In
Lusoponte the private partner assumed totally traffic risk, but as it is considered a low
risk sector uncertainty is comparably lower than in Indáqua. The maximum of
uncertainty is in-between 10 and 20 years. It is new infrastructure so it is relatively
difficult to predict its impact, but after 20 years the market situation will be relatively
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well known, hence a decline in uncertainty.
Table 5.9. Commercial Uncertainty
LIJSOPONTE
Traffic Risk has been accepted by the private sector. One of
the reasons for the inclusion of the operation and
maintenance of the 25' April crossing was to mitigate traffic
risk, and consequently to diminish risk for the overall
project. Both crossings connect the urban area of Lisbon to
the south hank, so it was reasonable to assume that traffic
would he diverted, the extent of which was very diflicult to
predict. Whereas when considering combined traffic the
uncertainty is much less. The other underlying reason was
to obtain revenues to partially finance the project.
Traffic depends mainly on:
• Tinting and development of the south bank
• GDP Growth affecting Car OisersIilp: In 1998, the
Lisbon area had 421 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants, and in
Setubal (south hank) 319 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants.
Saturation is believed to he about 600 vehicles per 1000
inhabitants;
• Level of tolls: People always look for cheaper
altematives. Both bridges have tolls only northbound. It is
noticeable in the traffic statistics that some drivers enter
Lisbon from the south by the 25' April Crossing, which is
cheaper (150 vs. 320 escudos) and leave town by the Vasco
da Gama Crossing, which has no traffic jams and no tolls in
this direction. Fhe dillerence in traffic northbound and
southbound is superior in the 25th April Crossing where
5000 cars more enter Lisbon than leave, while that on the
Vasco da Garna it's the reverse: there are 2000 more cars
leaving Lisbon than entering.
• Impact of fuel price increases - In Portugal the
Govemment sets controls on thel prices imposing a
maximum price to the public. In March 2000, the time of'
the first increase in fuel prices, there was a decrease in
traffic dunng the tbllowing ts%o months, alter which it
returned to the pre'.ious levels. The price increase that took
place in January 2001 (-4-5 escudos per litre) was small sith
negligible negative impact. By the end of 2001 it is
expected that the government will liberalise fuel prices,
sshich will undoubtedly mean a much higher price increase
(between 5-30 escudos). It is important to note that if this
price increase coincides with an interest rate increase, and
consequently an increase in mortgage loan repayments, the
impact will be especially significant because the great
majority of' commuters are low to middle income young
couples who moved to the .southem bank because of cheaper
housing;
• Lisbon traffic restraint policies;
• Competing traiisportation niodes - Rail link - The
negative impact seems to have been overestimated. It is
operating above expectations. hut this either released
suppressed denuind or captured traffic from buses
(Barraqueiro cancelled their buses) and lerries. As a result
the 25 April Crossing has reached full capacity one year
after the opening of' the sixth lane, instead of the anticipated
3 to 4 years;
Impact of Carregado bridge upstream of Vila Franca de
Xira - There is always the possibility to construct another
crossing outside the area of' Lusoponte's concession,
upstream of Vila Franca de Xira just beyond the
concession's limit.
L"iDAQUA
The commercial risk depends on the revenues from the
services provided. The revenue level is affected by the
following four main factors:
•	 Adoption level (before construction 2000 for
water, and 4% for the wastewater sewerage);
•	 Demographic evolution of the municipality;
•	 Water per capita consumption;
•	 Payment risk.
The commercial risk allocation is split among the
municipality, the concessionaire, and the consumers, If the
concessionaire is under certain adverse conditions the
consumers carry the risk through increased tariffs. It is
important to note that the consumers are not homogeneous.
There are three segments: domestic, commercial and
industrial. Each one has different needs and their future
evolution differs too.
Adoptiois level - This is the most important risk assumed
by the concessionaire. It is expected that the majority of
new consumers will connect to the service during the
construction stage. It is very expensive and inefficient to
make the connection to a consumer alter concluding the
installation of the main pipes.
Marketing campaigns are scheduled to promote the
connection particularly to the wastewater sewerage network.
The connection to the svastewater sewerage is critical.
because it is not legally mandatory and is generally
considered to be the most profitable segment of the
business. Its need is still not very well understood by all
consumers, as they are used to discharging (at no cost) the
wastewaters without treatment and now they would have to
pay for that service.
Demographic evolution - The demographic studies are the
municipality' responsibility: if the population evolution
proves to be 1000 less than the forecasted, there will take
place an automatic mechanism for the renegotiation of the
financial equilibrium of the concessionaire and the tariffs
will be raised. It is considered that for the demographic
evolution very conservative estimates were used hence this
risk is small.
Per Capita Consumption - If per capita consumption is
lO g s less than of the forecasted, tariffs will be raised.
Payment Risk - Historically', the payment risk (billing risk)
is low, as it is an essential service and in the case of non-
payment it will be discontinued. The weight of the water
bill in the overall budget of the consumers is reduced and an
upward margin of 20°o would be acceptable. This explains
why the other concessions have already increased prices
sithout any problem (initially they were supposed to lower
the prices), adjusting the prices to the operational costs. For
example. Aguas do Cavado was planning to reduce the price
and instead raised it from 50 to 65 escudosim3.
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Depending upon the specific characteristics of the market the revenues are affected by
different factors. Table 5.9 describes the Lusoponte and Indaqua risks together with the
viable mitigation measures implemented. For Indaqua the commercial uncertainty
depends on two factors: demographic evolution and adhesion level. It is perceived that
the later is the most important, so once operation starts, as the consumers connect to
service uncertainty declines, but never reaches zero level as the population growth is
never a complete certainty.
Conversely at Indaqua the long term commercial risk assumed by the private sector is
considered to be of high uncertainty - a new market affected by many factors although
with risks mitigated by the imposition of maximum thresholds of variation.
5.4.9 Operation and Maintenance Uncertainty
Operation uncertainty starts at the beginning of service provision and increases as times
progress. The uncertainty is related to the unforeseen operational problems that can
affect the service specifications thus introducing financial penalties (JSCSC), or that can
cause higher operating costs thus affecting negatively the project's cash flows
(Lusoponte).
Table 5.10 describes two examples drawn from the Lusoponte and JSCSC case studies.
In Lusoponte the main issues were related with higher than expected costs of toll
collection procedures, while with JSCSC the emphasis was on the need to comply with
the complex system of service specifications. Somewhat surprising, staffing proved to
be a major operational issue.
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Table 5.10. Operation Uncertainty
LUSoPONTE
Higher running costs of Via Verde: The Via Verde is an
electronic toll charge in operation on all Portuguese toll
highways. The car has a transponder that identifies the
vehicle, its class, and activates a direct debit to the driver's
bank. It permits 1200 car crossings/hour instead of an
average of 250 carslhour (some manual operators in peak
time can reach up to 480 cars/hour).
The electronic tollbooth creates more costs per car (costs per
transaction) than the manual tollbooth. There are bank
costs, processing costs, mailing costs and the costs incurred
by the non-payment (cars that go through without paying)
and subsequent procedures to try to recover payment. In the
base case all these costs were accounted for, but what
happened was that the increased utilisation of Via Verde
was much higher than expected, and consequently the costs
were higher than expected.
Non payment of Via Verde When a car without a
transponder crosses Via Verde it is registered and a
proLedure starts to recover the payment and tine. This is a
Lostl\ procedure, so on one of the two Via Verde lanes on
the Vasco da Gama Crossing a gate was installed that only
opens when the Lar is properly identified. Another example
oLcurred when Gestiponte started operating the 25th April
crossing, violations accounted for up to 5 percent of all
transaLtlons. The enforcement system using a video
recording, and the legal process. didn't allow the prevention
of violations or an et1ctive recovery. It took four years for
the government to adjust legislation and give Lusoponte the
pov.er to issue notifications against the oflnders. The
installation of more accurate equipment and a sensitisation
Lampaign for the users enabled the reduction of the level of
violations to 1 percent of total tolled traffic.
Inheriting an old system - Before Gestiponte took over
operation of the 2S April Crossing, hut alter the signing of
the contra.t, they found out that there were major
deficiencies in the toll collecting system. The manual
system was completely revised to improve the control and
monitoring, from the moment the toll is paid to the
reconciliation phase. This has led to claims against the
grantor.
JScsc
Service Provision Control - The operational nsk, i.e., the
risk that the private partner would he financially penalised
by an unsatisfactory service, has been controlled as this is a
self.monitoring and benchmarked project. 	 The Self'
performance Monitoring Criteria assess the performance of
the services provided against a benchmark that was
negotiated within the contract with the MoD. This
benchmark is still negotiable and it will be revised alter one
year in operation. The system is considered "fair" by both
partners and is based on trust. The MoD has preferred to opt
for this solution, according to the partnering approach
adopted, instead of having a team on site to do the "contract
monitoring". Usually this involves 12-16 people at a cost of
at least £250,000/year, and that might not have a positive
perspective to solve problems. The actual system involves
penalty points for specific events, that if exceeded will
induce a financial penalty. The information system
interlinks this data on-line and the managers of the various
departments have access to it.
The system consists mainly of a set of tables describing the
events, for which a pre-determined number of points is
attributed according to the occasion on which they take
place: Normal, Audit or Key Events (Veiy important days
when key events take place, usually involving about 12 days
a year). If the event takes place in a Normal day the points
to attribute will be the pre-set benchmark, if the event takes
place on an Audit day the benchmark is multiplied by two.
and if it happens on a Key event day it will be multiplied by
three since it very important that service should be tiawless.
EaLh manager has a standard template to till in. and on a
daily basis can control the number of points attributed and
compare them with the benchmark. The system works on a
3-months basis, thus gising a good margin to correct
problems.
Stalling Problems - The Mess Services - catenng and
cleaning were sub-contracted to Eurest. At the beginning
of operation Eurest had big problems with stalling. The
area where the JSCSC is located is 3000 short in labour
positions (i.e.. in the area there is an average of 3 000
employment vacancies). Eurest had underestimated dse
problem and as such it caused major problems with the
performance monitoring system. According to this system if
the agreed levels of performance are not attained Sercos
payment by the MoD is penalised. The turnover of the
personnel was excessive - few stayed for longer than 2
weeks - and stalling was tiarther complicated by the need of
being secunty cleared an average 50°c wouldn't pass.
So far Serco has not been financially penalised, and having
opted for a partnering approach they worked in conjunction
with Eurest to work out the best solutions. One year after
service commencement this problem has been reduced.
performance has improved and Eurest has managed to get a
good set of supervisors. Currently Eurest employs 160-180
persons, probably needing a tiarther 10-12. They get
emplosees from as liar as Oxford (30 Nm).
The uncertainty associated with maintenance naturally increases as time progress but
the trend is highly dependent on the specific project. Two examples draw from data of
the following projects: Lusoponte, and Victoria Dock Primary School and illustrate two
different situations (Table 5. Ii).
154
Maximwfl Urerlr1y
----r
4
-
C
C
2
0
1
I	 I
---
-6y.ar	 ----- - 26yeaf9
155
Model for Management of Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty in PFI
In Lusoponte there is a very specific trend associated with the technical characteristics
of the structure (Figure 5. 10) with a cycle of 25 years related with the characteristics of
the cables, pillars, expansion joints, etc., and the replacement of control equipment. In
the school the main concern was to reduce maintenance costs and potential maintenance
problems.
Figure 5.10. Long Term Maintenance Uncertainty in Lusoponte
Model for Management of Whole Life Cycle Risk Uncertainty in PFI
Table 5.11. Operation Uncertainty
LLJs0PONTE
The 0/M team was involved since the beginning of the
project to evaluate the adequacy of design to simplity 0/M,
keeping its costs at the minimum possible level. For
example, the access to the South Viaduct structure for
routine inspections (check sensors, support apparatus, etc),
were planned from the start: The existing suspension cables
would not permit a cradle installation to accesses under the
deck for inspection. The 0/M proposed a project
modification: the installation of a small fixed platform !br
inspection that would run beneath the 800 metres long deck.
This resulted in a much more eflicient maintenance
programme.
Alter service commencement the risks and uncertainties
remained high and constant during the first years (2) as the
structure stabilizes and settles. Also the well-known
phenomena that some electronic equipment ( 2%) will fail
dunng the first two years, the reaming will perform well
during their regular lifetime for 20 years. During those first
\ears monitoring is detailed and intensive. hut with the
passing of time the behaviour of the structure becomes
known with less uncertainty and less monitoring is needed.
In those first years there are always surprises: The coils of
expansion joints were loose and falling although they were
according specifications.
The degree of control and monitoring reduces uncertainty
forLing the line downwards and stabilizing around 5 sears.
based on what is known about materials behaviour. As of
2000, some areas could he considered stable because they
ssere built in 1993.
Alter 20 years, and for 5 years, the electronic and support
equipment has to he replaced having reached the end of its
ldeL5cle, and the structural risks derived from the natural
ageing of materials increase uncertainty. There is the need
to replace pillars (there might appear areas where the
conLrete is damaged), beams and to make the maintenance
of the structure and cables. This cycle repeats itself every
25 sears.
Uncertainty increases with the passing of time because no
one really knows the behaviour of concrete during 120
years, which is the projected life of the Vasco da Gama
bridge. Concrete was introduced in the 30's and it was
supposed to be eternal, which is now known to be untrue.
VICTORIA DOCK PRIMARY SCHOOL
The school was designed to have low maintenance costs,
paying special attention to reduce potential vandalism. For
example they use external steel shutters (very uncommon in
the UK) that although more expen.sive - higher initial
investment and maintenance every six months - prove in the
long run to be a good investment reducing (or stopping) the
breakage of glass windows
As the school pays for their own gas and electricity great
efl'ort was made to design an energy efficient building (also
not common in the UK). Some special features to reduce
whole life cycle costs included are: double glazing windows,
large cavity walls with air pockets to improve insulation,
less expensive roof tiles that are replaced every 15 years
instead of 25 years tbr the traditional aluminium foil, also
they didnt insulate the concrete tloor having considered that
not much heat would escape thus saving the increased costs
of insulation. Doors are painted (thus easier to repair)
instead of varnished.
To reduce vandalism and for security and respective
recurring costs they have put thick plywood to the cover of
the roof thus preventing people breaking in. So far the only
vandalism has been graffiti.
They have a security system sub-contracted to Prosegur.
The school has a multiskilled and flexible 'caretaker' with
the authority (empowerment) to solve simple tasks, like
fixing a plug. More complex maintenance problems, like
breakdown of pipes, an external company has to be used.
5.4.10 People Uncertainty
People uncertainty deals with risk attitudes and perceptions towards risk. Regarding the
risk attitudes it is always beneficial that the risk profiles of the concessionaires coincide
with the risk characteristics of the sectors. For example, Carden Croft - the risk averse
concessionaire of the Manchester Fire Station - has opted for low risk sectors (Table
5.12). The human uncertainty derives mainly from the people's perceptions on how the
projects will affect their own well-being: personal, professional, etc.
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Figure 5.11. People Uncertainty
The human uncertainty profile of Indáqua (Figure 5. 1) illustrates this dependency on
risk perceptions. At the beginning there is a low uncertainty, followed by an increase as
more players begin inter-acting (typically the peak is in the later stages of construction)
and then decreases as people get to know each other better and establish (or maintain)
good inter-personal relationships (Victoria Dock). Uncertainty also decreases as the
employees see their professional situation resolved as it was the case of Indáqua where
part of the Municipality's staff was transferred to the concessionaire.
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Table 5.12. People Uncertainty
MANChESTER FmE STATION
Carden Croft, the contractor of the Manchester Fire Station,
is not a risk taking firm and will always focus in low risk
areas like the Blue Light sector. They discarded
accommodation, technologically adjusted to their own
know-how but where there is high uncertainty regarding the
building's residual value because at the end of the
concession this value might be seriously undervalued from
the one expected.
LUSOPONTE
At the beginning of the project and as more people are
joining the team the uncertainty increases, reaching the
maximum at the beginning (or middle when more people
intervene)) of' construction. In any case, it decreases sharply
stabilising during 0 M with less people involved and that
have become to know each other well
INDAQtJA
In Portugal by law, in all concessions, the Municipality's
employees have the option whether or not to be transferred
to the concessionaire, with their previous rights and
privileges always guaranteed. Indáqua Feira absorbed 30
employees that had to be trained and integrated into the
culture of a private company. It is important to move them
away from their old working environment, and give them
better working conditions, like good changing rooms, etc.
In this northern region, the unions are notorious for standing
for their rights
VICTORIA DOCI
Paul Sewell had a very good and close relationship with the
school's headmistress (was on a first name basis) and Sewell
Group being a local company had traditionally good
relations with the town councillors and the Education board.
Throughout the process a partnership approach was used,
promoting co-operation between all the parties involved.
The decision taken by Sewell to promote a 'Community
Dividend' has enhanced this approach. The Victoria Dock
School PFI Ltd is to return a proportion of their profit to the
community. As of 2000. it represented around £35,000 that
went back to the school and was applied on special projects,
like environmental - A Wildlife Vood was set up within the
school grounds providing a wildlife habitat in an urban
setting and an environmental f'ocus for education.
5.4.11 Force Majeure
Force Maj cure Uncertainty remains at a constant level throughout the whole life cycle of the
projects, as by nature they are events for which there is no possibility to forecast.
5.4.12 Residual-Value Uncertainty
Residual Value Uncertainty existence depends on the contracts Usually the asset is returned
free of charge to public sector.
The next sections present the assessment of the quantification of risk uncertaint y in Indáqua and
Lusoponte.
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5.5 WLCRUM Quantification
This section presents the quantification of the WLCRUM model for the PFI - Indáqua
Feira, using MatLab as the analytical software to calculate the area beneath the
uncertainty lines. This area represents the quantum of uncertainty. It used the function
Mgrade that calculates the memberships grades of the domain elements in the fuzzy
sets. The difference between crisp sets and memberships grades, is that the crisp
numbers are assigned the value of either 1 or 0, while the memberships grades indicate
that the values assigned fall within a range, i.e., introducing the notion that the number
is not for instance 2 or 3, but about 2 or 3. According to Klir & Folger (1988) a fuzzy
measure indicates the degree of subjective certainty that it belongs to the set and thus
defined within the range 0 to 1. The Fuzzy Sets (Klir & Folger 1988; Zadeh &
Kacprzyk 1992) methodology is an alternative to the Gaussian Methods of analysis
being particularly adapted to uncertainty analysis and reasoning under uncertainty as it
is based in feelings, vagueness and deals very well with ambiguity by eliminating the
sharp boundary dividing members and non-members of a set. All the risks analysed are
based on uncertainty and as such Fuzzy sets is a natural selection. The interviewees
were much more comfortable to attribute a number to uncertainty that was not definite,
but that would be 'approximate', that would look 'appropriate' or that 'ii looks like x%
would he ok'. Previous methods rely mostly on the Monte Carlo simulation with its
corresponding probabilities and regressions, requiring precise numbers (still based on
expert opinions) and therefore not so well adapted to the current research objectives.
Table 5.13 indicates the raw data obtained from the interviews to participants (expert
opinions) in the PFI. For each type of risk, and for the most relevant dates it indicates
the uncertainty on a scale 0 to 1. The values are therefore normalized enabling the
comparison between different risks, and different projects
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Table 5.13. Risk Uncertainty in Indáqua
1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2008	 2035	 Uncer
tainty
Bidd.	 Negot.	 Sign.	 Constr.	 O/M	 Constr.	 OIM
Beg.	 Beg.	 Ends	 Ends	
ea)
OhM	 0	 0	 0	 0	 .2	 .6	 .8	 1	 29.7
Commercial	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 .8	 .4	 23.0
Political	 0	 0	 0	 .2	 .8	 .4	 .4	 1	 22.9
Econ.hFin.	 0	 0	 0	 0	 .6	 1	 .4	 .6	 19.5
Residual	 0	 0	 0	 0	 .2	 .2	 .4	 .6	 15.9
Value
Legal	 0	 0	 0	 .2	 .8	 .4	 .4	 1	 15.6
Human	 .6	 .2	 .6	 .6	 1	 1	 .2	 .2	 12.8
Bidding	 1	 .6	 .8	 .6	 .4	 .4	 .2	 .2	 10.6
Social	 0	 0	 0	 0	 .4	 .2	 .2	 .2	 7.3
Force	 0	 0	 0	 0	 .4	 .2	 .2	 .2	 7.3
Majeure
Construction	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 .8	 0	 0	 4.2
Design	 1	 .6	 .8	 .6	 .4	 0	 0	 0	 2.9
Table 5. 14 shows for each risk the graph of the evolution of uncertainty throughout the
life cycle. The value of uncertainty is, as mentioned before, the area beneath the line.
Included are also the values of x=years and y =uncertainty (Table 5.13), the script of the
algorithm and the calculated result for the area.
The higher values of uncertainty are from O/1\4 (29.7), Commercial (23.0) and Political
(22.9) risks. Political uncertainty is clearly related with the change in governmental
policy at the beginning of the project that caused so many problems. As could be
expected both O/M and Commercial uncertainties with high values reflect the long-term
nature of the project (30 years). It is interesting to note that construction uncertainty is
very low.
For the PFI of Lusoponte a different approach was tried to collect data. Instead of
asking for specific values, interviewees were asked to draw the lines. As a result the
lines obtained were smooth and not possible to quantify using the functions utilized in
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the previous example. It also used MatLab to compute a function that could be
described by the data points. It was chosen 'splines' which utilizes a polynomial logic
to interpolate the points and calculates the best function that describes the lines drawn.
It was then possible to calculate the area. Two examples are shown to demonstrate the
potential for this method (Table 5.15). The values indicated are only approximate as it
would be necessary to compute the values at regular intervals (required by this method
unlike in the previous example). Nevertheless, while not using fuzzy sets that are in
principle more adequate to the way people think about these issues, it has proved that
with the adequate raw data it is a valid approach.
In conclusion, the WLCRLTM was tested in PFI projects and proved to be a very useful
tool to map uncertainty and force managers to consider the long-term nature of the
project. The need to rationalize the uncertainty, and its underlying causes, over the
future was mentioned as very positive. In this process some interviewees realized the
existence of factors that could influence the project and over which it would be possible
to act upon (to mitigate it). The WLCRVM model is an effective management tool.
The quantification of uncertainty is still in a very embryonic stage. Nevertheless it is
one of the most promising research areas to develop.
The next chapter addresses the proposal for the model for CSFs in a PFI.
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% Risk Commercial Indáqua
x{0 1 2 3 4 51239];
mgrade[0 0 0 0 0 1 .8 .4];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area = 23.0000
% Risk Ec/Financial Indáqua
x[0 1 2 3 4 5 12 39];
mgrade[0 0 0 0 .6 1 .4 .6];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area= 19.5000
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Table 5.14. Risk Uncertainty for lndáqua
% Risk Construction Indáqua
x[0 1 23 4 512 39];
mgrade=[0 0 0 0 1 .8 0 0];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area = 4.2000
1r
::
(cont.)
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% Risk O/M Indáqua
x{0 1 23451239];
mgrade=[0 000 .2 .6 .8 1];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area = 29.7000
% Risk Bidding lndáqua
x[0 1 23 45 1239];
mgrade=[1 .6 .8 .6 .4 .4 .2 .2];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x, mgrade);
area= 10.6000
(cont.)
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Table 5.14. Risk Uncertainty for Indáqua (cont.)
% Risk Legal Indáqua
x[0 1 23 45 1239];
mgrade={0 0 0 1 .8 .4 .4 .4];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
p Iot(x, mgrade);
area= 15.6000
% Risk Political Indáqua
x=[0 1 2 3 4 5 12 39];
mgrade={0 0 0 .2 .8 .4 .4 1];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade),
area = 22.9000
% Risk Design Indàqua
x{0 1 2345 1239];
mgrade=[l .6 .8 .6 .4 0 0 0];
areatrapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x, mgrade);
area = 2.9000
(cont.)
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Table 5.14. Risk Uncertainty for lndáqua (cont.)
% Risk People Indáqua
x=[0 1 2 3 4 5 12 39];
mgrade{.6 .2 .6 .6 1 1 .2 .2];
areatrapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area = 12.8000
% Risk Social Indáqua
x[0 1 2 3 4 512 39];
mgrade=[O 0 0 0 .4 .2 .2 .2];
areatrapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area = 7.3000
% Force Majeure Indáqua
x{0 1 23451239];
mgrade=[0 0 0 0 .4 .2 .2 .2];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area = 7.3000
% Residual Value Indáqua
x[0 1 2 3 4 5 12 39];
mgrade[0 0 0 0 .2 .2 .4 .6];
area=trapz(x, mgrade)
plot(x,mgrade);
area= 15.9000
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Table 5.14. Risk Uncertainty for 1ndqua (cont.)
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Table 5.15. Risk Uncertainty for Lusoponte
Social Uncertainty
area = 2.5667
x = 2:1:6;
y = [.7 .6 .75 .5 .3];
xitp	 2:0.01:6;
yitp = interpl(x,y,xitp, 'splineT);
plot(x,y, 'oT,xitp,yitp)
area	 trapz(xltp,yitp)
Human Uncertainty
area = 4.1736
X = 0:1:6;
y = [.73 .75 .75 .75 .74 .6 .4];
xitp	 0:0.01:6;
yitp = interpl(x,y,x±tp, Tspl±ne');
plot(x,y, 'o',xitp,yitp)
area = trapz(xitp,y±tp)
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CHAPTER 6
Critical Success Factors in PFI projects
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses and proposes a model to achieve a successful PFI project. A
successful organisation is generally defined as one that achieves its goals. Translating
to a project it means that a successful project is the one that fulfils the project's goals
unequivocally related to the project's effectiveness and efficiency. However, when
Belout (1998) discussed the definitions of success/failure in a project he pointed out that
this is a restricted traditional mechanistic approach originated mainly from the project
manager's point of view excluding the views of other stakeholders. A definition of a
successful project should measure success against 'the accommodation of all
stcikeholder' expectations', e.g., of the sponsor, project manager, users, etc. It is clear
that this definition also comprises the criteria of the project's effectiveness and
efficiency.
In the current research a successful PFI is hereafter considered as:
A successfiul PFI is a project that satisfies the needs and expectations of all the
stakeholders involved
What determines success? Which are the factors that lead an organisation or project to
success? These factors named as the Critical Success Factors were introduced in 1979
by Rockart and can be viewed as 'the critical competences within an organization'
whose existence or non-existence determines the organization's success or failure:
• 'The limited number of areas in which results, f they are satifactoiy, will
ensure successful competitive peiformance for the organization. They are the
few key areas where things nziisl go right for the business to flourish. If results
in these areas are not adequate the organization 's efforts for the period will be
less tha;z desired;
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. Areas of activity that should receive constant and careful attention from
management.'
Within the same line of reasoning but more specific is another CSF definition proposed
by Aaker (1992)
• A Key Success Factor (KSF) is a competitive skill or asset that is needed to
compete successfully. Successful firms are usually strong on several KSF and
not weak in any.
Brannback (1996) used CSFs thinking to force managers to become aware not only of
the CSFs but also of the threats the organisations faces and decision opportunities it has.
The importance of CSFs assessment lies in that once they are made explicit (Bullen &
Rockart 1981) 'managerial priorities can he set more knowledgeably and resource
allocation improved.'
Within each economic sector there are different sets of CSFs at different levels:
industry, organization, sub-organization and individual. The current research focused
only on the assessment of 'industry' level CSFs, i.e., overall PFI market. As such, one
purpose of the research was:
What are the CSFs for the 'PFJ Industry'? or phrasing it differently
What are the CSFs for the procurement model that FF1 represents?
6.2 Cognitive Mapping
The assessment of the PFI' CSFs used Cognitive Mapping as the analytical tool to
analyse the qualitative data obtained in interviews to PFI's stakeholders. It is
considered a 'neutral' tool, in that the ideas and structure developed express the
representation of the PFI project.
Cognitive Mapping origins lie in the works of Tolman (Eden 1992) who wished to
develop an alternative to the stimulus-response model of man. The original theoretical
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developments go back to Kelly's Personal Construct Theory (Eden & Ackerman 1998).
In this theory the fundamental proposition is that a person is continually trying to make
sense of the surrounding world and develops the 'personal construct .system', i.e., the
understanding how individuals organize their environments requires that subjects
themselves define the relevant dimensions of that environment. The personal construct
system was represented by Repertory Grids that were the basis for the development of
Cognitive Maps by Eden. Cognitive Mapping as a technique to map complexity is now
widely acknowledged (Eden & Ackerman 1992).
Cognitive mapping can be defined as (Eden & Ackerman 1998) 'a
technique designed to capture the thinking of an individual about a
particular issue or problem in a diagrammatic, rather than linear, format'.
Cognitive maps are the graphical representation of the individual thinking
and perception of an issue. They reveal how issues relate to each other, the
concepts an individual uses are represented as points and causal arrows
represent causal links between these concepts. The causal relationships can
take a positive sign that indicates 'may lead to', 'has implications for',
causes or 'supports' - moving up the arrow, or 'is supported by' when
moving down the arrow, or negative signs that indicates the opposite. In the
current study only considers the positive causal relations.
Cognitive mapping aids to structure the individual's underlying values and beliefs and
discloses the relevant links between the concepts involved in a particular issue.
Cognitive mapping is an open procedure that starts with a blank page, the full meaning
(Eden & Simpson 1989) of the ideas is given by the 'whole picture' when the map is
completed. The graphic form is an enormous advantage as it is relatively easy to
visualize: first, how concepts and causal relationships relate to each other and second
the overall causal relationships of one concept with another.
The works of Chaib-Draa (1998, 2002) include a detailed description of Cognitive Maps
in the context of relational algebra and a formal model with precise semantics. This
analysis is outside the scope of the current research but it illustrates that cognitive maps
are not the ad-hoc descriptions of intuitive views but instead models described by
formal mathematical treatments.
Cognitive mapping ensures that the manager's tacit knowledge is explicit, articulated
and explored as managers have to explain and put into words issues, relations,
consequences that are most often based on tradition, values, beliefs, experience and
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faith.	 To ensure CSFs assessment validity it is critical that tacit knowledge is
incorporated.
If several individual maps are merged into one, it ceases to be the representation of
individual thinking and provides the aggregated view of a group. The aggregated
cognitive map becomes the collective and combined view of all interviewees and a
shared understanding of what is a PFI. It is a 'consensus cognitive map' of a PFI
project representing all issues and their causal inter-relationships. It is then as desired, a
holistic and systemic view of all the content and context (described by the links around
the concepts) of all the issues involved in a PFI, as well as an accurate representation on
how the relationships fit together in a hierarchical manner.
6.2.1 Comparison with other methodologies for CSFs identification
Cognitive Mapping is more suited to assess CSFs than similar techniques, like Mind
Mapping and Concept Mapping, because these lack the causal relationships established
among the issues. In addition, Mind Mapping starts with one central concept (issue)
and all links depart from this central concept, which is clearly not the case in PFI where
several issues can simultaneously influence (be central) to other issues.
Cognitive Mapping also has the advantage of reduced subjectivity when compared with
surveys or checklists (Chan, Ho & Tam 2001, Wang et al. 1999; Chua, Kog & Loh
1999, Tiong, Yeo & McCarthy 1992). The subjectivity can derive from two different
sources:
. Interviewees: both surveys and checklists are based in a scale (usually 5-Point
Lickert, Very Low to Very High) where the relevancy is individually analysed
based only in the interviewers heuristic perceptions, missing the explicit
hierarchy behind the reasoning explicit in Cognitive Maps, 'this leads to'. With
surveys the outcomes are lists. Different surveys, with different questions to
different interviewees, in different contexts produce different lists, eventually
with some overlapping CSFs. An alternative is to use a checklist approach and
ask for the item's evaluation to a panel of experts (Ozdoganm & Birgonul 2000).
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• Researcher: with Cognitive Maps there is no room for the researcher' subjective
interpretations. The concepts and respective inter-relationships are all explicit.
What the software does is merely to perform sequentially a set of analyses to
identifiy the 'more important or key factors contributing to the desired goals'.
The hypothesis being that these factors are the Critical Success Factors in a PFI.
Subjectivity in both surveys and checklists can also derive from the tools used to
analyse the questionnaires. For example, surveys always require large samples and
Factor Analysis is one of the most common analytical tools for dealing with a large
number of items. This analysis logically groups the questionnaires' items into sets or
factors. These factors that hypothetically represent the CSFs are not identified; what the
analysis returns is merely Factorl, Factor2, etc., it is then necessary to make a
subjective interpretation and qualify each factor to identify the CSFs.
Previous studies (Bana e Costa et al.1999) also used Cognitive maps to determine CSFs,
but it was in a different context and their approach was not fully Inductive, introducing
some subjectivity. Experts proposed the CSFs (similar to factor analysis) basing their
choice in the Cognitive Map analysis: 'explanations', 'consequences' and 'clusters'.
Finally, surveys and checklists are very limited in exploring the contexts in which the
CSFs are identified. Belassi and Tukel (1996) emphasized the importance of the inter-
relationships among success factors although using a different approach from the
current research. He first identified the group a CSF belongs to, and then determined
the combined effects of this factor, while the current research adopted the opposite
approach, i.e., first identify the issues and respective inter-relationships and from that
context derive the CSFs.
171
CSFs in FF1
6.3 Methodology for CSF Identification in a PFL
The methodological approach to identifi the CSFs avoids subjective interpretations and
combines the perceptions of actual PFI' stakeholders and is based on the PFI'
operational issues. It is Inductive rather than Deductive where conclusions are drawn
from general principles assumed to be true.
The fundamental assumption in the current research is that 'the CSFs are within the
most relevant issues of a PFI those that simultaneously influence and contribute to
more than one PFI goal'. The logic being to select those issues that exert more
influence throughout the entire project and that have a positive contribution to the
achievement of goals. Why more than one goal? Because by definition the CSFs are
limited in number and if all relevant issues are considered, a very large number of
factors would be obtained, which is against the essence of CSF. If more than four or
five factors are considered critical, the organizations disperse its efforts with
questionable results as to the improvements that the focus on CSFs convey
As the cognitive map describes in its entirety the project's several stages it takes into
account that:
• PFI requires a broad range of competences to inter-relate closely for a common
purpose - very often for the first time ever;
. PFI involves many stakeholders over the long-term (20-30 years) whole life
cycle context.
To obtain the best possible PFI' holistic' and systemic 2 description the cognitive map
included data from all the developed PFI case studies and the opinions of experts from
several sectors in different functions - financial, operation and management, etc. The
cognitive map was built by sequentially incorporating the information given in
successive interviews to a representative group of PFI stakeholders that checked and
validated the map. During the interviews the researcher exerted some judgment and
asked for a re-evaluation of some relations. As interviews progressed new concepts or
issues were added reflecting each person's perception of their own field of expertise, for
example, finance managers would naturally concentrate in financial issues, operations
Holistic - that conceptualises the reality s an undivided ho1e.
2 Systemic - complete.
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and management managers on operational issues. Project managers were also
interviewed and were key to provide the holistic perspective. With this methodology
the map is validated, as it would be not feasible to repeat the interviews or get together
all interviewees.
The approach of intentionally not asking for the interviewee opinion on CSFs also
avoids interviewee bias, as many managers may not fully grasp what the research
considers to be a CSFs (or have a different one from the one that we consider) and also
because they tend to over (under) estimate, as in surveys and checklists, the CSFs
related to their own area of expertise. In addition, it avoids preconceptions based on
existing literature.
In short, Cognitive Maps analysis eliminates some limitations of other methodologies
because:
• There is no subjective interpretation of factors, i.e., the concepts, and respective
inter-relationships displayed in the map are not the product of the researcher'
interpretation,
• The maps analyse context, i.e., how issues inter-relate hierarchically. The
importance and relevance of the issues are connected to the PFI' goals, in the
assumption that there is a hierarchy of the type: One leads to the other and so on.
• It is open, and not affected by previous analysis or preconceptions.
Decision Explorer (1997-2OO1) was the software tool used to analyse PFI Aggregate
Cognitive Map. It is a database of relationships that permits both the building and
analysis (explore) of the map. The methodology developed to assess the CSFs ensures
the results' validity, and was adapted from the Tutorial presented by Ackerman (2001).
The methodology's sequence (Figure 6.1) is to: First determine the Goals of a PFI,
second in a separate analysis find the most important issues (the ones that exert more
influence) and finally combine the results of the two previous analyses and determine
which of the most important issues contribute to more than one Goal.
Decision Explorer © 1997-2001 Banxia® Sothvare Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The detailed procedure is:
1. To find the best possible description of a PFI project putting together an
aggregate or consensus cognitive map, where the operational issues (concepts)
and their respective context (inter-relationships) are represented (sec. 6.3. 1).
The map was verified and validated throughout successive interviews. Before
proceeding with the analysis the map must be cleaned of concepts that are not
linked, thus with no interest to the analysis (orphan concepts) and of the loops
that indicate biased reasoning (sec. 6.3.2);
2. The CSFs are considered to be the most relevant issues (Relevant issues
Identification (sec. 6.3.4)) that influence and contribute (Hierarchical Analysis
of Goals (sec. 6.3.5)) to more than one PFI goal (Goals Identification (sec.
6.3.3);
3. The CSFs identified (sec. 6.3.6) and directly obtained from the analysis are
named Operational CSFs' because only the operational issues are represented in
the map not the underlying theoretical generalisations (Figure 6. 1). Further
conceptualisation is needed to determine the model for the PFI' CSFs;
4. The CSFs are critically considered checking internal consistency and evaluating
the critical validity recurring to the empiric knowledge and insight gained during
all the research, including the available bibliographic information. If any CSF
(or the operational issues that it supports) has an opposing causal relationship
with other CSF, then there is a conflict. 	 As it is impossible to have
simultaneously two conflicting CSFs, it is then necessary to review the cognitive
map;
5. The next step is the evaluation of external consistency to ascertain as to their
criticality and validity;
6. The final step is the development of the CSFs Model. A critical analysis of the
results and literature review was made, followed by careful consideration,
interpretation, judgement and conceptualisation to find the underlying
theoretical generalisations of each Operational CSF or the 'Real' CSFs.
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IDENTIFICATION OF PFI GoALs
IDENTIFICATION OF THE GOALS I
	
ASSESSMENT OF THE MOST
SUBORDINATES	 IMPORTANT ISSUES WITHIN THE PFI
C9iTEXT
IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMMON ISSUES
•1
OPERATIONAL CSF
VALIDATION OF RESULTS
CHECK OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY
4.
A SSESSAJENT OF THE THEORETICAL GENERALISATIONS UNDERLYING THE
OPERA nON-IL CSFs
4.
PFI' CSFs MODEL '3ARRows'
Figure 6.1. Methodology for CSF Assessment
The following sections present a detailed description and rationale of all steps.
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6.3.1 Development of the PFI Aggregate Cognitive Map
The cognitive map that represents a PFI project is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The map has
40 operational issues (concepts) and 79 causal links (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1. Operational Issues included in the PFI Aggregate Cognitive Map
Adequate Financing Package
Adequate Regulative framework
Adeq' ftc return
A leq'lLtL	 'r iLe output (q'i 1 t-
(.0li enleliLe)
Commitment to common goal
Consistency of strategies-common
goal
Control of Obsolescence risk
Correct estimate of concessions
length
Correct market evaluation
Correct price of Service
Correct risk allocation
Correct risk evaluation
Correct Risk Identification
Developed financial markets
Empowerment of Public project
team
Established Po]itjc'il Will
L\pericnce i
	
ieiou. t.nder'seetur
Good ci	 din tcrrcld1iolliips
Good preparation of proposal
Good project leader
Good Project Management
Improves Confidence between
parties
Integrate knowled ge from current
O/M
Investment according to estimates
Low biding cost
Market according (or better) than
estimated
Operatinglmaintenance costs
controlled
Perception of Reduced Risk
H I Ir inin
Polltkali'SoLidl ri k Cdi di oliLd
Reduce ambiguity
Satisfied clients
Scheduling Bidding ... undefined
negotiation period
Service clearly defined
Short negotiation period
Stable OIM Team
Standardisation Bidding &
Negotiation procedures
Standardisation of O/M procedures
Team Stability
Win tender
6.3.2 Tidying the Map - Identification of Orphan Concepts and Loop Analysis
The concepts that are not linked - orphan concepts - are of questionable interest in a
map whose central significance are the relationships established between the concepts.
The existence of loops may, or may not, indicate biased reas2ning. so
 careful
consideration must be given to the decision on maintaining them as they are, or, if it is
necessary to review the relationships within the loop and eventually eliminate the loop.
An analysis after the decision to maintain the ioop is suggested by Chaib-Draa (2002)
that used causal maps as a tool to represent the dynamic holistic approach of an
organi/ftion. I-Ic st'ited that orgam':ciIioi i! 1ici;ii a.'f'c'cts and i1?fl1','i?cfts 'voJi
through pat/is that close on themselves and Jbrnz loops. The loops are important for two
main reasons:
a
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• A change positive (negative) in an organization is the result of deviation-
ainpIj5'iiig loops, i.e., series of successive positive (negative) causal relations;
• The stability of an organization is the result of deviation-countering loops, i.e.,
positive causal (leads to) followed by a negative causal (doesn't lead to).
The first step is then to tidy up the map checking for the existence of orphan concepts
and loops. No orphan concepts were found, but one loop was identified (Figure 6.3) of
three concepts: Improves confidence between parties, Correct Risk Allocation and
Perception of Reduced risk. After consideration of the rationale that originted the loop
it was decided to maintain it, since the underlying reasoning indicates a logical iterative
process not a biased reasoning. Indeed it is reasonable to suppose that a correct risk
allocation will cause a perception of reduced risk, which in turn will improve the level
of confidence which in turn leads to a better risk allocation.
I Correct Risk	 ______________
[Allocation J	
Leads to	
J Improves confidence
between parties
/I Perception of
Reduced Risk
Figure 6.3 Loop in the PFI aggregate cognitive map
According to Chaib-Draa (2002) it is a deviation-amplifying loop. It indicates that one
positive transformation (or negative) of the PFI can be the result of an initial increase
(decrease) in confidence between parties that increases (decreases) the perception of
correct risk allocation which in turn increases (decreases) the perception of reduced risk.
Finally, and to close the loop, the increase (decrease) in perception of reduced risk
increases (decreases) conii.len..e bet\ee.1
4
178
CSFs in PFI
6.3.3 Identification of PFI Goals
The cognitive map is based on a hierarchy, where the 'layers' of ideas move from the
top where are the aspirations or 'goals' to achieve, to the bottom layers that represent
the causes or what leads to the desired goals (Brightman 2000). The logic behind the
hierarchy is that people talk about issues with a view to make a situation better or 'less
bad'. In Decision Explorer, the goals are identified as the 'Head' concepts, which are
the outcomes at the 'top' of lines of argument.
Three goals in a PFI were identified, critically analysed and vali rlated based on the
empiiic knowledge and insighL gained. Low Bidding Cost, \Viii the Tender an..i
Adequate Return.
It is interesting that each goal refers to the widely acknowledged three most important
landmarks in a PFI: the tender stage where it is very important to keep costs down, the
signing of the contract - without it there wouldn't exist a PFI, and finally the operation
stage where the investors get return on their investment.
• Low Bidding Cost it is essential for all parties to keep the bidding costs as low
as possible. Both the public and private partners have to avoid unnecessary
costs, and don't incur excessive (and needless) expenses. The private companies
have to bear in mind that if they don't win the tender the money spent preparing
it is a total loss.4
• Win the tender clearly is a goal for the private partner.
• Adequate return is the essence of a PFI. The private sector has to recover its
investment which is only possible it if the project generates sufficient revenues.
It is also important to the public partner as it is an indication that the project is
performing well with an adequate service output, thus achieving the ultimate
objective of the government which is the provision of a well performing service.
The TTK government is LQnsidering the h ypothesis of finaniaI compensation in some instances for unsuccessful
bidders, to avoid that private companies with less financial strength can be damaged or that olhers seek compensation
reflecting these losses in future tenders.
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6.3.4 Identification of the Most Relevant Issues in a FF1
Decision Explorer can identify the most relevant issues in a cognitive map by
combining the results of two separate analyses: Domain Analysis which gives an
indication of the complexity of the linking around the concepts, and Central Analysis
which gives an indication of the influence of the concepts in the context of the map.
The rationale (Banxia 1998-99) behind Domain Analysis is that people tend to talk a lot
about what they perceive as relevant issues, and consequently the concepts that appear
in the map and that characterise these 'relevant issues' will be highly elaborated (a lot of
cocepts linl.Jng in and out) Tlighly elaborated concepts will have a high domain score.
Central Analysis is complementary to Domain Analysis. It looks beyond the immediate
environment (links) around a concept and examines the complexity of links at a number
of levels away from the concept. The higher the score the more influence the concept
has within the model as a whole.
The highest scoring central concept may not be at the top of the domain analysis results,
and vice-versa. That is why a genuine key issue must combine a high score in both,
Domain and Central analysis, i.e., exerting simultaneously influence in the immediate
and remote environment throughout the model.
The results of Domain and Central Analysis of the PFI Cognitive Map are listed in
Table 6.2.
Table 6.2. Domain and Central Analysis
Domain analysis 	 Central analysis
Operational Issues with equal or more than six
	 Operational Issues with equal or more than
	
links directly around them
	 twenty links in the net\\ork around them
1. Exi'ciience in preuous tLnder/seetor - 14 links	 Experience in previous tender,sector —25 links from
around	 39 concepts
2. Short negotiation period - 11 links around
	 2. Service clearly defined - 23 links from 39 concepts
3. Service clearly defined - 14 links around
	 3.4deqiiate retil?72 - 22 liiiksfronz 39 concepts
4. Reduce ambiguity - tO links around	 4 SI art ngoti.ilion period - 21 links from 36 concepts
C rr.ct ri k II )cfl1 a	 Q links to tid	 R. i	 '-	 it - 2 'iiks frm 3t C i cej
6. 4decjua,c iCtiull 9 1ink. woun1	 u. Correct risk allocation -20 links from 36 concepts
7. Good project leader - 8 links around	 7. Good project leader - 20 links from 36 concepts
8. Improves Confidence between parties - 7 links
	 s. Improves Confidence between parties - 20 links
around	 from 36 concepts
9. Good Project Management - 6 links around
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'Aclecjuate Return' previously identified as a Goal, and 'Good Project Management'
which was not common to both sets, were removed. As such, the most important issues
that are simultaneously more elaborate and exert more influence within PFI (common to
both Domain and Central Analysis) are included in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3. The most Important Issues in a PFI
Correct risk allocation
Experience in previous tender/sector
Good project lLd.r
Improves ConfidLnce bLt\\ecn parties
Reduce ambiguity
Service clearly defined.
Short negotiation period
The next step is a hierarchical analysis that will permit the identification of the
Operational CSFs, i.e., most relevant issues that contribute positively to the desired
Goals.
6.3.5 Hierarchical Analysis of Goals and Identification of the CSFs in a PFI
The Goals' hierarchical analysis looks at each goal individually and identifies the
concepts that support them (the concept's subordinates), or the respective Group of
Teardrops. Each teardrop contains every concept that leads to it. Not to overburden the
figures, the Hierarchical Set, or HieseL for all the Goals presented in figures 6.4 to 6.6,
includes only the links that are directly connected to them, otherwise it would be too
complex.
The hierarchical set for the Goal 'Low Biding Cost' is illustrated in Figure 6.4. Not
surprisngl\ . Short N iitHn Perkd' Iris a significant imporhrice in reducing
'Bidding Cost'. The same occurs with 'Standardisation of Procedures'.
a
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Bidding & r
	 f,"	 _____________	 ITExperierice ii
16 Good projec1	 previousNegotiation 
' ' iAduce amblgui	 leader	 L_tender/sectorprocedures _____________
Figure 6.4. The subordinates of(or that support) the concept Low Bidding Cost
The hierarchical set for the Goal 'Win Tender' is illustrated in Figure 6.5. 'Good
Preparation of the Proposal' and 'Experience in Previous Tender/Sector' are the two
most important issues that lead to 'Winning the Tender'.
.112 Good	 Experience in
of proposal	 previous
tender/sector
Figure 6.5. The subordinates of (or that support) the concept Win Tender
The hierarchical set for the Goal 'Adequate Return' is illustrated in Figure 6.6. In order
to get an 'Adequate Return' a significantly higher number of factors are involved as
could be expected. The issues range from 'Correct Price for the Service' to 'Adequate
Fir1d1CTn Packa'.
a
182
CSFs in FF1
Figure 6.6. The subordinates of (or that support) the concept Adequate Return.
Having identified the issues that support each PFI goal, the next step is, according to the
proposed methodology, the identification of the concepts common to different hie.sets,
i.e., those that contribute positively to more than one Goal.
6.3.6 Identification of the Operational CSFs
Potent Analysis in Decision Explorer, identifies the concepts common to several hiesets.
When comparing the results of the Table 6.4 and of Figures 6.4 to 6.6, some of the
operational issues included in table are not visible in the figures because, as mentioned.
for simplicity each representation of the hiesets only includes the first layer of concepts.
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Table 6.4. Potent Analysis
Operational Issues common to	 Operational Issues common to
	
3 Goals Hiesets	 2 Goals Hiesets
Good project leader *
	
Experience in previous tender/sector 	 Commitment to common goal
Service clearly defineC *
Established Political Will
Good Project Management
FF1 training
Control of Obsolescence risk
Empowerment of Public project team
'1dcnt1ULCt as one 01 the most important opLrallonal iss'is iii a iii (1 awe .i.).
It is now possible to identify the operational issues that comply simultaneously with the
two criteria to classify as Operational CSFs: most important in terms of complexity
around them and that have more influence in the whole context of a PFI (Table 6.3); and
that contribute to more than one goal (Table 6.4).
The PFI operational issues that satisfy the two criteria and that can be classified as the
Operational CSFs are:
• Experience in previous tender/sector - contributing to three goals;
• Good project leader - contributing to two goals;
• Service clearly defined - contributing to two goals.
The next step is the validation of the Operational CSFs assessing their internal and
external consistency. Looking first at internal consistency, it seems that they are closely
inter-related and logically bound - a 'Good Project Leader', with 'Experience' leads to
a 'Better Service Definition'. A good example of the interrelation of the three factors is
found in the area of custodial services, where the correct definition for the service has
led in early PFIs to extensive discussions before contract signing. Now with the
experience gained, in a sector that traditionally has good leadership the service is clearly
defined and is widely tecognised that it is a sector where PF1 peiforms well. In
conclusion, the three Operational CSFs present a high degree of internal consistency.
As to external consistency the Operational CSFs are consistent with the empiric and
heuristic knowledge found in PFI and project finance areas within the research
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undertaken. The Operational CSFs are consistent with the ones found in the literature
for projects of this nature (Chari, Ho & Tam 2001, Wang et al. 1999, Chua, Kog & Loh
1999, Tiong, Yeo & McCarthy 1992). Experience in the PFI methodology is specially
valued and implicitly acknowledged by the UK government that has already recognised
the imperious need of recruiting the best available people to deal with PFI projects in
public sector teams. Leadership is also seen as critical in the early stages 'The Authority
should ... appoint a (PFI) contract manager, with clear objectives, well before the
contract enters into force ... the contract manager will need to fully understand the
business '(1-IM Treasury Taskforce 2000).
in conclusion there is internal and externil consistency and therefore the Opertonal
CSFs (Table 6.5) are validated.
Table 6.5. Operational CSFs
Experience in previous tender/sector
Good project leader
Service clearly defined
6.4 The CSFs Model
In the previous sections, the three CSFs represent the operational issues that are key for
success in a PFI: Experience in Previous Tender/Sector, Good Project Leader and
Service Clearly Defined. These CSFs are operational as they are drawn from the PFI
cognitive map where only the PFI operational issues are represented. To pursue the
objectives of the research, and find the theoretical generalisations underpinning the
operational CSFs, it is necessary to draw the theory-based implications of these results
and propose a model for the CSFs in PFI projects.
It is necessary now to conceptualise and propose the (subjective) theoretical model that
underliL h e Uperational CSFs. AtIer ca eful conidrali3n is proposed thit:
Clear Strategy should be the underlying theoretical concept for Service Clearly
Defined,
4
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Effective Leadership should be the underlying theoretical concept for Good
Project Leader;
S Knowledge Management should be the underlying theoretical concept for
Experience in previous tender/sector.
A detailed discussion follows on the reasoning and justification for the choices done.
The main objective of the discussion is to answer 'why' these factors were considered
the underlying theoretic concepts of the operational CSFs in a PFI.
6.4.1 Strategy as the Underlying Theoretical Concept for Service Clearly Defined
'A well-defIned strategy is the basis of a successful PFI' (KPMG Management
Consulting 1998)'.
This statement emphasizes the importance of strategy definition.
The Service Clearly Defined is an operational issue, but it is also a clear strategic
objective. Strategy in military terms is always defined as 'where the battle is going to
be fought'; tactics is how you get there. In business terms it means to determine in
which market, or market segment, the company is going to operate. A clearly defined
strategy means that there is an accurate definition of the clients' market segment and of
the objectives to pursue the answers to the questions:
• Who are your clients/market?
What is the client's need / which service do they want?
• What are the client's choice criteria
Ac such th definition of' stratev permits to define correctl y the operatiernl ohjr'ctives
on how to reach the clients/market. A company has to know well what it is selling, in
order to sell it well. The Service in a PFI is no different from the product/service that
companies supply to their customers. It aims at a specific market determined by the
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Government5 . It is its responsibility to accurately define the strategy, i.e., the market for
the PFJ which service and which clients it is going to serve. The government does this
when it evaluates 'Business Need'. In the case of PFI it defines the clients and their
need, which is the service provided. If strategy is clearly defined, service definition
derives naturally
The correct strategy is vital to the project's revenue as it conditions the Level of Usage,
i.e., how many clients will use your services. If the level of usage is overestimated (less
clients than estimated) there will be less revenue and a deficit in the PFI revenue is
likely to occur. Before the contract signing lengthy discussions always occur if the
objectives are unclear or undefined.
As such, a clear strategy seems to be unequivocally the underlying theoretical concept
for Service Clearly Defined.
A very important issue is the need for 'stralegic consistency'. This need is applicable to
all stakeholders and also internally within the companies that participate in a PFI. For
example, a constructor that participates simultaneously in other projects must ensure
that there exists strategic consistency or coherence between the PFI's strategy and the
other project's strategies, i.e., all projects must make sense within the company.
Strategy is at the bottom level of the pyramid that has Vision and rvlission as the two top
levels. Before the PFI, both the Authority and Concessionaire had different Visions,
Missions and Strategies. A PFI project developed by these entities cannot be a separate
entity with a distinct Strategy. Instead, all the stakeholders' strategies and that o .f the
PFI must be aligned. The sharing of common Visions, Missions and Strategies implies
the sharing of common Strategic Objectives, which are the vehicles for an
understanding of the PFI and better resolution of the problems that may arise.
The Government also needs to display consistent strategies. For example, the UK
Government publicly declares its commitment to contain urban sprawl, revitalising
inner-city areas, which means promoting projects in brownfield sites, which is
contradictory with the development of PFI because most PFI projects are in greenfield
sites necessarily less costly to build-on. The opposing strategic approaches that the UK
Government demonstrates o'l y irodves confusion, an 1 if a PF1 service definition is
in question it will be more difficult to define.
hi a PFI the ultimate resnsibiIity for the Service provision lies ulwa\s with the Government. The Government
just delegates it temporarily to a private concessionaire, and retains throughout the PFI whole life c ycle the right to
step-in, in the presence of possible environmental, health and safety hazards.
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6.4.2 Leadership as the Underlying Theoretical Concept for Good Project Leader
Leadership is, according to Donnelly, Gibson and Ivancevich (2000) 'the ability to
persuade people to pursue with enthusiasm pie-established objectives. It/s the human
factor that bonds the group and motivates it to achieve the objectives. Management
activities such as planning, organizing and taking decisions are like sleeping embiyos
that the leader awakens through motivation and guidance to pursue the objectives'.
Leadership is not only the ability to meet performance goals but it needs to meet all the
challenges that an organization (or project) faces, including (Jones, George & Hill,
2000) 'the need to oh/a;ii a coinpelilh'e adi anlage, the need fofo.5/er ethical behaviour
and the need to manage a diverse workforce fairly and equitably'. In complex projects
like PFI a strong leadership ensures that not only the operational objectives are met, but
also very importantly that a good network of personal relationships is established
fostering the climate of trust and confidence between parties, thus reducing the
perception of risk and uncertainty that is always present in these projects.
Leadership is essentially a process through which someone influences others through
commonly shared vision. To be effective it cannot be based in force or coercion. When
leadership is exerted effectively the participants are motivated, committed and
performing. This is very important for the success of a PFI, as these types of projects
are very dependent on the ability to raise efficient and innovative solutions. The needed
creativity is essentially fostered by motivation, which in turn is highly dependent of
effective leadership.
A good practical example of the importance of effective leadership is the existence
among the insurance package offered to PFI sponsors, of an item named 'Insurance of
Key Man Loss'. This illustrates unequivocally the importance of good leadership in a
PFI project.
According to what was discussed and using some judgement it seems clear that the
theoretical concept underlying the need for a good project leader is leadership.
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6.4.3 Knowledge Management as the Underlying Theoretical Concept for
Experience
'In an economy where only certainly is uncertainly, the one sure source of
lasting conipetitive advantage is knowledge' (Nonaka 1991 p.96 quoted in
Brannback 1996, p.71).
Knowledge Management (1(M) is a process through which it is possible to turn human
intellectual capital into organisational capital (KPMG 1998). KM ensures that not only
structured data included in databases are transmitted throughout the organisation, but
also that unstructured data - like expe iences and heuristics - are also transniii5-d to the
organisation and fed into new projects. It aims to understand the value of intellectual
assets, fostering collaboration and knowledge sharing, re-using existing know-how and
expertise, and therefore improving decision-making.
What is new about attitudes to knowledge today is the recognition of the need to
manage knowledge and include it and use it as a company asset. It is a challenging task,
as it requires a profound shift in the prevailing organisational culture where you are
rewarded by what you know not for what you share. As such, KM requires a
combination of discip1ins from Human Resources to IT that provides the mechanisms
to capture store and retrieve the corporate (or organisational) raw data that forms the
basis of knowledge (Financial Times 1999).
There is also ample empirical evidence on the importance of KM in risk management.
Spreading knowledge throughout an organisation naturally raises the organisation's
overall level of knowledge, and (Peters 1999) increasing knowledge may decrease
ambiguity and thereby reduce uncertainty. Turner in Stewart (1995) also linked
organizational learning with the management of risk, and identified three mechanisms
by which organizational learning may be achieved: by direct experience, by interpreted
experience and by the development of collective understandings. All mechanisms are
forms of KM integration. In addition, Dawson (1997) referred to this need of
knowledge integration proposing a hierarchical model for RM where the company's risk
mancrcrncnt model comri ises all th comp'ny's projccts.
According to these definitions it seems valid to propose that KM is the underlying
theoretical concept for Experience.
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Another Soft systems analysis has been used in risk management in projects (Stewart &
Fortune 1995). it is also a holistic technique and deals 'with hard tangible information
and also with the soft complexity that arises because people are involved'. It concluded
that an emphasis on the systemic should begin when a project is first conceived and
continue until the final lessons have been learnt after completion.
In long-term projects with life cycles spanning through 20 to 30 years, KM becomes
naturally a Key Factor for Success. Key personnel will depart before the end of the
project, and it is vital to have some structured system to keep their knowledge and
expertise within the project's organisation.
The next section presents the conceptualised data induced model for CSFs in a PFI.
4
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6.5 The '3Arrows' - The PFJ CSFs Model
The proposed model for the CSFs in a PFI project was named '3Arrows' because it is
simple and accurately describes the model's graphical representation (Figure 6.7). The
rationale behind the representation is the following: Each of the three CSFs is
represented by one arrow: Clear Strategy, Effective Leadership Knowledge
Management. As the CSFs are closely inter-related the arrows interact with each other
in a continuous and iterative process. The reasoning is that in order to have an effective
leadership, clear strategic objectives have to be established, all stakeholders need to
share a common vision, and also knowledge (from previous and current experiences)
has to be incorporated in the whole process. It demonstrates that without the previous
establishment of the strategy it is not possible to have effective leadership and vice-
versa.
CSF
Knowledge
anagern
Figure 6.7. '3Arrows' - Model for the Critical Success Factors for a PFI project.
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In conclusion, the methodology proposed for the assessment of the CSFs in a PFI is
based in the systemic and holistic context, and on the hierarchy and respective inter-
relationships that have been identified in PFI projects. It differs from the usual ways of
identiflying the CSFs as it recognizes the complexity that these projects convey. The
advantages versus the traditional survey or checklist-based methods are that: fist, there
is no subjective interpretation of factors; second the maps analyse context, i.e., how
issues inter-relate hierarchically; and third it is open, and not affected by previous
analysis.
Based on the analysis of the empiric data collected a conceptual model s proposed tlia
integrates the three CSFs for a PFI project: Clear Strategy, Lflèctive Leadership and
Knowledge Management. It accounts for the need of clear objectives, of good project
leaders both from the public and private sector and very importantly of KM systems,
i.e., the need to keep structured all information and expertise within the organisation
until the end of the project's life cycle.
	 -
The next chapter summarises and proposes a framework for the sustainability of the
PFI's Competitive Advantage. As discussed in Chapter 3, for PFI to develop as a
procurement model requires a favourable political and economic environment, but each
individual project also needs to comply adequately with Risk Uncertainty (Chapter 5)
and focus on the CFS (Chapter 6).
4
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CHAPTER 7
Sustainable Competitive Ad;antage of PF!
7.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates the PFI's competitive advantage, a key issue for the ftiture of
PFI. 'Competitive Advantage' is the ability of a company to outperform the other
competitors within the same industry. (Jones, George & Hill 2000) To achieve this
cornpcitive aclvantae tii company has to produce the goods or servic moie
efficiently and effectively than its competitors, which is translated financially by a profit
rate higher than the average for the industry.
A PFI is always defined as a project but it can also be regarded as a company with a
predefined life span. The PFI's legally and ftinctionally acts like a regular company
whose sole objective is the project's completion. It is then possible to apply the theories
of competitive advantage that were developed for regular companies. The following is
a brief explanation of the model adopted to assess the PFI's competitive advantage:
The 4 Building Blocks of Competitive Advantage.
Figure 7.1. The '4Bjocks' of Competitive Advantage
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According to Jones, George and Hill (2000) the four building blocks of competitive
advantage are: Innovation, Quality, Efficiency and Responsiveness to Customers
(Figure 7.1). Each of these blocks is dynamic, i.e., it is understood that it is necessary to
continuously improve each block to obtain and maintain the competitive advantage.
The main concern was to try to answer the questions: How is it tesfed? How is it
measured? And How is it evaluated? The issues in a PFI to which these questions
apply are numerous and a standard metric for the improvements is in itself a broad area
outside the scope of this research. The establishment of benchmarks and milestones to
assess these factors is undoubtly an important area for future research work. In this
research the questions were open and the interviewees would comment on th area of
their expertise. The result is a set of areas, and issues where improvement was
identified by comparison with the pre-PFI status quo.
Increasing Innovation - Innovation is a process where new goods or processes are
developed under incentive, it derives from an intellectual effort that is only done under
pressure. Incentive is needed as human nature tends to be conservative. If something
has worked out why change it? You don't touch a winning team (paradigm). Innovation
requires the creation of a work environment that encourages risk taking.
It is interesting to note that PFI was in itself an innovative product relative to the
traditional ways of procurement, but can PFI induce innovation? In PFI there is always
a strong incentive for the private sector to innovate and get a better return on investment
by reducing costs and/or increasing revenues.
Increasing Quality - The existence of Quality in a process means that there is the right
adjustment between process and output, or between what is offered and the needs. It
aims at getting the right service (product) to the customers reducing losses or
unnecessary high standards. It is not subjective. Operational and measurable
parameters have to be stated a priori to enable the understanding of what is meant by
quality, and most important, to measure and control the quality. Good quality products
'Do the job they are designed for, do it well and give customers what they want' (Jones,
George & Hill 2000). The best known managerial technique to improve quality is TQM
that f3cuscs on imp roving the quality of a company's products and services and stresses
that all the olganization ' s functional activities should be directed to this goal, for
example Lean Construction philosophy aims at improving quality in the construction
industry. Another reason to improve quality is that higher quality is closely related to
improved efficiency a'nd better VFM.
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Increasing Efficiency - Efficiency is key in today's competitive environment. It aims
at reducing the resources needed to produce a specific output, or conversely, with the
available resources increase the output. Efficiency gains can be obtained either
recurring to new technologies and/or to new ways to manage the
procedures/organisations.
Improving Customer Responsiveness (or Attention to the Client) - It is about giving
to customers what they want and need and promoting the organisational strategies that
respond to those needs. It is important to correctly identifj the client's needs,
recognising that very often customers have unperceived needs. It is a marketing job to
make the clients aware of their unperceived need develop the need and persuide the
clients to buy the product. Very often what customers desire is value for money, that is,
to have the notion that they have correctly 'invested' their money. As VFM is closely
related to good quality low cost product (efficiently produced) it is clear that all the
building blocks of competitive advantage are closely inter-related.
All of the'4Blocks' of Competitive Advantage are not mutually exclusive. Indeed they
are closely inter-related. For example, improving the efficiency of a process has clear
implications on innovation and quality.
Having achieved a competitive advantage the next step is to keep it. The key issue for a
company or PFI in the current dynamic environment is the Sustainable Competitive
Advantage. It is necessary to never stop improving the four blocks of Competitive
Advantage. The main pitfalls to avoid depend on the existing Imitation Barriers, the
Capacity of Adjustment to Change and the Industries' Dynamics:
The raising of Imitation Barriers depnds upon which factor the competitive
advantage is based. It can be on tangible or intangible factors. The tangible
factors are the easiest to imitate since they are largely based on technology, so
it is important to focus on intangible assets like know-how. procedures, etc,
that are more difficult to imitate.
The two major factors that hinder the Capacity of Adjustment to Change are:
Inertia and the Icarus Paradox. Inertia is very easily installed in an
organisation that is doing well, but it is very important to resist it and instead
to adopt a more proactive attitude, as competitors are always improving. The
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Icarus Paradox occurs when a company becomes focused on one particular
factor of' competitive advantage at the expense of other equally important
factors.
The Industries Dynamics depends on the particular industry, but the
surrounding environment is constantly changing and that also has to be
accounted for. A continuous attention to the environment and a strong focus
on innovation are key to maintain a Sustainable Competitive Advantage.
The folloing are examples drawn from the empiric data collected for the purpose of
supporting th conclusions on the PFI' Competitive Advantage and its Sustainability
7.2 Empiric Study
The data to assess PFI's Competitive Advantage was collected during the fieldwork
undertaken for the PFI case studies: Lusoponte (Annex II) the PFI to build and operate
two bridges in Lisbon, Portugal, the Victoria Dock Primary School (Annex III) in Hull
UK a PFI to build and operate a primary school, a similar PFI from the JSCSC (Annex
IV) in Watchfield T.JK, Indáqua Feira (Annex V) the water and wastewater systems
construction and operation in Santa Maria da Feira in Portugal and the Manchester Fire
Station (Annex VI). Some evidence was also drawn from interviews with experts in the
various functional areas of PFI.
The remainder of this chapter provides the answers the following questions:
•	 Does PFI improve Inno',ation?
•	 Does PFI improve Quality?
Does PFI improve Efficiency?
Does PFI improve Attention to the Client?
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7.2.1 Innovation
The key driver to promote innovation was cost reductions to improve the project's
profitability. In technological areas the contractors remained rather conservative, the
perception being that technological innovations would be too risky to implement.
In Lusoponte (Annex II) innovation was fostered mainly in the conception and
implementation of programs to control operations in two areas: Logistics and
Monitoring - Maintenance. At the time of construction in Portugal no other
organisation in this area had similar systems The development of a Construction
Quality Control progiam proved to be an opportunity to integrate th information
collected in its Data Base in these two systems.
1 - Logistics associated with construction was strongly conditioned by a tight schedule
(especially after the delas in the approvals) and the prospect of fines. It was necessary
to co-ordinate several construction sites on the north and south bank, bearing in mind
that all items could not be built simultaneously.
2 - Program of Monitoring and Maintenance currently in use by Gestiponte'. Consists
of three systems:
•	 Structural monitoring;
•	 Routine inspection;
•	 Maintenance management.
The Structural Monitoring System is a contractual obligation and integrates all available
structural data in a Data Base. It was developed by an external consultant, and has the
particularity to integrate the routine inspection system reports or data, which in itself is
an innovation.
The Routine Inspection System integrates the procedures, the operation planning, the
maintenance manual, etc. The existence of a formal procedure is very important to
Lusoponte's civil liability in the event of an accident. For example, if scrap falls off a
tnick and causes an accident, this might not automatically imply civil liability because it
might be possible to prove that a maintenance team inspected and reported no defects 20
minutes earlier. Also, with accidents caused by animals crossing the carriageway the
liability can be overturned if it is proved that the proper fences were in place.
a
Gestiponte - The Operation and Maintenance sub-contractor of Lusopente.
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Gestiponte accepted full responsibility for accidents caused by animals when the works
in the service area were not conipleted and the yard was not fenced.
This program also acknowledges proper Knowledge Management procedures, as it
recognises that the experiences gained in O/M must be integrated in future norms and
procedures. The O/M team was always present during construction, making it possible
to retain within the organisation the accumulated knowledge. This proved to be vital for
a good performance during the O/M stage making proper use of the created procedures
and implemented systems.
I he co;icLssion contraut oF the \'ictoria Duck Primary Schooi (Anncx 111) had the
innovative feature of considering the possibility for alternative usage of the assets after
a first period dedicated to educational activities. The land where the school was built
was leased to the Sewell group for 40 years The PFI contract for educational services
is only for 25 years. After this period they can use the building for another 15 years and
possible options for future utilisations are: continue as a school, disco, nursery,
homecare, or any other that will suit the community's needs. The reason for the
possibility of an alternative usage for the buildings is that in 25 years demographics in
the area will change and there might exist no need for a school, and other utilisations
will be more useful. After 40 years the buildings and the land are to be returned to
council.
7.2.2 Quality
Quality improvements can be detected in several areas: 	 service, process,
methodologies, etc
Lusoponte (Annex II) sees its mission as the rossing of the Tagus iii the most efficient,
etlècti've and s tl	 it.dflflf, elnphd.;Li11	 ti	 qual iiy of the se ice piovided, their
competitors being boats and trains. So far, all stakeholders ran ging from the
shareholders to the users have expressed satisfaction with the project's quality of
service. An Interna1 Construction Quality Control Program was implemented during
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the early stages of the project. As a result construction proceeded with increased safety
and speed Quality was also greatly improved by continuous cross checking. For
example, during construction there were three entities always cross checking each other.
At the operationlmaintenance stage this Program evolved to a ftill quality certification
for the company according to ISO 2000.
The head Mistress of the Victoria Dock Primary School (Annex III) seems very pleased
to concentrate only on educational activities. Her role in the school management is of a
performance monitor. The school built such a good reputation regarding the
educationdi acti'vitics' qu'ility, tInt as a dii ect result of demands fror out He tb €..
a new building was completed in January 2001 permitting the accommodation of more
pupils. PFI permits technical staff to focus on their core competences and relieves them
from the administrative and managerial jobs, therefore it improves the quality of the
staff's educational activities.
The same applies to other sectors like the example of the Manchester Fire Station
(Annex VI), where a PFI scheme relieves the firemen from the administrative and
managerial jobs enabling them to concentrate only in their area of expertise: fire
fighting.
In the JSCSC (Annex IV) the Service Provision Quality Control is seen as key to
success of the project. The operational risk, i.e., the risk that the private partner would
be financially penalised by an unsatisfactory service, has been controlled in this project
by self-monitoring. The Self-performance Monitoring Criteria assess the performance
of the services provided against a benchmark that was negotiated within the contract
with the MoD. The system is considered "fair" by both partners and is based on trust.
The MoD has preferred to opt for this solution, utilising the partnering approach, instead
of having a team on site to do the "contract monitoring". Usually this involved 12-16
people at a cost of at iLdt £250,0')O year, and tl.t might not have a positive perspective
to solve problems. The dupid Sft1fl in\ O\ t penalt F31S for yeLiñc events and
stated thresholds, that if exceeded v ' il1 incur a financial penalty. The information
system interlinks this data on-line and the managers of the various departments have
access to it.	 u
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The system consists mainly of a set of tables describing the events, for which a pre-
determined number of points is attributed according to the occasion on which they take
place: Normal, Audit or Key Events (Very important days when key events take place,
usually involving about 12 days a year). If the event takes place in a Normal day the
points to attribuie will be the pre-set benchmark, if the event takes place on an Audit
day the benchmark is multiplied by two, and if it happens on a Key event day it will be
multiplied by three since it very important that service should be flawless.
Each manager has a standard template to fill in, and on a daily basis can control the
number of points attributed and compare them with the benchmark. The system works
on a 3-months basis, thus giving a good margin to correct problems.
Also in JSCSC there is an example of the need to qualify what is meant by Quality
Service Specifications. "Fit for purpose" was introduced in the construction sub-
contract to characterise the service specifications of some of the construction items. It
proved to be the origin for several problems, because the purpose can change depending
on the client's point of view. The most striking example is the 'Fit for purpose' of a fire
escape: outside the bar there is a fire exit with a balcony and stairs to the ground. It
happened that during the commemoration of Victory in Europe (VE) Day people, who
were at the bar, went out to see the planes fly pass and the excessive weight caused the
balcony to bend. It was designed for people to pass through not to stand, but as it didn't
prove in that particular circumstance, the construction contractor was forced to redesign
it and rebuild it as it was "not fit for purpose".
7.2.3 Efficiency
Efficiency is critical to a privately financed project to reduce costs to the minimum
possible level and consequently increase profits. More efficiency leads both to correct
schedules and reduced costs during the construction and the O/M stages. Efficiency is
essentially related to cost control ranging from construction costs to O/rvl costs
Lfficienc' improvements were noted in sevt'ial areas.
4
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In Lusoponte (Annex II) a great concern with efficiency was present since the project's
inception and this translated into a very strict cost control regime. Without this
philosophy it would have been very difficult to get construction completed on time and
budget - avoiding penalties for delays and costs overruns. During construction there
were two very difficult winters (especially 1995) and it was necessary to implement a
very strict maximization of resources, and minimization of costs. One of the concerns
was to find solutions that apart from the technical aspects would also be cost effective.
If the concern regarding efficiency hadn't been expressed, solutions would have been
found and implemented but certainly at increased costs.
It was critical to involve OIM prior to operations and they were involved from the very
binniiig oU the project. The initial team had three iiernbers: the curreit Gesiponte
O/M Director, an expert from the Dartford Crossing, and an expert from Eurotunnel.
Their task was to evaluate the adequacy of design to simplify O/M, keeping its costs at
the minimum possible level. For example, the access to the South Viaduct structure for
routine inspections (check sensors, support apparatus, etc), were planned from the start:
The existing suspension cables would not permit a cradle installation to access under the
deck for inspection. The O/M proposed a project modification: the installation of a
small fixed platform for inspection that would run beneath the 800 metres long deck.
This resulted in a much more efficient maintenance programme.
Efficiency has to be closely monitored. There is always a danger in routine procedures.
After 20 years the O/M staff that were first employed. (mainly) at the beginning of their
active life, have aged, and this combined with the prolonged routinisation of tasks
(boredom!) can reduce the quality level of performance.
Efficiency is also related to traffic. An increase in traffic, above a certain level leads to
more accidents, and higher transaction and maintenance costs. As such, on the 25th
April Bridge, that was nearly at ftill capacity, it was implemented a program to reduce
shuttle traffic, i.e., from people that everyday cross the bridge to work in Lisbon. This
type of traffic represents 25% of the overall traffic. If for example, it would be possible
to increase the occupancy rate from 1.4 to 3 persons/vehicle, this would lead to a
reduction in traffic and consequently a better servce, more efficiency and reduced costs
(seve al iiiaiit '1e creratiurs, like sweeoirg can c'nlv he dune during the night,
therefore at increased costs).
C
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Another measure that increased efficiency was a different way to handle the Via Verde2
receipts. Brisa - the fist highways concessionaire - issues automatically receipts for
every client and for every vehicle. This contrasts with Gestiponte where Via Verde's
receipts are issued only on request, including all the movements for the same company.
For example, a transport company doesn't receive different receipts for every vehicle,
but only one receipt for all the bridges including all their vehicles. This reduces costs in
mailing and processing, and is more efficient to both Lusoponte and their clients. In
addition, many clients (90% of 250 000) are not interested in the receipt (or don't need)
and by issuing only on request Lusoponte reduces costs.
L astly, efficiency improvements can only happen with arl erlur f e human resources - A
project like Lusoponte in the public sector would have difficultly in attracting the
quality human resources needed to manage it. The private sector has total liberty to
reward its employees according to merit, which is very difficult to achieve in the public
sector where people are included in a very low pay, inflexible structure. This project in
the private sector can attract adequate human resources, motivating them, and
consequently achieving a better efficiency in the running of the company
The Victoria Dock Primary School (Annex III) was designed to have low maintenance
costs, including reducing potential vandalism. For example they use external steel
shutters (very uncommon in the UK) that although more expensive - higher initial
investment and maintenance every six months - prove in the long run to be a good
investment reducing (or stopping) the breakage of glass windows. As they pay for their
own gas and electricity great effort was applied to design an energy efficient building
(also not common in the UK). Some special features to reduce whole life cycle costs
included: double glazing windows; walls with air in bricks to improve insulation; less
expensive roof tiles that are replaced every 1 5 years instead of 25 years for the
traditional aluminium foil; also they didn't isolate the concrete floor having considered
that not much heat would escape thus saving the increased costs. Doors are painted
(thus easier to repair) instead of varnished.
To reduce vandalism and for security and respective recurring costs the y have put thick
plywood beneath the roof tiles to prevent people breaking in.
2 Via Verde - automatic tollbooth.
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The JSCSC (Annex IV) was a Government's flagship project so it was very susceptible
to state-of-the-art good industry practices like the Zero Defects Initiative that was
introduced as a political advice from the DETR and the Partnering Initiative the political
advice from the Construction Best Practice Program. The Zero Defects Initiative is
related with construction quality and aims at no defects, while the Partnering approach
is related with the project's procedures. Partnering can be defined (McDermott &
Charmer 2001) as
'a long-term commitment between two or more organisations
for the purpose of achieving specic business objectives by
may/in/sing the effectivenesv of each participcuit 's resoiuces.
I'he relatioiiship i. based on trust, dedcaIion to CO/fl/fl 011 goals
and an understanding of each other 's individual expectations
and values. Expected benefits include improved efficiency and
cost-effectiveness, increased opportunity for innovation, and the
continuous improvement of quality products and services'.
These requests aim at getting a better project which in its essence good, but can
constitute a risk for companies not familiar with these management techniques.
7.2.4 Attention to the Client
When analysing attention to the client it is necessary to consider that there are two
possible forms of PFI: A free-standing project where the clients (service end users) are
paying diiectly for the service like Lusoponte, or a DBFO where the clients needs are
predefiried and it is the public sector that pays against space, or service availability like
the Victoria Dock Primary School.
In L usoponte ('\nne' 1I both partners dt-'a1t vith it nUon to the client: The Portuguese
Government through GATTEL took great care to profit from the opportunity and
imposed terms and conditions related to the clients that otherwise wouldn't have
existed. Meanwhile, the private partner' (Lusoponte) main concern was to provide
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a service that would be both satisfactory in terms of safety and convenience. There was
no real need to capture clients, since it was a vital infrastructure.
Lusoponte also take great care that the employees that are in direct contact with the
public are polite, for example, the manual tollbooth operators. During regular daytime
they are allowed a maximum 2 hours ontinuous service, not because of a lack of
efficiency but because after that period of time they are naturally not so willing to serve
the public with the adequate level of politeness (like saying thank you and smiling).
Gestiponte operates two bridges with different characteristics so their concerns
regarding the clients differ in the two bridges. At the 2S April their main concern is to
re Itice t affin con'cstion 'ml ac r idcnis wlc at the Vasco di Gama Brid'e jt k
The contract doesn't include any penalty related o road safety, like minimum level of
accidents. It is supposed that the bridges are according with legislation and the 'rules of
good art work'. To reduce accidents at the 25th April Bridge Lusoponte implemented
the following measures:
•	 A 6th lane was built, eliminating the use of the central lane that could fl.inction
alternath ely in both directions. The non-existence of a central barrier was the
cause of many accidents, when two cars going in opposite directions would
overtake simultaneously;
Separators were placed after the tolls creating lanes conducting the cars
towards the entrance of the bridge. The entrance to the bridge has three lanes,
and constrains traffic creating enormous jams and small accidents when cars
from 20 toll booths ti-v to enter the bridge in an uncontrolled way.
At the Vasco da Gama Bridge Gestiponte's main concern is safety. The speed limit is
between 100 and 120 kmlh, and although the rate of accidents per km per bridge is half
than of the 251 April they tend to have more serious cOnsequences, due to the higher
speed (At the 25th Bridge the speed limit is 60 km/h). Increasing security reduces the
stress levels and fewer accidents happen. Also, as mentioned before, reducing traffic
congestion leads to a better service: first, the clients are more satisfied, and the
company's iiia	 k improved, second the company increases the service' efficiency,
reducini costs .,il.' ..iys a.sct:ted	 iti ac Llen.
Lusoponte took the risk of expropriating all the land necessary for temporary and
permanent works, including the risk of land price inflation and took great care to
accommodate the neds of fonner residents that although not clients were directly
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involved. On the north shore, there were two areas: the EXPO98 site— a disused
industiial area and to the northern end, property was predominantly commercial and
residential where 273 families were re-housed in new apartments constructed by
Lusoponte or offered financial compensation. A new primary school was built at
Portela to replace one demolished on the boundary of the Praca José Queirôs access and
an old age day care centre in Moscavide has been relocated. On the south shore land
was predominantly agricultural.
The Government underestimated public reaction to raising tolls demonstrating that they
were unaware of customer responsiveness. According to contractual terms, the tolls for
each bridge where to be eqiiiliscd. As a consequence of this the Portugues' State raisel
the tolls on the 25th April Bridge in June 1994. This caused a public outcry (buzinäo)
and the government was forced to rescind this decision. The toll will remain frozen at
150 escudos (for class 1 vehicles) until 2002, when it will be raised to 200 escudos (1
Euro). A rise of 1.5 times the Base Toll instead of 2.6 times. In addition, the
Portuguese State imposed on Lusoponte a Frequent User Discount Scheme in August
1994 for users of the 25th April Bridge only. A 10 percent discount for users pre-
purchasing books of twenty tickets with no date limit, and a 20 percent discount for
users pre-purchasing books with a one month limit was introduced. A further scheme
was introduced for the Via Verde, allowing a 50 per cent discount after the 13th trip
within a month, and with all trips after the 72' being free. As a result the Portuguese
Government had to agree on six compensation packages required to restore Lusoponte's
financial position in relation to the GATTEL Base Case.
Sewell the concessionaire for the Victoria Dock Primary School (Annex III) considers
that their involvement in PFI projects changed their attitude to their business. They
perceive that now they are more service oriented improving customer responsiveness
accommodating the needs of the children. The service provided has proved so good
with parents that the school had to build a second building to accommodate more pupils.
In md ci ( :\J11L V) the j eiceied needs can affect the client's connctiuns to water
and wastewater systems. This was the most important risk taken by the concessionaire
and marketing campaigns are scheduled to promote the connections particularly to the
wastewater sewerage network during the construction stage as it is very expensive and
inefficient to make the connection to a consumer after concluding the main pipes'
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installation. The connection to the wastewater sewerage is critical, because it is not
legally mandatory and is generally considered to be the most profitable segment of the
business. Its need is still not very well understood by all consumers, as they are used to
discharging (at no cost) the wastewaters without treatment and now they would have to
pay for that service.
In conclusion, the analysis of the empiric data points out at improvements in all
'4Blocks' of Competitive Advantage and proved that PFI has a competitive advantage
versus the ti aditional forms of governmental procurement. [0! g-term fai1ur can he
mitigated by continuous attention to the factors that originated the competitive
advantage. Included in the Conclusions (Chapter 8) is a detailed account of the PFI
Competitive Advantage.
Taking into account these research findings the research identified three areas that must
be addressed (Chapter 2) to secure the sustainability of the competitive advantage:
Political, social and economic environment that favours the utilisation of private capital
and provides the adequate regulatory framework; Risk Uncertainty Management to
improve mainly efficiency and efficacy and Critical Success Factors to ensure success
and that influences all four factors. The three research areas were analysed from
Chapter 3 through 6 and this Chapter draws on them and proposes an integrative model
for the Sustainable Competitive Advantage of PFI. The next sections describe the SCA
model, why it must be dynamic and iterative, discusses the need to be integrated in an
adequate political and regulatory environment, and lastly how the two sub-models on
Risk Uncertainty and CSF contribute to Better service, increased efficiency and
continuous innovation, i.e., how the SCA model contributes to the improvement of all
building blocks of competitive advantage of PFI. Lastly, the SCA is tested against the
in-depth PFI case studies that were developed (Annex II through V).
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7.3 The Sustainable Competitive Advantage model for FF1
The SCA model must be a dynamic, iterative framework that manages risk throughout
the whole life cycle of the project, assuring that the knowledge gained in previous
studies and previous stages is incorporated into subsequent projects. Kahkonen and
Huovila (1996) introduced the concept of 'systematic project risk management', stating
that it means advanced preparation and decision making for minimising the
consequences of possible adverse future events, and to maximise the benefits of positive
future events. Their model for the systematic risk management emphasizes that the
several phases in risk management provide only a framework that, in order to be
complete, must include a sysvm of 'Co . itiiuious coiilrol, ai cuniulcilion of expel ie,ces
and know-how'. The notion of continuous flow is to be applied throughout the project
life cycle. Risk management must not be a static exercise; indeed, it must be a dynamic
procedure continuous throughout the whole life cycle of the project.
PFI projects are dynamic projects that progresses constantly evolving throughout time.
The SCA model takes into account this dynamic quality, and incorporates a constant re-
evaluation not only of risks and their consequences, but extends it also to the evaluation
of CSFs throughout the whole life cycle of the project. The preconditions for the
assumptions that were made in their first assessment change continuously. Overall, the
process is a dynamic and iterative process, where the knowledge gained from
experience is incorporated in subsequent intra- and inter-project risk analyses ensuring
that existing know-how and expertise from previous studies and previous stages, are
always incorporated in the decision process. It is a vital framework for the focus on
K.M one of the CSFs in PFI. It values intellectual assets, fosters collaboration and
knowledge sharing, and therefore improves decision-making.
The proposed model for the SCA of PFI (Figure 72) includes a dynamic and iterative
framework and:
• An adequate political social and economic environment (Chapter 3);
• The whole life cycle risk uncertainty management sub-model (Chapter 5);
• The CSFs sub-model (Chapter 6).
4
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These areas are closely interrelated and overlap in many issues that are represented by
the overlapping of the sub-models on risk uncertainty and CSFs, which in turn are
conditioned by the environment.
iteratiVe Dyne,,,,0
Adequate political social
economic environment
Figure 7.2. Proposed model for the Sustainable Competitive Advantage of PFI
As it was demonstrated in Chapter 3, economic growth and private investment are
highly correlated with social and political stability and there is ample evidence that for
PFI to succeed is necessary the existence of a supportive political, social and economic
environment to ensure that the adequate regulatory framework - rules, regulations and
policies - is in place. Very important is to tap innovative forms of finance and to create
the conditions to develop the financial market. Life insurance companies and pension
funds invest long-term and their risk profile fits the long-term debt issues of PFI, that
are closely scrutinised projects usually seen as low risk. Also is the circumstance that
EU is considering to limit pension funds investments in high-risk holdings. The EU
member countries budgetary constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty works in
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favour of off-balance sheet investments as PFI. Nevertheless, for the implementation of
PFI it is necessary that the political will clearly demonstrates the resolve to modify the
traditional procurement methods and embark on the PFI route. It requires flexibility,
open mind and a desire for innovation.
The prevailing political social S and economic environment is clearly favourable to the
development of concessions, but PFI is a very specific form of concession and the
experience of the UK and Portuguese governments shows that not all the necessary
legal framework was in place. For example, in the IlK Local Authorities had to correct
pr blerns rel ted vith Capital Finance. In Portugal, the financial niiket, a [he timc of
the first PF1, was not developed enough to permit the contracting of a cap', i.e., to
insure the risk of excessive increases in the interest rates. Also, in both countries there
are also unresolved problems regarding accounting rules.
The WLCRUM model's main innovative feature versus the existing models of risk
management is that it describes how the uncertainty of each risk type progresses
throughout the whole life cycle. The main contribution to the sustainability of PF1
competitive advantage is that it fosters improvements in efficiency and efficacy. It also
can improve innovation, as when acting as a project management tool it looks in detail
for the underlying reasons of uncertainty of the risks and provides an opportunity to
implement measures to reduce uncertainty and hence favours innovation.
The model integrates three CSFs for a PFI project: Clear Strategy, Effective Leadership
and Knowledge Management. It accounts for the need of clear objectives, of good
project leaders both from the public and private sector and very impoitantly of KM
systems. The focus on the CSFs ensures success by improving on all four factors of
competitive advantage: Innovation, Quality. Efficiency and Responsiveness to
Customers. Clear strategy impacts in all three competitive factors: better service
(accommodating the client's needs) increasing efficiency (not wasting resources
pulsuing other objectivLs) and innovation providing a clear guidance. The private
sector has traditionally had effective leadership, so is more dynamically efficient, and is
a better allocator of resources, which increases the efticiency. KM is a structured
procedure that has a 4direct impact in better service as it contributes to better knowledge
209
Sustainable Competitive Advantage
of the clients and, improves efficiency as it ensures that knowledge from other areas of
the project, and from other projects is incorporated. The experience and learning that
participants derive from the involvement in PFI projects has two major consequences:
First, it increases efficiency throughout the process, especially in the bidding phase.
The establishment of a climate confidence between the parties reduces uncertainty. The
bidding process becomes easier, shorter and consequently less expensive. Second,
private companies benefit from specialisation in the same sector.
Although each PFI project is unique, there are strong similarities among projects the
risks involved and risk mitigation techniques. It stands to reason that companies having
invested in the learning process of PFI bidding will want to capitalise on thr
knowledge by winning future projects within the same sectors.
7.4 Testing the SCA model
The SCA model was applied to the four in-depth case studies: Lusoponte (Annex II),
the Victoria Dock Primary School (Annex III), JSCSC (Annex IV) and Indaqua (Annex
V). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the theoretical replication was assessed. The logic
being the test is to find if the model 'fits' or 'doesn't fit', and if different results are
found they are for predictable reasons. Table 7. 1 indicates how in each case study the
three components of the model performed.
4
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Table 7.1 Testing the SCA model
Victoria Dock
Lusoponte	 JSCSC
Primary School
Indaqua
NO
Adequate	 Good political
PolJSocIEc	 will, but 'wishful Good	 Good	 Central and Local
Environment
	
thinking'
	 Gov. had different
agendas
WLCR UM
High Uncertainty
CSFs
Strategy
Leadership
KM
Outlook
Political	 I Good
Strut. - [K	 Sfrat. - OK
Lead. - OK	 Lead. - OK
KM deficiencies K%J fostered by
in public partner partnership
Confrontational approach
Shaky Start-up
with high level
of litigation
	 Very Good
Good O/M
Strat. + -
Lead. - Private
veiy bad
K1I— Bad with
confrontational
approach within
the private
consortium
The construction
sub-contractor
suffered heavy
losses
Strat. Ill-defined
from the Public
partner
Lead. OK
Ktf - OK with
Partnership
approach
?
En ironinental	 Small projLct ',s eli I Dsn - \'c..J) high Poltica!
Design	 known sector
In conclusion, the SCA model 'fits' with the events that developed within all four case
studies. In the Victoria Dock Primary School there is almost complete coincidence with
the proposed framework, and as the model predicted it is a successftil PFI. In the others
the degree of success/failure/problems varies but the model explains the underlying
reasons as well it points out at possible solutions.
This Ciiapter proposcd a m3Jcl for th' SCA of PH concluding the piesentalion of the
research goal. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the research together with a set of
findings and recommendations for PFI stakeholders. Included are also suggestions for
fliture research.
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CHAPTER 8
Con ci usi ons
This chapter concludes the dissertation, by listing the aims of the thesis and stating the
original contribution that this study conveyed. It pursues by examining the models
presented and assessing the extent to which the aims were attained, including some
conclusions and practical recommendations for the public and private sectors. Lastly it
presents suggestions for future research that constitute the study's natural development
The aims of this thesis, as stated in Chapter 1, were as follows:
Has PFI proved to deliver a better service and VFM than the traditional forms
of undertaking public projects?
Has PFI proved to provide an adequate framework for risk allocation between
the private and public sectors?
Has PFI proved to be a competitive procurement tool?
•	 Has PFI the adequate conditions in the macro economic and political
environment to develop?
8.1 Original Contribution of this Study
The main original contribution of this study is a framework to ensure the sustainability
of the PFI's Competitive Advantage. As stated in Chapter 1, with this framework
government and private companies will have a sound empiric basis for future strategic
decisions on whether or not to pursue the PFI route. The proposed model for the
Sustainable Competitive Advantage of PU (Chapter 7) integrates three components: an
Adequate Social Political Economic Framework, the WLCRTJM model and the Critical
Success Factors of PFI. According to the SCA model if a PFI project develops within
the adequate environment (seen as a pre-condition to success) and if it applies the
4
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models of risk uncertainty management and focuses in the critical success factors it will
meet all the conditions to develop a sustainable competitive advantage.
The SCA model is holistic, systemic and contributes positively to the competitive
advantage as it promotes efficiency gains, cost control, innovation and provision of a
better service. The model encompasses th whole life cycle of the project and
recognizes that the complexity stems both from the project and from the social and
political environment. The model's dynamic and iterative characteristics assure that
there is a continuous adjustment to the prevailing (and ever changing) PFI market
conditions, and to the factors that originated the competitive advantage. There is the
continuous assessment of each risk's uncertainty (and its causes) and of the CSFs.
Also an original contribution is the empiric evidence (Chapter 3) of the close relation
between the macro economic and political context and the development (or not) of
privately financed projects since the 17th century.
Another contribution is the characterisation of PFI (Chapter 4). This study proposes the
PFI Holistic and Integrative Conceptual model that integrates a hierarchy of four levels
of concepts: Government Ideology, Principles, Practices and Tools. The PFI model
provided a basic framework for its conceptualisation and is coherent with the SCA. The
PFI life cycle process, value chain and value-delivery network are mapped. The PFI
competitive advantage is also assessed (Chapter 7).
Other original contribution is the methodology developed to identify the CSFs (Chapter
6). It is based on the analysis of the PFI aggregate cognitive map that conveys a clear
picture of all the issues present in a PFI and respective inter-relationships. The
advantages versus the traditional survey or check list based methods are that: first, there
is no subjective interpretation of factors; second the maps analyse context, i.e., how
issues inter-relate hierarchically recognizing the project's complexity; and third it is
open, not biased by previous analysis.
Other contributions were four detailed case studies in the transports, education and
water undertaking sectors (annex II through V). The research also included the
collection of empiric data on particular aspects of other PFI projects. A standard case
study protocol to present the case studies was also developed in co-authorship (Annex
I). Case study research to test and validate the models was considered adequate for the
research (Chapter 2). This assumption was present when Edwards (1998) emphasized
the importance of case studies for the construction industry in his literature review of
risk management in construction. In it he concluded that good case study research
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would fill an important gap in our knowledge of the economic and financial risks of
construction.
The empiric data collected permitted to establish a preliminary assessment of the
variability of projects according to the company size, to the sector and the region (cross
bordervariability). This led to a set of recommendations to the public and private
sectors, as well as to the applicability of PFI to SMEs (Annex VI).
A brief description of the two sub-models follows including the reasons as why they
contribute to the sustainability of the PFI competitive advantage.
8.1.1 The WLCRUM model
The WLCRUM model shows the uncertainty profile of each risk throughout the whole
life cycle of the project. Uncertainty and risk are very often incorrectly used
interchangeably as uncertainty is a feature of risk. The assessment of risks is the first
step, and it must be followed by the analysis of each risk's uncertainty. The model's
fundamental assumption is that in the long-term projects the evolution of the uncertainty
attached to each risk is the key factor to manage. Managing to reduce (or mitigate)
uncertainty is key to the project success.
The WLCRUIVI was applied to the PFI case studies and permitted to conclude that:
The uncertainty attached to a specific risk varies - increases, decreases,
appears, disappears - according the stage of the project's life cycle;
•	 Different sectors have different risk uncertainty profiles;
Experience and learning effects (thus providing more information) decrease
uncertainty;
•	 The evolution of design uncertainty is a good indicator of the degree of
con 1plexity of th PFI and or maturity of the PU market in the sector. For
example, in the hospitals sectors the design uncertainty has a higher value at
beginning of construction and decreases slowly, while in the prisons it is
4
214
Conclusions
much lower indicating that the project is well defined as a result of previous
expeiiences hence a moie mature PFI sector;
• If uncertainty is high it means that there are few mitigation measures in place
(probably for some risks there are none possible). If uncertainty can be
reduced, it means that the risks are better managed, hence a project with a
higher probability of success.
The WLCRUM main contribution to the sustainability of PFI competitive advantage is
that it fosters improvements in efficiency and innovaticin. When acting as a project
managemuit tool it looks in detail for the underlying causes or' the unceitirity. It then
provides an opportunity to implement measures to reduce uncertainty through
innovative and more efficient measures.
In conclusion, the WLCRUtvI model is an assessment and management tool for risk
uncertainty. It provides a sound basis to the risk allocation between the public and
private partners, and can also be used to structure strategic decisions regarding PFI. It
can be used as a Decision Support System for Senior Management to assess the risk in
long-term projects as it allows a clear view on how uncertainty progresses, avoiding the
wishfi.il thinking attitude that underestimates some types of risk (preventing the
adoption of corrective measures). Project Managers can also use it as a project
management tool as it forces them to rationalise the underlying reasons of uncertainty
and provides an opportunity to implement measures to reduce it. Finally researchers
can use it as a basis to develop models for the quantification of the long-term risk
assessment in PFI (or other similar projects).
8.1.2 The PFI' CSFs
The PFI CSFs are: Clear Strategy, Effective Leadership and KM systems. These CSFs
a e closLly inte -i eluted i 'i a COIIiiflUOUS and i[cratl\ e nianei.	 \ ith a. effcci.i
leadership, clear strategic objectives are established and knowledge (and information)
from previous and current experiences is continuously incorporated in the PFI.
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Conversely, without an effective leadership clear strategy is difficult to achieve and the
guidance necessary to implement KM systems will be missing.
The need for consistent strategies was apparent in Indáqua where the private partner
complained that the excessively lengthy negotiation period was due to the non-existence
of pre-defined objectives by the public sector. Another example of lack of clear
strategy and incoherent strategies among stakeholders can be found in the JSCSC
project. The constructor sub-contractor at start-up had poor information on design as no
clear objectives were defined. This was followed by conflicting strategies between the
design and construction teams. The end result were hefty losses to the construction sub-
conti actor.
One good example of proper KM procedures is the Information System that has been
developed and set up by Lusoponte. All information is collected and managed since the
beginning of the design/construction stage up to the most current O/M data. Among
negative examples, is the confusion and loss of negotiation power to the public sector
that prevailed in several tenders in Portugal. The public partner replaced the members
of the negotiation teams (Lusoponte) or as in the case of the SCUTs where different
public sector teams were simultaneously negotiating with practically the same private
teams, without any mechanism put in place to exchange information among the various
public sector teams.
A negative example occurs also in Lusoponte, where the government's negotiation team
that supervised construction has no formal procedure to retain and disseminate the
knowledge and experience gained during the negotiation and construction stages. As
this team has a fixed period of existence when it dismantles this knowledge will be lost
for the government. Different teams will conduct future projects not profiting from past
experiences. Similarly in the UK, Hospital Trusts that have only 5 years duration,
negotiate and conduct all the procedures but the experience gained is not used in future
PFI hospitals, as the Trust is not appointed to other PFI projects. Bid experience and
proper KM procedures related to the bidding stage are critical for PFI.
KM seen as the experience and learning that participants derive from the involvement in
PFI projects has two important consequences: First, it increases efficiency throughout
the process, establishing a climate of confidence between the parties that reduces
uncertainty. The bidding process becomes easier, shorter and less expensive. Second,
private companies benefit from specialisation in the same sector. Although each PFI
project is unique, there are strong similarities among the projects, the risks involved and
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the risk mitigation techniques. It stands to reason that companies having invested in the
learning process of PFI bidding will want to capitalise on the acquired knowledge by
tendering (with a better chance to win) future projects within the same sectors. Another
underlying reason for this specialisation trend lies in the public sector criterion for bids
evaluation wherein previous experience in similar projects is considered.to  be a good
asset for a private company.
In conclusion, the CSFs contribution to the Sustainable Competitive Advantage of PFI
is the improvement in all four factors of competitive advantage: Innovation, Quality,
Efficiency and Responsiveness to Customers. Clear strategy enhances all three
c )rnpetltive factors: better service (accommodating the client's needs) increasing
efficiency (not wasting resources pursuing other objectives) and innovation (providing a
clear guidance). Finally KM increases responsiveness to customers (know who the
clients are) and efficiency (knowledge from other areas of the project and from other
projects is incorporated). The experience and learning increases efficiency throughout
the process, fostering the establishment of a climate confidence between the parties
reducing uncertainty.
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8.2 Assessment of the Research aims
The next sections assess the extent to which the research aims were attained
8.2.1 Has PFI proved to deliver a better service and VFM than the traditional
forms of undertaking public projects?
The focus on measures to control costs is always present. PFI is a proLurernent tool that
has proven to be able to reduce the overall project cost by applying the VFM decision
criteria because the decision to go ahead with a PFI scheme is only taken after proving
that it costs less than the traditional methods of governmental procurement. Examples
of better service and VFM can be found within the case studies:
• Victoria Dock Primary School made a great effort to design an energy efficient
building as it was paying for its own gas and electricity. Some special features
to reduce whole life cycle costs were among others: double glazed windows,
large cavity walls with air pockets to improve insulation, less expensive roof
tiles;
• In Lusoponte O/M was involved since the beginning of the project. Their task
was to evaluate the adequacy of design to simplify O/M. keeping its costs at the
minimum possible level. For example, the access to the South Viaduct structure
for routine inspections (check sensors, support apparatus, etc), was planned from
the start;
• JSCSC where the Self-performance Monitoring Criteria assesses the
performance of the services provided against a benchmark that was negotiated
within the contract with the MoD. The system is considered "fair" by both
partners and is based on trust. Usually this involves 12-16 people at a cost of at
least £250,000/year. and who might not have a positive perspective to solve
problems. The current system involves penalty points for specific events, that if
exceeded will induce a financial penalty.
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In conclusion, from the analysis of the empiric data, PFI has proved to deliver a better
service and VFM. The delivery of a better service is closely related with quality and
attention to the client that are discussed afterwards within the PFI competitiveness.
8.2.2 Has PFI proved to provide an adequate framework for risk allocation
between the private and public sector?
The whole lile cycle context in which the projects develop, not only the risks pparent
at the time of th analysis but a clear perception of the possible outcomes (events) in the
future is key to an effective RM exercise. Traditional RM techniques have been used
extensively in the implementation of PFI projects. Nevertheless, these techniques fail to
account for the holistic, systemic and very often for the full implications of the long-
term nature of the projects. They fail to account for some type of risks and/or a wishful -
thinking attitude has led to over costs, overruns and other setbacks in several projects.
Usually financial and construction risks are very well accounted for, but less tangible
risks like political and environmental are very often demised (or underestimated) with
adverse consequences. For example:
• In Lusoponte the public partner underestimated the social impact of raising tolls
on a bridge that by common knowledge had already been paid for, the public
perception being that in due time it would be without toll. Undermining
environmental issues led to the signing of contracts without an approved EIA.
• In JSCSC planning regulations surprises were not avoided even with the PFI'
framework for risk allocation. At the time of the contract signing Laing
Construction assumed that the construction was approved by the Local
-	
Authority Planning Department and had the construction works ready to start
when they were informed that the building would only be approved if was 2
meters deeper than planned. The immediate major adverse consequence was
that the building's foundations reached a very bad soil instead of rock as
planned, and cotisequeiitly costs escalated. The L.C. team had little experience
and as a result the concession contract (and 28 schedules) became an implied
document in the construction contract. 	 Therefore the requirements of
a
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untried/untested PFI concession became an implicit feature of all contractual
negotiations.
PFI combines several unfavourable pre-conditions for decision-making. Often, the
projects are new ventures in untested sectors, using untested methodologies. Therefore,
the perception of a risky situation arises, frequently accentuated by the presence of
ambiguity.
Another adverse condition for decision-making is that one of the decision-makers, the
public sector is by nature risk averse. This context can explain the need for lengthy PFI
negotiations and extended legal reasurances that aie a way to ciLal ith risk enhanced
by the presence of ambiguity.
The partnership approach is clearly a very effective risk perception reducing
mechanism. In Indaqua Feira throughout the project and both from the public and
private partners, there was a partnering approach, the development of a sense of trust,
and the understanding of the need to work for a common goal. This approach still
prevails and proved to be essential to overcome some difficulties. This contrasts with
what happened with JSCSC
In conclusion, there is room for improvement of the PFI risk allocation framework.
4
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8.2.3 ilas PFI proved to be a competitive procurement tool?
Next follows a detailed account on how PFI impacts on the '4Blocks' of Competitive
Advantage: Innovation, Quality, Efficiency and Customer Responsiveness.
8.2.3.1 Does PFI improve Innovation?
The .\uthoiity, which is mainly conceuied with an adequate service output, givs great
freedom and flexibility to the actual design of the asset. Nevertheless, the attitude of the
private sector towards innovation is rather conservative as it is perceived to be a risk
factor. The greatest innovations are derived from the need to promote easy and cost
effective long-term maintenance (including replacement costs), and also to provide lay-
outs that can reduce the construction area (reducing initial cost) and provide the
flexibility for different usages in the ftiture. Another trend has been the increasing
introduction of aesthetic criteria, in both design and colours.
An example of flexilibility for different usages in the ftiture, is the Victoria Dock
Primary School where the land the school was built has been leased to the Sewell group
for 40 years, although the PFI contract is for only 25 years. After this period and for 15
years the buildings and land can have alternative usages such as: continue as a school,
disco, nursery, homecare, according to the local residents' needs in 25 years.
In the prisons sector the private companies tend to specialise and bid only for projects
within this sector, like Kvaerner. It is then possible to continuously innovate and
improve construction techniques and design from previous projects (although it must be
based on the modular design supplied by Her Majesty Prison Services). This contrasts
with hospitals with little innovation due to lack of freedom given to the private sector.
The National Health Service and the Hospital's Trusts have their own set of standards
(technical specifications) which have to be included in the bid, leaving little room for
innovation not giving to the private partner freedom to innovate and propose better
(usually less costly over the whole life cycle) solutions for the provision of the specified
service. This contrast with the Prisons where the private partner will replace existing
technology with a new one if it means reducing costs, such as staffing that in the prisons
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is all from the private partner unlike in the hospitals where technical staff— doctors and
nurses - are from the public sector.
The design team and the operator should be involved in early stages of negotiation to
foster innovation (maintenance cost reduction) and to assess future maintenance costs at
an early stage. The designer has to be free to innovate. On a whole life cycle basis, an
operator needs to consider the interaction between a more expensive design solution and
lower operating and life cycle costs and vice-versa.
The contractors are very conservative in the materials they utilise, the usage of new
construction materials is considered too risky in long-term projects as they are unproven
in the long-term. It is the example of The Victoria Dock Primary School where the
construction and design risks were niinimised by adopting conservative design and
construction techniques in which Sewell Construction had ample experience. The
constructor even supplied all the materials, taking special care to use only those whose
behaviour was well proven. Another reason is that the operator links the construction
sub-contractor to building maintenance contracts. The liability for latent defects is the
contractors unless they clearly specify the conditions of usage. For example: the vinyl
floor in a hospital had lifting edges due to the use of incorrect cleaning agents; if the
construction contractor hadn't specified the usage conditions he would be liable.
Both trends, of innovative design and proven materials, follow naturally from the
requirement that the contractor is also the operator.
8.2.3.2 Does PFI improve Quality?
Quality in PFI projects is needed both to accommodate the expectations of the
stakehotders and to reduce costs over the whole life cycle. The logic being that an
emphasis on quality will also increase the operations efficiency and effectiveness. By
quality it is meant a correct adjustment between the service provided and the degree of
satisfaction of the stakeholders, i.e., their expectations are ftilfihled.
PFI improves quality essentially through two mechanisms: Directly by the need to abide
to the contracted service specifications, and indirectly in some areas like education, by
allowing the staff relief from administrative tasks. Teachers can concentrate on their
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core competences therefore enhancing the quality of the educational services provided.
As for human resources, staff quality is also a key feature in the SPV' teams. For
example, in Lusoponte and Ilndáqua it was strongly emphasized that staffs qualification
and efficiency was much higher than it would be expected especially when comparing
to management teams in projects of a similar nature.
8.2.3.3 Does PFI improve Efficiency?
The basic concept that underlies PFI, VFM in itself constitutes a measure of efficiency
gains translated in reduced costs versus traditional procurement and management of
public services. Improving the efficiency is paramount to reduce costs and therefore to
increase the project's profitability. All empiric data indicates that efficiency gains are
the main key driver in a PFI, which is closely related with Quality. One factor affecting
the other interchangeably. One of the most important areas where PFI has improved
efficiency is translated by the widespread usage in PFI projects of new managerial
techniques sometimes introduced by the public partner' initiative, such as the Zero
Defects Initiative (also closely related to quality) imposed on the JSCSC by DETR
Construction companies see PFI as an opportunity for providing a continuous flow of
work, so to be efficient they have to specialise. In the early days of PFI projects' teams
were involved in different sectors, but that has changed. Specialised teams are involved
in only one area, their expertise being built on previous projects. Even large companies,
such as Kvaerner, that are involved in PFI projects in various sectors - schools, roads,
prison, accommodation, etc. - have developed specialised teams within the companies.
For example, having identified the prisons market as an attractive market with a
continuous flow of projects, and as Kvaerner plan to be involved in the forthcoming
prisons' PFI, their design teams work in-between projects to improve prison design
prior to the tenders. Another example is Carden Croft & Co that also sees specialisation
as a key to success. They specialised in the Blue Light sector (Fire fighting and
ambulances) bLcause their op. trional needs are very simiktr, like the need for a quick
response to the alarms, the existence of dormitories, etc.
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8.2.3.4 Does PFI improve Attention to Client?
Customer responsiveness is clearly improved when dealing with a free-standing project
where the clients pay for the service (Lusoponte, Indáqua). With a DBFO where the
client needs are predefined and it is the public sector that pays for the service, it is
necessary that the end users needs are accommodated within the contracted service
specifications. It is not a real life market driven situation and it occurs in several sectors
like prisons, schools and fire stations. If the public partner that discussed the contract is
directly involved in the service provision there is a clear improvement in customer
iesponsiveness For example, in the Maic.hester Fire Station the public prrnr th
negotiated the contract was the Greater Manchester Council, as it is the entity that
administers the Greater Manchester Fire Service. They had a good sense of what was
needed and were very much 'target oriented' with a great deal of commitment as they
were dealing with their own business. When people are not as committed because they
are told what to do this might not happen. Of course the end result is that the public in
general got a better service. Besides these requirements Carden and Co, the contractor
of the Manchester Fire Station, had also to take into account cultural adjustments in
design, as fire fighters (that can be viewed as other type of clients) are very cultural
specific. For example, they don't like open space offices (where money could
potentially be saved) because they regard their own 'territory' as an important rank
mark.
In conclusion, attention to either the direct client (general public) or to the indirect
clients (like the fire-fighters) is improved as a result of the introduction of PFI.
The research concluded that PFI has a competitive advantage versus the traditional
forms of governmental procurement as it induces improvements in all '4Blocks' of
Competitive Advantage: Efficiency, Quality, Innovation and Customer Responsiveness.
The PFI main block of Competitive Advantage is the increased efficiency brought by
the nud a strict COS control to deliver \rFM. PFI has also impi o ed quality and
customer responsiveness but its incentive is mainly derived by the necessity to comply
with the contracted service provision rather than by the usual market driven situation to
attract clients. Inno,ation is rather conservative occurring mainly in the design stage to
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reduce operation and maintenance costs rather than construction costs for which there
are very well established project management techniques. For innovation to occur it is
important the public sector willingness to consent to enough freedom and flexibility in
the contract as to give to the private sector 'freedom to innovate'. In PFI there must be
created a strong motivation to continuously innovate, in particular reducing
maintenance costs. The attitude to avoid is the very dangerous inertia of people who
think 'everything was done in this way and performing satisfactorily, why change it?'.
According to Porter (1990) lower costs and differentiation are sources of competitive
advantage. This model is not contradictory with the '4Blocks', instead it is a different
perspective to look at the same issues. Cost control over the whole life cycle is behind
the drive for innovation, efficiency and quality. Also PFI clearly diflèrentiates from
other forms pf public procurement. So both models acknowledge PFI' competitiveness.
In conclusion, currently PFI has a competitive advantage versus the traditional forms of
governmental procurement. The advantage's sustainability is going to depend upon the
continuing focus throughout the whole life cycle on efficiency gains (cost control),
innovation, quality and provision of a better service. This dynamism is one key feature
that was incorporated in the proposed SCA model.
Next follows the answer to the fourth and last research aim.
8.2.4 Has PFI the adequate conditions in the macro economic and political
environment to develop?
The political and economic context was determinant, a pre-condition, for PFI
development. PFI emerged as a response to government needs for funding of public
projects, and was also favoured by the prevailing political and macro economic
environment. The future environmental conditions are always a question mark. If the
political and econoniic climate remains favourable then PFI has a future. If not, even
the worst case scenario of nationalisation can materialise as in the past with
concessions. The government acting as a sponsor has also the responsibility to create
the adequate regulatory environment for PFI to develop. At the beginning of the 20th
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century, concessions brought on themselves their felling out of favour in great part due
to the abuses of dominant positions. PFI must profit from this lesson and avoiu the
same mistake.
Ft nn the an dysis of the content of the previous sections i. can be staLed that the
research has permitted to draw conclusions and consequently fulfil all four research
aims. The answers to the questions provide also a valuable insight on how to pursue the
PFI route. It is also possible to draw some conclusions and recommendations for PFI
stakeholders, the promoters size and the variability across Sectors and regions, that
follow. These conclusions stem from the data collected and are ancillary as to the stated
research aims. Nevertheless the decisions to include them was based on the fact that
these would enrich the analysis and permit a better overview of the complex context in
which PFI develops. These areas also provided valuable insight to the definition of
ftiture research areas.
a
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8.3 Conclusions and Recommendations
8.3.1 Conclusions and Recommendations for PFI Stakeholders
It is vital that all stakeholders involved in the PFI market adapt to the this novel way to
do business. The need for changes in the organisational culture is profound.
A key lesson drawn from the research is that a PFI project must be a good deal for all
stakeholders. It's a long-term relationship where opportunistic moves will cost dearly.
Neither the public nor the private partner can assunie that one can take advantage over
the other. A 'Good' or 'Successful' PFI has to accommodate the needs and expecations
of all stakeholders:
• VFM for the Public Sector;
• Return on Investment for the Private Sector;
• Better Service for the Users.
The partnership instead of the confrontational approach has already been recognized by
the U.K government as a route to pursue with PFI (the importance of common visions
and strategies becomes clear). The decision taken by Sewell to promote a 'Community
Dividend' from the profits of the SPV is a good example. In contrast, in JSCSC the
public sector got a good deal, with the project on time and on budget, assuring the
delivery of a service on a guaranteed benchmark. However this was at the expense of
heavy losses for the construction sub-contractor. This is not sustainable because if the
private sector (where the construction companies are included) gets the perception that
they stand to lose money, then PFI vvill no longer be perceivd as a viable route. There
must exist a perception of fairness throughout the process.
One criticism is that in some successful PFI projects, the private partner gets 'unfair'
profits - often from refinancing debt. The Treasury is considering the inclusion in the
contract of provisions so that part of the earnings will also be transferred to the
Authority.
a
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Very importantly it must be realised by all stakeholders that PFI must be an open
project. There must be a mandatory continuous assessment of the project, to adjust it to
the market and technical developments and sustain the competitive advantage.
It is important to develop PFI training skills, both for the public and private sectors,
coverihg project (or contract) management and technical skills. Training must also
cover soft skills like: communication, interpersonal relationships and team teamwork,
all of which play a key role in PFI.
8.3.1.1 Conclusions and Recommendations for the Public sector
• In a PFI the government can't waive its responsibility for the provisions of a
public service it only changes the type of responsibility, which very often
brings an increase in its technical and political complexity. Delegating the
service to the private sector means that the government has to adopt legal and
regulatory mechanisms to ensure that the service is provided efficiently and
the responsibilities assumed by the private sector are fulfilled;
•	 The applying, monitoring and enforcing of rules all must be in accordance.
otherwise rules may remain the wish of the regulator;
•	 Clear and consistent strategies are key. The opposing strategic approaches
only introduces confusion, and if a PFI service output definition is in
discussion it will be even more difficult to define;
•	 Improve the framework for Knowledge Management within the governmental
structure. -It is critical to set up formal procedures to disseminate the
knowledge and experience gained during the negotiation, construction and
operation stages. Otherwise with no formal procedure to retain the knowledge
this will be lost for the government. The UK Government has in each
Ministry it's own PFU (Private Finance Unit) that centralises and disseminates
infornyition c' g rdn the PFI piojects;
•	 Project Finance is a demanding tool. Since it relies on the cash flows of the
project, it requires the exhaustive identificacion, analysis, allocation and
mitigation of all risks. This is a complex process, subject to a great deal of
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uncertainty and lengthy negotiations, but the decision process in PFI can be
improved by reducing ambiguity and perceived risk;
.	 There is the need to improve the procedures during the bidding stage, for
instance, introducing drop dead dates to avoid lengthy negotiations;
.	 There is the need for complete information, a stable design and predefined
scope of works (no additional works) at the time of the signing of the contract.
It is necessary to avoid common procedures as in the traditional methods of
procurement where the client keeps asking for alterations and the constructor
presents new cost estimates for additional works. This usually leads to
significant cot o' erruns arid to a high lecl of litigation ni claims fom th
private partner.
8.3.1.2 Conclusions and Recommendations for the Private sector
.	 As the concessionaire is responsible for both the construction and
maintenance, it has a strong incentive to minimise costs on a whole-life cycle
basis, and not to pursue initially cheaper solutions that in the long run would
be more expensive. Inno'ation appeared essentially with new designs more
efficient and cost effective to operate and maintain through the whole life
cycle of the project;
Mainly due to the involvement of financial institutions projects are closely
scrutinised, both in terms of technical details but also their financial
consequences;
Legal costs are considered too high, but a good legal adviser is key to a good
contractual agreement;
.	 PFI also induced innovation in the financial and insurance sectors. In the
capital markets sector there were innovative forms of bond issuance and the
use of holistic insurance schemes;
.	 Insurers must be involved from the beginning of the process of risk allocation,
as they alsç take risk. The client usually builds the risk matrix, negotiates it
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and only then asks for insurance coverage. But the insurance company may
not agree and the whole process has to be repeated increasing the tender costs;
.	 The Human Resources of the concessionaire are typically highly qualified,
with wages above average;
Construction companies see PFI as an opportunity for providing a continuous
flow of work, so to be efficient they have to specialise;
•	 The emergence of the notion of Corporate PFI. This derives from the notion
of service provision and is an extension to the application of PFI to the private
sector. The authority is replaced ith a corporation, e.g., N1&S will build an
office block for headquarters with this scheme. 	 This will permit to
'concentrate' in their core business.
The main recommendation to the construction industry is the need to focus on KM.
disseminating knowledge throughout the industry, improving communication and
integrating the supply chains.
The next sections include some remarks drawn from the study like the variability in PFI
projects according to the promoters size, the sectors and the international context.
4
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8.3.2 Conclusions and Recommendations on Promoters size
The main questions related to the problems that SMEs face in the PFI market, and on
the strategies that they can adopt (Annex Vl) are:
Is the PFI market adjusted for SMEs?
Are SMIEs being left out of the PFI market?
•	 Is it feasible or not for a SMIE to act as sponsor in a PF1 project?
•	 Does a SIVIE have the required technical and financial capacity?
•	 Does a Sv[E have any advantages in entering the PFI market?
•	 Which are the main constraints for SMEs in the PFJ market?
Regarding the first question - Is the PFI market adjusted for SM1Es? This study
concluded that Yes. SMEs can play a role in the PFI market, but paying attention that
SMEs must choose the right segment/niche (McDonald & Dunbar 998). 1
The empiric data collected provided an understanding on how the PFI market functions
and on the key variables to the public and private partners. As such, it is proposed
(Table 8.1) the following segmentation variables, or dimensions, adequate to
differentiate between projects are: The Dimension of the sponsor and the Dimension of
the contractor. The market can then be divided into homogeneous segments
characterised by the relative dimensions of all parties.
It is this study's proposal that to apply to the PFI methodology to SMEs, that 'there
must exist an adjustment of the project 's dimension, to both the concessionaire' and
authority' dimension'. The sponsors of a PFI can he the Central Government that
usually launches large projects (defined in terms of project cost) 2 and Local
Government that can launch all types of projects from large to small.
The definition of McDonald & Dunbar as adapted as 4%Iarket segmentation - is a processes of splitting the
market into different groups or segments, within which the projects have the same or similar requirements?
2 Large PFI over £100 million, Medium PFI £50-tOO million, Small FF1 lesr than £50 million. Small projects can be
bundled to get a larger project.
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Table 8.1. PFI Market Segmentation
Large
Companies
SME
Large PFI
Highly
Appropriate
Not
Appropriate
Small PFI
Not likely to
occur
Not likely to
occur
Large PFI
Appropriate
(conditionally)
Not
Appropriate
Small PFI
Not Appropriate
Hig/z1'
Appropriate
It is reasonable to expect good results when the negotiation teams from both the public
and private sectors are balanced in terms of dimension and expertise. Special attention
has to be paid to large companies and small sponsors (Local Government or
Corporations), where the public team cannot be understaffed and has to be balanced
with the private sector team in dimension and expertise.
The adjustment between the relative dimensions of project and sponsor makes sense as
small projects require fewer resources and a narrower range of expertises than large
projects. it is important to note that it is the range of expertise that is in question not the
degree of specialisation. In effect the research points out that small PFI projects are
more suited to specialised companies that operate in market niches. In conclusion.
SNIEs can play an important role in Small PFI projects, which very often are not very
attractive to large companies.
The key lessons to remember are:
•	 Small companies can't afford to lose upfront costs;
• If financing is solved a SNIE can be the concessionaire of a successful PFI,
specialising in low risk sectors. Traditional corporate loans (or equity) are
always viable options, but the access to other financing like capital markets is
not adapted to SMFs:
• PFI is very demanding on the provision of good quality services and SMIEs
face specific constraints regarding the availability of technical and human
resources;
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SMEs can always be sub-contracted in a PFI, which might give them
increased security ensuring, over a longer period of time, a steady stream of
income. But even then SMEs must be aware that PFI has stringent demands
regarding efficiency and quality and that a sub-contractor must also abide by
this philosophy;
Lastly but critical: If SMIEs are to be a player in the PFI market the
Government must provide appropriate guidance and include in its strategic
objectives a legislative and regulatory framework adapted to SMIEs.
8.3.3 Conclusions and Recommendations for Differences Sector Wise
Based on the research four factors emerged as potential differentiators of the sectors.
These are:
• Social Costs I Social Visibility;
Uncertain Revenues;
Degree of Empowerment and Decision Process;
Degree of Maturity.
Social Costs / Social Visibility - PFI projects in sectors both sensitive and visible, and
that can affect the public in an irreversible and adverse way, have the potential for high
social costs. The situation worsens if there exists no alternatives for the service. It is
possible to identify a priori sectors particularly sensitive to social costs, like some IT
projects.
In IT projects often there is an old system in place that provides the service, when one
system has to be replaced by another this poses the problem of existence or not of
alternatives to the provision of the service when the public is the client (high social
vicihility) This n'ikc the trntion particularly sensitive and visible. An example to
remember is the public outcry (Financial Times 1999) when IT projects went wrong
with the British passport agency and social services.
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In contrast, in a road the service to be provided is the access from one location to
another. If construction lags behind schedule or if there is a technical problem, traffic
can still flow the old way. Also it is a well-known sector where a project if correctly
managed has very few uncertainties regarding completion and performance.
Uncertainty of revenues - The major problem relates with the existence, or not, of
clear and identifiable revenues, and how this risk is split between the public and the
private partner. This is critical for the private partner as it is from the revenues that its
profits come from. Uncertainty of revenues varies across sectors. For example, in an
Hospital there are usually two streams of cash-flows, that are both easily identifiable
and controlled: First, an Availability Fee for providing a pre-defned number of beds
and maintaining the hospital running in good order; and Second, a Service [Le, for
providing 'soft services' such as catering, laundry, waste management and telecoms. As
hospitals are often large and complex to operate and maintain, both stream of cash-
flows are subject to great uncertainty and often it is not possible to identify the stream
of revenues throughout the life of the project. Nobody knows what is going to happen
with certainty in the long-term maintenance in hospitals. It is still an untested sector for
PFI and traditionally surprises are very common. Day-to-day maintenance is different,
it can more easily be predicted.
Another example for uncertain revenues are IT projects. These have a high degree of
uncertainty of outcome, in terms of timing (completion risk) and performance. The
payments are often related to the performance of the system, such as savings achieved
from the implementation of the system or volume of business the system handles. First
they deliver the prototype, receive the first payment, and sign the contract. Full
payment is only after the total development of the system is completed. The problem is
that the provider doesn't know how long development and implementation will take.
Degree of Empowerment and Decision Process - S ta Maria da Feira Municipality, the
Authority in the Indáqua project, suffered the consequences of lack of Decision Power
and of Empowerment within the governmental system. An important lesson to draw is
not to sign contracts for which one doesn't have to rely on future decisions, as when
there was no firm (written) commitment from the Central Government to allow the
Municipality access to EU funding
Having the Decision power concentrated instead of distributed makes a big difference in
the bidding stage. Too many parties involved imply constant revisions like in the
hospitals sector. Th culture in hospitals is risk averse, and there are many social and
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politically sensitive issues. Negotiations are lengthy. Usually only about 1/3 of design
is defined at the beginning of construction. Table 8.2 summarizes the differences
between the Hospitals and Prisons procedures to define the detail design. In Hospitals
the Heads of Department are always included in the Decision Process which leads to
extensive and difficult negotiations..
Table 8.2. Main Differences of PFI between the Hospitals and Prisons Sectors
	
Hospitals	 Prisons
Hotel Ser\ ices from the Private sector	 Total Operation for the Private sector, that
	
Operat i on is from Public scctoi	 pros ides Staff I- Maii tenanc + Educatioi F
Accommodation.
• One Trust (experience gained is lost) 	 • Authority capitalises past experience
• Negotiation procedure with too many 	 • Local Authorities (like Fire station)
	
Heads of Department	 • Operator led the design
• Real negotiation	 ________________________________________
The procedures are not straightforward:
• General specification - Heads
Department
• Trust
• Short List
• Present options (3 usually)
• Heads of department will go along with
that?
• Negotiation follows
Degree of Maturity - The various sectors are in different stages of maturity as it is
indicated by the trends in design uncertainty. It seems reasonable to assume that the
degree of matuiity of the sectors is closely related with experience gained in previous
projects that has permitted to minimize the social costs, to reduce the uncertainty of
revenues and improve the empowerment and decision process. Alastair Campbell
(1999) from the Treasury Finance Policy Team classified the sectors according to the
development of PFI projects as Mature, Developing and Emerging.
Mature Sectors include roads and budges, prisons, hospitals, government office
accommodation and low-mid technology defence projects. Developing Sectors include
tolled motorways, trams and metro, street lighting schemes, court buildings, schools,
universities, IT projeLcts and water and waste treatments plants. In the Emerging sectors
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are included Social Housing and Regeneration projects, advanced defence projects, city
centre traffic management scheme and multi-sector projects.
In conclusion, there are factors that can condition 'a priori' the performance of a PFI. It
is important that all the stakeholders are aware of them to permit a more correct
adjustment of risk management procedures.
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8.3.4 Conclusions and Recommendations on Cross Border Variability - The
International Context - Portugal
The research has permitted to draw some preliminary conclusions on the impact PFI has
had on the competitiveness of UK construction industry enhancing the four blocks of
competitive advantage: Innovation, Quality, Efficiency and Attention to the Client. It
has also developed the way the construction industry is managed. There is the
widespread use of management tools like whole life cycle costing, risk mana gement and
b eiiel imarki fl4.
In the UK, PFI also induced the communication through an increased functional
integration of the traditionally vertically fragmented UK construction industry, forcing
the interaction and feedback from all the stakeholders in a project.
The introduction PFI in Portugal has had some beneficial consequences to the private
sector that incorporated well the knowledge and experience gained. For example, some
Portuguese members of the Lusoponte consortium participated successfully in
subsequent tenders for DBFO roads (SCUTs). In the Portuguese SPVs there is a
marked effect on corporate culture when comparing with the prevalent organisational
culture in other Portuguese companies. There is a greater emphasis on efficiency, cost
consciousness, whole-life cycle costing, accountability and also the notion that the
client is important both in terms of safety and satisfaction (see Lusoponte, Indãqua).
Also, the process is totally transparent, which is something not common in the
Portuguese corporate culture, particularly the construction sector which is notorious for
its culture of secrecy. -
However some difficulties were encountered: The public sector's negotiation abilities
are very unsatisfactory and there is a difficult co-ordination with the public partner. For
example, in Lusoponte it was easier to deal with only one entity like the GATTEL.
After completion of construction it is more difficult because as GATTEL is dismantled
different entities with different opinions and no central directive have to deal with
Lusoponte. Difficulties were also encountered during the negotiation as the government
changed, most members of the negotiation team were replaced and had no previous
knowledge of the ontracts in discussion. The Lusoponte file had 114 different
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documents in discussion, which were well known to the previous members, as they
were the ones that were involved in drafting them. The government has put itself in a
weak negotiation position and the same happened with Indáqua where the Public
negotiation team was clearly under-staffed.
Very often contracts are signed underestimating the risk of environmental issues. This
led to the signing of contracts without an approved EIA, with disastrous consequences.
For example in Lusoponte as the EU conditioned the availability of funds to the
existence of an approved EIA the private partner had construction delayed six months
on a very tight schedule. The same happened in some SCUTs as construction was
halted because the whole length of the road didn't have an approved EIA.
Some key aspects to a correct development of PFI in Portugal, are:
•	 Central Government must make clear if it considers PFI an option or not.
There are divergent opinions, as some politicians see PFI a danger to avoid as
it pawns future generations incomes. Unlike in the UK there is no government
commitment to the PFI route. Ministries apply the technique on a one-by-one
project basis without any central guidance;
•	 There is the need to clarify what is a PFI. There is a widespread minimalist
sense that PFI is project finance that utilises private funding for public
projects, missing framework of the PFI conceptual model (Figure 3.1) and the
key aspect that a PFI contract if for service provision not asset construction;
The legal and regulatory framework must be adjusted, namely the possibility
for bond-issuance to finance the projects and adjusting accounting rules;
•	 Projects must be assessed for VFM (up to the present none was).
The research provided insights as to suggestions for future research which are
synthesized in the next section and conclude the dissertation.
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8.4 Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis has presented the research undertaken to propose a model for the
sustainability of PFI's Competitive Advantage. These suggestions for further research
derive naturally from the scope of the current research that identified several empirical
and practical areas that constitute its natural extension. Some extensions constitute
natural developments of the research while others are related to the limitations of the
study. The models developed are of a tentative nature and the empiric and academic
data collected had limitations. For instance: The assessment of literal replication, or
similar results expected, undertaking for example, three case studies nn the same
sectol s, has not been done because it was outside the scope of the current research
which was limited to testing the applicability of the models to different sectors, to get
the overall context of the PFI market.
The suggestions for future research work are divided in: The potential utilisations of
the quantification of the WLCRUM (which constitutes a natural development of the
study) and the extension of the models to study the variability across the sectors and
different regions to address some limitations of the study and to permit to draw
conclusions adapted to each sector/region based on a sound empiric basis.
8.4.1 WLCRUM Quantification
The research findings should be pursued on a more quantitative approach. The
establishment of benchmarks and standard metrics is a very important research area that
stems from the current research. The quantification of the WLCRUM will permit to
extend research to various research areas:
Project's Uncertainty Levels. To develop uncertainty scales to identify if a
project is low or high risk. Decisions can be made over a single project. If the
risk uncertainty level is considered unacceptable the project is either rejected
or reformulated, but if the risk uncertainty level is acceptable the project can
proceed. The risk scale can also be used to compare several projects, rank
C
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them making possible an informed decision on the priorities to undertake the
projects;
.	 Sector's Uncertainty Levels. A characterisation of each sector - transports,
prisons, IT - by a 13 type factor (similar to the stock and bonds risk level) could
influence the projects financial ratiri and therefore the loan's lending rates;
Risk Type Uncertainty Level. A similar 13 factor can be applied to the
individual analysis of each risk type. It would be possible to assess, for
example, the political or the construction risk level and then according to the
level make a pre-agreed risk allocation, as suggested in Table 8.3. If the
uneertaility level is too high then the rhk it is to be returnd to the public
sector; if uncertainty is average then the risk could be shared- and if
uncertainty is low should be transferred to the private sector. The sum of all
risk uncertainties would be the project's risk uncertainty.
Table 8.3. Risk Uncertainty Level and Agreed Allocation
Returned	 Shared	 Transferred I
High Uncertainty - 13>1	 V
Average Uncertainty - 1<13<0	 V
Low Uncertainty - 13<0	 V
To study the relation between the risk uncertainty and the degree of PFI
development within a sector, thus enabling a classification of the sectors from
PFI mature to PFI emergent. This should be interlinked with the proposed
development on sector 13s.
For the quantification of the WLCRUTvI model is proposed Fuzzy Logic which is
particularly adapted to uncertainty analysis as the reasoning on uncertainty is based in
feelings, vagueness and ambiguity. The risk levels of different projects can be
normalised, i.e., be in a common scale to compare the risk levels of different projects.
For each project it is then possible to have its risk level characterised by a numeric
factor permitting the risk ranking of projects.
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8.4.2 Region and Sector-Wise
The research focused on the overall adequacy (applicability) of the models to different
sectors, but it open remains the question on: 'Which are the main risks that can
differentiate the sectors', or 'Is there an adequate risk allocation sector-wise?' Table 8.4
presents a suggestion as to what could be the most important issues (or key issues) that
have the potential to differentiate the sectors: Social Costs/Social Visibility,
Identifiable Revenues, Completion Risk, Obsolescence Risk, Demand Risk and
Performance Risk. The research should be pursued as to assess the key issues sector-
wise and therefore permit a more correct risk allocation.
Table 8.4. Relevance of Risk Type by Sector
Uncertainty	 Social	 - Alternative	 Identifiable	 Identifiable
of outcome	 costs,	 service	 revenues and	 Service
(Completion	 Social	 (Obsolescence	 cash flows	 specifications
Risk)	 visibility	 Risk)	 (Performance
___________ ____________ __________ ______________ ____________ 	
Risk)
Transport____________ ___________ ______________ Key Issue ______________
Hospital______________ Key Issue ________________ 	 Key Issue	 ________________
IT	 Key Issue _____________ 	 Key Issue	 Key Issue	 Key Issue
Custodial	 Key Issue	 Key Issue
Services______________	 ________________ ______________ _______________
8.4.3 Other Suggestions for Future Research
Further suggestions for future research are:
.	 The assessment of CSFs in the PFI projects by sector - transports, health, etc.;
•	 The establishment of benchmarks and milestones to assess the Blocks of
Competitive Advantage - Innovation, Quality, Efficiency and Responsiveness
to Customers - by sector;
• The study of the Competitiveness in different regions. The current research
studied PFI and similar projects in the UK and Portugal, but though the
regional covering was limited, it was found that cultural differences appear to
be a factor that influences PFI competitiveness. This finding should be
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confirmed and systematically studied to find how different cultures and
social/organi sational values influence the development of PFI.
As future practical developments for the research the study tested models, gathered
information and provided a set of conclusions and recommendations that can constitute
a sound empiric basis to develop practical tools such as best-practice guidance for PFI
stakeholders, like Governments, Contractors and Financiers.
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Case Study Protocol - Index
PFI PROJECT SYNOPSIS1
Title
Country
Project Cost
Sector
Status
Sponsors
Purchaser
Financing Package
Special Features
Brief
1. BACKGROUND - HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES
2. THE BIDDING PROCESS
2.1. TIMETABLE
2.2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
2.2.1. Project Team
2.3. NEGoTIATIoNs
2.4. DUE DILIGENCE
2.5. DEBRIEFS - COMMUNICATIONS
3. THE CONCESSION
3.1. MAIN PARTICIPANTS
3.1.1. Authority
3.1.2. Contractors - SPV
3.1.3. Construction Sub-Contractor
3.1.4. Operating Sub- Contractor
3.1.5. Senior Lenders
3.1.6. Consultants
3.2. CONTRACTS
3.2.1. Concession Contract
3.2.2. Construction Sub-Contract
3.2.2.1. Design Sub-contract
3.2.3. Financing Agreement - Loan agreement
3.2.4. Operation and Maintenance Sub-contract
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3.2.5. Direct Agreement
3.2.6. Shareholders Agreement
3.3. LIFE CYCLE
3.4. LIFE CYCLE AND STAKEHOLDERS
4. RISK TRANSFER
4.1. VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM) A1) PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR (PSC)
4.2. RISK ALLOCATION
4.2.1. Political and Regulatory Risks
4.2.2. Economic and Financial Risks
4.2.3. Social Risks
4.2.4. Environmental Risks
4.2.5. Legal Risks
4.2.6. Bidding Risks
4.2.7. Construction Risks
4.2.8. Design Risks
4.2.9. Commercial Risks
4.2.9.1. Project Specific Risks
4.2.9.2. Operation/1\Iaintenance costs
4.2.9.2.1. Maintenance Costs
4.2.9.2.2. Operation costs
4.2.10. People Risks
4.2.11. Force Majeure
4.2.12. Residual Value
4.3. ACCOUNTING ISSUES (PROCESS)
5. KEY MESSAGES
For the Private Sector:
For the Public Sector:
Figures:
Contract
Life Cycle
Value Chain
Value-Delivery Network
a
'Adapted by author and David Eaton from a Model from the Infrastructure Finance Directory.
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The Contracts in a PFI
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-	 Case Study Protocol
PFI - Life Cycle
Business
Need
Consistency with
_____________________	 Strategic Objectives
r
Appraise
—1
Options
I	 Unaffordability
Refine
I	 Appraisal
Expression
- ---4	 of Interest
OJEC
Re-Tendering of
Services
Biding
Design
Short List
I!
N egotiation
Final
Evaluation
- ____
Contract
Award and
Financial
Close
Construction
Development
Contract
Operation	
ManagementContrcto	
Auihoriiy
	
I	 I
	
I I	 __________________________________________Alternaiive	 Asset remains nj	 End of	 Asset Transferred
Use	 Public Sector	 Contract	 to Private Sector
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Accounting
Consultants
PFI - Value-Delivery Network
Legal	 \	 Financial	
Consultants
Technical
	
Consultants /	 Ii Consultants
Insurance
Auditing	 SLpiers
Authority
	
Contractor
Operating
Sub-
Contractors/
// ;,/ /
/	 I
	/ 	 I	 \
	
/	 \
"/	 /
/ \	 /	 I
	I 	 /\	 /\	 /	 ". I	 ___________Users A (1)	 /
/	 'S
/	
'S/	 Senior\	 /	 N	 Lenders/	 /	 N
/	 \.	 __________
	Labour	 \	 Environmental\	 Political \	
Statutory \
	
Issues	
/	
Issues	
/ ft 
issues	
/	
Regulatory /
__________	 ______________	
Agencies__/
Construction
Sub-
Contractors
KEY
(1) Users that pay for the ser1ce 	 4	 '	 Most Inortant Contracts
(2) Users that dont pay for the service	 -I	 -	 Ancillary Contracts
	
-c	 Relationships not onntradually bnding
4
262
Case Study Protocol
Interview Guide
I - Field Visit Procedures
Initial Scheduling of Field Visit
Review of Preliminary Information
Special Documents
Persons to be Interviewed (and other sources of information)
II - Outline of Individual Case Study Reports
II.!	 Descriptive Information
Explanatory Information
11.2 - What is the model for sustainable competitive advantage in PFI?
Topics
Factors for Competitive Advantage - Innovation, Quality, Efficiency,
attention to the client
Assessment Techniques - Risk Management, Benchmarking, Client
satisfaction, knowledge management and market studies
Summary of questions
PFI improves Innovation?
• PFI improves Quality?
• PFI improves Efficiency?
• PFI improves Attention to the client?
11.3 What are the CSF in PFI?
Topics
Theory of CSF
Mind Mapping (Decision Explorer)
Summary of questions
• Mind Map Concepts and relationships
11.4 What is the model for risk management?
Topics
Theory of Risk Management
Fuzzy Sets
Summary of questions
• Fill Table - Membership Grade (attached) or/and
• Draw Uncertainty Evolution
263
Case Study Protocol
Membership Grades of Uncertainty according to the type of risk and
stage of life cycle of a PH
1- To assign membership grades to the start and end of each stage. If the line is not
straight draw the line in-between (a blank char is attached)
2- To assign to each type of risk the Relative Importance (weight 1,2,3.4,or 5).
Type of	 Business	 Bidding I	 Construction	 Operation I
Risk Need	 Design	 MaintenanceRelative
Importance	 MG atMGat	 MGat	 MGatBeg*	 End
___________ ______________ Beg* 	 End Beg* End _____________ Beg* End **
Bidding
Commeicial - _________________ ________________ 	 _______	 ______--
Construction
Design
Economicall
Financial
Force Majeure
Human
Legal
Operationl
Maintenance
Political
Residual Value
Social
* Membership grade at Beginning and End 01 Stage	 •LflU 01 1-ToJect
Membership Grades (MG) - It is important to realiie thai membership grades are not probabilities. The summation of
probabilities must equal 1, while there is no such requirement for MG. A value is assigned to each element of the
universal set signifying its degree of membership. An example of MG is presented in the following table
Infant	 Adult
	
You	 Old
5
	
0
	 0
	 0
l0
	 0
	 0
	 0
20
	
0	 .8	 .8
30	 0	 .5	 .2
40	 0	 .4
50	 0	 .6
60	 0
	 0	 .8
70
	
0
	
0
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LUSOPONTE
Project Synopsis
Title - Lusoponte - Tagus River Crossings - Construction and
Operation of Vasco da Gama Crossing, Operation of the 25th
April Crossing and the pre-feasibility study of a 3rd Crossing.
Country - Portugal.
Project Cost - 170 billion Escudos ($1.1 billion) initial cost, plus
24 billion Escudos refinancing in July 2000.
Sector - Transport.
Status - Operating. Finance Agreement closed July 1994. Took over operation/management of
25th April crossing on the 1st January 1996. The Vasco da Gama crossing opened to
traffic 29th March 1998.
Sponsors - Concessionaire/Lead Manager - Lusoponte - A special joint venture consortium of
Portuguese, French and UK companies.
Purchaser - Portuguese Government.
Financing Package - European Union Cohesion Fund: 64 billion escudos (35.0%); European
Investment Bank (EIB) Loan: 23 billion escudos in Deutsche Marks (13.0%) and a
further 37 billion in Escudos (20.0%); Existing revenues from the 25th April Crossing:
10 billion escudos (6.0%); Others (shareholders, government grants, etc.): 46 billion
escudos (26.0%).
Special Features - Access to long-term (maturing in 30 years) EIB funding. Partially financed
by the revenues of the existing 25th April crossing.
Brief - The Concession Agreement, dated 24th March 1995, awards the design, construction
and financing of the Vasco da Gama Crossing, plus the operation and maintenance of
both the new and the existing 25th April Crossings. The concession was originally to
expire at the earliest of March 2028 or a total cumulative traffic flow of 2,250
million vehicles. Included in the Concession is the exclusivity of operation of all road
crossings across the Tagus (excluding river crossings by boat, rail or air) downstream
from Vila Franca de Xira, (25 Km from Vasco da Gama). To settle all pending
disputes and claims a Global Settlement Agreement (GSA) was signed on the 3rd July
2000, that extends and establishes the concession expiry as 24th March 2030,
irrespective of the number of crossings, and includes the additional obligation for
Lusoponte to undertake pre-feasibility studies for a 3rd crossing over the Tagus.
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The 17.2 Km toll crossing is the longest ever
built in Portugal 1 , second in Europe only to
Eurotunnel, and the longest river crossing in
Southern Europe. It carries traffic across 10 km
of water over the Tag us estuary and 8 km of
land. The viaducts 2 account for 12 Km, the rest
of its length being approach roads. It includes a
cable-stayed bridge with a suspended section,
31 metres wide, 830 metres long, and a
shipping channel 47 metres high, near the
Lisbon side. As of 1999, the Annual Average
Daily Traffic was about 41 thousand vehicles,
and the yearly crossings totalled 15 million. For
2000, it is expected a total of around 19 million
crossings (a 30% increase).
The crossing was named after the famous
Portuguese navigator of the 15th and 16th
century, Vasco da Gama, on the 500th
anniversary of his discovery of the sea route to
the Indies around the Cape of Good Hope in
1498.
It forms an important link with Lisbons new
northern and southern highway systems, completing the road network around the city. On the
north shore, at Sacavem (adjacent to Lisbon) the crossing links with Al motorway to the North,
the CRIL (Lisbon Internal Ring Road) and the EN1O Variant interchanges. The south
interchange, near Montijo, joins the Al2 motorway and the lCl3 Coma Regional Ring Road,
providing easy access to the SetUbal Peninsula, Spain and the Algarve.
The Vasco da Gama Crossing runs through one of the ten most important wetlands in Europe -
400 hectares of the Samouco Salt Pan classified as a Special Protected Area under European
Law. It is an important breeding ground for a number of protected bird species such as the
Black Winged Stilt (Himantopus himantopus), the Little Tern (Sterna
aibifrons), and the Kentish Plover (Charadrius alexandrinus).
Lusoponte's role was to expropriate and recover the area of the salt
pans that are public property and be given back to the public sector
now that the recovery is completed. The Government has to create
the Foundation of the Samouco Salt Pans (Lusoponte will be part of
it) that will ensure its management and promote programs of
environmental education (environmental workshop).
As part of the commitments agreed and following recommendations
of the ES, Lusoponte created the Environmental Monitoring Study
Centre (CEMA) that monitors and does surveillance work in
conjunction with external consultants. The various disciplines
continuously studied by these experts include the socio-economic
impact, the water and air quality, flora and fauna, bird life, marine life, archaeology, and noise
levels.
The environmental aspect of the project has created widespread interest and this is met by a full
colour quarterly informative newsletter published by CEMA on the progress of the project which
is sent to schools, universities, municipalities and other interested organisations. A Visitors
Lusoponte, !tfl:I/wwwiuspi1tcpt (accessed 17-01-2000).
2 1.ishon Bridges, illp//j	 w.pcisonaLu iici.com!—luso/hridccs.htin (accessed 16-10-2000).
Ihe Salinas were a victory br the environmentalists. Ihere were some local authorities in Alcochete that
considered the Salinas was a waste ol land since it could be developed for construction (Prof. 1)r. Joâo Gomes
lerreira, tJNI , Interview 14 June 2000). I .usoponte repaired the dams and the accesses, cleaned the paths and fenced
the area.
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Centre, where the project is presented through graphic displays, video, and lectures, had
attracted some 2,200 people by the end of 1996 including journalists, students, professional
engineers, and politicians from numerous countries.
Near the toll plaza there is a small museum where stones carved by Neanderthal men are
displayed. In the area now occupied by the tollbooths there was a "factory" of flakes. The
carved stones - Bifaces side scrapers, points & knives - are less than 30 thousand years old,
confirming Neanderthal presence in a later period than expected.
25th April Crossing
the time of their sinking
Opened in 1966, this toll suspension bridge
is very similar in appearance to the Golden
Gate Bridge in San Francisco. It is 2,278
metres long, and leaves Lisbon at high level
above Alcãntara and makes landfall at
Almada on the southern bank of the river.
Its centre span, of 1,012 metres was the
longest central span of any European
suspension bridge when built. However,
both the more recent Humber Bridge (UK)
and Bosphorus Bridge are now longer. The
bridge crosses the Tagus at a height of 70
metres and its foundations, 79 metres deep
into basalt rock, were also a world record at
The deck currently has six traffic lanes.
It operates at near full capacity, and at peak times, queues can be enormous. By 1999, the
AADT was 149 thousand vehicles, totalling 54.5 million crossings per annum. In 2000, it is
expected an annual traffic increase at around 4 percent.
In June 1999, Fertagus inaugurated a heavy railway - dual track double deck service - under
the bridge. This was a separate concession agreement from Lusoponte.
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1. BACKGROUND - HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES
1.1. HIsToRIcAL BACKGROUND
In 1991, only the 25th April road crossing connected Lisbon on the Tagus's north bank
to the south bank. The nearest crossing over the Tagus was in Vila Franca de Xira
approximately 40 Km upstream from the river mouth.
A second crossing was a vitally needed infrastructure in order:'
. To solve the serious traffic congestion on the 25th April Crossing;2
• To detour national and international heavy traffic travelling in the axis North-
South from Lisbon city centre;
To develop the Tagus south bank - relieving the urban pressure in Lisbon and
developing new industrial projects;
To improve links between Spain and Portugal;3
• To create a new north-south link jbj
And was facilitated by:
The availability of structural funds to integrate the crossing into the
TransEuropean Network Project (European Union Cohesion Fund);
• The need to improve access to the World Exhibition Expo98 site and, to
promote its future urban development;
• Favourable socio-economic indices - The most important was the increase in
number of vehicles per 1000 inhabitants - in the Lisbon area it increased from
258 in 1990 to 421 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants in 1998, and in Setubal (south
bank) the increase was from 147 to 319 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants. There
was also an increase of 8-9% in commercial vehicles.
In January 1991, the Portuguese Government, created GATTEL (Gabinete da Travessia
do Tejo em Lisboa), a governmental agency under the Ministry of Public Works
Lusoponte 2000, paper presented to INA - G.P.S.P., Lisbon, 9 May.
2 EIA, GATTEL/LusoponteCoba, 1994.
Proposal to the Cohesion Fund and Dec-Lei that creates GATTEL.
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(MOPTC), with links to the Ministry of Environment (MARN) and the Ministry of
Planning (MPAT), to conceive a new road crossing over the Tagus estuary and decide
its location. In 1994, by the Dec-Lei 76/94 GATTEL's duties were further extended to
co-ordinate and control the procedures required to promote the construction and
operation of the Vasco da Gama crossing as a private concession.
In September 1991, GATTEL 4 concluded a series of studies, discarding the tunnel
solution and comparing three corridors: eastern (Sacavem Montijo), central (Chelas
Barreiro) and western (Alges Trafaria). By then, no Environmental Impact Assessment
(ETA) had been conducted. After a while only two options remained for consideration:
. Road bridge Sacavem-Montijo, complemented by a new heavy rail track on the
existing bridge, linked to a strategy of opening new urban development fronts,
priority to roadways and individual transport. This alternative was defended by
MOPTC and the municipalities of Montijo and Alcochete;
• Combined Road and Railway bridge Chelas-Barreiro, complemented by a new a
light railway track on the existing bridge, linked to a strategy of urban zoning,
integrated perspective of land use management and transportation, and priority
to public transport. This alternative was defended by v1IPAT; MARN, by the
planning office and consultants of GATTEL, by the Regional Land Use Plan for
the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, by the municipalities of Almada, Barreiro,
Seixal and Moita, and also by the preliminary EIA of the two alternatives.
In July 1992, the MOPTC approved the Sacavem-Montijo crossing despite the
opposition from planning departments and environmental organisations, probably
assuming that the location for the new airport in Lisbon would be Rio Frio on the
southern bank of the Tagus. The international competitive tender for the concession
was then launched
4 Joanaz-de-Melo, J., The ?1W bridge over the Tagus Estuary or how not to develop a project,
hp://despodata. pt/geotingles/nethridg htin (accessed 7-06-2000).
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September 1992
October 1992
March 1993
December 1993
1 3th April 94
19t April94
15th Juiie 1994.
June 1994
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2. THE BIDDING PROCESS
2.1. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
17th June 1994
30th June 1994
Dec-Lei 14A/9 1 the Portuguese Government creates GATTEL
Selection of preferred corridor route
Final decision on the selection of the Sacavem- Montijo corridor
International BOT tender. Pre-qualification
Selection of three consortia to present a proposal
Direct negotiations starts. Two consortia were short-listed: Tejoponte led by
Bouyges and Lusoponte led by Kvaerner and Campenon Bernard SGE
Prcferred Bidder - Agreement for negotiation with Litsoponte. after pre-selection
Ministerial Dispatch
Dec-Lei 168/94 DR IA, 13 6/94 - approves the basis for the concession and awards
it to Lusoponte
The Government was unable to implement the contractual toll increase on the 25th
April Crossing due to violent public reactions.
The Government submitted the project to the Cohesion Fund, and the European
Commission conditioned the availability of finds to the existence of an approved
EIA (influenced by the Commissioner Wulf-Mathies)
Resolucio do Conseiho de Ministros 13/94 DR II, 13 8/94, Interim Agreement
EIA conducted by the concessionaire was concluded and sent for approval of
MARN via GA1TEL
28th July 94	 Finance agreement
6th October 1994
	 End of public consultation period on EIA
3rd November 1994
	 EIA study approved by MARN (Cohesion Fund) and sent to Bruxells
15th December 1994
	 Resolucio do Conseiho de Ministros l21-A/94, DRIB 288/94 Approves the second
concession contract
31 January
 1995	 Creation of Gestiponte- Operaco e Manutenco das Travessias do Tejo, S.A. -
Operation and maintenance operator
Februaiy 1995.
	 EIA approved by the European Commission
24th March 1995.
	 Financial clos&, 2 contract and project contracts between Lusoponte and the
Portuguese Government
July 1995	 Construction started five months behind schedule (it was planned for Februaiy
1995 but was delayed due to the need of EIA approval)
January 1996
	 Gestiponte begins operation and maintenance 0f25th April crossing.
15th Jul 1996 Protocol signed between the EU and the Portuguese State defining the pre-
conditions that need to be satisfied for further release of EU funds, following an EU
commission investigation on allegations of violations of the EIA by various
environmental groups
28 March 1998
	 GATTEL and Lusoponle signed an Inspection Report for the Vasco da Gama
crossing enabling it to be opened to traffic
29th March 1998
	 Open to traffic before schedule
3rd July 2000	 Global Settlement Agreement (GSA) and draft Global Financial Rebalancing
_____	 Agreement (GFRA)	 ________
The date at which all the conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the lenders' conmiitments have been satisfied
or waived.
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2.2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
2.2.1. Project Team
Initially, the project team of Lusoponte had three main areas: Finance, Operation!
Maintenance (0(M) and DesignlConstruction (D/C). The O/M was very small, and its
function was to check the functionality of design to future 0/M actions, the
DesignlConstruction was by far the largest. At the peak of construction (October 96),
there were 3300 people involved, with 14 different nationalities 6 . When construction
vas completed the DIC disappeaied and the O/M team increased in size and ililportance.
2.3. NEGOTIATIONS
In October 1992, the international competitive tender for the concession was launched
and eight consortia7 expressed their interest (pre-qualification stage):
1. GTM (France), Engil, Opca, Sopol (Portugal), Amec (UK), Dumez (France),
John Laing (UK)
2. Trafalgar House (UK), Campenon (France), BPC, Edifer, Hagen, Mota,
Somague and Teixeira Duarte (Portugal)
3. Andrade (Brazil), Agroman (Spain), A. Ribeiro, Tamega, M.da Maiaand Zagope
(Portugal)
4. Bouyges (France) Dragados (Spain), Soares da Costa (Portugal), Gogefar
(France) R.Rosa and Soconstroi (Portugal)
5. Tarmac (UK), H.Beton (Netherlands) P.Holzman (Denmark)
6. Cubiertas, Entrecanales, Fomento(Spain)
7. Condotte, Ferrocemento, ICLA, Bonifica, Autostarde, Recchi S.di Messina
(Italy)
8. Balalst (Netheilands), T.\Voodrow (UK), Hojgaard ,Skanska (Sweden), Somec,
SETH, A.Veiga (Portugal)
6 
'Os que tizeram a ponte',xpresso, 21 March 1998.
Mello, R. F., 1999, A perspectiva Empresarial de urn Project Finance, paper presented to the Conference on Project
Finance, Lisbon, Novernber.
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Out of the eight consortia five pre-qualified namely:
1. Travessia Rodoviária do Tejo —TRT (Lusoponte) led by Kvaerner
and Campenon Bernard SGE
2. Pontejo led by Bouyges
3. Consórcio Europeu para a Ponte sobre o Tejo
4. Tarmac, HEW, Hollzman
5. Europonte
Of these, three presented a proposal: Lusoponte, Pontejo and the Consórcio Euro peu
inra a Ponte sobre o Tejo. In December 1993 - The first to - Lusoporite and PontLjo
were short-listed for direct negotiation with the Government. Some members of the
third consortium integrated with the other two.
Throughout the negotiation process there was strong political and diplomatic activity
surrounding the negotiations. Lusoponte had a strong British influence through
Trafalgar House, and Pontejo had a strong French influence as it was led by Bouyges
and had Hidroprojecto owned by the French Lyonnaise des Eaux as a member of the
consortium.
During the negotiations the British Embassy in Portugal lobbied strongly for Trafalgar
House and from the French side Jacques Chirac invited the Portuguese Prime Minister
Cavaco da Silva for a special visit.
The future concessionaire Lusoponte had to complete, prior to the signing of the
contract, several studies, or agreements:
For Project Analysis;
For Consultants selection;
• A Financial Options Paper - Financing Model, Risk Takers vs. Funding
Sources, Discussion and approval;
• To Define the Financing Strategy: Rating of project for Capital Market
(Offering circular, Road Show, Pricing) or Bank Market (I.M., Term Sheet,
Negotiations);
C
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. 
To Abide by the Conditions Precedent 8 established between Lusoponte and the
Banks.
2.4. DUE DILIGENCE
The legal Due Diligence was completed before final signing of contract by the banks to
ensure that all contracts accord with the Portuguese and UK law. Of all the contracts -
concession, warranties, intercreditor, etc - only the security agreement has to be in
accordance with the Portuguese law. This is a crucial contract for the banks because it
is the wairanty against their financing and all assets given as a warranty are in Portugal
and the disputes must be ruled in a Portuguese Court. Given the intricacies of
Portuguese law sometimes it is difficult to adapt the contract to UK law. The reverse is
not true. All the other contracts are usually drafted according UK law, and are easily
accepted.
Conditions precedent are tiectively a check list of documents the lenders require as the basis for their financing,
and when they are satisfied the lenders are obliged to advance finds.
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3. THE CONCESSION
3.1. MAIN PARTICIPANTS
3.1.1. Authority
GATTEL an autonomous entity set up under the Ministry of Public Works, with links to
the Environment and Planning Ministries.
3.1.2. Contractors - SPY
Lusoponte, a consortium of Portuguese, French and British companies. The original
shareholders were:
• Kvaerner Construction International Ltd (formerly Trafalgar House
Construction Special Projects);
• Campenon Bernard SGE of France and part of Vinci Construction 9, part of the
Vinci Group that has three other business areas: Vinci Concessions, which is the
largest car park operator in France and has 1200 Km of motorways concessions and
several other concessions, Vinci Energies-Information and Vinci Routes.
and six Portuguese construction contractors:
• BPC - Be,ito Pedroso Conslruçôes SA, 1 ° part of tne Odebrecht Organisation, the 5th
largest Brazilian private group, has four business areas: Engineering &
Construction, Chemicals & Petrochemicals and Infrastructure & Public Services,
and a Pulp Manufacturing Venture;
• Mota & Companhia, SA, the main activities are building of motorways, highways,
airports, darns and dredging works;
• Somague '- Sociedacle de Construçöes SA, one of the leading companies in
Portugal undertaking public infrastructure projects;
9 http/fvwi.v roupe-vmci cpm (accessed 8-1 1-2000)
10 li1pJLk.c p (accessed 8-1 -2000)
htt//v somagup (accessed 8-11-2000)
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• Teixeira Duarte - Engenharia & Construçôes SA, has been engaged in large scale
public infrastructure for over 70 years;
• Sociedade de Construçöes H Hagen SA;
. Edifer - Consiru câes Pires Coelho & Fernanc'es SA. has been engaged in large
public infrastructure projects for over 26 years.
In 1999, Kvaerner Corporate Development Limited, sold its shares in Lusoponte to
Macquarie Infrastructure Group (MIG)' 2, which is managed by Macquarie Bank,
and is one of the world's largest owners of toll roads.
In July 2000, the shareholding structure was as follows:
	 -
Macquarie Infrastructure Ltd (UK)	 23.80%
Campenon Bernard SGE (Vinci Group, France)	 22.00%
Bento Pedroso Construçoes SA (Odebrecht, Brazil)	 14.84%
Teixeira Duarte Engenharia & Construcoes SA 	 7.50%
Sociedade de Construçöes H. Hagen SA (Vinci Group, 2.80%
France,)
Kvaerner Construction Ltd (UK)	 1.00%
Edifer ConstrucOes Pires Coelho & Fernandes SA. 	 0.40%
Note: The changing shareholding structure reflects the phases of the project. Pre
Service Commencement there was a clear majority of construction competences, after
the 0/IVI competences become prevalent with the Macquarie and Vinci Group. (In
reality, it was not a pre-determined strategic move - Kvaerner went through a series of
financial difficulties and had to sell its participation in Lusoponte and it made sense to
sell it to an experienced operator).
4
' 2 httpI/v macquane coin au 1mhZ (accessed 8-11-2000)
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3.1.3. Construction Sub-Contractor
Novaponte - Agrupamento para a Construção da Segunda Travessia do Tejo,
ACE. Lusoponte's original shareholders formed a separate consortium led by
Campenon Bernard SGE, which was responsible for the design, construction, and
completion of the new bridge.
The shareholding structure was as follows:
Kvaerncr Construction Ltd (UK)	 23.00%
Campenon Bernard SGE (Vinci Group, France)	 1 8.00%
Bento Pedroso Construcoes SA (Ode brechi, Brazil) 	 14.34%
Mota & Companhia	 13 .33%
Somague - Engenharia SA
	 13 .33%
Teixeira Duarte Engenharia & Construçoes SA 	 9.00%
Sociedade de Construçöes H. Hagen SA, (Vinci 500%
Group)
Edifer Construçoes Pires Coelho & Fernandes SA. 	 4.00%
All members of the ACE have joint and several liability for the obligations undertaken
by the ACE which are guaranteed by their parent companies, or by the members of
Novaponte themselves where companies don't have parent companies.
3.1.3.1. Design Sub-Contractor
Novaponte sub-contracted the design to TejoProjecto a consortium of four companies:
One from the UK, another from France and two Portuguese: Kvaerner Technology
(Ov ned by Kvaerner that meanwhile had acquired Trafalgar House Technology); EEG
- Europe Eludes Gecti (part owned by Campenon Bernard); COBA - Cons-u ltores para
Obras, Barragens e Planeaniento; and PROPONTE - Projectos de Pontes e Estruturas
Especiais.
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3.1.4. Operating Sub- Contractor
Gestiponte - Operaçao e Manutenção das Travessias do Tejo, S.A. - wholly owned
subsidiary of Lusoponte, established on 3 1 January 1995.
3.1.5. Senior Lenders
• [lB Loin: 23 bflhjon escudos in Dcutsche Marks (13.0%) and a further 37
billion escudos (20.0%); 2oyears.
3.1.6. Consultants
Consultants for the Government:
Not disclosed
Consultants of Lusoponte:
• Financial - Chase Manhattan Bank and Schroders were joint advisers.
• Technical - Jean Muller International.
•	 Design - Tejo Ponte Control.
•	 Traffic - Halcrow Fox & Associates. Symonds Travers Morgan audited.
•	 Acer Consultants.
•	 Tudor Engineering Company.
•	 COWlconsult, Consulting Engineers and Planners.
•	 Charles Lavigne & Alain Montois Architects.
• Legal - Morais Leitão, J. Galvo Teles e Associados (Portugal) and Arhurst
Morris Crisp (UK).
Consultants for the Banks
• Traffic - Synonds Travers Morgan.
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• Insurance - Willis Corrom - insurance package covers all risks.
• Technical - Nortlicroft - Construction and O/M costs are in line with expected.
• Legal - Abreu & Marques e Associados (Portugal) and Allen Overy (UK) -
legal due diligence.
Brisa - At the time the sole operator of the Portuguese motorways was an
operator/maintenance consultant for both the private and public partners.
3.2. CONTRACTS
The contractual structure is indicated in Figure 1.
Tejo Projecto
Design gt
Portuguese Directrout
Agr
Senior Lenders
EIB
lnt.& Portuguese
	 Lusoponte
Commercial
Banks
0 M Agt
Gestiponte
Novaponte
Confraut Claine Agt
Confractor Undtk
Insurance agt
Confractor Loan Agt.
Equity Subs Agt	 I
Addt Shareh Finance Agt
Call Option Agt.
Shareholders
Technical Srv Agt
Figure 1. Lusoponte Contractual Structure
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3.2.1. Concession Contract
The Concession Agreement, dated 24th March 1995, awarded the design, construction,
financing, of the Vasco da Gama Crossing, and the operation and maintenance of both
the existing 25th April (from January 1996) and the new Vasco da Gama Crossing to
Lusoponte. The concession would expire at the earliest of:
. 24th March 2028 (a maximum period of 33 years)
. or a total cumulative traffic flow of 2,250 million vehicles and full repayment of
the associated debt facilities under the Financing Agreements.
The concession requires equal toll prices on both bridges and provides mechanisms for
compensation to the concessionaire in the event of unilateral modifications from the
Portuguese Government.
The Concession Agreement has the following sections:
Introduction
2. Purpose and Type of concession
3. Duration of Concession
4. Contractor
5. Financing
6. Expropriations
7. Design, Project and Construction
8. Services Area
9. Operation
I0 Maintenance
11 Environmental Protection
12 Other Rights of Authority
13 Restrictions on the Contractor
14 Warranties of Performance
15 Performance Monitoring by the Authority
16 Penalties
17 Authority Step-In
18 Termination
19 Financial Equilibrium
20 Intellectual Property Rights
21 Service Commencement
22 Other
23 Dispute Resolution Procedures
To settle all pending disputes and claims a GSA was signed on the 3' July 2000. The
most important agreements are:
a
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• Extends and establishes the end of the concession as 24th March 2030
(concession life is extended to a fixed 35 years period), irrespective of
the number of crossings (removing the traffic cap).
• A settlement of all claims and outstanding works completion issues.
3.2.2. Construction Sub-Contract
The construction contract consisted of seven distinct work packages that were split
between the membcrs of the consortium Novaponte:
1. The Sacavém and EN1O Variant Interchanges - H. Hagen, Bento Pedroso
Construcão and Teixeira Duarte - Two interchanges on the north side of Tagus link
with the Al motorway to the north, the CRIL and the EN1O Variant. The EN1O Variant
provides access to Lisbon and the World Expo 98 site.
2. The North Viaduct - Teixeira Duarte - A 488 metres long viaduct, which spans
the main railway line and several local access roads, with a variable deck width to
accommodate the slip roads.
3. The Expo Viaduct - Campenon Bernard SGE - A 672 metres long viaduct
comprising twin pre-cast concrete box deck segments on concrete columns of varying
heights.
4. The Main Bridge - Campenon Bernard SGE - The Main Bridge is a cable-stayed
structure with a 420 metres main span and two 203 metres side spans. based on two 150
metres-high concrete pylons, which give a clearance of 45 metres above high water at
the Cala de Norte shipping channel. The deck is a composite structure with road slab
supported by steel crossbeams, which span between concrete edge beams. The
foundations consist of 44 bored piles of 2.2 metres diameter up to 65 metres deep.
5. The Central Viaduct - Kvaerner Construction (formerly Trafalgar House
Construction Special Projects) and Bento Pedroso Construçöes. - Construction of
the 6,53 1 metres Central Viaduct was carried out using 78 metres long pre-cast deck
units weighing 2,200 toiines placed on 81 piers founded on eight 1.7 metres diameter
driven piles up to 95 metres deep. The deck is less than 14 metres above water for most
of its length but elevates up to 30 metres over two shipping channels, the Cala das
Barcas and Cala de amora, with spans of 130 metres to accommodate medium sized
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vessels. The piers are strengthened to withstand ship impact and five of the deck
sections have wider edges to provide for emergency vehicle parking. A huge pre-
casting yard at Seixal, 22 km downstream from the bridge, was used to manufacture
units for this viaduct. The deck sections are made in eight pieces and then stitched into
78 metres long beams. The yard worked to a schedule producing one beam every two
days.
6. The South Viaduct - Somague The 3,825 metres South Viaduct consists of 45
metres deck units cast in situ using twin launching girders on two fronts. There are 85
piers, partially on land and partially on marine driven piles. The viaduct runs through
the Sarnouco Salt Pans.
7. The South Access - Mota & Companhia - The 3.9 km South Access links the
crossing with the South Interchange through mainly agricultural land and cotmects with
the Al2 motorway to Setiibal and the Coma Regional Ring Road linking Alcochete and
Coma. The toll plaza is located about halfway along this stretch for south to north
traffic and incorporates 16 manually operated booths using cash and 2 automatic
payment systems. A complete service area, sub-concessioned to Gaip, is located on
both sides of the approach next to the South Viaduct.
There are two additional contracts with Novaponte:
Insurance Agreement;
• Claims Agreement (related to temporary works site) and Contractor Undertaking
(related to the occurrence of Force Majeure events and defining the claims
procedures and its financing).
3.2.2.1. Design Sub-contract
The design sub-contract was established between Novaponte and Tejoprojecto the
Design consortium. Each member of the consortium was responsible for a different
section of the crossing.
• Coba prepared designs for the whole crossing, for the north and south
interchanges, including 21 art works, the service area and the toll plaza;
I
• Proponte - the North and South viaducts;
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. EEG - the Expo Viaduct and the Main Bridge;
• Kvaerner - the Central Viaduct.
The architects Albert e Ronald Yee dealt with aesthetic issues of the crossing. The
Architect Lavigne was a consultant for the design and construction stages. Sua Kay
conceived the service area and toll plaza.'3.
The whole project took three years to complete involving about 250 technical staff from
four different companies that produced more than 9000 drawings. After filing 12, the
final design occupies about 50 m3.
The work was co-ordinated by a design management team consisting of representatives
from each company. The designs are in turn checked by an independent consulting
consortium, Tejo Ponte Control, consisting of: A2P Consult, Estudos e Projectos Lda,
Hyder Consulting Ltd., Provia Consultores de Engenharia Lda., and Tudor Engineering
Company.	 -
3.2.3. Financing Agreement
The financing of the Vasco da Gama Bridge was made through a Build Operate
Transfer (BOT) scheme. The private sector undertakes the entire project, operates it
commercially and at the end of the concession period transfers it back to the
government. The shareholders carry the risks but receive a return on their investment
and dividends during the period of the concession.
The Vasco da Gama Bridge is financed from the following sources:
European Union Cohesion Fund subsidy: 64 billion escudos (3 5.0%);
ETIB Loan: 23 billion escudos in Deutsche Marks (13.0%) arid a thrther 37
billion in Escudos (20.0° o);
Existing revenues from the 25th April Crossing: 10 billion escudos (6.0%);
Others (shareholders, government grants, etc.): 46 billion escudos (26.0° o).
4
13 
'Ricardo Oliveira —Foi urn trabaiho de grupo', Expresso, 21-3-1998.
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Of the total cost of the project (180 billion escudos), about 129 billion escudos are for
construction and the balance - 51 billion escudos - for maintenance costs of both
crossings, payment for expropriated land, re-housing, and environmental projects.
The European Union Cohesion Fund subsidy is non-reimbursable.
Loan agreement - The term of the EIB loan is 20 years, with no capital repayment over
the first 120 months during which EIB assumes full project risk. There is a fixed
interest rate for 15 years. During the remaining 15 years, the Effi's financing is
guaranteed by a syndicate of commercial banks led by Chase and BPA. The
commercial bank guarantee is designed to fall away as the project becomes profitable.
'1 he EIB loan 'i" is split 60% into Escudos (PTE) and 40% into Deutsche Marks (DM)
and is guaranteed by two banking syndicates. The DM lenders provided with protection
against possible escudo devaluation. The PTE facility is guaranteed by Banco
Português do Atlântico, ABN-Amro Bank, Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor, Banco Totta &
Açores, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, and CISF. The DM facility is guaranteed by Chase
Investment Bank, ABN-Amro Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, and Société Generale. A
secondary syndication of this facility took place in February 1997.
The revenue from the 25th1 April Bridge accounts for approximately 50% of the
revenues of the project.
Shareholder funding - According to the terms of the contract shareholder funding is
made up of a Share Capital of 5 billion escudos (equity), plus 7 billion escudos of
shareholder Supplementary Equity and an additional 1.2 billion escudos of "Deferred
Suprimentos".
There are the following sub-contracts in the financing agreement with the banks:
• Escudo facility agreement;
• Deutsche mark facility agreement;
• EIB facility agreement;
• Bridging facility agreement - contrato e financiamento intercalar relativo ao
subsidio da União Europeia;
• Contractor's loan agreement - contrato de empréstimo do construtor;
• Security agreement - contrato de prestacão de garantias;
• Call option agreement - contrato de opcão de compra de accöes;
• Subordination - payment priority among the various entities;
• Forecasting - every 6 months the ratios of the financial model are checked;
a
Inter American Development Bank 1995, Directory of Innovative Financing.
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• Intercreditor - Procedure check list among the creditor banks (it increases
security);
• Account - All the accounts are only in one bank - BPA checks if all the
transactions are correct according to the contract. The relations with the
affiliates are careflully checked.
Refinancing - After the opening of the Vasco da Gama crossing, Lusoponte has
negotiated a refinancing package with Effi guaranteed by commercial banks - The
Arranger Bank Group comprising Banco Comercial Português, S.A./BCPA- Banco de
Investimento, S.A:, BNP Paribas, Caixa Geral de Depósitos and SG.
The original DM and PTE facilities were arranged in 1994, when respective interest
rates were at higher levels making them unattractive in comparison to the current
Euribor long-term rates ( 6-7 per cent). The original facilities were converted to a new
longer-term Euro Facility, guaranteed by commercial banks over 19 years. It will have
a 21-year tenor with a sculpted annuity style repayment, taking project risk for the final
two years following release of commercial bank guarantees.
The second element of the refinancing is a new 19-year Euro 120 million term loan,
floating debt indexed to Euribor, to finance the settlement of claims owing to
Novaponte and to cover associated refinancing costs.
The original shareholder funded equity and supplementary equity remains in place. The
standby Deferred Suprimentos has been reduced and renegotiated to cover defined risk
events15
3.2.4. Operation and Maintenance Sub-contract
Lusoponte is responsible for all the routine and structural maintenance of the Vasco da
Gama Crossing. As for the 25th April crossing it is only responsible for routine
maintenance. The Portuguese State retains responsibility for all structural maintenance
of the bridge and its access viaduct. Operations and routine maintenance have been
subcontracted to Gestiponte. Lusoponte has the option to subcontract longer-term
maintenance (e.g resurfacing of roads) either to Gestiponte or directly to a third party.
Before the inauguration of Vasco da Gama crossing in 1998, it had already been
operating and maintaining the 25th April crossing since the 1 January 1996.
C
IS Lusoponte 2000, Meniorandurn July.
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3.2.5. Direct Agreement
There ate three Direct Agreements (Lusoponte 2000)
Portuguese Government ---- Banks/EIB;
• Portuguese Government ---- Gestiponte - Operation Co - temporary step-in, due
to management problems with Lusoponte related with non-compliance;
Portuguese Government - Novaponte - Construction Co. the same.
3.2.6. Shareholders Agreement
Equity agreement;
Additional equity agreement;
. Call option agreement;
. Technical Services Agreement - Certain shareholders are cotnrnitted jointly and
severally to provide necessary skilled personnel technical information and
assistance. In this way Lusoponte can secure the expertise and experience of its
ultimate sponsors.
3.2.7. Dispute Resolution Procedure
There are two phases: Pre_litigation and Litigation.
In the Pre-Litigation Phase the claimant will notify the other party identifying the matter
in dispute and requiring the hearing of one of the two expert committees, the Financial
and Technical Committees (Annex 19 of the Concession Agreement).
The Arbitration shall take place in Lisbon and be conducted in Portuguese.
a
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3.3. LUSOPONTE - LIFE CYCLE
The Lusoponte's Life Cycle (Figure 2) started with the establishment of a business need
for a new road crossing in 1990. Options were appraised by GATTEL that developed a
Business Case and launched an international competitive tender in 1993. Afterwards
the preferred bidder was selected from the shortlist, and the concession awarded to
Lusoponte. Construction of the Vasco da Gama crossing started in 1994. In 1996,
Lusoponte began operating and maintaining the 25th April crossing.
Lusoponte is currently undertaking a pre-feasibility study for a 3rd crossing over the
Tagus as agreed in the GSA. The study involves: the selection among alternative
locations (within the specified corridor Chelas- Barreiro), the undertaking of geological
studies including drilling bores and also environmental impact studies. Lusoponte has
to appraise options within the corridor Chelas-Barreiro, and develop the Business Case
for the 3rd Crossing. The following stages: Official Journal European Community
(OJIEC), Bidding, Design and Construction are the government's initiative. The GSA
omits any mention of these stages. Lusoponte has only the exclusive rights to road
crossings, but as this will be a road-train crossing, it is expected the involvement of
other partners will be required. 	 -
At the end of concession the assets will revert free of charge to the Public Sector. The
re-tendering of the services is always an option but the concession contract doesn't
mention it.
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3.4. LIFE CYCLE AND STAKEHOLDERS
In a project like Lusoponte, the stakeholders involved are numerous, but throughout its
life cycle their intervention changes. While some appear in one or two stages, others
are present throughout the entire cycle. The character of their intervention also changes:
In some stages they play a critical role, while in others it can be mild. Table 1 identifies
when the stakeholders intervened in the several stages of Lusoponte's life cycle, and
also the character of their intervention: strong, normal or mild. This diagram
contemplates the fact that Lusoporite has two different crossings that at some point in
time were in different stages. A description of each stakeholder's intervention follows.
Authority - The authority intervenes since the beginning of the project, establishing the
business need. Its intervention is particularly strong during construction and
development because all construction works have to be previously authorised (by
GATTEL) and afterwards have to be monitored and approved.
Contractor - The contractor's consortia always try to influence decisions at the
establishment of Business Need and sometimes during the Appraisal of Options. The
contacts are informal at the political level. Afterwards it is after the start of bidding that
they actively intervene throughout the project until the end.
Senior Lenders - Prior to construction the intervention was not so direct, intervening
only in the financial conditions and legal Due Diligence prior to the signing of the
contract. The Senior Lenders most active intervention was during Construction and
Development. It's the stage of the project were the big capital expenditures occur, and
the great emphasis is on the risks associated with construction, like costs overruns and
delays (with the associated penalties). After service commencement senior lenders
intervention is much softer, assuming mainly the role of monitoring the financial ratios.
After construction completion, the risks are diminished; usually there is a revision of the
financing terms.
European Commission - EU partially financed the Lusoponte's project, and their
intervention was especially strong after the signing of the contract and during
construction when it conditioned the release of finds to the resolution of environmental
concerns.
Construction Subcontractor - The intervention starts with bidding and design and
ends at construction tompletion when the construction consortium is dissolved.
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Operating Subcontractors - The main intervention of the operating subcontractor lies
afler service commencement. Nevertheless although not formerly identified as the
actual operating sub-contractor, people from that area intervene in the pre-service
commencement period checking the functionality of design for the future O/M. The
2S April crossing was already in operation and the role of Gestiponte the Operating
sub-contractor began during construction of the Vasco da Gama crossing.
Suppliers - Before construction their role was minimal, the only involvement is
through eventual price consultations. The role of suppliers is very important during
construction. During operation its role diminishes.
Insurance its role starts with Bidding for consultation purposes. It is c ritical during
the negotiation period with the preferred bidder and during construction. During
negotiations its role is related to the process of risk transfer, advising which risks are
insurable or not. During construction its importance lies in the sheer value of the
insurances in place: 2.5 billion escudos. During operation (service and maintenance) its
value is reduced to about 100 000 million escudos, because the number and importance
of insured risks is much less.
Users of Service - The users intervention starts with service commencement. Similarly
to the operating sub-contractors the users of 25th April intervened during the
construction of the Vasco da Gama Crossing.
Technical consultants - There are different consultants to the public and private sector,
and their intervention starts and ends at different periods. The technical consultants for
the public sector start at the beginning when the business need is established and end
when construction finishes (GATTEL is extinguished then). For the private sector their
intervention starts in the bidding and only stops at the end of the project.
.Financial Consultants - It's a similar situation to the above: Financial consultants for
the public sector start with business need and end when the contract is signed, and
construction begins. For the private sector the beginning of intervention is at the
beginning of the bidding process, but the end is the same. The financial services are
then executed in-house.
Accounting Consultants - 'I he situation is identical to the financial consultants, with
only one difference: After service commencement accounting services tend to be
outsourced. (There is the opinion that it should include Biding and negotiation,)
I
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Legal consultants - For the private sector legal consultants have a strong intervention
from the start of bidding until the end of construction. Their first major intervention is
in the signing of the contract, and the second is dealing with claims during construction.
Auditing - At the beginning of design technical auditing starts and ends only when
construction is completed because the detail design is still being developed. During
operation and termination it's the financial auditors (and banks) that are involved.
Environmental - The environmental groups were active doing the appraisal of options.
Afterwards their intervention was very mild until the award of the concession when all
issues related to the EIA were raised. Their intervention was particularly strong until
con. truction completion ('there are di/fere,it opinions). During operation they retain a
mild action monitoring the whole of the operation.
t
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4. RISK TRANSFER
4.1. VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM) Arm PUBLIc SECTOR COMPARATOR (PSC)
In the original UK PFI models the Government only approves the PFI financing scheme
if it demonstrates that it produces Value For Money (VFM) when compared with the
traditional methods of procurement. This means that PFI procurement generates
savings to the public sector during the whole life cycle of the concession. This is done
by compaling the contract costs with the Public Sector Comparator (PSC), which is
calculated by costing what the public sector would have to pay to procure the
construction, and the operation and maintenance of the crossing over the period of the
concession.
In the Lusoponte concession there was no assessment of VFM. The decision to finance
- the project through a BOT scheme was made irrespective of this option achieving VFM.
The BOT option has been essentially a political one to capture private capital for a
project that otherwise would mean a huge capital investment for the state, increasing
public debt to levels of non-conformity with the Maastricht Treaty Convergence
Criteria.
In the Lusoponte contract there is the "Base Case" that can be mistaken for the PSC.
The Base Case comprises only the project's financial projections, that is, the agreed
financial equilibrium.
4.2. RISK ALLOCATION
The essence of PFI type contracts lies in the transfer of risk to the private sector. The
underlying concept being that the risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it,
and this results in costs reductions brought about by increases in efficiency and
innovations introduced by the private sector. In the case of Lusoponte the
concessionaire takes all risks inherent to the concession, but is entitled to a
compensation if the financial balance of the concession is lost (Clause 101 of
concession contract) in the event of:
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• Unilateral modification by the Portuguese state in respect of the conditions of
development of the activities in the concession provided that, as a direct result of
such modification, Lusoponte suffers a material cost increase or a material loss
of revenue;
• Occurrence of events of Force Maj cure, save if as a result of such events, the
termination of the concession agreement takes place;
• Occurrence of exceptional events causing extremely damaging changes in the
international foreign exchange markets that significantly affect the underlying
assumptions of the base case;
• Legislative changes that have a specific material and direct impact on the
revenues or costs of the operation of the crossings (this does not include changes
in law or tax law of general applicability).
The restoration of the financial balance can at the Government's discretion, be the
following alternatives:
• Extension of the concession period;
• Extraordinary increase of toll rates;
• Direct payment of compensation by the Portuguese State;
• A combination of the above or any other form to be mutually agreed between the
parties.
This form of risk transfer doesn't specify which risks are taken or shared by the public
sector and instead forwards the renegotiations to relatively undefined events that might
affect the financial balance of the concession. The balance is defined against the
restoration of' two out of three key criteria: Aniiiial debt service ratio, loan lfe cover
ratio and net present value.
Prior to June 2000, clause 101 - concessionaire financial balance - was evoked on six
occasions.
The following sectiQns characterise Lusoponte's main risk categories and the some
adverse risks that have already occurred. Several interviews were undertaken and
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necessarily the opinions are not coincidental. Sometimes the views are even opposed,
reflecting the different viewpoint according to the function and also the risk profile of
the interviewee.
4.2.1. Political and Regulatory Risks
There is always the possibility of grantor's step-in.
i/'e f'orlugiiese Stctte (I !I.soponIe 2000) can ietleein the Concession oii one
year's notice on the grounds of public interest after the expily of at least four
fifths of the latest projected term of the Concession (which would therefore
allow redemption, according to the current projections, on or after 31 March
201 7). Lusoponte would then receive compensation for redemption based on
the latest semi-annual projections to the projected expiry of the Concession.
Lack of consistency in governmental will - It has been observed that during the
negotiations and after the signing of the contract the Government's orientation changes.
Such changes have been noticed when the Social Democrats (PSD) Government was
replaced by a Socialist (PS) Government. And also when a second PS government
replaced the first PS government
The lack of consistency has become more apparent now that GATTEL's influence has
diminished because: first, it was scheduled for extinction at the end of 2000, and,
second because of a lack of political backing from the second PS government.
Lusoponte now has to deal with the MOPTC and the Ministry of Finance separately.
This creates co-ordination problems, the two Ministries don't have a common
orientation, and although Lusoponte tries to sit both at the same meetings it is very
difficult to find a common governmental orientation. It is like having to deal with
several partners instead of one.
Third Crossing - Lusoponte as per the GS\. and GFRA signed in July 2000, is
undertaking a pre-feasibility study for the Third Crossing (road-train) over the Tagus.
So far, the Government is politically determined to have a crossing that connects the
north and south rail network, and although a road crossing looks necessary to alleviate
296
Lusoponte
the 25th April crossing, it hasn't so far committed itself unequivocally to a road
crossing. This Business Case will be the basis for the Government's decision regarding
this crossing. This study consists mainly of traffic studies and other preliminary
technical studies, for example, geotechnical. The existing contract doesn't award
Lusoponte the design and construction of the crossing, and the decision to make (or not)
the crossing lies entirely with the Portuguese Government. Also, there is an additional
potential risk that Lusoponte will have to operate a crossing designed and built by
another entity, whose concern is solely construction and not maintenance. Because, if
the project is to have access to European thnds it must be competitively tendered.
4.2.2. Economic and Financial Risks - Totally with the Private sector
Interest Rates - The contract had fixed interest rates and when the tender was
launched, in 1993, the interest rates varied between 7-8%. In March 1995 they had
climbed to 11-l2°. Consequently, the Internal Rate of Return decreased from 11.43%
to 100 0. This risk was completely absorbed by the private sector without mitigation
measures even insurance. The Portuguese financial market was not developed enough
to permit the contracting of a 'cap', i.e., to insure the risk of excessive increases in the
interest rates. As a result the risk was reflected in the project adding an extra 8 billion
escudos to the overall project cost.
Contract not yet shielded reduces financing options - The 20-year E financing was
needed because at the time of the contract there was no other entity that would lend over
this period, as an example, public debt was not issuing bonds at such long-term the
maximum was 10 years. The other option for long-term financing - capital markets -
was considered inadequate for this project. A monoline' 6 finances long-term, but with
thousands of investors in the stock markets, needs a very stable project. It is completely
impossible to refinance, and there are very strict controls of the variability of the
financial ratios. The EIB financing was a strategic decision taken by the shareholders.
In the last refinance negotiations EIB and a US monoline were competing for the
financing with very similar conditions. The shareholders knowing that the project was
not contractually shielded, and that it would not reach financial stability for a prolonged
period (due to the third crossing open possibilities for construction), opted for Effi
financing because it was more flexible than a monoline financing.
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As to the additional financing needed for the third crossing in the event that design and
construction is awarded to Lusoponte, one of two options is possible:
. It will be included with the existing financing, involving a global financial
restructuring of the project.
It will be individually financed, separately from the existing finance agreement.
The loss of revenues (estimated as 100 billion escudos) due to diverted traffic
from the other two crossings will then imply a revision of the Lusoponte Base
Case.
4.2.3. Social Risks
Expropriations - Lusoponte took the risk of expropriating all the land necessary for
temporary and permanent works, including the risk of land price inflation. This was the
first time that this process, normally undertaken by government agencies, had been
carried out by a private sector company. The Government's sole role was to declare the
designated areas for "public benefit". This administrative process was well conducted.
At the beginning, there were 350 parcels to expropriate, out of these 250 settled
amicably and 100 had a Court settlement (20 are still pending). Some tried to speculate
by asking for unreasonable values. For example, an industrialist asked for 1.8 billion
escudos, and finally it was settled by the court for 280 million escudos.
On the north shore, there were two areas: the EXPO98 site— a disused industrial area
and to the northern end, property was predominantly commercial and residential where
273 families were re-housed in new apartments constructed by Lusoponte or received
financial compensation. A new primary school is being built at Portela to replace one
demolished on the boundary of the Praça José Queiros access and an old age day care
centre in Moscavide has been relocated. On the south shore land was predominantly
agricultural.
Late access and additional land purchases (see Samouco Salt Pans) resulted in a number
of disputes between Lusoponte and GATTEL
Buzinäo (Big Hoot) - According to contractual terms, the tolls for each crossing where
to be equalised. As a consequence of this the Portuguese State raised the tolls on the
25th April Crossing in June 1994. This caused a public outcry (buzinão) and the
ID Monoline credit insurer - Insurance company that only insures credit lines (no other lines of insurance).
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government was forced to rescind this decision. The toll will remain frozen at 150
escudos (for class 1 vehicles) until 2002, when it will be raised to 200 escudos (lEuro).
A rise of 1.5 times the Base Toll instead of 2.6 times. In addition, the Portuguese State
imposed on Lusoponte a Frequent User Discount Scheme (FT.JDS) in August 1994 for
users of the 251h April Bridge only. A 10 percent discount for users pre-purchasing
books of twenty tickets with no date limit, and a 20 percent discount for users pre-
purchasing books with a one month limit was introduced. A further scheme was
introduced for the Via Verde, allowing a 50 per cent discount after the 13th trip within a
month, and with all trips after the 72' being free.
As a result the Portuguese Government had to agree on six compensation packages
required to restore Lusoponte's financial position in relation to the GATTEL Base Case.
4.2.4. Environmental Risk
The environmental group's pressure led to:
• The European Commission conditioned the availability of funds subject to the
existence of an approved ETA (influenced by the Commissioner WuIf-Mathies).
• Alleged violations of the ETA. This resulted in the suspension of EU funds, until
the signing of a protocol between the EU and the Portuguese State establishing
conditions that had to be satisfied for a further release of funds.
Increased expropriation of an area of 300 ha, to include the Samouco Salt Pans
special protection area. The viaduct would typically have required a much
smaller area. This resulted in a claim (now settled by the GSA) of 1.2 billion
escudos for expropriation and refurbishment of the salt pans area.
The building of a viaduct instead of an embankment to cross the saltpans.
Initially the crossing of saltpans was to be made by embankment, but to avoid a
detrimental effect upon the area a 4.5 Km viaduct was built which meant an
increase of 25 billion escudos in costs.
The Lusoponte's staff also includes an Environmental Engineer, which was not
anticipated at the beginning of the project.
a
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The environmental impact of the bridge was controlled and minimized by:'7
• Measures to minimize noise levels and air pollution including landscaped
acoustic barriers;
• The leaching of metals from the bridge is controlled. On the South Viaduct,
where it crosses the saltpans, the rainwater runoff; contaminated by metals, oils
and other pollutants, is collected in three treatment tanks;
• The construction not affecting the fish nursery areas in the estuary;
The disturbance of river sediment being a one-off situation, and was not
significant since the estuary is very dynamic - every day 1/3 of the water
volume is transferred to the sea by the tides- consequently, the tidal erosion in
the riverbed is very high, rendering irrelevant the disturbance caused by the
bridge
• The greatest environmental impact of the crossing being the urban development
on the South shore. How this development will proceed depends on the Local
Authorities permissions for urban developments in an area that was mainly rural.
The monitoring studies that Lusoponte regularly undertakes, includes an
evaluation of the social and economic conditions surrounding the Vasco da
Gama crossing.
Apart from the risks associated with environmental concerns, there are risks related to
the social visibility of the project. Due to the extensive litigation between Lusoponte
and GATTEL and especially with the indemnity that was awarded to Lusoponte
regarding the claims of loss for revenues on the 25th April Crossing imposed unilaterally
by the government, the image transmitted to the public by the media (and some political
parties) was that the project was costing a lot of taxpayers money. This negative image
was even extrapolated for the essence of project finance, creating the assumption that
this type of financing was expensive and likely to need a lot of taxpayers' money and
consequently pawning future generations' income.
4.2.5. Legal Risks
t
Prof. Dr. João Gomes Ferreira, UNL, Interview 14 Jun 2000.
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The concessionaire assumes full acceptance of the risk associated with changes in
general law or taxation. The only exception is changes in regulations that affect directly
and adversely the operational revenues of the crossings. Legal Due Diligence
investigation checks the adequacy of existing legislation with the contract
responsibilities, and was done before final signing of contract by the banks to ensure
that all contracts accord with the Portuguese and UK law. Of all the contracts -
concession, warranties, intercreditor, etc - only the security agreement has to accord
with Portuguese law only. This is a crucial contract for the banks because it is the
warranty against their financing and all assets given as a warranty are in Portugal and
any disputes must be ruled in a Portuguese Court. Given the intricacies of Portuguese
law it is sometimes difficult to adapt the contract to UK law. The reverse i not true.
All the other contracts are usually drafted according UK law, and are easily accepted.
In spite of all Due Diligence investigation problems occurred with Via Verde. One
related to alterations in the existing contract with Brisa and another with a legislation
gap. After the signing of the contract but before taking over the operation of the 25th
April crossing it was found that the conditions of the existing contract with Via Verde
were changed (from the time of contract signature?). This led to claims against the
grantor. Also the transgressions on Via Verde led to legal problems - When a car
without transponder crosses Via Verde it is registered and a procedure starts to recover
the payment and fine. When the concession was signed it included obligations against
the transgressors, but in reality there was a gap in the legislation and Gestiponte didnt
have effective power. It took four years to update the legislation and give Lusoponte
the power to issue notifications against the offenders.
4.2.6. Construction Risk - Totally transferred to the Private partner
The detail design was developed during the construction stage, and work could only
start after GATTEL's approval. Because of the delays in the signing of the contract,
and to assure that construction could be completed according to schedule it was
necessary to:
Support additional temporary site installation costs. All the resources needed
for construction were made available by the French partner even before the final
approval. While waiting for the 'green light', they undertook minor works. In
the end this measure, although costly, paid off because construction could begin
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the day of the final approval, and it was not necessary to wait for the
mobilisation of resources;
During this period the design team was developing work at Lusoponte's risk;
Novaponte conimnced construction at its own liability in July 1995 before
GATTEL' s approval.
The crossing was designed to last 120 years, so special care was given to the structure.
This resulted in additional costs and/or delays because:
The driven piles were supposed to be 60 m deep, but instead it was necessary to
go up to lOOm deep, greatly increasing costs;
• The intertidal zone of the piles has twice the anticipated thickness of concrete to
prevent corrosion of the steel cables;
The unavailability of land considered in the proposal for temporary site
installations and consequent need to relocate and split up such installations.
The Vasco da Gama Crossing has been in operation for two years but the construction
risk has not been extinguished, because the outstanding works were expLoted to be
finished by the end of December 2000. After the Final Inspection Report, Lusoponte
will issue the Final Acceptance Certificate to Novaponte. Novaponte's shareholders
confirmed its commitment to carrying out all works necessary to achieving Final
Acceptance Certification. They are fully liable for completion.
The Inspection Report acted as a pressure instrument during the period when all
disputes and claims were pending.
The one-year defect warranty period (after delivery) has now expired. The question
now is the definition of delivery. After two years in operation there are issues that arise
and that are related with the usage of the asset, and it becomes difficult to distinguish
between those and problems related with construction that should be covered by the
defect warranty.
After the Final Acceptance Certificate by Lusoponte, there is a one-year warranty for a
12 month maintenance period, during which any minor defects, imperfections or faults
have to be remedieL For latent defects there is a 10-year (after Final Acceptance)
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performance warranty. The consortium Novaponte will be dissolved after finishing
construction but the liability is transferred to the shareholders.
There is also the potential construction risk of the Third Crossing - Lusoponte has
exclusive rights to the exploration, but the agreement omits design and construction.
Nevertheless, it can happen that, in the future, Lusoponte shareholders might be part of
the construction contractor consortium for the Third Crossing.
4.2.7. Design Risks
The main difficulty encountered was the need to comply with the construction schedule
(that was already very tight) co-ordinating the delivery of the designs so that the
constructors wouldn't be stopped by a lack of design details.
During construction, GATTEL' 8 imposed several modifications to the preliminary
design, as well as the construction designs. These caused significant delays In the
relevant approvals besides the additional costs incurred by changes in the nature of
construction works and the need for land availability. The delays also caused
significant onerous acceleration measures to ensure timely completion. This led to
claims by Lusoponte that amounted to 25 billion escudos. The most important were:
• The reformulation of the link to Pc. José Queiroz on the Northern Bank. The
initial project was for a level connection, which was soon discarded. In Oct. 96
the connection was not yet defined. One of the main reasons for the delays was
the need to coordinate all intervening authorities: GATTEL, EPAL (Water
company because of the Aiqueva Aqueduct), Municipality of Loures and
Lisbon, Expo 98 and CCRLVT (Lisboa and Vale do Tejo Regional Coordination
Committee);
• A similar situation involved the Southern connection, also involving the need to
coordinate several entities, among which were Brisa (concessionaire for
motorways) and JAE (Roads Authority);
• The reformulation of Sacavem Interchange, also involving increased
construction works. Extra cost amounted to 3.2 billion escudos;
" GATTEL interfered consintl y in the minimum technical details. For example, there was an engineer that insisted
so much, on a particular white for the painting of the bridge (which was not easy to obtain) that it was named the
'Machado White'.
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Remediation.
4.2.8. Commercial Risks
4.2.8.1. Traffic Risk - Totally Transferred to the Private sector
One of the reasons for the inclusion of the operation and maintenance of the 25th April
crossing was to mitigate traffic risk, and consequently to diminish risk for the overall
project Both crossings connect the urban area of Lisbon to the south bank, so it was
reasonable to assume that traffic would be diverted, the extent of which was very
difficult to predict. Whereas when considering combined traffic the uncertainty is much
less. The other underlying reason was to obtain revenues to partially finance the
project.
Traffic Risk has been accepted by the private sector. It depends mainly on:
GDP Growth;
Timing and development of the south bank;
• Car Ownership - In 1998, the Lisbon area had 421 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants,
and in Setubal (south bank) 319 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants. Saturation is
believed to be about 600 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants;
• Level of tolls - People always look for cheaper alternatives. Both bridges have
tolls only northbound. It is noticeable in the traffic statistics that some drivers
enter Lisbon from the south by the 25th April Crossing, which is cheaper (150
vs. 320 escudos) and leave town by the Vasco da Gama Crossing, which has no
traffic jams and no tolls in this direction. The daily traffic flows (average in the
year 2000) in both crossings shows clearly this trend
Vasco da Gama - South to North 26 000 cars/day
North to South 28 000
25th April - South to North 78 000 cars/day
North to South 73 000
4
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The difference in traffic northbound and southbound is superior in the 25th
April Crossing where 5000 cars more enter Lisbon than leave, while that on the Vasco
da Gama it's the reverse: there are 2000 more cars leaving Lisbon then entering.
• Impact of fuel price increases - In Portugal the Government sets controls on
fuel prices imposing a maximum price to the public. In March 2000, the time of
the first increase in fuel prices, there was a decrease in traffic during the
following two months, after which it returned to the previous levels. The price
increase that took place in January 2001 (+5 escudos per litre) was small with
negligible negative impact.	 By the end of 2001 it is expected that the
goveinment will libcralise fuel prices, which ill undoubtedly mean a much
higher price increase (between 5-30 escudos). It is important to note that if this
price increase coincides with an interest rate increase, and consequently an
increase in mortgage loan repayments, the impact will be especially significant
because the great majority of commuters are low to middle income young
-	 couples who moved to the southern bank because of cheaper housing;
. Lisbon traffic restraint policies;
• Competing transportation modes - Rail link - The negative impact seems to
have been overestimated. It is operating above expectations, but this either
released suppressed demand or captured traffic from buses (Barraqueiro
cancelled their buses) and ferries. As a result the 25th April Crossing has
reached full capacity one year after the opening of the sixth lane, instead of the
anticipated 3 to 4 years;
• Impact of Carregado bridge upstream of Vila Franca de Xira - There is
always the possibility to construct another crossing outside the area of
Lusoponte's concession, upstream of Vila Franca de Xira just beyond the
concession's limit.
So far all projections have been too pessimistic, traffic has increased on both bridges
(Table 2), indicating a stronger than expected suppressed demand (Gestiponte data)
a
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Table 2. Yearly Traffic for the two Crossings
Actual Traffic
Year	 Yearly Crossings	 Annual Average	
Growth
000's	 Daily Traffic
1997	 51,234	 140,367	 +1.1%
1998	 60,106	 164,674	 +17.3%
1999	 69,442	 190,252	 +15.5%
2000	 76 018	 208,268	 +9.5%
4.2.8.2. Operation/Maintenance costs
4.2.8.2.1. Maintenance Costs
Role of Operation and Maintenance (O/1\'I) prior to servicing - O/M was involved
since the beginning of the project. The initial team had three members: Eng° Firmino de
Sá (formerly Brisa and the current Gestiponte O/M Director), an expert from the
Dartford crossing, and an expert from Eurotunnel. Their task was to evaluate the
adequacy of design to simplify O/M, keeping its costs at the minimum possible level.
For example, the access to the South Viaduct structure for routine inspections (check
sensors, support apparatus, etc), were planned from the start: The existing suspension
cables would not permit a cradle installation to accesses under the deck for inspection.
The 0 M proposed a project modification: the installation of a small fixed platform for
inspection that would run beneath the 800 metres long deck. This resulted in a much
more efficient maintenance programme.
Sacavem Interchange - The maintenance is partially from Portugal Road Institute
(IEP). There have been some problems with illumination, due to recurring thefts of
copper cables. Gestiponte has replaced the cables at a cost of 28 000 thousand PTE
because of security and also to maintain the image of the company. The public doesn't
know that the responsibility rests with IIEP.
4
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4.2.8.2.2. Operation costs
The Via Verde (electronic toll charge) utilisation has induced two factors that impacted
on the financial Base Case:
• Higher costs due to a higher utilisation than expected;
• Violations (non-payment of toll).
Higher running costs of Via Verde The Via Verde was developed by Brisa to
facilitate toll collection on Iliotorways, and is in operation on all Portuguese toll
highways. The car has a transponder that identifies the vehicle, its class, and activates a
direct debit to the driver's bank. It permits 1200 car crossings/hour instead of an
average of 250 cars/hour (some manual operators in peak time can reach up to 480
cars/hour).
The electronic tollbooth creates more costs per car (costs per transaction) than the
manual tollbooth. There are bank costs, processing costs, mailing costs and the costs
incurred by the non-payment (cars that go through without paying) and subsequent
procedures to try to recover payment. In the base case all these costs were accounted
for, but what happened was that the increased utilisation of Via Verde was much higher
than expected, and consequently the costs were higher than expected.
In 1995, 25°o of cars used Via Verde and 5% Multibanco' 9, and it was expected that in
2000, it would be respectively 37% and 8° o. Actually, the rate of increase was much
higher and in 2000, the real values are 51% for Via Verde and 15% for Multibanco.
Non-payment of Via Verde - When a car without a transponder crosses Via Verde it is
registered and a procedure starts to recover the payment and fine. This is a costly
procedure, so on one of the two Via Verde lanes on the Vasco da Gama Crossing a gate
was installed that only opens when the car is properly identified. Other more efficient
methods are currently in development to be applied on all Via Verde lanes. As an
example, when Gestiponte started operating the April crossing, violations
accounted for up to 5 per cent of all transactions. The enforcement system using a
video recording, and the legal process, didn't allow the prevention of violations or an
effective recovery. It took four years for the government to adjust legislation and give
19 Multibanco - An interbank network for debit cards. The driver hands over the card and the operator debits the toll
amount. No need for code input which speeds up the procedure.
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Lusoponte the power to issue notifications against the offenders. Now if the offender is
not immediately stopped and notified by the GNR, a notification for voluntary payment
of a fine and the tariff is mailed. If it is not paid (the majority are) the process proceeds
to courts (which is costly). Lusoponte recovers 40% of the fine and the due tariff. The
installation of more accurate equipment and a sensitisation campaign for the users
enabled the reduction of the level of violations to 1 percent of total tolled traffic.
Inheriting an old system - Before Gestiponte took over operation of the 25th April
Crossing, but after the signing of the contract, they found out that there were major
deficiencies in the toll collecting system. The manual system was completely revised to
improve the control and monitoring, from the moment the toll is paid to the
reconciliation phase. This has led to claims against the grantor.
4.2.9. People Risks
The culture of Portuguese construction is very much towards secrecy in the accounting
issues. Traditionally this is a very closed sector. At first, it was very difficult for them
to adapt to a culture of complete disclosure of information, as is necessary when dealing
with a project finance structure.
4.2.10. Force Majeure
Lusoponte is exempt from liability for non-fulfilment csf' its obligations arising from an
event of Force Majeure, defined as 'unpredictable and irresistible events alien to the
parties' to the Concession Agreement, which have a direct negative impact on the
concession. Lusoponte is entitled either to the restoration of the financial balance of the
concession, or in cases where the restoration proves to be unreasonably onerous to the
state or the impossibility for performance becomes permanent, to terminate the
agreement. An example is the social unrest that occurred when the Government raised
tolls at the 25th April Crossing in 1994.
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4.2.11. Residual Value
Zero Residual Value. The Crossings will be handed over to the Government at no cost.
4.3. ACCOUNTING ISSUES (PROCESS)
The big problems are still to come. So far, accounting issues have been settled with the
Ministry of Finances on a problem-solving basis. The Ministry has so far shown a great
level of understanding and resolved the situations. For example, it has authorised that
the amortizations would be proportional to traffic, instead of constants, as the law states.
The authorisation was based on the project's specific idiosyncrasies that were not
covered by the existing regulations.
There are still problems pending with VAT, related with structures that don't generate
income, like viaducts
309
Lusoponte
5. KEY MESSAGES
For the Private Sector:
• There is a marked effect on corporate culture in comparison to the prevalent
organisational culture in other Portuguese companies. There is a greater
emphasis on efficiency, cost consciousness, whole-life cycle costing,
accountability and also the notion that the client is important both in terms of
safety and satisfaction;
• Great improvement in efficiency and effectiveness;
• As the concessionaire is responsible for both the construction and maintenance,
it has a strong incentive to minimise costs on a whole-life cycle basis, and not to
pursue initially cheaper solutions that in the long run would be more expensive;
. The process is totally transparent, which is something not common in the
Portuguese corporate culture; particularly the construction sector which is
notorious for its culture of secrecy;
• The Human Resources of the concessionaire are typically highly qualified, with
wages above average;
• The knowledge and experience gained has been incorporated well within the
private sector. Some Portuguese members of the consortium participated
successfully in subsequent tenders in the transport sector, for example DBFO
roads;
• The environmental impact can be positive. The construction of the crossing has
had an environmental impact but on the positive side has enabled the
remediation of degraded areas, like the salt pans. These were in ruin;
• The risk of underestimating the environmental issues. This led to the signing of
contracts without an approved ETA. Between the award of the concession to
Lusoponte in June 1994 and the approval of the ETA in February 1995 there was
a period of indecisiveness as to the viability of the project. Until February 1995,
there was no certainty regarding the availability of funds, and although the
concessionaire undertook all the actions to start construction it took the risk that
the project wouldn't be approved;
4
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Difficult co-ordination with the public partner. It was easier to deal with only
one entity like GATTEL, now it is more difficult because different entities have
different opinions and there is no central directive.
For the Public Sector:
The need for having a stable design and predefined scope of works (no
additional works) at the time of the signing of the contract was undermined by
the public partner. After the signing it kept asking for additional works and
revisions in light of the prevalent philosophy of projects financed the traditional
way by the Government. This led to a high level of litigation and claims from
the private partner: This procedure is common in the traditional methods of
procurement where the client keeps asking for alterations and the constructor
presents new cost estimates for additional works. This usually leads to
significant cost overruns in the projects;
The public partner underestimated the social impact of raising tolls on a bridge
that by common knowledge had already been paid for. The public perception
being that in due time it would be without toll;
• One of the main learning points summarises some of the above: All concession
contracts have to make a realistic and exhaustive risk analysis and establish the
management measures during the negotiation phase. A high level of litigation
can then be avoided;
• Knowledge management is also a weak point for the government. The
negotiation team of the government represented by GATTEL had no formal
procedure to disseminate the knowledge and experience gained during the
negotiation and construction stages. When GATTEL dismantles this knowledge
will be lost to the government, since different people will conduct future projects
and no formal procedure to retain the knowledge is in place;
During the negotiation as the government changed, most members of the
negotiation team were replaced and had no previous knowledge of the contracts
in discussion. The Lusoponte file had 114 different documents in discussion,
which were well known to the previous members, as they were the ones that
were involved in drafting them. The governmeit has put itself in a weak
negotiation position;
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Similarly to the UK there should exist an evaluation of VFM, ensuring that the
project is less costly than when compared with the government's traditional
procurement. This would help to reduce some perception in the political and
media environment that a PFI is more costly and that the State is pawning future
generations income;
• The Public Sector as the owner of the project has to be careful when applying
the UK rules. One major difference is that in the UK there is no EU funding, so
the rules by which the Government has to abide are different from the UK,
where financing from the Government comes from its own budget.
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Victoria Dock Primary School
Project synopsis
Title - Victoria Dock Primary School.
Country - Kingston-Upon-Hull, East Yorkshire, United Kingdom (UK).
Project Cost - Total cost was £1 million.
Sector - Education.
Status - Operating since January 1999.
Sponsors - The Victoria Dock School PFI Limited owned by Sewell Construction.
Purchaser— Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council Education Authority.
Financing Package - The City Council contributed with £200,000 covered by the Central
Government. The Private partner applied £250,000 of their own funds and recurred to
a traditional corporate finance bank loan over 10 years for financial leverage for the
remainder of the financing.
Special Features - It was the first school in the UK to be built under a FF1 scheme. The FF1
project was negotiated in 1998 between the Hull City Council and Sewell Group to
become the first school PFI which was opened by Deputy Prime Minister John
Prescott in January 19991. It was such a successful project that an extension of
facilities soon had to be contemplated. The new building was completed in January
2001, and opened by Lord Puttnam in September 2001.
The land where the school was built has been leased to the Sewell group for 40 years,
although the FF1 contract is for only 25 years. After this period and for 15 years the
buildings and land can have alternative usages such as: continue as a school, disco,
nursery, homecare, according to the local residents' needs in 25 years.
htt,/Iw'vw seweII-roup.co uk/pti-hasehtml (accessed 26 November 2001).
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1. BACKGROUND - HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES
1.1. PFI IN EDUCATION
The use of PFI in the Education sector has been greatly encouraged by the UK
Government. As an example, it was announced 2
 by the then Education and
Employment Secretary David Blunkett that, for the year 2000, a total of £100 million
was made available to enable high quality PFI projects to modernise schools.
The Victoria Dock Primary School is located in Kingston-upon-Hull and serves the new
estate development of Victoria Dock. It is part of a revitalisation programme of
neglected areas such as the docks. It was built by public pressure due to lack of
educational facilities in the area. A PFI scheme was used because Hull City Council
didn't have enough funds to build a new school.
1.2. KINGSTON-UPON-HULL
Figure 1. Kingston-upon-Hull
_______iomu Kingston-upon-Hull 	 isORridlinqtol?l 	 10km
JrkIiiJ
	
the main county town of
[iös	 <,Hornsea	 the	 region	 of East
BvrIey
Kingston Upon	 Yorkshire (Fig.1). whose
GooIeP
	
°'1ithernsa	 history goes back 700
years to the reign ofScurithorp Greot Grimsby
©(	 [] °Cleethorpes	 Edward I, who realising
8	
_____	
Li1	 the strategic importance
'[1]	 [j	 1 1	 Lout h
Al	 o	 \	 of this growing port on
02002 MapQuot.ocm. Inc. 02002 AND Data SOIUtbflS B.V.
the River Humber, conferred upon it the title of Kings Town upon Hull and granted the
town its first Royal Charter in 1299. Within its 71 square miles the city is home to a
population of almost 269,000 people '.
It is a city famous for its docks, and while the hulk of the fishing fleet may have gone
forever, business is still booming in the port, a key European link for the rest of Britain
2 
'UK (iovcrnnlcnl: lxtra repair cash vill replace temporary classrooms http:/'wwwglobalarchiveft.comsearc/i,
lull articles !tI2 press wire. II November 1999.
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and Ireland. Today the docks handle more than 10 million tonnes of cargo yearly and a
million passengers.
Hull has successfully moved from being a black smog industrialised city to a city that is
coming to terms with modern days. In Hull there is an historic Old Town area, the I-lull
Marina, historic pubs, top class educational facilities, including the world-renowned
Hull University, the Princes Quay Shopping Centre and some of the finest shopping in
the north of England. New developments include The Deep, a new sports super stadium
and a city centre Ferensway redevelopment which will involve a new transport
interchange, shopping facilities, parking and the pioneering Hull Truck. It has libraries,
theatres, museums, cinernas arid art gal!eiies, while its new look marina attracts
yachtsmen from all over the world. A mile or two south from its centre stands the
Humber Bridge, the longest single span bridge in the world, and the region's most
famous landmark.
2. THE BIDDING PROCESS
2.1. TIMETABLE
After the Invitation to Negotiation (ITN) the negotiations took 12-15 months before the
signing of the contract. The major delay was caused by the need to sort out the legal
details - it took 6 months while in normal circumstances it would have been 2 months.
The lengthy negotiations were worsened by a very rough design. Only after being
selected as preferred bidder was the design refined and detailed by Sewell.
The school was scheduled to start operating in January 1999, which made it necessary
to reduce the construction stage from 9 to 6 months which was achieved successftilly,
and inaugurated by the then Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott.
Lord Puttnam inaugurated an extension of the school premises in September 2001.
4
httpf/v u1de-2OOOco.uk-!s1teinstovtuo1)oflIu1fl htin (accessed 26 November 2001).
317
Victoria Dock Primary School
3. THE CONCESSION
3.1. MAIN PARTICIPANTS
3.1.1. Authority
Kingston - Upon - Hull City Council Education Authority.
3.1.2. Conlractors - S1'V
The Sewell Group is a very sound 120 years old family business with headquarters
located in Hull Northern England. The group consists of the following companies:
S ewell Construction, Maintenance, Homes (developers), Joinery, Services (Facilities
Management), Decorations and Service Stations. Being a developer has given the group
a sense of a long-term approach to business.
The Sewell Group had past experience in school construction and property
development. Being a believer in planned maintenance the group has a great deal of
involvement and expertise in building maintenance, refurbishment of schools and
hospitals, etc.
3.1.3. Construction Sub-Contractor
Sewell Construction undertook the construction.
3.1.4. Operating Sub- Contractor
Sewell Facility Management provides the facilities management.
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3.1.5. Senior Lenders
Royal Bank of Scotland.
3.1.6. Consultants
EC Harris was appointed by the RBS to provide technical risk advice - design,
construction, operation and preventive maintenance.
3.2. CONTRACTS
3.2.1. Concession Contract
The land where the school was built has been leased to the Sewell group for 40 years.
The PFI contract for educational services is only for 25 years. After this period they can
use the building for another 15 years and possible options for future utilisations are:
continue as a school, disco, nursery, homecare, or any other that will suit the
community's needs. The reason for the possibility of an alternative usage for the
buildings is that in 25 years demographics in the area will change and there might exist
no need for a school, and other utilisations will be more useful.
Payment is against square footage of class space availability and performance. In case
of teachers absence due for example to illness or other external cause that affects
availability or performance they loose their revenue. This loss is covered by insurance
and the premium is built into the financial model.
After 40 years the buildings and the land are to revert to the council. A possible
extension of the contract is on an open book basis, i.e., the concessionaire states all the
costs which are verified by an auditor from the Authority.
The school started operating with 60 pupils in 1999, in 2000 had already 94 pupils (26
in kinder garden) with ages ranging from 3 to 11, distributed in 3 classes: 3-5, 6-7 and
8-11.
The school has been operating successfully having earned a good reputation with
abundant demand from outside the estate development. As a result the construction of a
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new building was completed in January 2001 and inaugurated in September permitting
to accommodate a total of around 220 pupils.
3.2.2. Construction and Design Sub-Contract
No commercial details released.
3.2.3. Financing Agreement - Loan agreement
The total cost of the project was £1 million. Financing was distributed as:
• The City Council contributed with £200,000, covered by the Central
Government;
• The Private partner used £250,000 of their own finds;
• Corporate finance bank loan with the Royal Bank of Scotland over 10 years for
financial leverage for the remainder of the financing.
3.2.4. Operation and Maintenance Sub-contract
Sewell Facility Management undertakes the day-to-day maintenance and repair
maintenance.
Sewell Construction built the kitchen but doesn't provide catering which is perceived as
being outside their skills. The provider is the Local Authority that already had this
capacity and was keen to use it. Meals are prepared offsite and heated in the school.
3.2.5. Direct Agreement
No commercial details released.
4
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3.2.6. Shareholders Agreement
No commercial details released.
3.3. LIFE CYCLE
The Life Cycle of The Victoria Dock Primary School PFI project (see Figure 2) started
with the Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council Education Authority establishment of a
Service Need for the provision of local educational services. As the Coun"il had
insufficient funding to undertake construction it considered the then innovative PFI
route in the Education sector.
The standard procedures in a PFI require the development of a Business Case and the
Public Sector Comparator (PSC). It followed the ITN and the nomination of Sewell
Construction as the Preferred Bidder. It then took 12-15 months for the signing of the
PFI contract to provide 25 years of educational services. Within this contract there is a
further extension of 15 years for possible alternative usages of the land and building.
Operation started successfully in January 1999. It has built a good reputation arid as a
direct result of demands from outside the estate a new building was completed in
January 2001 permitting the accommodation of more pupils. The contract ends 2039
and the assets are to revert to the Council free of charge.
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Kingston Upon Hull
City Council
establishes need
Identification of a possible
PFI opportunity
PSC
B s in ess
Case
PFI Project
Re-Tendering of
	 Advertise opportunity
Services
by Private Contractor
Invitation to Negotiate
Preferred Bidder
12-15 months
PFI Contract signed for a period of
25 years with SPV
The Victoria Dock Primary School
June 1998
Land lease signed for a period of
40 years with SPV
The Victoria Dock Primary School
June 1998
Construction
Development
Operation Starts
January 1999
School Extension
School Operating
until 2024
	 Construction Development
completed January 2001
Alternative usage
for 15 years
Asset Remains in
the Public Sector	
r-r-- End of
I----------------Contract
2039
Figure 2. The Victoria Dock Primary School Life Cycle.
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4. RISK TRANSFER
4.1. VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM) j'w PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR (PSC)
In the original UK PFI models the Government only approves the PFI financing scheme
if it demonstrates that it produces Value For Money (VFM) when compared with the
traditional methods of procurement. This means that PFI procurement generates
savings to the public sector during the whole life cycle of the concession. This is done
by comparing the contract costs with the Public Sector Comparator (PSC), which is
calculated by costing what the public sectoi would have to pay to procure the
construction, and the operation and maintenance of the school over the period of the
concession.
To render the PFI project viable the City Council contributed £200,000; otherwise it
wouldn't be possible to produce a favourable comparison with the PSC.
4.2. RISK ALLOCATION
The essence of PFI type contracts lies in the transfer of risk to the private sector. The
underlying concept being that the risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it,
and this results in costs reductions brought by about increases in efficiency and
innovations introduced by the private sector.
The Victoria Dock Primary School PFI Ltd takes all the risks inherent to the concession,
such as the Political, Regulatory, Economic, Financial, Social, Environmental, Legal,
Bidding Construction and Design Risks. In these risk categories the main issues were
related to bidding costs, as the legal costs were ten times what was initially expected
(E50,000 instead of £5,000). The construction and design risks were minimised by
adopting conservative design and construction techniques in which Sewell Construction
had ample experience. The constructor even supplied all the materials, taking special
care to use only those whose behaviour was well proven.
a
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4.2.1. Commercial Risks
4.2.1.1. Project Specific Risks
As the contract is for availability of space there is no risk derived from demographic
changes in the area.
4.2.1.2. Operation/Maintenance costs
The school has an insurance, policy - hotel type - that covers the whole range of
services. The school was designed to have low maintenance costs, paying special
attention to reduce potential vandalism. For example they use external steel shutters
(very uncommon in the UK) that although more expensive - higher initial investment
and maintenance every six months - prove in the long run to be a good investment
reducing (or stopping) the breakage of glass windows
As the school pays for their own gas and electricity great effort was made to design an
energy efficient building (also not common in the UK). Some special features to reduce
whole life cycle costs included are: double glazed windows, large cavity walls with air
pockets to improve insulation, less expensive roof tiles that are replaced every 15 years
instead of 25 years for the traditional aluminium foil, also they didn't insulate the
concrete floor having considered that not much heat would escape thus saving the
increased costs of insulation. Doors are painted (thus easier to repair) instead of
varnished.
To reduce vandalism and for security and respective recurring costs they have put thick
plywood to cover the roof thus preventing people breaking in. So far the only
vandalism has been graffiti.
They have a security system sub-contracted to Prosegur.
To reduce costs and increase efficiency in maintenance the school has a multiskilled and
flexible 'caretaker' with the authority (empowerment) to solve simple tasks, like fixing
a plug. Training is also provided. For more complex maintenance problems, like
breakdown of pipes, an external company has to be used.
4
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4.2.3. People Risks
Paul Sewell had a very good and close relationship with the school's headmistress (was
on a first name basis) and Sewell Group being a local company had traditionally good
relations with the town councillors and the Education board.
Throughout the process a partnership approach was used, promoting co-operation
between all the parties involved. The decision taken by Sewell to promote a
'Community Dividend' has enhanced this approach 4. The Victoria Dock School PFI
Ltd is to return a proportion of their profit to the community. As of 2000, it represented
around £35,000 that went back to the school and was applied on special projects, like
environmental - A Wildlife Wood was set up within the school grounds providing a
wildlife habitat in a urban setting and an environmental focus for education.
4.2.4. Residual Value
The land and buildings is to revert, free of charge, to the council after 40 years.
4
http//;-w-c. seve]1-group Co uk/pfl-base html (accessed 21 November 2001)
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5. KEY MESSAGES
• The Sewell Group went into the PFI market following a long—term strategy of
return on investment. They invested mainly their own money (250,00O)
recurring to traditional bank loans for financial leverage, and regard PFI as an
opportunity for investment of their disposable cash. They go for low risk PFI
projects (like schools) and expect to get a return on investment of an average 12-
15% instead of 5% in bank deposits.
• The Sewell Group sees PFI as a strategy to smooth the cycles in the construction
industry (usually ten years cycles). In times of depression for the construction
industry the company has a secure revenue.
• The Sewell Group's involvement in PFI projects changed their attitude to
business as they reckon that now they are more service oriented instead of asset
oriented. Being responsible for the school's operation and maintenance made
them look very careftilly at whole life cycle costing.
• The Sewell Group is a strong advocate of small PFI projects for small
companies, for example a school which can cost up to £5 million. It is important
to promote simultaneously local involvement from the community and
workforce. They always use local labour even when constructing outside Hull.
It promotes local employment so important in depressed areas such as in Hull.
• Local involvement is also important in assuring good maintenance in non-
centralized locations like Hull. For example, a big FM company would take too
long to replace parts, like one day vs. one hour to replace a boiler.
• A partnership approach is always beneficial promoting co-operation between all
the parties involved. 4 The decision taken by Sewell to promote a 'Community
Dividend' from the profits of the SPV is an example of this approach.
• Joint Ventures are a viable solution when any of the partners doesn't have the
financial strength to undertake the project. The Kingston Upon Hull City
Council contributed with £200,000; otherwise it wouldn't be possible to obtain a
favourable comparison with the PSC.
• Small projects undertaken by Municipalities are very sensitive to local social
and economic environments. EC Harris, the consulting company, considers The
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Victoria Dock Primary School PFI Limited as a 'Bad PFI' because it is very
small, it was only possible because the headmistress pushed for it, and it was a
'local' deal - a local contractor owner of construction and facilities management
companies. EC Harris considers that a big contractor could have done it cheaper
(scale economies). This issue relates with the previous one, as effectively it was
necessary to obtain a public partner's contribution to make possible a favourable
comparison with the PSC. This raises the political issue of the social dimension
of local authorities' small projects that require a delicate balance between local
relations and strict profitability that in principle favours large companies with
large economies of scale. On the other hand, in strictly 'local' projects there is
always the possibility of inbreeding which is a danger to be avoided as it reduces
efficiency.
• When 5-6 or more school projects are bundled the big companies are interested
in bidding. One school PFI project it not interesting for them.
• A PFI contract in the education sector relieves technical staff from
administrative and managerial job. The Head Mistress (Sue Roach) seems very
pleased to concentrate only on educational activities. Her role in the school
management is of a performance monitor. For example, if a lamp is not replaced
within the pre-set period, a report is done and penalty points are given
potentially affecting the unit price of the service thus affecting the revenue of the
concessionaire.
• Previous experience is important. The Sewell Group had already constructed
schools, and had a great deal of involvement and expertise in building
maintenance and rethrbishment in schools/hospitals. As a result, when Sewell
decided to enter the PFI market they built upon their previous expertise and core
business, adjusting their approach to a long-term perspective of operation and
management. The focus on reducing maintenance and repair costs was a critical
issue during project development; Sewell's being responsible for building
maintenance.
327
Vctona Dock Primary School
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to all staff from the Sewell Group and The Victoria Dock
Primary School PFI Ltd for their valuable contributions, opinions and assistance
received in preparing this case study.
All opinions expressed in this case study are those of the authors alone.
a
328
Joint Service Command and Staff College
ANNEX IV
CASE STUDY
JOINT SERVICE COMMAND AND
STAFF COLLEGE
329
Joint Service Command and Staff College
PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE (PFI)
CASE STUDY
JOINT SERVICES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (JSCSC)
Teresa de Lemos
330
Joint Service Command and Staff
Joint Services Command and Staff College
Project Synopsis1
Title - Joint Services Command and Staff
College (JSCSC)
Country - Watchfield, Wiltshire, UK
Project Cost - The construction contract was
worth £88 million
Sector - Education - training staff officers of
all three Armed Services
!..IIT
	
Status - Operational. Finance Agreement
closed in 1998.	 Construction ended 6
September 2000
Sponsors - Concessionaire/Lead Manager - Defence Management (Watchfield) Ltd
Purchaser - Authority: The Secretary of State for Defence (Government Minister for Ministry of
Defence - MOD)
Financing Package - Commercial Details not disclosed
Special Features - It was the first PFI scheme in the Defence Sector combining education and
estates, including housing, training support services and mess accommodation
support services
::
au
$	 1.
Brief - The PFI Contract, dated 5 June 1998
awards to Defence Management the design,
construction, financing and the operation and
maintenance of the JSCSC for 30 years. This
College merges the educational activities of
three services: Army, Navy and Royal Air Force.
It provides command and staff training at junior,
advanced and higher levels for all 3 services.
The concession covers the academic teaching -
military teaching is MOD's responsibility -
management of classrooms, teaching theatres
and offices, facilities for singles accommodation
and 290 homes
The construction of the building was delivered on time, but the cost escalated from £88 million
to £120 million at the expenses of the construction sub-contractor.
All pictures arc from the JSCSC web site 	 accessed 10 April 2001
331
Joint Service Command and Staff
1. BACKGROUND - HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES
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The creation of the JSCSC. located at Watchfield near Shrivenhaim followed studies
undertaken by the MoD and was according to the Chiefs of Staff of the three Armed
Forces that wished to:2
Maximise the opportunities for the common understanding of the approach to
warftire and deftnce as a whole, consistent with the increasing importance of
the joint, combined, multinational and inter-agency nature offuture operations;
. Provide the potential Jbr future development of the Staff College on a combined
and inter-agency basis.
The establishment of the JSCSC involved the closure of the former Staff Colleges in the
UK - the Joint Services Defence College and the Royal Naval Staff College at
Greenwich, the Army Command and Staff College at Camberley and the Royal Air
Force Staff College at Bracknell. The three Service Junior Divisions - Royal Navy
Junior Division. Army Junior Division and Royal Air Force Junior Division - also
moved to Shrivenham in August 2000. enabling all military command and staff training
to be delivered from one site.
JSCS web site blip:	 accessed 10 Apnl 2001.
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The decision as whether or not to make the JSCSC a PFI project was related with
general policy procedures. The MoD has the policy that for every required output or
service, the PFI route has to be explored and the decision to pursue as a PFI project
depends often on the MoD capital expenditure requirement. MoD policy is that there is
no declared minimum capital or contract value threshold level below which PFI need
not be considered.
The initial location was to be Camberley but the concessionaire proposed Watchfield
due to excessive costs. The criteria for site selection were: to be within 2 hours
travelling from Whitehall (lots of people going back and forth), site cost, site extension
(it needed a big site) provisions, possibility to be secure and the existence of local
resources both during the construction and the operational stages when it employs about
250 civilian staff. The fact that there was a hospital nearby was also considered
advantageous.
Construction and equipment of the buildings ended 6 September 2000. The official
opening of the JSCSC at Shrivenham took place 28th February 2001.
The College has around 2200 students from the three Services considered to be the top
lO0 o
 of the Armed Forces. Foreigners also attend the JSCSC.
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2. THE BIDDING PROCESS
2.1. TIMETABLE
June 1997	 MoD issued Invitations To Negotiate (ITN) to a select list of
bidders
5th June 1998	 PFI contract signed between MoD and Defence
Management - An SPV for Laing & Serco.
May 2000	 Construction of the College was far behind schedule and all
elforts were put on its timely completion.
Beginning of August 2000
	 First time that construction completion on time looked
feasible
6th September 2000	 The college buildings already furbished were delivered to
MoD
28th February 2001 	 JSCSC officially inaugurated. 	 -
2.2. PROJEcT MANAGEMENT
2.2.1. Project Team
The MOD set up one of the best client Project Management teams that Defence
Management had encountered with sufficient empowerment and execution decision
powers. In contrast a young and inexperienced manager led the team from Laing
Construction.
2.3. NEGOTIATIONS
An Industry Briefing Day was held to provide the interested companies with sufficient
information to enable them to make an informed decision on whether or not to bid.
Topics' typically covered were: background information, how the service is currently
MoD 2001, The phases of a PFI project - procurement, http://ww .mod.uklindex.php3 9page 356 (accessed 7
May 2001).
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being delivered, the service requirements, the project timetable and other sources of
further information.
The MoD's usual procedure is to filter the number of potential bidders through Pre-
Qualification Questionnaires and Invitations to Submit Outline Proposals. JSCSC ITNs
were issued June 1997 to a selected shortlist of bidders. The concession contract was
signed with Defence Management in June 1998.
2.4. DUE DILIGENCE
The details were not made available.
2.5. DEBRIEFs - Co1'rr1uNicATIoNs
The MoD follows the Public Procurement Regulations 4 under which companies are
entitled, on request, to a debrief on the reasons for their non-selection. The MoD also
offers the opportunity to both successful and unsuccessful bidders of a debrief covering
all aspects of their submission. The main purpose being the quality improvement of
future submissions.
3. THE CONCESSION
3.1. MAIN PARTICIPANTS
3.1.1. Authority
The Secretary of State for Defence acted as the Government connection with the
Ministry of Defence - MoD.
3.1.2. Contractors - Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
Defence Management - Watchfield Ltd. The shareholders are:
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• Serco (50%), facilities management company and the operation and
maintenance service provider for JSCSC. They run scientific establishments,
maintain buildings, run leisure centres, railways, etc.
•	 Laing Investments(25%)
•	 Laing Hyder plc (25%), a specialist company set up to invest and
manage PFI projects. The shareholders are Laing Investments and Hyder
Investments
John Laing plc has three business areas besides the Construction Division. The
corporate structure and interrelationships for JSCSC is presented in Figurel.
Figure 1. Corporate interrelationships for Defence Management shareholders.
3.1.3. Construction Sub-Contractor
Laing Construction Ltd (L.C.) owned by John Laing plc.
3.1.4. Operating Sub- Contractor
Serco Aerospace Ltd
4
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3.1.5. Senior Lenders
Royal Bank of Scotland (R1S). The RBS also acted as the "Security Trustee" and
Senior Agent" in the Direct Agreement.
3.1.6. Consultants
Con,suIIaiiIv ?f .
.	 Technical
• Watermans - Waterman Partnership Holdings plc is an international
multi-disciplinary consulting engineers firm providing professional advice
and design services in civil, structural, mechanical, electrical and power
engineering together with all aspects of environmental engineering and
project safety planning. The Group has in excess of 730 staff and an aimual
turnover of30.3 million.
• Over fifty specialised companies were sub-contracted by L.C. during
construction.
3.2. CONTRACTS
The contractual structure is indicated in Figure 2. In total 30-35 different firm
agreements were involved.
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3.2.1. Concession Contract
The PFI Contract, dated 5 June 1998 awards to Defence Management the design,
construction, financing and the operation and maintenance of the JSCSC for 30 years.
This College merges the educational activities of three services: Army, Navy and Royal
Air Force. It provides command and staff training at junior, advanced and higher levels
for all 3 services. The concession covers the academic teaching - military teaching is
MOD's responsibility - management of classrooms, teaching theatres and offices, and
facilities management of singles accommodation and 290 homes.
Senior Lenders
Royal Bank or	 -
S cotland
Watermans
Stmct.,.I
En9
Ministry or	 .....
on'
-- --
	 Management
Din.ntA9r..,,.nt	 Defence
Watchfield
LEE rchtect
D.gn Agt.
Laing
Construction
Serco
Over 50 package
sub-contractors
Eurest
s College
Shareholders
Laing Investments (25%)ing Hyder (25%)
	 Serco (50%)
Figure 2. JSCSC Contract Structure.
The concession contract has 52 clauses that constitute the main contract are relevant to
either Construction or Service Provision. There are also 28 schedules:
Schedules
1. Definitions
2. Execution Documents
3. Collateral Documents
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4
	
Land Matters
5	 Construction Matters
6
	
Transfer Requirements
7
	
Equipment and MoD Property
8	 Service Requirement Specifications and Method Statements
9.	 The Financial Model
10
	
Variation Procedure
11
	
Provisional Employee List
12
	
Custody Agreement
13	 Review Procedure
14
	
Not Used
15	 Performance Monitoring System
16,	 Availability Deduction Mechanism
17
	
Insurance Requirements
18	 Payment Provisions
19	 Record Provisions
20	 Form of Funders Direct Agreement
21
	
Dispute Resolution Procedure
22.	 Certificates
23	 Compensation on Termination Provisions
24. Services Mobilisation Requirements
25. Corporate details of the PFI contractor and its Holding Company
26. Market Testing Procedure
27. Not Used
28. Third Party Revenue
Schedule 5 is the most important document for construction. Schedule 13 - Review
Procedure caused difficulties for construction. Schedule 6,7,8 and 24 are the most
important documents for Serco, along with 15 and 16, which were reviewed by Serco.
3.2.2. Construction Sub-Contract
The construction sub-contract was a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMIP) contract
between Defence Management and Laing Construction worth £88.85 million, and fixed
term 113 weeks. The construction phasing had 8 defined stages with 102 defined work
packages.
Laing Homes was sub-contracted by L.C. to build the residential area of JSCSC.
4
339
Joint Services Command and Staff Col
3.2.2.1. Design Sub-contract
Architectural design was by HLM Architect and Structural by Watermans, together with
package sub-contractors: M&E, Roof Cladding, Internal Partitions, Atrium Glazing etc.
The MOD wanted to make the JSCSC a flagship project, so the projected image was a
key issue. Design should have visual impact, emphasize the status, be aesthetic and also
functional.
The chosen design is modular, i.e., repetitive to reduce costs. The materials used are -
proven ones to reduce risks.
3.2.3. Financing Agreement - Loan agreement
Commercial arrangements not released.
3.2.4. Operation and Maintenance Sub-contract
The OperationlManagement (O/M) sub-contract was signed between Defence
Management (Watchfield) Ltd and Serco and aims at procuring the facilities
management equipment, to recruit the staff and put in place a facilities and task
management for the Support Services for the College. In total the SPV's initiat
investment was £5.8 million. It is a fixed price contract over 30 years, and represents a
general gross income of between £5 million-10 million (8 million most probable) a
year paid monthly. Each service is paid monthly against performance criteria with
typical monthly incomes from £10,000 to £200,000/month, with deductions being made
where performance has failed to meet the correct levels. Each service will have a range
of six deficiency bands with deductions ranging from 0% to 20% of income against
each band.
The O/M sub-contract covers four main business areas:
. Teaching 
—The War Studies Group in the School of Humanities at
King's College London, is sub-contracted by Serco to carry out the Academic
Support Service. The contract's duration is 10 years. The Group provides a
Dean, 45 lecturers and support staff to deliver teaching in War Studies. The
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team includes over 38 on-site academic staff linked to the Department of War
Studies, based at King's Strand Campus 2 Taken together with the University
of London's Centre for Defence Studies, also based at King's, the grouping will
be the largest academic defence studies entity in Europe. The Defence Studies
Department at JSCSC objective is tc be a centre of excellence for teaching and
research in defence studies. It has also a Military Directing Staff working
together in team teaching with the academics.
Training Services - Serco carries out the
o	 Libraiy (the second largest War Studies library in the world
combining the volumes of the three libraries - Army, Navy and Air
Force);
a	 IT Services for both hardware and software (the majority of the
software was specially developed by a consultant, and it controls the
quality system within the College);
o	 Audio Visual - Serco has 7 personnel controlling the classrooms,
syndicate rooms and 8 major lecture theatres with a capacity ranging
from 800 to 40 persons. CCTV and TV cameras interconnect the
theatres and a lecture can be simultaneously transmitted to all;
o	 Training Resources covers all the resources related with the
teaching activities like secretarial, administrative, graphics, photography,
photocopying, sports and travel.
.	 Estates - Serco carries out the Security, Facilities Management and
Estate Management Services. Provides all the grounds and buildings
maintenance for the 100 acre site, containing some 45 000 sq metres of College,
290 Family Quarters, and sports pitches including 2 cricket grounds, an all
weather hockey pitch, tennis courts, a rugby and football pitch as well as squash
courts and a fitness suite
•	 Mess Services - Serco sub-contracted Eurest to carry out Catering and
Cleaning Services. The catering is prepared for 650 persons/day and must also
serve 450 people on a silver service dinner.
2 King's College London 2001, £20m contract for academic teaching at new military staff College,
http//v kcl.ac uk/ahout/nes/ni/actrmtst html (accessed 27 April 2001).
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Serco employs a staff of over 300. Within the organisational structure there is a
specialised Department on Quality Health and Safety that abides by the ISO 9000. It is
expected that the Quality Manuals will be finished by August 2001.
3.2.5. Direct Agreement
The Direct Agreement was signed between the Secretary of State for Defence (the
Authority), the Royal Bank of Scotland (Security Trustee and Senior Agent), John
Laing Investments Limited (Mezzanine Agent) and Defence Management (Watchfield)
Ltd (PFI Contractor). Under this agreement the Access Licence may be re-granted to
another entity put forward by the Security Trustee.
3.2.6. Shareholders Agreement
Commercial arrangements not released
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3.3. LIFE CYCLE
The Life Cycle of the JSCSC PFI Project (see Figure 3) started with the MoD's
establishment of a Service Need for the provision of joint educational services to the
three services of the Armed Forces, following the decision of the Chiefs of Staff to
integrate these services to accommodate the needs of modern warfare. 	 -
The next steps were to assess if the project was appropriate for a PFI route. So a
Business Case and the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) were developed.
After the decision was taken to go for a PFI, the project followed the usual procedures
established in MoD's policy. Presentation of the project, holding an Industry Briefing
Day, Invitation to Negotiate to a group of selected bidders in September 1997, and
finally announcement of Defence Management as the preferred bidder.
The PFI contract between the MoD and Defence Management was signed 5th June 2000,
and construction started. The buildings including their respective equipment were
delivered the beginning of September 2000. It then follows a period for the service
provision.
The PFI Contract ends 2028, and the services will either be re-tendered or will revert to
the MoD.
The assets reside with DM until expiry of the concession period. At that point the assets
revert to MOD at zero capital transfer cost. Should the concession be ended
prematurely an asset capital transfer reservation clause comes into force, by which MoD
have the exclusive rights to purchase the asset at a sum reflecting the remaining
concession period (Various sub-clauses are enacted if termination of the concession is
due to either default by the concessionaire; or by changes in statutory requirements of
Government).
a
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3.4. VALUE DELIVERY NETWORK
3.4.1 Value Chain
The Value Chain's model introduced by Porter (1985) segregates a firm into its
strategically relevant activities to better understand the behaviour of costs and potential
sources of diffefentiation. Every firm is considered as a collection of activities
performed to design, produce, market, deliver and support the product/service. The
value chain identifies the strategically relevant activities that create value and cost in a
specific business.
Value chain analysis is a tool designed to assess the firm's competitive advantage vis-à-
vis its competitors. It is not suited for industries since it would be too broad and
important sources of competitive advantage, and differentiation that can only be applied
to a company will necessarily be obscured. Differences among competitor's value
chains are a key source of competitive advantage. The firm's task (Kotler 1999) is to
examine its costs and performance in each value-creating activity and to look for ways
to improve it. The firm must also estimate its best competitor's costs and performances
and establish them as benchmarks. To the extent it can perform certain activities better
than its competitors it can achieve a competitive advantage.
3.4.2 Value Delivery Network
The firm's value chain combined with the one from suppliers, channels (distributors,
customers), and the links between all value chains is designated the Value-Delivery
Network. Value is created not only within the company but also throughout the
network involved in a project, that is, the value chains of all the stakeholders involved.
Competition is therefore between networks, not firms. Consequently the competitive
advantage derives from the better network and not exclusively from the firm's own
value chain. In a PFI project, there are numerous stakeholders involved in value
creation, the Value-Delivery Network encompassing the value chains of all the
stakeholders. The model of a PFI value-delivery network gives a good and clear picture
on how value is created. An analysis of the JSCSC Value Delivery Network follows.
Porter, ME. 1985, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Peiformance, Free Press.
' Kotler, P. ed. 1999,Aiarketing Management, 10th Ed.
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The Stakeholders in the JSCSC are:
• Authority - MoD;
• Contractor - Defence Management;
• Finance - Senior Lenders - Royal Bank of Scotland;
Construction Sub-contractor - Laing Construction - Watermans, FILM
and package sub-contractors;
• Operating / Maintenance Sub-Contractors - Serco - King's College and
Eurest;
• Suppliers;
• Insurance;
• Users;
• Technical consultants;
• Accounting consultants;
• Legal consultants;
• Financial consultants;
• Auditors (like the National Audit Office);
• Political / Regulatory Issues;
• Environmental / Social Issues;
• Labour Issues;
Figure 4 presents the JSCSC Value-Delivery Network. It includes all the stakeholder's
value chains together with their respective inter-actions. The bold arrows represent the
most important connections that form the essence of the PFI contract. The thin arrows
represent other eventual contractual relationships that are not intrinsic to the PFI
contracts, mainly with consultants. The dotted arrows are possible influences that might
occur, that is, connections that are always present in a PFI, not included in any contract,
but that very often play a key role in the project's development.
In the centre are the main players: the Authority - MoD - and the Contractor - Defence
Management - surrounded by the other stakeholders. These can be cotmected with one
or both main players. For example, in the figure several stakeholders connect directly
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only the Contractor like Sub-contractors, Senior Lenders, Insurance, and Suppliers, etc.,
similarly Auditing is only directly connected to the Authority.
Although all the consultants are connected to both the Authority and Contractor, they
are not the same for each one. This simplified representation was chosen so as not to
overburden the figure with, for example, the duplication of all the consultant's value
chains.
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The problems that arose during construction derived mainly from a poor interaction of
L.C. value chain with the others to which it connects directly. Figure 4 presents how
the section of the value-delivery network centred on L.C. should have inter-acted.
Figure 5 presents the reality during construction. The connections between L.C. and
both Defence Management and its sub-contractors were very loose (or nonexistent). To
make matters worst HLM wishing that this building would be a flagship project,
established a link with MoD and would feed into the MoD the requirements that MoD
would in turn impose on L.C.. Both MoD and HLM would press L.C. so much for
certain specifications that L.C. would finally concede.
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4. Risk Transfer
4.1. VALUE FOR MONEY (VFM) AND PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR (PSC)
According to governmental guidance for a project to proceed by the PFI route it must
demonstrate that it produces Value for Money (VFM) when compared with the
traditional methods of procurement, i.e., it generates savings with the taxpayer's money.
To demonstrate the savings, the project's cost is compared with the Public Sector
Comparator (PSC), which is calculated by costing what the public sector would have to
pay to provide the same service over the concession's period.
In the JSCSC project the PSC was worth £68 million. The project cost was estimated at
£88 million but in reality construction costs escalated to £120 million. The public
sector clearly got a good deal because now they own (or will own) a building at a
fraction of its cost.
4.2. RISK ALLOCATION5
The following sections describe the most relevant risks that proved to have had an
adverse effect on the development of the JSCSC PFI project. The main purpose of this
case study is to analyse and draw lessons for the construction companies involved in a
PFI, so necessarily the risks that are presented are centred in the bidding and
construction stages. As Service Provision has been going on for a short period without
any relevant problems mainly due to the strict monitoring system installed, a description
of this system is also presented.
4.2.1. Political and Regulatory Risks
Political advice - The JSCSC was a Government's flagship project so it was very
susceptible to state-of-the-art good industries practices like the Zero Defects Initiative
that was introduced as a political advice from Department of the Environment Transport
and the Regions and the Partnering Initiative the political advice from the Construction
This section draws on intrviews and Eaton D. 'SLEEPT Factors Analysis for PFI Projects' the paper presented at
the conference The experience of PFI in the UK and Project Finance in Portugal, Lisbon, 19th January 2001.
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Best Practice Program. The Zero Defects Initiative is related with construction quality
and aims at no defects, while the Partnering approach is related with the project's
procedures. Partnering can be defined as 6 'a long-term commitment between two or
more organisations for the purpose of achieving specific business objectives by
niaximising the effectiveness of each participant 's resources. The relations/np is based
on trust, dedication to common goals and an understanding of each other 's individual
expectations and values. Expected benefits include improved efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, increased opportunity for innovation, and the continuous improvement of
quality products and services'. These requests aim at getting a better project, which is•
fundamentally good, but can constitute a risk for companies not familiar with these
management techniques.
Client change - During the negotiations there was a restructuring of MoD that affected
the normal procedures. The risk was that the changes in MoD personnel would bring
idiosyncratic changes to the project objectives. The personal interpretation of prior
agreements could change either the scope or content of the project, etc.
Planning regulations surprises - At the time of the signing of the contract Laing
Construction assumed that the construction was approved by the Local Authority
Planning Department and had the construction works ready to start when they were
informed that the building would only be approved if was 2 meters deeper than planned.
The immediate major adverse consequence was that the building's foundations reached
a very bad soil instead of rock as planned, and consequently costs escalated.
4.2.2. Economic and Financial Risks
The O/M sub-contract is a fixed price over 30 years; as such inflation is the most
important risk at which the project is subject to.
4.2.3. Social Risks
Impact in Local Infrastructure - For example, there was only one Army Pub, now
there is a Navy pub too. New schools were also needed.
6 McDermott, P. & Charrer, K. 2001, 'Partnering within FF1 projects' paper presented to the conference The
experience of PH in the UK and Project Finance in Portugal, Lisbon, 1 9th January.
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4.2.4. Environmental Risks
Flood Water - The JSCSC was built to withstand an event that would occur 1:100 years
(once every hundred years), i.e., exceptional one. Unfortunately the rains in the winter
2000 were a 1:200 event, which caused all sorts of problems namely: flooding in the
ground floor of the main building and the lagoon's overflowing in spite of the drainage
installed (it was supposed to overflow to a creek).
Contamination - The 1:200 event caused mains sewerage from site (and also off-site)
to overflow into the containment lagoon. This lagoon (also a landscape feature) was
then required to be pumped dry, its previous stone lining removed, the whole cover
decontaminated and then relined with a new stone lining and then refilled. All at no
additional cost to the SPV/client and at the expense of John Laing Const.
4.2.5. Legal Risks
The concession contract (and 28 schedules) became an implied document in the
construction contract. Therefore the requirements of untried/untested PFI concession
became an implicit feature of iLcontractual negotiations. The full implications of the
implied terms where not recognised in GMIP. Hence the reason for constructors costs
escalating from £88 million to £120 million with no change in GIVIIP.
4.2.6. Bidding Risks
The information brief was considered by L.C. to have been too poor, too loose, leaving
too much room for interpretation to the lead designer. The consequence was that the
contract was signed with inadequate information to correctly budget the construction
works.
4
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4.2.7. Construction Risks
Planning and Construction approvals - Traditionally UK Government Departments
have been exempt from Local Authority Planning Approval Procedures (Although by
custom and practice they have tried to comply).
The implementation of the Humans Rights Act (HRA) (1998) and its
applicationlcommencement in October 2000 gives local citizens a statutory right of
appeal against infringents of personal rights/freedom. There is a strong body of legal
opinion that Government bodies (and by implication their agents such as Defence
Manaemt.nt) cannot interfere with their rights by claims to Crown Immunity, as was
previously done.
Therefore any "local" complaints about planning and/or Construction Approvals could
potentially lead to a claim under the I-IRA (1998).
No contingency/remediation from actions was contained in the contracts and therefore
liability for compliance following any such action would be at the cost of the
concessionaire or constructor.
To date there is no knowledge of any action. However, social risks; for example the
temporary shortage of school places; could lead to action against the MoD and their
agents, DM, etc. There are currently no legal directions as to the liability for actions
under I-IRA (1998). Therefore DM has an unknown potential liability.
Site conditions - One of the main problems that L.C. encountered related to the site
conditions is related to Ground water. Bad ground and excavations below water table
occurred in excess of all reasonable expectations at tender stage. The 1:200 floods
caused a significant alteration in ground water levels and ground water content.
The requirement to deepen excavations for foundations by a further 2 metres increased
the volume and technical complexity of earthwork and sub-structure activity. L.C.
having agreed a GMIP with the concessionaire did not lay-off its risk to their sub-
contractors. The construction sub-contracts were largely "traditional" and allowed sub-
contractors to send and obtain reimbursement for variations in the works.
Poor drainage - One of the main problems encountered was poor drainage after the
heavy rains of the first winter after delivery of the building. This might be related to the
alterations requested by the planning departments to lower the building 2 metres. It
happened that L.C. had already built the drainage network before knowing of the
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alteration, and although they were removed on paper as the pipes were already in place
actually they were not removed, which might have caused the flooding of the building.
An example of trying to comply with planning requirements: The documentary
evidence was amended to suggest compliance whilst the physical works (already
executed) were not amended. If this should cause local flooding problems in the future,
there is the possibility of an action under HIRA (1998) by "local residents".
NB: These "local residents" could even be the occupiers of the military family homes
on site, who historically have been unable to take any actions against MoD (and agents)
because of claimed Crown Immunity. Once again DM have an unknown potential
liibility.
Structural problems - It has been noted that there is evidence of the existence of major
cracks along the expansion joints. This might be related to the bad soil conditions were
the building stands. DM has the liability for this potential defect.
Co-ordination problems - There were sequencing and programming difficulties, that
for example, led to the scaffolding sub-contract in the final account amounting to plus
870 o over tender, that is £560,000 in excess of L.C. estimate.
Labour shortages - L.C. experienced serious labour shortages, as the Swindon area is
very buoyant with few people available that can be employed as carpenters, electricians,
etc.
Latent Defects - After delivery there was a 3 months period of snagging to correct
construction defects. A final inspection will be performed one year after delivery to
assess if all defects were corrected. There is a period of 12 years during which L.C. will
be liable for latent defects.
All the problems encountered means that the GMP of £88 million, would in reality cost
L.C. £120 million.
4.2.8. Design Risks
Insufficient specifications - At the start of construction only 5% of the drawings were
available. Their quality was poor, impossible to estimate from effectively, which was
problematic since the construction contract was budgeted according to the philosophy of
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GMIP, and this methodology to be valid requires the assurance of 8O% of the design of
what is going to be built. But at the time of signing the JSCSC construction contract not
even 50% of the design was known, making it impossible to budget correctly. Even the
materials choice was done as construction progressed; for example, it happened that, as
image was a big issue L.C. was forced to use walnut for the doors instead of a cheaper
material.
Poor design procedures - Laing devised the Review Process themselves but it proved
to be very bad for the progress of the construction works. It introduced delays because
construction could only start when there were no comments from every partner. The
Review Process was an itec ative process with the following stages:
•	 First, HLM architects produced the drawings;
•	 The drawings were sent to a review committee composed of MOD,
Serco, planning and building control. They had 20 days to comment,
•	 The drawings were redone and resubmitted to the committee;
•	 This process would repeat itself until there were no comments.
But "No comment" didn't mean, "I agree ", which meant that later problems could
surface. Effectively, it happened that long after construction commenced problems
were raised. For example, there was only one overworked planning officer in the
municipality, who although issuing a "No comments" would raise issues long after
because it was then that he had time to analyse the drawings. Also the fire department
stated afterwards that construction was not in accordance with safety regulations: the
corridors wouldn't withstand 1 hr. (only 30 mm) which was in contravention of
regulations, that state that rooms have to withstand a fire for 30 mm, corridors 1 hr. and
other places 2 hr.
The usual way to proceed is to present the drawings for comments, and after receiving
comments proceed with construction.
Designs were not timely - Often the plans were revised, with the annotation that there
were only minor alterations, which in reality would mean alterations in 50 items.
Schedule revisions were constant, which was very disturbing because it was a tight
schedule as L.C. had to deliver the building already equipped on 6 September 2000.
Otherwise it would mean a one-year delay in starting operation, as the academic year
would be lost. Design evolution was accompanied by panic control, which can be
explained by how the progress in drawings delivery was (illustrated in Figure 6). The
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difference between the ideal delivery schedule and as it was in reality is great. The
construction sub-contractor had the majority of the drawings in his possession only near
the end of the construction period, whilst its delivery by the designer should have been
smoothly phased from the beginning of construction.
Start at site	 End of construction
Figure 6. Progress in delivering the drawings.
Service Specifications - "Fit for purpose" was introduced in the construction sub-
contract to characterise the service specifications of some construction items. It proved
to be the origin for several problems, because the purpose can change depending on the
client's point of view. The most striking example is the 'Fit for purpose' of a fire
escape: outside the bar there is a fire exit with a balcony and stairs to the ground. It
happened that during the commemoration of Victory in Europe (VE) Day people who
were at the bar, went out to see the planes flypass and the excessive weight caused the
balcony to bend. It was designed for people to pass through not to stand, but as it didn't
prove in that particular circumstance, L.C. was forced to redesign it and rebuild it as it
was "not fit for purpose". It is important to note that the concept of 'Fit for Purpose 'is
uninsurable, no one insurance company will accept to cover this risk, and it is the
constructor that takes the risk not the designer.
C
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4.2.9. Commercial Risks
4.2.9.1. Project Specific Risks
Staffing Problems - The Mess Services - catering and cleaning - were sub-contracted
to Eurest. At the beginning of operation Eurest had big problems with staffing. The
area where the JSCSC is located is 3000 short in labour positions (i.e., in the area there
is an average of 3 000 employment vacancies). Eurest had underestimated the problem
and as such it caused major problems with the performance monitoring system.
According to this system if the agreed levels of performance are not attained Serco's
payment by the MoD is penalised. The turnover of the personnel was excessi .ve - few
stayed for longer than 2 weeks - and staffing was further complicated by the need of
being security cleared - an average 50% wouldn't pass.
So far Serco has not been financially penalised, and having opted for a partnering
approach they worked in conjunction with Eurest to work out the best solutions. One
year after service commencement this problem has been reduced, performance has
improved and Eurest has managed to get a good set of supervisors. Currently Eurest
employs 160-180 persons, probably needing a further 10-12. They get employees from
as far as Oxford (3 0Km).
Service Provision Control - The operational risk, i.e., the risk that the private partner
would be financially perialised by an unsatisfactory service, has been controlled as this
is a self-monitoring and benchmarked project. The Self-performance Monitoring
Criteria assess the performance of the services provided against a benchmark that was
negotiated within the contract with the MoD. This benchmark is still negotiable and it
will be revised after one year in operation. The system is considered "fair" by both
partners and is based on trust. The MoD has preferred to opt for this solution, according
to the partnering approach adopted, instead of having a team on site to do the "contract
monitoring". Usually this involves 12-16 people at a cost of at least £250,000/year, and
that might not have a positive perspective to solve problems. The actual system
involves penalty points for specific events, that if exceeded will induce a financial
penalty. The information system interlinks this data on-line and the managers of the
various departments have access to it.
The system consists mainly of a set of tables describing the events, for which a pre-
determined number of points is attributed according to the occasion on which they take
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place: Normal, Audit or Key Events (Very important days when key events take place,
usually involving about 12 days a year). If the event takes place in a Normal day the
points to attribute will be the pre-set benchmark, if the event takes place on an Audit
day the benchmark is multiplied by two, and if it happens on a Key event day it will be
multiplied by three since it very important that service should be flawless.
System of Points Deductible
Points	 Normal	 Audit	 Key Events Benchmark
Description	 X 1
	 x 2	 X 3	 ## (pre-set)
Each manager has a standard template to fill in, and on a daily basis can control the
number of points attributed and compare them with the benchmark. The system works
on a 3-months basis, thus giving a good margin to correct problems.
4.2.9.2. Operation/1\'Iaintenance Costs
To facilitate staff employment Defence Management had to promote the transports and
invest in the local bus network.
4.2.10. People Risks
Not emerged as an important issue
4.2.11. Force Majeure
Not emerged as an important issue
4.2.12. Residual Value
Not emerged as an important issue
4
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4.3. ACCOUNTING ISSuES (PROCESS)
Not emerged as an important issue
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5. Key Messages
Key Learning Points:
1- Is FF1 a sustainable model? The main lesson to draw from the JSCSC
case study is to demonstrate how a PFI project an be considered successflul
from the financial aspect but at the same time be particularly ruinous for one
partner - The construction sub-contractor in this instance. For PFI to be a
sustainable solution it must demonstrate being fair and a good deal to all
stakeholders.
2- Coiilracts mu.sl licive good .5pecificalions (good quality of informciuioiz is
critical). A good contract must be workable with good specifications. It must
cover the technical deliverables and provide for an on-going continuous
process that guarantees, over the long-term, good procedures during the
contract management. In the JSCSC PFI contract the construction
requirements were too loose.
For the Private Sector:
• There must exist a consistency in the strategies and objectives within the
private sector team. It happened that from the concessionaire point of view the
project was quite successful. Nevertheless, for the construction sub-contractor it
was a nightmare. They lost a great deal of money, and the construction process
itself was hectic.
•	 The project team must be strong for all partners. L.C. set up a team led
by a too young and inexperienced project manager and also it was seriously
understaffed. It took L.C. several months to realise that changes in the team had
to be done in order to be able to fulfil the contract.
•	 Good Project Management is essential - The co-ordination between the
various construction sub-contractors was a serious problem in part due to delays
in design.
•	 Don't over reassure the other partner. For example, in order to reassure
the MoD that the building was according to their wishes, L.C. devised design
4
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procedures - Review Process - that proved to be hindrance leading to excessive
delays, affecting the already tight construction schedule.
The project was rushed due to delays mainly in signing the contract
coupled with the need to open the College on a specific date (otherwise an
academic year would be lost).
Do not sign any contract without having all the planning permits in
place. L.C. was surprised just after the signing of the contract with the demand
by the planning department to lower the building by 2 metres.
Do not sign a contract where there is too much room for interpretation.
The brief from the Public sector was not clear enough; the construction
requirements were loose and with open-ended solutions. As such, there was
ample room for interpretation as to what the building was supposed to look like,
consequently the key designer felt free to interpret the client's wishes.
. Naivete of L.C.. They tried to accommodate the requirements that were
successfully imposed by the architect that wanted to build a flagship building,
and that manoeuvred behind the scenes feeding to the MOD the requirements
that they would in turn impose on L.C.. Due to the lack of previous
specifications, and because both MOD and HLM would press so much, L.C.
would finally concede.
Lawyers can be useful. The team and project manager of L.C. was too
much task-oriented and had an inborn aversion against lawyers, the perception
being that they earn too much money for what they do. Consequently L.C.
probably accepted some terms and conditions wrongfully imposed on them
The private companies cannot take an over-optimistic approach taking
risks for which they are not prepared.
Value Delivery Network analysis. The co-ordination problems
experienced by L.C. were originated in part by the huge number of sub-
contractors involved. Now they are undertaking a major revamping of the
company culture, to make the incorporation of their sub-contractors Value Chain
Management systems into their own. Effectively, they are simultaneously
working within the company developing their Value Chain analysis of the whole
supply chain, and with their sub-contractors to make them aware of the
advantages and helping them to set their own.
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Efficiency increases are always possible. To increase efficiency L.C. is
trying to implement a Nation Wide Agreement on Procurement with several
preferential designated sub-contractors.
Unsuccessful projects hurt companies. In November 2000, John Laing
plc announced the decision to sell Laing Construction plc and its subsidiaries.
Negotiations took place between John Laing and O'Rourke plc and a Heads of
Agreement was signed on 2nd April 2001.
For the Public Sector:
A PFI project must be a good deal for all stakeholders. The public sector
got a good deal, with the project on time and on budget, assuring the delivery of
a service on a guaranteed benchmark. However this was at the expenses of
heavy losses for the construction sub-contractor. This is not a sustainable
solution, because if the private sector (where the construction companies are
included) gets the perception that they stand to loose money, then PFI will no
longer be a sustainable solution. There must exist a perception of fairness
throughout the process.
A good PFI contract must be workable and with good specifications,
encompassing both the technical aspects and a good continuous review process.
The main contract and the sub-contracts must form a coherent hierarchy.
The PFI route, because its project and contract management is more
controlled, when compared with the traditional methods of procurement, is more
likely to ensure that the projects will be "on time" and "on budget"
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Indáqua Feira
sta
 Maria da Feira Water Supply and Wastewater Sewerage
Project Synopsis1
Title - sta
 Maria da Feira Water Supply and Wastewater Sewerage.
Country - Portugal.
Project Cost - EUR 160 million (32 billion escudos).
Sector - Water Undertaking.
Status - Financial Close 3rd December 1999. Construction works started January 2000 with
completion scheduled for 2008. Concession ends 2035.
Sponsors - Concessionaire! Lead Manager - lndáqua Feira - lndustria de Aguas de sta Maria
da Feira.
Purchaser - Municipio de sta Maria da Feira - Municipal Authority - Local Authority.
Financing Package - Total capital expenditure amounts to EUR 160 million.
The private sector, Indáqua Feira will raise a total of EUR 110 million: EUR 80 million
of non-recourse finance from the European Investment Bank Loan (EIB) guaranteed
-by a Group of Portuguese Commercial Banks and EUR 30 million from sponsor equity
and subordinated debt. The EIB loan offers a 25-year term and a grace period of up
to 10 years before the repayment of principal commences.
The Municipality will contribute EUR 50 million.
Special Features - It's the first FF1 type of project undertaken by a Municipality using
European Union (EU) Cohesion Funds to leverage private finance for a major public
infrastructure. These funds (85% non-returnable) would directly finance part of the
capital works. The Municipality had not enough funds to undertake the project, and
could not apply for a commercial loan because the service debt weight on the annual
budget has a legally imposed limit of up to 20% of the budget.
Joint financing of the public and private sector was needed because with the level of
investment needed it would be impossible to have an adequate return (the financial
ratios of the model would not be favourable for the private loans) and simultaneously
maintain a reasonable level of tariffs if only private funding would be used.
Brief - The PFI project was signed and lndáqua Feira was awarded the concession for water
distribution and wastewater in sta Maria da Feira. The Municipality commited itself to
build part of the necessary infrastructure, for which it needed the contribution of the
Cohesion Funds. However, in the meantime the political guidelines changed and the
Municipalities were not allowed direct access to the funds. This has left the sta Maria
da Feira unable to fulfil its contractual obligations, and has led to a standstill in the
construction of the sewerage networks.
'Presentation of Eng° Paui'o Jorge Ferreira de Sa for the Institute for International Research, Lisbon January 2000,
and Price Water HouseCoopers, News Releases (accessed 3 —8- 2000.)
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1. BACKGROUND - HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES
1.1. WATER DISTRIBUTION AND WASTEWATER SEWERAGE MARKET IN PORTUGAL
1.1.1. Legal Franiework	 -
In Portugal, until the early 1990's, 2 the water distribution and wastewater sewerage
systems were exclusive municipal prerogatives, with the sole exception of EPAL a
state-owned company that supplied water to Lisbon and the surrounding municipalities.
In November 1993, a new legal framework was set up and opened the water market to
the private sector. The ultimate responsibility remains with the Local Authorities that
have the power to award concessions to private companies to build and operate the
systems.
The Government simultaneously created the Multi-municipal systems, concessionaire
companies where the JEP-Aguas de Portugal (IEP-AdP) - state holding company -
always has the majority (>51%) of capital. The other shareholders are the interested
municipalities and private companies that can never assume management
responsibilities. The Multi-municipal systems may be privatised, in the future, up to
49°o.
As of the beginning of 2001, the development of the Multi-municipal systems was
mainly in the Central and Northern part of Portugal, a region with a high population
density. In the southern part of the country, the municipalities are not willing to
participate partially because of low population density means that the level of
investment is very high in relation to the population served rendering very problematic
the financial profitability of private investments.
The Government also created the Inter-Municipal Companies, formed by the
Municipalities, where the IEP-AdP might not be a majority shareholder together with
the private companies that might hold up to 49% of the shares (giving them
management capacity and decision power). These can only be viable when the
municipalities have financial capacity, and are more adequate for low investment
infrastructures like the clean water distribution and wastewater collection networks.
2 Melo-Franco 2000, 'The t 'se and management of service contracts. National Report Portuga1, WarerSupply vol. 18,
no.1 pp27, 1WA Publisher.
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Portugal has a population of 9.3 million inhabitants, and as of December 2000, the
private sector (Inter-municipal or municipal systems) had 18 municipal water and
sanitation systems under concession agreements serving a population of 945 000
people. There were also two other concessions under competitive bidding,
corresponding to 160 000 people. There was also one collective wastewater treatment
system serving 375 000 people and a bulk water system serving 250 000 people under
concessions.
1.1.2. Water and Wastewater 11arket Data
The Portuguese water and wastewater sector is described in Table 1. As of 1999, the
water distribution network was acceptable - over 90% of the households were covered.
However, there were great deficiencies in the sewerage systems, for example, the
connection to the wastewater treatment plants were available to only to 55% of the
consumers. The values presented are national averages. Some regions have much
worse indicators.
The Municipalities carry fUll responsibility for these systems, but the vast majority lacks
the necessary fUnds to undertake the construction works. That is why the availability of
EU Cohesion Funds, partially non-returnable, is critical to build the necessary
infrastructures. It is also an urgent task as the deadline for the complete enforcement of
the EU Water Framework Directive is 2010, when all the water distribution and
sanitation system will have to be completed.
Table 1. The Water and Sewerage Sector in Portugal
1994(*)	 1999(**)	 2006 (***)
Household Water Distribution 	 84°c	 90%	 95°c
Connection to a sewerage s ystem	 63°c	 75%	 90°c
Connection to a wastewater treatment plant	 21?	 5500	 90%
(, ) First and (**) last year of the II QCA (Community Support Framework), EIJR 1.7 billion.
(***) Last year of the ifi QCA, ETJR 2 billion.
Melo-Franco 2001, Portiga1 Case Study: Lusagua —The oldest Private Water Operator, paper present at the
Southern European Water Summit, IBC Global Conferences Ltd, 13 March, Rome.
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1.2. THE MUNICIPALITY OF ST" MARIA DA FEIRA
Sta Maria da Feira4 is a Northern Portuguese municipality located 30 Km from Porto
and 270 Km from Lisbon, with 211
Km2 of area, and a population of 130
'A uarda
	
L juntDi imaC1ve	 ranca	 000, which is expected to reach 170
Braga- •..Mirandela / - 000 m 2035 - end of the concession.
4!i orate	 a'Ke[	 Moga'douro
-	
Feira has great economic activity
	
Eapinho	 fr
ao Joao De Made ira
pinhal	 being the world largest centre of cork
Viseu ,'	 C'	 /
	
ilisavo	
manufacturing, and other industries(Mi a uo	 $eia	 (
AtiC'	
-	 CovilhaCantare -
	
,' like shoe making, toys, wood
aura	 \pIasncia
Ni <Fiqueirá Des Yiahoj	 products, paper, dairy products, etc.
—.	 P2	 [
Figure 1. Sta Maria da Feira Municipality
In 1999. the water supply network (main) had 280 km; and the wastewater network 180
km. Table 2 shows that the water system (distribution) was available to 30% of the
population but with only 20% (10 750 registered consumers) connected.
The situation is even worse with the wastewater sewerage system, because the
connection is done on a voluntary basis, involving the payment of a monthly fee.
Although the wastewater sewerage system (and wastewater treatment) was available to
20% of the population, only 4% was connected. It was estimated that the real number
should be around 6-7%. the difference being accounted by illegal connections (that are
not registered and therefore don't pay the tax).
Both the water distribution and the wastewater market show a great potential for
growth.
4Sta Maria de Feira web site http://vww.hvweh.ptlsaritarnariadafeiralindex.html (accessed 12 September 2000).
lndñqua Ieira is going to tn to assess the illegal wastew'ater coirnections: The y are going to charge the wastewater
tax together with all water hills and wait Ibr the consumers protest stating that they dont have it.
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Table 2. Water Supply and Wastewater Sewerage Systems
Sta
 Maria da Feira - 1999
Available to	 Population (%)
Population (%)	 Effectively Connected
Water Supply & Distribution	 30%	 20%
Wastewater Sewerage 	 20%	 4%
The main objectives of the concession are therefore:
• to provide the whole of the population with water supply and wastewater
treatment;
• to improve the quality and safety of the service;
• to ensure that the level of tariffs is compatible with the population's standard of
living; 6	-
to guarantee the adequate management capacity and skills for a project of this
nature. The Local Authority lacks the necessary staff.
6 Based on previous studies for social housing, it was estimated that over 95% of the households incomes was over
100 thousand escudos per month. A tariff of 400 escudoslm3, representing an expense of —4.5 thousand
escudos/month would be reasonable for this level of income.
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2. THE BIDDING PROCESS
2.1. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
April 1997	 The Municipality presented the application for the Wi Cohesion Funds (11
QCA) to the Environment Ministry in the amount 4.8 billion escudos to
directly finance part of the capital woks. This amount was afterwards
reduced to 3.5 billion escudos
27th September 	 Competitive Tender was launched
1997
1720th March
	 Bidding - Opening of the proposals
1998
August 1998	 Thc Ministry send the application to Brussels, but the 11 QCA (that would
be finished end I )98) had airead) exhausted the funds
End 1998	 Application for the III QCA, and the promise from the Environment
Ministry that the application would be supported
20th November	 Proposals Preliminary Evaluation report
1998
12th January 1999 Proposals Final Evaluation report
1 February 1999	 Preferred Bidder: lndáqua Feira - Industrias de Aguas de Sta Maria da
Feira
February 1999 -	 Discussion of concession contract with preferred bidder (the terms of the
June 1999	 tender remain unchanged)
27th July 1999	 Closing of negotiations
3rd December 1999 Signing of concession agreement
15t January 2000	 Beginning of concession
The Environment Ministry issued a law stating that all EU funds from the
2001 III QCA. would be channelled to the Instituto de Participacôes de Estado
(IPE) and its companies that would build and manage all the wastewater
seerage systems in Portugal. This leaves the Municipality of Feira in a
very delicate position, since it is bound to a contract to build several
infrastructures for which it has not enough funds
2.2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
2.2.1. Project Team
The Municipality had only one member actually negotiating the contract, the rest were
consultants. The private partners presented a usual team of 5-6 members plus
consultants.
4
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2.3. NEGOTIATIONS
In September 1997, the competitive tender was launched and four consortia presented a
proposal:
. Indáqua Feira, the shareholders were:
•Indáqua-68%;
• Cifial - 25%;
• Hidrocontrato - 5%;
• Engil - 0.5% - Portuguese Construction Group;
• Mota & Companhia - 0.5% - Portuguese Construction Group;
• Soares da Costa - 0.5% - Portuguese Construction Group;
• Teixeira Duarte - 0.5% - Portuguese Construction Group.
. Feiráqua, the shareholders were:
• AGS - 36.5% (owned by Somague);
• Aquapor - 3 6.5% (owned by IPE-AdP);
• Efacec Ambiente - 12%;
• lIP Holding - 10%;
• Camilo de Sousa Mota & Filhos - 5%.
. Luságua, the shareholders were:
• Agbar - 49.98% - Spanish Water Services Group;
• BPI - 30% - Portuguese Bank;
• Edifer - 20% - Portuguese Construction Group;
• Other - 0.02°'.
. Hidrofeira, the shareholders were:
• Construtora Abrantina - 30%;
• Hidrodinâmica - 20° o;
• Focsa - 1%,
• Seragua - 48%;
• Urbaser - 1%.
The terms of the tender didn't require project finance structure for the concession. Only
Indáqua Feira and Feiráqua presented their proposals according to this financing regime.
The proposals' five pre-defined evaluation criteria were weighted according the
following percentages:
• Minimum Level of Tariffs - 70% (legally mandatory according to Dec-
Lei 147/95 of the 21 June 1995);
• Financial structure and engagement compromise - 12%;
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Proposed Quality and safety levels - 8%;
Start of service - 8%;
• Contribution to the Authority - 2%.
On the 1 of February 1999, Indáqua Feira was selected as the Preferred Bidder for
direct negotiation with the Municipality. The concession contract was signed on the 3rd
December 1999.
3. THE CONCESSION
3.1. MAIN PARTICrPANTS
3.1.1. Authority
Municipality - Câmara Municipal de Sta Maria da Feira
3.1.2. Contractors - SPV
The contractor Indaqua Feira is owned by:
Indáqua - Industria e Gesto de Aguas SA - 68%;
Cifial - 25%;
Hidrocontrato - 5%;
Mota & Companhia, Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte Engenharia e Construçoes
SA and Engil each hold 0.5%.
Indáqua and Hidrocontrato (participated by Severn Trent) expertise lies in the Operation
/ Management (O/M) of water and wastewater systems.
The shareholding structure is indicated in Figure 2. The figure also illustrates the
relationships between the concessionaire - Indáqua Feira - the construction companies
shareholders of the Construction sub-contractor and with Indáqua (parent company).
Indáqua's sharehold&s are
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• Four Portuguese construction companies: Mota & Companhia, Soares da Costa,
Teixeira Duarte Engenharia e Construcoes SA and Engil - each hold 14%;
• RAR Ambiente (Portuguese company) has a financial participation of 14%;
• Severn Trent Water International (STWT) 7
 (a subsidiary of British Severn Trent
Plc) a water and wastewater management company holds 30%.
Indáqua participates in three other water and wastewater concessions although not under
the project finance regime: The municipalities of Fafe (since 1995), St°Tirso and Trofa.
Iridáqua Feira	
IIIItS%_J_nafltOL
Concessionaire
Figure 2. Indiqua Feira - Shareholders Relationships
One of UK's leading environmentally engaged companies. As an international environmental solutions company,
we are a leading provider ot water, waste and utility services. (hI//\\ seveni-trent corn, accessed 12 September
2000)
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3.1.3. Construction Sub-Contractor
Grupo Construtor da Feira ACE, owned by the four construction companies that are
Indáqua's and Indáqua Feira shareholders. The contractors comprising the ACE are
jointly and severally liable for the execution of its obligations under the Construction
sub-contract. If any one of the partners becomes insolvent, or withdraws from the ACE,
the remaining partners will be responsible for assuming the remaining ownership and
corresponding obligations.
3.1.4. Operating Sub - Contractor
The operation and maintenance is assured by Indáqua Feira.
3.1.5. Senior Lenders
European Investment Bank (Em) loan: EUR 80 million; 25-year term;
Em's financing is guaranteed by Banco Totta & Açores SA, Banco Totta
& Sottomayor de Investimeritos SA (formerly Chemical), and Banco
Pinto & Sottomayor SA.
C
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3.1.6. Consultants
To the Municipality:
• Economical & Financial - BES Investimentos;
• Legal - Gonçalves Pereira, Castelo Branco & Associados;
The technical assistance was assured by the staff of theWater Municipal
Services of Feira (SAMS).
To Indáqua Feira:
• Financial - PriceWaterHouse;
• Auditors & Project Engineering - Consortium COBAIEFIEFE;
• Legal - PLMJ - Saraga Lea!, Miguel Judice;
• Project - CLSER.
3.2. CONTRACTS
3.2.1. Concession Contract
On the 3rd December 1999, Sta Maria da Feira Municipality granted to Indáqua Feira
two concession contracts for 35 years: first the water collection and distribution and
second the wastewater sewerage treatment. Indáqua Feira will design and build part of
the network of water supply and treatment, and operate the whole system.
Under the terms of the concession, the municipality has to give Indáqua Feira an annual
subsidy of 250 million escudos in cash or equivalent in construction works, for a period
of 7 years, totalling 1.75 billion escudos. The choice is the exclusive prerogative of the
municipality and it has to be communicated to the concessionaire in advance from the
planned construction schedule (from 2 years to 6 months depending on the type of
construction involved as to allow the necessary time to adjust the concessionaire's
plans). The construction works have to be done according to the terms defined in the
concession contract.
The Municipality is also committed to build part of the infrastructures: the ETAR's
(wastewater treatment plants), the reservoirs, the pumping stations and the sewage
interceptors, i.e., 30% of the water distribution and wastewater sewerage networks.
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Construction of the water system started January 2000, and construction of the two
complete networks was scheduled to last for 8 years and 3 months.
3.2.2. Design and Construction Sub-Contract
The design and construction contract was awarded to Grupo Construtor da Feira, ACE,
constituted by the construction companies shareholders of Indáqua Feira: Mota &
Companhia, Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte Engenharia e Construcoes and Engil.
The concessionaire's construction works involve:
. Water and Sewage Mains (2 x 1100 Km)
S
	 Water Distribution	 8 billion escudos
Wastewater Sewerage	 11 billion escudos
. Water Pumping Stations - 2 units (<200 m3/h) 	 100 million escudos
The municipality is committed to build
• Sewage Interceptors (100 Km)	 4 billion escudos
• Reservoirs - 18 units (16 000 m3)	 800 million escudos
• ETAR's	 3 units (20 000 to 85 000 inhabitants)
5 units (5 000 to 20 000 inhabitants)
12 units (<1 000 inhabitants)	 3.2 billion escudos
3.2.3. Financing Agreement - Loan agreement
Total capital expenditure amounts to EIJR 160 million. The financing has the following
sources:
• The private sector, Indáqua Feira raised EUR 110 million:
•	 Sponsor equity and subordinated debt: EUR 30 million;
• Effi Bank Loan in non-recourse financing regime: EUR 80
million. Guaranteed by three Portuguese commercial banks:
Banco Totta & Açores SA, Banco Totta & Sottomayor de
Investimentos SA (former Chemical), and Banco Pinto &
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Sottomayor SA; 25-year term and a grace period of up to 10
years.
Very importantly, the availability of Effi' financing to the private partner is conditional
upon the completion of the construction works which are the Municipality's
responsibility.
• The public sector, St Maria da Feira Municipality, contributes with EUR
50 million (8.1 billion escudos worth of construction works and a
subsidy of 1.75 billion escudos). The origin of the finds is:
• European Union Cohesion Fund: 3.5 billion escudos (the first
projections were that the fund - non returnable - would cover
85% of the investment, but due to the constraints of the III QCA
this percentage is now reduced to an estimate of 5 0%);
Municipality own funds: 2 billion escudos. They have a budget
of around 8 billion escudos, the current expenses are about 4
billion escudos.	 Need 2 billion escudos for other internal
investments, and only the remainder can be used to invest;
•	 Commercial Loans: 2 billion escudos;
.	 A contribution to the concessionaire of 1.75 billion escudos cash
or equivalent in construction works for a period of 7 years (250
million escudos per year).
The municipality has opted not to pay cash as the contribution to the concessionaire and
instead undertake construction works. They consider that the works commissioned
directly by the municipality can be cheaper than when done by the companies sub-
contracted by the concessionaire to construct the networks. One of the reasons is that in
S ta
 Maria da Feira the unemployment rate is about 2.8%, which in practice is full
employment. This means that the non-local construction have to pay premium wages,
increasing their costs and putting them in disadvantage with the local companies. There
is also a socio-economic reason: the municipality has had very good long-term
relationships with local contractors. In practice, this means that when the market for
construction is good the companies don't overcharge, and vice-versa that when the
market suffers a downturn the municipality proposes fair prices, taking no advantage of
the situation.
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3.2.4. Operation and Maintenance Sub-contract
Not available
3.2.5. Direct Agreement
Not available
3.2.6. Shareholders Agreement
Not available
3.2.7. Dispute Resolution Procedure
Not available
3.3. LIFE CYCLE
The Life Cycle of Indáqua Feira Life Cycle (Figure 3) started with the establishment of
Business Need for the construction and maintenance of the water distribution and
sewerage networks in the Municipality of Sta Maria da Feira - Northern Portugal.
The next steps involved the appraisal of the financing options, and as the Municipality
has little funds it was decided to apply for the non-reimbursable EU Cohesion Funds.
The volume of construction works to undertake was such that other sources of financing
were necessary. Taking this into account a competitive tender was launched, and two
proposals came forward with a project finance structure.
Indáqua Feira was appointed as Preferred Bidder and the concession contract was
signed on 3rd December 1999.
The construction works was divided between the concessionaire and the Municipality.
The operation of both systems was Indáqua Feira's immediate responsibility. Problems
with the access to EU funding caused delays to the Municipality's share of construction
works, that as of May 2001 were not yet fully solved. The concession will end 2035.
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Figure 3. Indáqua Feira Life Cycle
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4. RISK TRANSFER
4.1. VALuE FOR MONEY (VFM) AND PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR (PSC)
No analysis whatsoever. However, the scheme would not be possible utilising any other
procurement and financing arrangement.
4.2. RISK ALLOCATION
A summary of the main risk categories allocation matrix is described in Table 3. There
is a brief description of the risks and the respective allocation agreed between the public
and private partners. It is interesting to note that for some risks the consumers carry the
risk. There follows a discussion of the main issues raised within the various risk
categories.
4.2.1. Political and Regulatory Risks
Non-availability of EU funds after signing the concession contract - St Maria da
Feira Municipality opted to apply for EU funding to construct some infrastructures
because it has a small budget and is legally prevented from having the service debt
weight over 2O° of its budget. The concession contract was signed in the belief that the
Environment Ministry would make the necessary funds available. What happened was
that: First, the Central Government took about a year and a half to send the application
to Brussels for funding through the II QCA. It arrived there four months before the end
of the program and the fund was exhausted. Second, by the time the III QCA was
available the Minister had been replaced and the policy for EU funding too, giving in
practice sole access of EU funds to IEP-AdP.
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Table 3. StE Maria da Feira Municipality Risk Matrix
Main	 Project Specilic	 Description	 Allocation	 CommentsGlobal Risk Characteristics	 Risk
Correct lnforrTratnon	 Correct speuficatioris 	 ConcesxrouiaireBidding	 ___________________ _____________________ ______________ ________________ ________________________________________________
Lo ofuncarre theAdhesion level to sewage
	
to nou-uwage of	 Concessionaire	 'Die sewage connection is not mandatorysydem
______________________________ service
Lower than expected
population	 Loss of income	 Municipality	 flit Mutocipatity us responsible forthe deanograploc studiesConsumers	 Bin tariff will lInen be raised
Lu ofiucome the
Undo 10% of tine estimated consumption it's an automaticBilling nab
	 to noti-collecued	 Ccncemiotiaire	
mectraiosan for raregotiauuti of the financial eqnilihnum
_______________________________________ hilt
	 ______________________________
Doss mid Risk	 Its i assumed a pre.Cant naerclral Pnco Varrahaonis	 Lower thair expected Water	 defined amount forper capita ccsiaimpironi 	 Consumers	 The lower revenue will be reflected m the pnce that Lire public paysPaymettt Risk	 iticrease in water per'
___________________________ capita consuitiption
	 _____________________ ______________________________________________________________
Price variation of din water
Cotisumernirplred by AD P
	 _________________
Lower revenue the in fewer
'Die concessIonaire in responsible for the industrials forecastsindustrial sewerage	 Concessionaire
estimatescotitiecticqi
When the Monicipalily unilaterully adversely changes the tariffs a
titunlataal tariff revision	 Loss of income	 Municipality	 Tantittation Event is iroflated, 'Die Muuicipaldywtll asusime all die
_____________________ concessionaire's obligations, including debt repayinmis
Cotistrrictionn delays
	 'Die contractor is reaparsible for imitating alt steps necesaniy for theMunicipalityDelays in eupropnattous	 the to unavailability Coticessiosutre
	
expropriation 'Die Municipality is responsible for the payment of
_______________________ of laid
	 _________________ any indemnities
Constriction	 'ay of the partners of tire construction consortium becomesContractor Solvency	 insolvent, die remainder will have to carry out the obligations of die
aibcontractirs
_________________________ _________________ ___________________ coxstmdion cob-contract
Cost Ovemni	 Constrictor	 The Constriction conu'art is fixed pnce
Costs arid delays caused by
Consumersdrajige no conniract
Cost Overrnus	 Unforeseen gmnitid 	 Construction sub-
Completion Delays	 uouditiou	 contractor
Latent Defect.	 Pamrois and atiprovals	 Delays in wi,ics	 Contractor	 The ACEwill negotiate indapendenilywidi die Municipality
In tirrie	 Cut overrun ut	 Shared	 The concesuooaire will pay immediately the predefined amounts
Tobudget	 esproiriaunog	 ____________________ _______________________ arid the municipality snpp mis the excess
Construction	 To specnticataert	 Completion Delays
	 Coticessionaire	 Thnikey coiiiract 'Die ridc irannsferred to the design / builder -
___________________________ __________________ _____________________ Cotisnnictiou cotiteactors dnardiolders
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According to the concession contract, any delays in construction or no (reduced) EU
funding are considered to be the municipality' exclusive responsibility, as it is
recognised that Indáqua Feira would incur revenue losses due to the non-availability of
infrastructures that are part of the networks under construction and that are critical for
the whole operation. A possible solution for Sta Maria da Feira would be, for example,
to allocate construction to the private partner, but this would imply a renegotiation of
the contract and it will necessarily be reflected in raising the tariffs. Sta Maria da Feira
Municipality partially solved the problem by establishing a second contract to build
their share of water distribution system with SHvIIRIA - Sistema Multi-municipal de
Recoiha, Tratamento e Rejeicão de Efluentes da Ria de Aveiro, a local Multi-municipal
systefn participated by IEP-AdP and adjoining Municipalities.
However, Sta Maria da Feira has yet to solve the problem of funding to construct its
share of the wastewater sewerage network the ETAR's and sewage interceptors. The
share of the network that is the private partner' responsibility is also on hold, as under
the agreement established between Indáqua Feira and Effi, the concessionaire will not
start any investments in the sewerage network until this issue is definitely solved.
State Monopoly - In Portugal, Local Authorities are usually very small, and depend on
the availability of EU structural funds to undertake the much needed infrastructure
investments. But, the Central Government controls the III QCA funds, and only accepts
the proposals (against EU directives) from Multi-municipal systems in which IIEP-AdP
is a majority shareholder. Nor can the private companies or even the Local Authorities
apply, as was the case when the Indáqua Feira concession contract was negotiated and
signed.
Consequently, the private companies, like Indâqua, that have entered the water supply
and sewerage management market with an expectation for a large market are now faced
with legislation that, in practice, gives the monopoly of all the systems upstream from
the clean water distribution networks or downstream from the wastewater collection
networks to IEP-AdP a state owned company. IEP-AdP have the exclusive rights to
apply for the EU funding (non returnable) and the Local Authorities, that have the
exclusive competence to manage these services, don't have the necessary funds to
undertake the construction works. This leaves for the private sector only the market for
infrastructure of the clean water distribution and the wastewater collection networks,
because with the level of investment needed it would be impossible to have an adequate
4
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return and simultaneously maintain a reasonable level of tariffs if only private funding
would be used.	 -
The power that [EP-AdP has derived from the access to EU funding extends to other
areas like the above mentioned clean water distribution and the wastewater collection
networks, because in any case the municipalities don't have funds to biild them. Also,
when there are tenders the IEP-AdP, through a subsidiary - Aquapor, is •
 present,
competing with the other private companies with the advantage that being a government
organisation it can trade favours with the municipalities promising them other
infrastructures, schools, etc.
	 -
As an example of the prevailing political wiTi, on 25th May 2001 the concession of the
Municipal System of Wastewater Treatment from 8 Algarve(southern part of Portugal)
was awarded directly without any tender to the company Aguas do Algarve, owned
51% by IEP-AdP and several municipalities of Algarve that were forced to join against
their will.
Melo-Franco described the current situation:
In Portugal, the outstanding contribution from the EUfunds, has contributed to
A sigmjIcant reinforcement of the role of the state held corporate sector;
A private economic players role much below their expectations.
Conflicting interests - The disarticulation among Ministries is also a very significant
issue when dealing with 'project finance' type of projects, as it leads to delays in the
decisions and can reduce the bargaining power of the public sector in a negotiation. The
negotiation teams are almost always replaced when the government change, each
Ministry has its own policy guidelines and the Government often imposes politically
driven decisions that affect the financial equilibrium of the project.
There are also discrepancies and a possible conflict of interests with the regulatory
authority. The Instituto Regulador de Aguas e Residuos (IRAR) - Regulatory Institute
of Waters and Residues - is nominated by the Environment Ministry and regulates this
activity within the concessions of municipal and multi-municipal systems, but doesn't
regulate the Local Authorities if they themselves manage the water and wastewater
systems. One of the IRAR' tasks is to undertake a pre-feasibility analysis to all tenders
for concessions for water, wastewater and solid urban residues systems.
4
8 Sistema Municipal de Saneamento Bãsico do Algarve
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Inflation - Both Indáqua Feira and the Municipality carry financial risks, because both
have construction works to undertake, and need external funding. Inflation is a major
risk that the project carries especially because the works are going to extend for eight
years.
Payments by the Municipality - The concession can involve several types of payments
to the concessionaire from the Municipality. These can be either the predictable annual
subsidies to the concessionaire or unexpected payments like when the financial
equilibrium of the concession has to be re-established by the Local Authority. There are
two basic issues regarding the realistic possibility of getting the payments:
The Local Authorities have small budgets and the service debt weight on the
annual budget is nearly always very close to the limits, so they cannot recur to
further borrowing. Any financial compensation will be hard to get;
. The other way to get a financial compensation is increasing the tariffs, which is
both unpopular and politically damaging to the local politicians.
4.2.3. Social Risks
Public Perception - This project doesn't involve a great deal of controversy since the
need for the establishment of the water distribution and sewage networks is well
understood and accepted. Nevertheless it is always necessary to mitigate some
opposition especially related with the inconveniences during the construction stage. For
example, it is necessary to maintain good relations with the church (it is a strongly
catholic region) and make provisions to prevent construction works, like open ditches,
disrupting the passage of processions.
Mixing Local Authorities - The solution to integrate Sta Maria da Feira network with
the networks of adjoining municipalities carries the risk of opposition based on ancient
rivalries. The projects involving water supply are especially sensitive to these issues
and procedures to deal with them have to be established.
Rights of Way - During construction it is also necessary to take care that the rights of
way are accounted for. Local people are very sensitive to these rights.
4
383
lndáqua Feira - St Maria da Feira Water Supply and Wastewater Sewerage
4.2.4. Environmental Risk
Environmental Impact Assessment studies are needed only for the ETAR's
construction, but as their dimension is relatively small the environmental impact usually
doesn't represent a big risk.
4.2.5. Legal Risks
There is a contradiction on the competences within the several governmental bodies
involved in the contract. On one hand, only the Local Authorities have the legal
endorsement to sign a contract, but on the other hand it is the Central Government that
has the legislative power and controls the allocation of EU funds.
4.2.6. Bidding Risks
Both the public and private partners fully assumed their respective bidding costs. These
are high and at a total loss to the private partner if they don't win the bid.
Partnership Approach to the Negotiations - The complexity of this concession
contract has lead to extensive negotiations and special care was given to establish a
good relation between the authority and the concessionaire. This approach has helped
to solve many of the problems encountered.
Experience - The experience of how to deal with these processes is very important, as
cost reductions can be huge. For the public partner this was the first project undertaken
using project financing and the costs for the municipality went up to 500 million
escudos. They estimate that the experience and knowledge gained with the negotiation
of this contract makes it possible that on future negotiations the costs will be reduced to
about 200 million escudos.
Information Quality - The bidding risk is related to lack of and erroneous information
that can lead to the inability to take decisions, or alternatively to make the wrong ones.
After the signing of the contract, it became clear that clarifications, interpretations, etc.,
were still needed. Clearly a sign that the information provided during the negotiations
was not completely adequate.
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4.2.7. Construction Risks
Construction risks are those risks that have the potential for causing Completion Delays,
Cost Overruns and Latent Defects. The construction of the entire water distribution and
wastewater sewerage treatment systems is split between Indáqua Feira and the
Municipality, which is responsible for building the sewage interceptors, the reservoirs,
the pumping stations and the water treatment plants. Both the Municipality and the
concessionaire carry construction risks.
Non-Completion or Completion Delays - The Municipality took tile risk of
completion delays for the infrastructures that it is supposed to build. These are part of a
network and its non-availability will necessarily affect the concessionaire financial
equilibrium because if it is impossible to connect the consumers Indáqua Feira will have
no revenues. As of May 2001, the Municipality' construction works were behind
schedule due to lack of funds. In order to minimise the effects to the overall plan, the
concessionaire has already postponed the works in the wastewater sewerage of year one,
and merged the activities of year-one into year-two
One of the rules established between Indáqua Feira and EIB is that they will not start
construction of the sewerage network and the Bank will not make available any funds
for this purpose unless the issue of the Local Authority delays in the investment
(ETAR's and interceptors) is definitely, settled. This type of risk can be eliminated if
the private partner is fully in charge of all construction works, but this would
necessarily lead to raising the tariffs.
Expropriations, Site-Availability - The very small property dimension in this region
make site availability a very important issue. The Municipality took the risk of delays
in site availability due to delays in expropriations, and the risk of expropriations' cost
overruns. The concessionaire supports the cost only up to a predefined level.
Expropriations are mainly needed for the construction of ETAR's and water pumping
stations. For the rest of tile networks it is only necessary to safeguard the rights of way.
The risk of social outcries related to expropriations is greater during the construction
stage. Due to the very small property dimension, the number of expropriation processes
can seem large relative to the area involved (213 Km2).
4
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Cost Overruns - The concessionaire took frill construction risk associated with the part
of the network allocated to them. Indáqua Feira then partially transferred this risk to the
construction sub-contractor - Grupo Construtor da Feira - that signed a fixed price
contract subject to inflation correction and insurance coverage of cost overruns and
completion delays. The risks associated with delays in obtaining 1icences and
authorisations are with the concessionaire.
The construction risk is especially sensitive to price variations, since the Investment
Plan spans eight years, which makes the uncertainty attached to the construction budget
relatively high.	 -
Latent Defects - The Municipality transferred their latent defects risk to the
concessionaire conditional to Indáqua's project approval and auditing of the
construction works undertaken by the concessionaire. The great majority of the mains
to be installed are standard - 90% of the network has pipes with the same diameter - 90
mm for the water pipes, and 200 mm for the wastewater sewerage - and this greatly
minimizes risks.
Ground conditions - There is a significant risk related to ground conditions during the
construction stage. Cables belonging to other companies like the telephone and power
companies also occupy the area where the water and sewage pipes are to be installed.
Traditionally the discipline of the several companies that utilise the underground for
their networks is poor. For example, there are big problems knowing the exact location
of power cables.
4.2.8. Design Risks
Quality of information - The Concession Contract integrates a detailed investment
plan of the network but the great design risk is related with the specifications that have
proved not to have the necessary detail. This has led to the need for countless
interpretations and clarifications with consequences at the construction level.
4.2.9. Commercial Risks
The commercial risk depends on the revenues from the services provided. The revenue
level is affected by the following four main factors:
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• Adoption level (before construction 20% for water, and 4% for the wastewater
sewerage);
• Demographic evolution of the municipality;
• Water per capita consumption;
Payment risk.
The commercial risk allocation is split among the municipality, the concessionaire, and
the consumers. If the concessionaire is under certain adverse conditions the consumers
carry the risk through increased tariffs. It is important to note that the consumers are
not homogeneous. There are three segments: domestic, commercial and industrial.
Each one has different needs and their future evolution differs too.
Adoption level - This is the most important risk assumed by the concessionaire. It is
expected that the majority of new consumers will connect to the service during the
construction stage. It is very expensive and inefficient to make the connection to a
consumer after concluding the installation of the main pipes.
Marketing campaigns are scheduled to promote the connection particularly to the
wastewater sewerage network. The connection to the wastewater sewerage is critical,
because it is not legally mandatory and is generally considered to be the most profitable
segment of the business. Its need is still not very well understood by all consumers, as
they are used to discharging (at no cost) the wastewaters without treatment and now
they would have to pay for that service.
Demographic evolution - The demographic studies are the municipality'
responsibility: if the population evolution proves to be 10% less than the forecast, there
will take place an automatic mechanism for the renegotiation of the financial
equilibrium of the concessionaire and the tariffs will be raised. It is considered that for
the demographic evolution very conservative estimates were used hence this risk is
small.
Per Capita Consumption - If per capita consumption is 10% less than of the forecast,
tariffs will be raised.
Payment Risk - Historically, the payment risk (billing risk) is low, because it is an
essential service and in the case of non-payment it will be discontinued. The weight of
the water bill in the overall budget of the consumers is reduced and an upward margin
of 20% would be atceptable. This explains why the other concessions have already
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increased prices without any problem (initially they were supposed to lower the prices),
adjusting the prices to the operational costs. For example, Aguas do Cávado was
planning to reduce the price and instead raised it from 50 to 65 escudos/m3.
4.2.10. Operation/Maintenance risks
The O/M risks are mainly related with raw water supply and the O/M costs. Both issues
are discussed below.
4.2.10.1. Raw Water Availability
The water has to be supplied by another company - Aguas do Douro e Paiva (A.D.P.) -
and there is always the risk of an interruption or insufficient supply.
	 The
Concessionaire and the Municipality in the case of a Force Majeure event share this
	 -
risk; otherwise A.D.P. carries the risk and correspondent liability.
4.2.10.2. Operation/Maintenance costs
The technology used is rather conservative and the risks associated with O/M are
generally well known and mainly related with the ageing of materials. Severn Trent has
given technical assistance at the beginning of the project, but now they consider it to be
unnecessary and expensive, viewing their participation in the project as merely
financial.
To guarante& an adequate level of service and to overcome the problems that will arise
it is expected that Indaqua Feira's staff will increase and that they will have better and
more technologically advanced means.
One of the main items in O/M costs are the wages. Indáqua Feira staff are highly
qualified. It happens that in the private sector the less qualified levels (administrative
clerks) earn less than in the public sector. The reverse happens for the highest levels,
where in the private sector they earn much more than in public sector. 9 The salary
range in the private sector is much wider, than in the public sector where it is around I
4
An engineer with 32-35 years earns less than 200 million escudos/month.
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to 4. It looked like that as the costs with personnel are higher in the private sector
apparently this would put Indáqua Feira at a disadvantage. It happens, private
employees are more motivated, and are more efficient a counterweight to higher costs.
It is important to note that with the contractual requirement to absorb former
municipality employees, the concessionaire has to take risks that otherwise could be
transferred to a third party, like an O/M contractor.
4.2.11. People Risks
By law, in all concessions, the Municipality's employees have the option whether or not
to be transferred to the concessionaire, with their previous rights and privileges always
guaranteed. Indáqua Feira absorbed 30 employees that had to be trained and integrated
into the culture of a private company. It is important to move them away from their old
working environment, and give them better working conditions, like good changing
rooms, etc. In this northern region, the unions are notorious for standing for their rights.
4.2.12. Force Majeure
Due to the relatively large area of the network (213 Km 2) it is unlikely that Force
Majeure events will affect the whole network, even in the worst scenario. Most likely,
the events might result in the non-functioning of some items in low areas more
susceptible to flooding.
A Force Majeure event can lead either to restoration of the financial equilibrium of the
concessionaire or termination of the concession with an adequate compensation.
4.2.13. Residual Value
The assets have to be returned to the public partner at no cost and in good working
conditions. The technology and the behaviour of the materials used are well known, so
this risk should not be very significant. However due to the long concession period
there is always the possibility of unexpected deteriorations.
4
4.3. ACCOUNTING ISSUES (PROCESS)
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Specific to Local Authorities
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5. KEY MESSAGES
Key Learning Points:
I. The Political/Regulatory Risks can never be underestimated - This case
study illustrates that not even the public partner is free from political/regulatory
risks originated by their own government. Usually the private partners are more
subject to the adverse consequences and uncertainties related with the
political/regulatory risks. As with what happened with Indáqua Feira
demonstrates every partner can be affected.
2. Decision Power, Lack of Empowerment - S ta Maria da Feira Municipality
suffered the consequences of incongruence in the governmental system. On one
hand only Local Authorities had the power to award the concession, but on the
other hand they could not minimally control the decision power that derived
from central government directives. An important lesson to draw is not to sign
contracts for which they don't have to rely on future decision, as it was the case
where there was no firm (written) commitment from the Central government to
allow the Municipality access to EU funding.
3. A partnering approach is beneficial - In this project there was a partnering
approach to project management, the development of a sense of trust, and the
understanding of the need to work for a common goal both from the public and
private partner - that was essential to overcome some difficulties, and is still
prevalent in the present.
4. Small Dimension projects and/or sponsors can be developed using the PFI
model (with project finance methodology) subject to certain conditions:
• Too Small Project - From the point of view of a private company
interested in investing in this market, a too small project dimension can be
solved establishing a pool of projects with different Municipalities. That is, the
financing package is one for all projects (conjoint), but the individual projects
are dealt with the different municipalities involved. However, this solution
(currently being tried) creates additional problems:
1. There is the need to manage different partners in the different
municipalities;
a
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2. There are different municipalities to deal with, and not all of
their interests are coincidental;
3. Finally, there are still some legal problems to solve.
• Too Small Sponsor - S ta Maria da Feira is ranked about the 20th
Municipality (or between the 10th and 20th)1O in dimension in a universe of three
hundred twenty five in Portugal. Even so, it is considered too small to undertake
a project like the one described in this case study. The issue is not even one of
financial capacity, but one of management ability and skills. It is essential for
the success of PFI projects that the Municipalities that currently are seriously
und.tstafIed can constitute stable and (relatively) autonomous teams to manage
these projects. The same reasoning applies to small medium enterprises (SMIE).
For the Private Sector:
• Sharing construction responsibilities is a destabilizing factor to a project
finance type of project.
• There is still very little experience in long-term relationships - To find
capital to construct the systems is relatively easy (BEI, commercial banks, etc.),
what has proved to be more problematic is the operationlmaintenance stage that
created the awareness for the need of good contract management procedures.
For the Public Sector:
• In Portugal, there is no tradition to learn from past cases. - Whenever a past
experience is used, it is only to copy without critical analysis. This can lead to
disastrous results as in Tavira where they copied a contract. Afier bidding
started the tender had to be suspended, because the contestants started asking for
clarifications that could not be adequately answered. Finally it was cancelled.
• Clear objectives are critical - The Public partner has to have a clear idea of the
objectives, before issuing the tender. Apparently clear objectives were not
defined. This has over-extended the negotiation period.
Project finance with thedjocal authorities the coastal region of Portugal seems to be feasible, but in the interior the
management, the organization and the procedures are difficult to overcome due to the ver y small dimension.
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• Don't under-staff the negotiation teams - The Public negotiation team was in
clear numeric disadvantage.
Dangers of an excessive emphasis on the price in the selection criteria - This
weight is legally predefined in Dec-Lei 147/95 21 June and all the concessions'
tenders for water and wastewater must abide by it and give 70% weight to the
price criteria, consequently the selection is very dependent on the price. For
example, in the case of Indáqua Feira there was one proposal that presented such
a low tariff that would win the tender leaving aside the technical aspects in
which the proposal was very deficient. It took three quarters of the time of the
evaluation committee to study the technical details and justify that it could not
attain the necessary levels of service. Otherwise, the tender would be won by a
technically very weak proposal and consequently the service provided would not
be adequate.
• Even for the public sector the rules for the usage of the structural funds are
changing - In the II QCA the non-returnable fraction was 85%, now with the III
QCA is between 40-50%, thus increasing the need for regular public funds.
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The adjustment of PFI projects and Small and Medium Enterprises
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1992, when the UK government introduced PFI, the market for PFI projects (or
PFI type) across Europe has steadily increased, the main interest for the governments
being the capture of private funding for governmental projects. It is clear too that
governments constrained by the demands of the Maastricht Treaty, have severe budget
constraints and will pursue the PFI route to undertake its projects'. As expected, large
construction companies that have greater financial capacity to raise funds than small
companies are the major private players. As the PFI market develops large companies
form consortia to bid (very often cross-border) for large infrastructure projects launched
by governments. In Portugal simultaneously with the introduction of PFI there occurred
the opening to the private sector of several areas of economic activity, like water,
sanitation and transport, which require the construction of large infrastructures. The
current scenario is therefore of an unavoidably expanding PFI market dominated by
large companies, because governments need private funds and large companies are in a
privileged position to obtain this financing and on top get the extra benefit of
diversifying their activities and countering and smoothing the construction industry's
economic activity cycles.
Some concerns have been raised that Small and Medium Enterprises (SI\'IE) 2 are being
left out of the PFI market due to the dominance of large companies. As an example, in
Germany the Ministry of Finance of the State of Rheinland-Pfalz3 presented the
endangering of SM1Es as a contra-argument to the utilisation of PFI as a procurement
tool due to the conflict between the application of the value for money concept and
measures for SME protection. This is a key issue with a great socio-economic impact,
as the construction sector throughout Europe always plays a very important economic
role in the national economies in terms of business volume and employment, and SMEs
constitute a large segment of the construction sector.
For an introduction 011 PFI and its background see: Lemos, MT.; Betts, M.; Eaton, D. and Almeida, L.T., From
Concessions to Project Finance and the Private Finance Initiative, PPP/PFI, Journal of Project Finance, Fall 2000.
2 to the European Commission SMEs are all private enterprises with: Less than 250 employees: Turnover
=< 40 Million Euros, or Balance Sheet =< 27 Million Euros; and pass the Independence criteria: > =25% of equity
cannot be owned by any company that cannot be qualified as a SME (except investment or venture capital companies
not exercising control).
Jorg Christen, PFI in Ge,7nanv - Can we and should we copy the British example? First European Infrastructure
Congress- BuB-Workshop' PFI and public buildings, Jan 2001 Frankfurt.
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In view of the importance of SMEs in the national economies, it is very important and
timely to analyse the adjustment of PFI projects to SMEs of the construction sector and
to examine the most adequate strategies for SM1Es under the current and foreseeable PFI
market conditions. The main questions to be answered are:
A. Is the PII market adjusted for SMEs?
B. Are SMEs being left out of the PFI market?
C. Is it feasible or not for a SME to act as sponsor in a PFI project?
D. Does a SMIE have the required technical and financial capacity?
F.	 Does a SME have an aulvantages in entering the PFI market?
F.	 Which are the main constraints for SMEs in the PFI market?
Our research has provided insight on these issues. The conclusions and suggestions that
were drawn are based on empiric data collected both in the UK and Portugal, the
countries that within Europe have adopted more extensively the PFI route, and also on
opinions of a panel of experts mainly in the financial and project management areas. It
is then possible to have an overview of the SMIEs positioning in the PFI market and to
draw some recommendations regarding the relationship between SME arid PFI projects.
The literature review provided very little. The few references to theoretical and
empirical studies that were found referred specifically to the non-existence of previous
studies on financing of Sr\'lEs. Also the London Society for Chartered Accountants 4 on
its comments to a Discussion paper 'Prospective financial information: Challenging the
assumptions' concluded that the 'paper correctly idenqlled the importance of
prospective financial information to the operation of transparent and efficient capital
markets and the ability to raise finance. But pointed out the failure of the paper to
make its proposals more relevant to the concerns of S/viEs, to whom the issue of the
provision of reliable PF1 for the purposes of raising finance is particularly critical'. It
is clearly a suggestion for future research
A brief characterisation of the construction industry in the UK and Portugal is
presented, which is followed by the empiric data collected, the conclusion of the study
and key messages for SMEs in the PFI market.
' London Society of Charteed Accountants, Technical Committee, Comments on the Discussion Paper: Prospective
financial information: challenging the assumption, February 2001.
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2. THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR IN PORTUGAL AND UK
In the Portuguese construction sector there are more than 30 000 registered construction
companies that account for about 7% of the GDP and employ 9% of the country's total
workforce. There are no official data for SMEs, but it is possible to get an overall idea
of their weight within the construction sector, by looking at the data for the companies
that have less than 100 employees. According to 1995 official statistics (IPMEI,
1998), the number of construction companies with less than 100 employees represented
83% of the total numbers of companies, 74% of the total number of employees, and
their business volume is 64% of tile constiuction sector. SMEs represent an even higher
percentage, since the contributions from all the companies that have between 100 and
250 employees must be included. The structure of the Portuguese construction sector
(Eurostat 2000), defined according to the above mentioned criteria, is very similar to the
average structure of the European Union.
The main problems in the Portuguese Construction sector (IAPM1EI, 1998) can be
grouped in the following areas: Lack of: Adequate Human Resources, Innovation,
Investment and Productivity, Management and Organisation Abilities, and very
importantly the overall fiscal, regulatory and governmental policy is not favourable.
The EU has also recognised that these problems affect SMIEs mainly in applicant
countries. A significant effort to help SMIEs in Central and Eastern Europe (Business
Europe, 2000)6 through its PHARE 7 and TACIS 8 programs has been successfully
focusing on improving the legal and institutional environment through lower and fairer
taxation, less red tape, orderly bankruptcy procedures, access to commercial courts and
better information for both banks and companies.
In the UK there is the more widespread usage of management techniques like value
chain analysis and risk management, and the governmental regulatory policy has been
adjusted to the PFI specific needs, like for example the accounting standards. In
support of these findings research conducted by Monk (2000) indicated that the 'most
0 Sector do Constrnçio - Diagnostico e Eixos de Intervenço - IAPMEI, Agosto 1998
Bucines.c Europe, v.40, n.16, August 2000, p.9.
1 he process of enlargement of the European Union vas launched on 30 March 1998. Negotiations are currently
being held with the following twelve applicants: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
8 Launched by the EC in 1991, the Tacis Programme provides grant-financed technical assistance to 13 countries of
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova,
Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), and mainly aims at enhancing the transition
process in these countries.
Monk R. 2000, Why Small Business Fail, CMA Management, Jul, p.12.
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significant reasons for SMEs failure rate is the inability of SMEs to make use of
essential business and management practices'.
There are structural differences between the construction industry in Portugal and in the
UK. The construction market in the UK is larger (in terms of business volume) such
that a large project such as bridge or a shopping mall doesn't have the same impact as in
Portugal where any of these will represent a large slice of the market. Similarly the
impact of public works is much greater in Portugal than in the UK, which gives
Portuguese companies a strong political power.
In the UK the construction market is more fragmented (about ten big players and fifty
intermediaries) than in Portugal with an oligopoly where a reduced number of large
companies controls the market. There are more large companies in the UK although
their relative weight is smaller than in Portugal due to the larger dimension of the
construction market. The large companies in the UK are usually vertically disintegrated
sub-contracting the design, quantity surveying etc, while in Portugal the large
companies have their own in-house competences recurring to sub-contracting only in
very large projects.
There are cultural differences between the two countties. In the UK it is assumed that a
contract is a definitive document while in Portugal, the prevailing attitude is that re-
negotiation is always an option, leading to great waste in time and money. Companies
and owners of the projects have a tradition to revise construction contracts introducing
extra-works that are carried out without tender. In Portugal there is still a lax attitude
towards the enforcement of regulations, while in the UK companies strictly abide by the
regulations including those from the EU.
Other cultural differences between the UK and Portuguese construction sectors refer to
the social environment. According to 'A Review of Procurement and Contract
Management for the EU' (Eaton 200010), the European national construction industries
can be classified according to their cultural, ethical and legal similarities:
•	 UK and Ireland integrate the 'Common Law Group';
•	 Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal integrate the Mediterranean-Ronzano
Group
a
'° Eaton D. 2000, Teaching notes of Salford University.
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The groups are characterised as:
Common Law Group - The countries have a strong common law history,
providing clearly defined and definitive legal traditions and legalistic process.
There is a predominance of separate and independent professions. The main
contractor significantly dominates total national output, and therefore, a strongly
organised and extensive network of sub-contractors and specialists exists to
assist. There is a division of legal responsibility, derived from the separation of
design from construction. The basis of competition tends to be based upon price
and speed (or a combination) rather than quality of output;
•	 .1vfe(IiIJrrcuwa/l-Ro/J/duio Group - In these countries quality is less
emphasised, but might be exceptionally good. The public administration of
planning and development is notoriously slow, and is characterised by
'expensive' regulatory mechanisms and the entire administration of procurement
and management of projects is bureaucratic and highly politicised. The cultural
attitude towards innovation is also different. Portuguese construction companies
are less keen to innovate with very often a high degree of resistance to change.
A contributing factor being that a significant number of companies is family-
owned. In contrast, UK companies tend to envisage innovation as a central
factor for competitiveness.
The Portuguese companies are very interactive, with an informed network and are much
more flexible than in the UK. This was not happening in the UK with a very
fragmented industry where the different partners were doing what they wanted. As PFI
forces interaction it is noticeable that this has changed and the integration of the
different companies value chains is a great concern of the industry especially because it
is so vertically disintegrated.
In Portugal there is a different approach to the PFI methodology from the one that was
established in the UK. In Portugal the VFM criteria is not applied, the decision whether
to undertake the project, is based on purely political, economical and financial
conditions of PFI as a stand alone project not in comparison with a benchmark such as
the PSC. Also the existence in Portugal, but not in the UK", of significant EU funding
was a determinant to the launching of infrastructure projects. The same applies to the
European Investment Bank's special financing conditions.
"Some EU funding is available in the UK. -
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3. EMPIRICAL STUDY
Two small successful PFI projects in the 15K constitute a good example on how a SME
can participate in the PFI market. Both successfully adapted their dimension and
expertise to the PFI projects' dimension and concentrated in specialised sectors:
Primary Education and Blue Light (ambulances, fire fighting) sectors.
A synopsis of the case study Indáqua Feira is also presented. It is a large PFI sponsored
by a small Local Authority. Although from a public perspective it illustrates some of
the issues faced by SMEs.
The Victoria Dock Primary School
The Sewell Group is a very sound 120 years old family construction busmess with
headquarters located in Hull Northern England. They went into the PFI market following a
long-term strategy of return on investment. They invest mainly their own money (250,000
for the Victoria Dock Primary School) recurring to traditional bank loans for financial
leverage, and regard PFI as an opportunity for investment of their available cash. They
 go
for low risk PFI projects (like schools) and expect to get a return on investment of an aerage
l2-l5° instead of 5% in bank deposits. The SeeIl financing strategy is consistent with the
findings of Romano (200 1)12 that studied the factors that influence funding decisions in
family owned SMEs. Romano found that financing through debt is significantl y associated
with firm size, family control, business planning and business objectives. Equity is a
consideration for owners of larger firms, young firms and owners who plan to achieve
growth through increasing profit margins. e.g.. Sewell that invested their own cash.
Sewell also sees PFI as a strategy to smooth the c ycles in the construction industry (usually
10 years cycles), so that in times of depression for the construction industry the company has
guaranteed revenue.
Sewell's involvement in PFI projects changed their attitude to business. They reckon that
now they are more service oriented instead of asset oriented and look very carefull y to whole
life cycle costing since now they are also responsible for Operation and Maintenance.
Se\elI strongly advocates small PFI projects (for example a school is approximately £5
million) to small companies, promoting simultaneously local involvement from the
community and workforce. "When 5-6 or more school projects are bundled into a sizeable
PFI, the large companies are interested in bidding - one school PFI project is not interesting
for them. Sewell always uses local labour even when constructing outside Hull because it
promotes local employment especially important in depressed areas, as is the case in Hull.
Local involvement is also important to good maintenance in non-metropolitan locations like
Hull where a big FM company would take too long to replace parts - one day instead of one
hour to repair a boiler.
Throughout the process a partnership approach was used, promoting co-operation between
all the parties involved.' 3
 The decision taken by Sewell to promote a 'Community Dividend'
12 Romano, C.A. TanewskL G.A & Smyrnios, K.X. (2001) Capital Structure Decision Making: A model for family
busmess, J. of Business Venturing, May; 16 (3), pp 285-310.
D http://ww\v.sewell-groupco.uklpfl-base.html.
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has enhanced this approach. The Sewell SP y
 'The Victoria Dock School PFI Ltd' is to
return a proportion of their profit to the community it serves and of which it is a part. As of
2000, it represented around £35,000 that went back to the school and was applied to special
projects, like environmental - A Wildlife Wood within the school grounds providing a
wildlife habitat in an urban setting and an environmental focus for education.
Previous experience is important to success. The Sewell Group had already constructed
schools, had great expertise in building niaintcnance and refurbishment in schools/hospitals.
As a result, when Sewell decided to enter the PFI market they built upon their previous
expertise and core business, adjusting their strategy to the long-term perspective of operation
and management for a period of at least 20 years. The focus on reducing maintenance and
repair costs was a critical issue during project develcpment, as it is their responsibility for
the day-to-day building maintenance.
Manchester Fire Station
Carden Croft & Co is a small architectural finn, with great experience in project
management. They regard PFI as an opportunity
 because entering into a long-term business
is a way to smooth the ups and downs of the cycles in the construction industry similar to the
previous example of The Sewell Group. Likewise for the cycles in governmental policy: if
the government needs to fuel the economy it awards more contracts especially for
infrastructure projects. vice-versa if the government needs to cool down an overheated
economy it withdraws the contracts.
Carden & Co was awarded the PFI project of the Manchester Fire Station. and in 2000 bid
for a network of rural fire stations'. It is responsible for construction, operation and
maintenance of the Manchester Fire Station (type Full) 14 . Greater Manchester Council
(GMC) is the public partner that administers the Greater Manchester Fire Service. Carden
Croft feels that GMC had a good sense of what was needed and was very much target
oriented'. This is not the case of other negotiations where people are not as committed
because they are told what to do, rendering the decision process very tricky. Cultural
adjustments had to be accounted for in design, as fire fighters are ver y cultural specific. e.g.,
they don't like open space offices (where money could be saved) because they regard their
own 'territory' as an important mark of rank, the same applies to office footage.
Carden Croft & Co also sees specialisation as a key to success. They will concentrate in the
Blue Light sector (Fire fighting and ambulances) because their needs are very similar e.g.,
the need to have a quick response to the alarms, the existence of dormitories. etc.
Cardcn Croft is not a risk taking finn and will always focus in low risk areas like the Blue
Light sector, which unlike accommodation where there is high uncertainty regarding the
buildings residual value because at the end of the concession this value might be seriously
undervalued from the one expected. They also consider hospitals as a complex high-risk
sector with too many decision centres.
14 There are three types of lre stations: Full - including accommodation, Medium and Rural - that operate only part-
time.
401
The adjustment of PFI projects to Small and Medium Enterprises
Indáqua Feira
S ta Maria da Feira' 5 is ranked about the 20th Municipality (or between the 10th and 20th)16
in dimension in a universe of three hundred and twenty five in Portugal. It is a Northern
municipality located 270 Km from Lisbon, with 211 Km2 of area, and a population of 130
000. Feira has great economic activity being the world largest centre of cork manufacturing,
and other industries like shoe making, toys, wood products, paper, dairy products, etc.
On the 3rd December 1999, Sta Maria da Feira Municipality granted to lndaqua Feira (SPY)
two concession contracts for 35 years: first for the water collection and distribution and
second for the wastewater sewerage treatment. Indáqua Feira will design and build part of
the network of watcr supply and treatment, and operate the whole system.
It's the first PFI type of project uiidrtakcn by a Municipality using European Union (EU)
Cohesion Funds to leverage private finance for a major public infrastructure. These funds
(85% non-returnable) would directly finance part of the capital works. The Municipality had
not enough funds to undertake the project, and could not apply for a commercial loan
because the service debt weight on the annual budget has a legally imposed limit of up to
20°c of the budget.
Joint financing of the public and private sector was needed because with the level of
investment needed it would be impossible to have an adequate return (the financial ratios of
the model would not be favourable for the private loans) and simultaneously maintain a
reasonable level of tariffs if only private funding would be used.
The PFI project was signed and lndáqua Feira was awarded the concession for water
distribution and wastewater in St5 Maria da Feira. The Municipality committed itself to
build part of the necessary infrastructure, for which it needed the contribution of the
Cohesion Funds. However, in the meantime the political guidelines changed and the
Municipalities were not allowed direct access to the funds. This has left the S ta Maria da
Feira unable to fulfil its contractual obligations, and has led to a standstill in the construction
of the sewerage networks.
Source: St Maria de Feira http://www.byweb.pt/smtamariadafeiraJindex.htin1  (accessed 12 September 2000).16 Project finance with the oca1 authorities of the coastal region of Portugal seems to be feasible, but in the interior the
management, the organization and the procedures are difficult to overcome due to the ver y small dimension.
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4. KEY MESSAGES FOR SMES
The conclusion supported by the empiric data collected in this study, is that SMEs can
play an important role in the PFI market. Nevertheless they have to be very attentive
because although there are advantages, the existing constraints can lead a project to
failure. The bankruptcy of SMEs is a strong possibility because a small company might
not have the financial strength to absorb such loss.
•	 Is THE PFI MARKET ADJUSTED FOR SMEs? Yes, but the PFI market is
segmented and the SMEs must choose the right segment/niche. (McDonald &
Dunbar 1998). 17 18
The analysis of the case studies and data collected provided an understanding on how
the PFI market works and on the relative importance of key processes to the public and
private partners. As such, it is proposed (see Table 1) that the segmentation variables,
or dimensions, adequate for the differentiation between projects could be: The
Dimension of the sponsor and the Dimension of the contractor. The market is then
divided into homogeneous sectors characterised by the relative dimensions of all
parties.
The sponsors of a PFI can be the Central Government that usually launches large
projects (defined in terms of project cost)' 9
 , Local Government that can launch all types
of projects from large to small, and the special case of Corporate PFI 2° where a private
company tenders for a service provision, the only difference being that there are two
private partners instead of one private and one public.
The basic principle, to apply the PFI methodology, is that 'there must exist an
adjustment of the project 's dimension, to both the concessionaire ' and authority'
17 Malcoin McDonald & Ian Dunhar - Market Segmentation - How to do it, How to protit from it - McMilI.m Press
ltd 2ed 1998.
18 The definition of McDonald & Duribar 1998 was adapted as' AIarket segmentation - is processes of splitting the
market into different groups or segments, within which the projects have the same or similar requirements?
19 Large PFI over £101) million, Medium PFI £50-IOU million, Small FF1 less than £50 million. Small projects can be
bundled to get a larger project.
20 Corporate FF1 is pickin up. Some good examples are the building of Smith Klein and Beecham and Marks &
Spencer headquarters. This area can prove to be an opportunit y
 for SMEs, as the projects dimension is more
adjusted to the company's dimension.
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diniension'. According to the PFI market segmentation SMEs can play an important role
in Small PFI projects, which very often are not very attractive to large companies.
Table 1. PFI Market Segmentation
Local Government
Corporate PFI
Large PFI
	 Small PFI
Appropricite	 Not Approprio
(conditionally)
Not	 Highly
Appropriate	 Appropriate
It is reasonable to expect that the negotiation teams from both the public and private
sectors are balanced in terms of number and expertise, while special attention has to be
given when in the case of large companies and small sponsors (Local Government or
Corporations), that the Public Team cannot be understaffed and has to be balanced with
the private one in number and expertise.
The adjustment between the relative dimensions of project and sponsor makes sense as
small projects require less resources and a narrower range of expertise than large
projects. It is important to note that it is the range of expertise that is in question not the
degree of specialisation. In effect the research points out that small PFI projects are
more suited to specialised companies that operate in market niches. It follows a brief
analysis of what can happen if the relative dimensions are not adjusted, i.e., if the
project, the sponsor and the private companies are too small.
If the project is too small - From the point of view of a private company
interested in investing in the PFI market, a too small project dimension can be
solved by establishing a pool of projects with different Municipalities. That is,
the financing package is one for all projects (conjoint), but the individual projects
are dealt with by the different municipalities involved. However, this solution
(currently bein tried in Portugal) creates additional problems:
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1.There is the need to manage different partners in the different
municipalities;
2.There are different municipalities to deal with, and not all of their interests
are coincidental;
3.There are always legal problems to solve.
If the sponsor (public partner) is too small - A good example is the concession
of the build and management of the water supply and wastewater sewerage
systems in Sta Maria da Feira. This Municipality is not the smallest in Portugal; it
is ranked about the 20th 21 in a universe of three hundred and twenty five in
Portugal. Even so, it is considered too small to undertake or manage a project
such as this. The issue is not financial capacity to undertake the project, but the
lack of management ability and skills. It is essential for the success of PFI
projects that the Municipalities that currently are seriously understaffed can
constitute stable and (relatively) autonomous teams to manage these projects.
If the private companies are too small (like S1\'IEs) - The explanation for a too
small sponsor also applies to small private partners like SMEs. To solve the
problem and achieve an adjusted dimension a consortium can be formed but the
number of companies in the consortium will be greater than if the companies
involved were large. This has two opposing effects:
•	 Positive - The number of competences increases (it is
reasonable to assume a combination of different competences)
•	 Negative - The entropy increases - more co-ordination
efforts, more adjustments are needed.
•	 ARE SMES BEING LEVF OUT OF THE PFI MARKET? No. SMEs can
always participate in this market as a sub-contractor, i.e., it participates in the
project but it is sub-contracted by the concessionaire. As such, it is playing the
same role as in the normal market providing services to the consortium. It is
important to understand that the aim of PFI is the provision of good quality
21 Project finance with the l2cal authorities of the coastal region of Portugal seems to be feasible, but in the interior of
the country, management, organization and the procedures are difficult due to the very small dimension of the
municipalities.
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services. SMEs might find it harder to deal with the concessionaire than a
regular client, as the first has very rigorous quality standards.
• Is IT FEASIBLE OR NOT FOR A SME TO ACT AS A SPONSOR IN A PFI
PROJECT? Yes provided that there is adjustment between the SMEs' dimension
and that of the PFI project. A Partnering approach is beneficial - This comes
as a pattern in our study and is often adopted, although informally, through the
pre-existing good personal interrelations in the local community
•	 DOES A SME HAVE THE REQUIRED TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL
CAPACITY? Yes, provided that two factors are considered: Specialisation
focussed in core competences, and Investment in low risk sectors, enabling a
straightforward decision, and providing low uncertainty in revenues, are the
key factors to consider. In principle there is np problem applying project
finance (the PFI financing technique) to a SME. 22 But the project has to be
adjusted to the promoter's 'balance sheet'. It is always necessary to make a
preliminary assessment of their financial capacity. Although the banks
consider that construction risk is the most important risk involved, their main
criterion to assess the promoter's strength is how strong is both the
constructor's and operator's balance sheet (which a priori favours the big
players). There is another factor that SMEs must take into account: PFI tenders
are complex and take much longer to discuss than with regular procurement,
which makes them more costly. In the UK it is not uncommon that the tender
stage takes up to two years, while with conventional procurement it would take
four months
•	 DOES A SME HAVE ANY ADVANTAGES IN ENTERING THE PFI FVIARKET?
Yes, several advantages can be envisaged:
•	 PFI must be viewed as an opportunity to enter into a long term business
that can smooth the ups and downs of the cycles in the construction industry.
Likewise for the cycles in the government policy: if the government needs to
fuel the economy it awards more contracts mainly for infrastructure projects,
4
22 Banco Português de Investimento - Interview.
406
The adjustment of PFI projects to Small and Medium Enterprises
vice-versa if the government needs to cool down an overheated economy it
withdraws the contracts. If SMIEs are sub-contracted one potential benefit is
security (Blackman, 2001)23, e.g., to provide services such as cleaning and
catering the terms available to a PFI subcontractor are often more stable (five to
seven years) than those on offer when dealing directly with the client (one to
three years).
• PFI can increase efficiency. It is important to make clear that although
PFI started as a need to capture private funding to central government projects, it
soon overcame that status and became an innovative way to do business in the
construction sector. It was how the contract was formulated, shifting the
contract's objective from construction of a physical asset to the sole objective of
a service provision (usually preceded by the construction of the asset) and giving
to the private sector the initiative to manage the service (plus design and
construct the asset that physically supports the service) that constituted the key
factor for improvements in efficiency leading to better Value for Money -
another key driver for the launching of PFI. In the sense of providing good
quality services it is an opportunity for a company to improve its competitive
advantage by improving efficiency;
• PFI enables technical staff to focus on their core competences and relieves
them from the administrative and managerial jobs - The Victoria Dock School
Head Mistress seems very pleased to concentrate only on education activities.
Her role in the school management is now that of a performance monitor. The
same happened in The Manchester Fire Station, where a PFI scheme relieves the
firemen from the administrative and managerial jobs enabling them to
concentrate only in their area of expertise: fire fighting;
• The involvement in PFI projects changes the attitude towards business. A
good example is The Sewell Group that reckon that they are now more service
oriented not asset oriented and look very carefully to whole life cycle costing
since they are responsible for Operation and Maintenance of the Victoria Dock
Primary School.
23 Blackman D. 2001, A match made in heaven, Director AIagazine, v.54. n.9, pp 42-46.
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WHICH ARE THE MAIN CONSTRAINTS FOR A SME IN THE FF1 MARKET?
. Joint Ventures with Public sector are ofien needed to secure financing.
For example, in the Victoria Dock School PFI project, the City Council paid
£200,000 that was covered by Central Government. Otherwise it wouldn't be
possible to establish a favourable comparison with the PSC. The same happened
with Indáqua Feira where the Local Authority had to contribute to the project to
keep tariffs down to a socially acceptable level;
• Companies have to look carefully to their project teams. In a negotiation
the existing competences and even also the sheer nuniber of people is very
important. Why number? Twenty heads think better thai four (or less in some
cases). The overall capacity of the human resources has. to be evaluated,
because of the need to establish autonomous teams to manage the projects (or
other new projects). Large companies have their own in-house PFI project
teams, for example the technical and legal teams;
•	 A FF1 bid is always veiy costly. As bidding costs are very high small
companies have to be very attentive and evaluate if they can afford to lose
upfront costs (a bid typically costs at least £1 million). The costs of
unsuccessftil bids are passed on to subsequent projects otherwise companies
might face collapse. Companies must win at least 50% of the bids, otherwise
they should stay out of PFI market.
4
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5. CONCLUSION
The focus of the current study was on the construction sector, because it is a sector that
is deeply involved in PFI and where most experience has been gathered since all
projects must go through the construction stage first. Nevertheless the conclusions that
were reached are generic and can easily be applicable to SMEs of other sectors,
including the services sector so important in the Operation and Maintenance stage. The
analysis provided a valuable insight on the problems that SMIEs face in the PFI market,
and on the strategies that they can adopt.
Of special concern to S\[Es is the possibility to raise finance. Traditioial corporate
loans (or equity) are always viable options if included in the company's strategy, but the
access to other financing like capital markets is not adapted to SMEs. To tackle this
problem in 1999 Schroders and the Rotch Property Group 24 studied the launch of a
Eurobond issuance programme to help finance medium-sized PFI type projects worth
£1Om-5Om that have had problems financing. Small PFI around £5m get their loan
guaranteed by their assets on the balance sheet, and large projects are financed through
bank loans or by the issuance of bonds in the international financial markets; this had
left a gap in the market for medium-sized PFI projects.
If financing is solved a SME can be the concessionaire of a successful PFI, focusing in
specialisation and low risk sectors. Nevertheless it has to be very attentive because PFI
is very demanding on the provision of good quality services and SMEs face specific
constraints regarding the availability of technical and human resources.
SMEs can always be sub-contracted in a PFI, which might give them increased security
ensuring, over a longer period of time a steady stream of income. But even then SMIEs
must be aware that PFI is very demanding regarding efficiency and quality and that a
sub-contractor must also abide by this philosophy.
Lastly and of critical importance: If SNIEs are to be a player in the PFI market the
Government must provide appropriate guidance and include in its strategic objectives a
legislative and regulatory framework 25 adapted to SMEs.
24 Eurobond programme oilers hope to small PFI deals, Project Finance, August 1999.
25 An example is the UK' government concern regarding the sophisticated equity markets that enabled a wide range
of companies to raise capital efficiently. 'Institutional investors - pension funds and life assurance companies - are
key players in those markets, controlling around 45 per cent of quoted equit y investments. The government is
concerned that there ma y 4be factors encouraging institutional investors to follow industi y-standard investment
patterns which Jbcus overwhelmingly on quoted equities and guts and avoid investing in SAlEs and other smaller
companies', Budget 2000 Red Book: in search of a strategy to encourage enterprise, Financial Times, 22 March 2000.
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